America's nuclear forces. Five myths about American nuclear weapons. Nuclear Policy Fundamentals
Every year the systems installed here more and more resemble museum exhibits... Upstairs, more and more international treaties are being concluded, according to which these wells are closed one by one. But every day, the next US Air Force crews descend into concrete dungeons in anticipation of something that absolutely should not happen ...
Another Day of Service Another watch carries suitcases with classified documents, fastened to overalls with steel cables. People will descend into the bunker on a 24-hour watch, taking control of ballistic missiles hidden under the meadows of Montana. If the fateful order comes, these young Air Force officers will not hesitate to deploy their apocalyptic weapons.
An inconspicuous ranch fifteen meters off a bumpy two-lane road southeast of Great Falls, Montana. A primitive one-story building, a chain-link fence, an off-site garage, and a basketball backboard just above the driveway.
However, if you look more closely, you can notice some funny details - a red and white lattice tower of a microwave radio relay rises above the buildings, here is a helicopter landing pad on the lawn in front of the house, plus another UHF conical antenna sticking out on the lawn like a porcini mushroom. You might think that some kind of university agricultural laboratory or, say, a meteorological station has settled here - the only thing embarrassing is the red banner on the fence, notifying that anyone who tries to enter the territory without permission will be met with fire to kill.
Inside the building, the security service scrupulously examines everyone entering. The slightest suspicion - and guards with M4 carbines and handcuffs will immediately appear in the room. Massive entrance door moves vertically upwards - so even winter snow drifts will not block it.
After the checkpoint, the interior becomes the same as in a regular barracks. In the center, there is something like a wardroom - a TV, sofas with armchairs and several long tables for common meals. Further from the hall there are exits to the cabins with bunk beds. The walls are decorated with standard government posters about stupid talkers and ubiquitous spies.
Malmstrom Missile Base maintains control of 15 launchers and 150 silos. Her entire economy is spread over an area of \u200b\u200b35,000 km 2. The control bunkers were buried so deep and so far apart that they could survive a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union and preserve the possibility of a nuclear retaliation. To disable such a system, the warheads must hit each launch position without missing.
One of the armored doors in the living area leads to a small side room. Sitting here is the Flight Security Controller (FSC) - non-commissioned officer, the commander of the launcher security. The three-meter chest next to him is packed with M4 and M9 carbines. In this arsenal there is one more door, through which neither the dispatcher nor the guards should enter in any case, unless an emergency situation requires it. Behind this door is an elevator that goes without stopping six floors underground.
In a calm voice, FSC communicates the codes for calling the elevator by phone. The elevator will not rise until all passengers have left it and the front door to the security room is locked. The steel door of an elevator is opened by hand in much the same way as the blinds used to protect windows and doors at night in small shops. A small booth with metal walls is visible behind it.
In order to descend 22 m underground, we need less than a minute, but there, at the bottom of the hole, a completely different world will open before us. An elevator door is built into the smoothly curving black wall of the circular hall. Along the wall, breaking its monotony, thick columns of shock absorbers are installed, which should absorb the shock wave if a nuclear warhead explodes somewhere nearby.
Behind the walls of the hall, something rumbled and clanked exactly as the lifting gates of an ancient castle should clang, after which a massive hatch smoothly threw out, holding a 26-year-old Air Force captain Chad Dieterle by its metal handle. Stencil letters INDIA are applied along the perimeter of this shockproof plug, which is a good one and a half meters thick. The 24-hour watch, which Dieterle, the commander of the Launch Control Center (LCC) India, has now just come to the middle, and this launch position itself was organized here at Malmstrom Air Force Base, even when the parents of this gallant Air Force captain went to school.
The mines and the launch control panel, located at a depth of 22 m underground, are guarded around the clock. The "rocket monkeys," as they call themselves, are training in a training mine - the same as real rockets. They replace cables to gyroscopes and on-board computers. These computers are hidden in bulky boxes that protect the electronics from radiation.
LCC India is connected by cables with fifty other mines scattered in a 10 km radius. Each mine contains one 18-meter Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
The Air Force command refuses to report the number of warheads on each missile, but it is known that there are no more than three. Each of the heads can destroy all living things within a radius of ten kilometers.
Having received the appropriate order, Dieterle and his henchmen can send this weapon anywhere in the world in half an hour. Hidden in silence underground, he turns an inconspicuous ranch, lost in the vastness of Montana, into one of the most strategically important points on the planet.
Small but effective
The American nuclear arsenal is approximately 2,200 strategic warheads that can be delivered using 94 bombers, 14 submarines and 450 ballistic missiles- remains to this day the basis of the entire national security system. Barack Obama does not tire of declaring his desire for a world completely free of nuclear weapons, but this does not contradict the fact that his administration regarding nuclear policy unambiguously postulates: “As long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, the United States will maintain its nuclear forces in a state of full and effective combat readiness. "
Since the end of the Cold War, the total number of nuclear warheads in the world has dropped dramatically. True, now states such as China, Iran or North Koreadeploy their nuclear programs and are designing their own long-range ballistic missiles. Therefore, despite the bombastic rhetoric and even sincere good intentions, America should not yet part with its nuclear weapons, as well as with the planes, submarines and missiles that could deliver it to the target.
The missile component of the American nuclear triad has been around for 50 years, but year after year it has been the focus of intense discussions between Moscow and Washington. Last year, the Obama administration signed a new treaty with Russia on measures to further reduce and limit strategic offensive arms - START III. As a result, the nuclear arsenals of these two countries should be limited to less than 1,550 strategic warheads within a seven-year period. Of the 450 US missiles on alert, only 30 will remain. In order not to lose support from the "hawks" and simply skeptical senators, the White House proposed adding $ 85 billion to modernize the remaining nuclear forces over the next ten years (this amount must be approved for the next meeting of the Congress). "I will vote to ratify this treaty ... as our president clearly intends to ensure that the remaining weapons are truly effective," said Senator Lamar Alexander from Tennessee.
An intercontinental ballistic missile silo. These mines hide their terrible nature behind a completely inconspicuous appearance. Some trucker will drive by on the highway and won't even look back. He will never know that nuclear weapons are hiding in these 30-meter-deep mines, maintained in a state of continuous alert.
Nuclear missile umbrella
So why are strategic missile forces, a symbol of the end of the Cold War, remaining at the center of 21st century defensive strategy, politics, and diplomacy? If we take three types of delivery vehicles (airplanes, submarines, and ballistic missiles), then ICBMs remain the means of the most prompt reaction to aggression from the enemy, and in general the most operational weapon allowing for a preemptive strike. Submarines are good because they are practically invisible, nuclear bombers are capable of delivering precision pinpoint strikes, but only intercontinental missiles are always ready to deliver an irresistible nuclear strike anywhere in the world, and they can do this in a matter of minutes.
The American nuclear missile umbrella is now deployed over the entire world. “As representatives of the Air Force, we are convinced that America has a duty to keep in sight and under threat any enemy object, wherever it is, no matter how serious protection it may be covered, no matter how deeply it is hidden,” he said Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, who only in January left his post as head of the Strategic Strike Command (Global Strike Command), the structure that operates nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles.
The launching positions of strategic missiles represent a major engineering achievement. All of these mines were built in the early 1960s, and since then they have been on full alert 99% of the time. More interestingly, the Pentagon built these launch sites for just a few decades. When the MinutemanIII missiles are decommissioned, all silos and launchers at Malmstrom will be mothballed and buried for 70 years.
So, Air Force control the most powerful weapons in the world, and the equipment for controlling these weapons was created in the space age, and not at all in XXI century information technologies... And yet these old launching systems do their job much better than one might think. “Building a system that will stand the test of time and still perform brilliantly,” says Klotz, “is a true triumph for engineering genius. These guys in the 1960s thought through everything to the smallest detail, generously laying down several redundant levels of reliability. "
Thousands of dedicated officers at three Air Force bases - Malmstrom, F.E. Warren in Wyoming and Mino in North Dakota - they spare no effort to keep the silo launchers on constant alert.
The Minuteman III was mined in the 1970s and set to retire in 2020, but the Obama administration extended its lifespan by another decade last year. In response to this demand, the leadership of the Air Force drew up a timetable for reorganizing the existing missile bases. A notable fraction of the billions of dollars that the White House recently promised should go to this.
The norm is perfection
Back to the India Launch Control Center, hidden under an inconspicuous ranch. Since Kennedy's rule, little has changed inside. Of course, paper teletype printers have given way to digital screens, and upstairs servers provide the underground team with Internet access, and even live television when things are calm. However, the electronics here - huge blocks set in wide metal racks and studded with many glowing bulbs and illuminated buttons - resemble the sets from the first versions of the Star Trek television series. Something really literally asks for an antique shop. With an embarrassed smile, Dieterle pulls out a nine-inch floppy disk from the console, part of the ancient but still functioning Strategic Automatic Command and Control System.
Thousands of officers at US Air Force bases keep the silo launchers on alert. Since 2000, the Pentagon has spent more than $ 7 billion on modernizing this type of troops. All work was aimed at ensuring that the Minuteman III model safely served until the decommissioning date, which was scheduled for 2020, but last year the Obama administration extended the life of this series for another ten years.
The missiles themselves and the equipment installed at ground level can still be somehow modernized, but with underground mines and the launch centers themselves, everything is much more complicated. But time does not spare them. It is very difficult to fight corrosion. Any ground movement can break underground communication lines.
The India Launch Control Center is one of 15 centers where Malmstrom Air Force Base missile personnel are on duty. “Take an ordinary house that's already 40 years old,” says Colonel Jeff Frankhauser, the base's maintenance team leader, “and bury it underground. And then think about how you will repair everything there. This is the same situation with us ”.
This missile base includes 150 nuclear ballistic missiles spread across 35,000 km2 of launch sites in the mountains, hills and plains of Montana. Due to the large distance between the mines, the USSR could not disable all starting positions and command posts with one massive missile strike, which guaranteed America the possibility of a retaliatory strike.
This elegant doctrine of mutual containment required the existence of a well-developed infrastructure. In particular, all these mines and command posts are interconnected by hundreds of thousands of kilometers of underground cables. Fist-thick harnesses are woven from hundreds of insulated copper wires and encased in pressurized sheaths. If the air pressure in the pipe drops, the operating team concludes that a crack has formed somewhere in the containment.
The communications system that sprawls across the surrounding area is a constant concern for the Malmstrom base personnel. Every day hundreds of people - 30 commands at the control panels, 135 operating workers and 206 security guards - go to work, keeping the whole economy in order. Some command posts are three hours away from the base. They grieve for the heroes offended by fate, who at the base are called "Farsiders". Every day, jeeps, trucks and bulky self-propelled units to retrieve missiles from the ground dart along the surrounding roads, and the total length of roads at this base is 40,000 km, and 6,000 of them are primers refined with gravel.
The mines were built on small plots purchased from the previous owners. You can freely wander along the fence, but you just have to go behind it, and the security service can open fire to kill.
Here the slogan reigns: "Our norm is perfection" - and in order that no one ever forget about this rigid principle, a whole army of controllers looks after the personnel. Any error may result in suspension from duty until the offender re-passes the qualification examination. Such captious control applies to all services of the missile base.
The cook will receive a strict penalty from the officer for using expired sauce for the salad or not cleaning the hood over the stove in time. And this is correct - food poisoning can undermine the combat readiness of the launch platoon as well as a team of enemy special forces would do. Caution to paranoid limits is basic principle for everyone who serves on this base. “At first glance it may seem that we are reinsuring ourselves,” says Colonel Mohammed Khan (until the very end of 2010 he served as commander of the 341st missile division at Malmstrom base), “but look at this seriously, here we have real nuclear warheads ".
Bunker everyday life
One turn of the key is not enough to launch a nuclear ballistic missile. If the appropriate command arrives at the India launch center, Dieterle and his deputy, Captain Ted Givler, must verify the encryption sent from the White House with the code stored in the center's steel safes.
Then each of them will take up their triangular switch, fixing their gaze on the electronic clock ticking between the blocks of electronic equipment. At a given moment, they must turn the switches from the "ready" position to the "start" position. At the same moment, two missilemen on the other launcher will turn their switches - and only after that the ballistic missile will break free.
Each mine is only suitable for one launch. In the first seconds, electronic components, stairs, communication cables, safety sensors and sump pumps will burn out or melt in it. Over the hills of Montana, a smoke ring will rise, ridiculously accurate the shape of the mine vent. Leaning on a column of jet gases, the rocket will escape into outer space in a matter of minutes. Another half hour, and the warheads will begin to fall on their targets.
The striking power of the weapons entrusted to these missile men, and the entire measure of the responsibility assigned to them, are clearly emphasized by the harsh situation in the bunker. In the far corner is a simple mattress, fenced off with a black curtain to keep the light out of the eyes. “It’s not a great pleasure to wake up in this nook,” says Dieterle.
And it's time for us to return to the world that the rocket scientists call "real". Dieterle pulls on the handle of the black shock plug until it turns smoothly. He smiles discreetly goodbye, and the door slams shut behind us with a heavy bang. We go up, and down there, Dieterle remains and the same as he is - in tense eternal anticipation.
Every year the systems installed here more and more resemble museum exhibits. Upstairs, more and more international treaties are being concluded, according to which these wells are closed one by one. But every day, regular crews of the US Air Force descend into concrete dungeons in anticipation of something that absolutely should not happen ...
An inconspicuous ranch fifteen meters off a bumpy two-lane road southeast of Great Falls, Montana. A primitive one-story building, a chain-link fence, an off-site garage, and a basketball backboard just above the driveway.
However, if you take a closer look, you can notice some amusing details - a red and white lattice tower of a microwave radio relay rises above the buildings, here is a helipad on the lawn in front of the house, plus another UHF conical antenna sticking out on the lawn like a porcini mushroom. You might think that some kind of university agricultural laboratory or, say, a meteorological station has settled here - the only thing embarrassing is the red banner on the fence, notifying that anyone who tries to enter the territory without permission will be met with fire to kill.
Another day of service
The next watch carries suitcases with classified documents, fastened with steel cables to the overalls. People will go down to the bunker on a 24-hour watch, taking control of ballistic missiles hidden under the meadows of Montana. If the fateful order comes, these young Air Force officers will not hesitate to set in motion their apocalyptic.
Inside the building, the security service scrupulously examines everyone entering. The slightest suspicion - and guards with M4 carbines and handcuffs will immediately appear in the room. The massive front door slides vertically upwards - even winter snow drifts won't block it.
After the checkpoint, the interior becomes the same as in a regular barracks. In the center, there is something like a wardroom - a TV, sofas with armchairs and several long tables for common meals. Further from the hall there are exits to the cabins with bunk beds. The walls are decorated with standard government posters about stupid talkers and ubiquitous spies.
One of the armored doors in the living area leads to a small side room. Sitting here is the Flight Security Controller (FSC) - non-commissioned officer, the commander of the launcher security. The three-meter chest next to him is packed with M4 and M9 carbines. In this arsenal there is one more door, through which neither the dispatcher nor the guards should enter in any case, unless an emergency situation requires it. Behind this door is an elevator that goes without stopping six floors underground.
In a calm voice, FSC communicates the codes for calling the elevator by phone. The elevator will not rise until all passengers have left it and the front door in the security room is locked. The steel door of an elevator is opened by hand in much the same way as the blinds are twisted, which in small shops are used to protect windows and doors at night. A small booth with metal walls is visible behind it.
In order to descend 22 m underground, we need less than a minute, but there, at the bottom of the hole, a completely different world will open before us. An elevator door is built into the smoothly curving black wall of the circular hall. Along the wall, breaking its monotony, thick columns of shock absorbers are installed, which should absorb the shock wave if a nuclear warhead explodes somewhere nearby.
Behind the walls of the hall, something rumbled and clanked exactly as the lifting gates of an ancient castle should clang, after which a massive hatch smoothly threw out, holding a 26-year-old Air Force captain Chad Dieterle by its metal handle. Stencil letters INDIA are applied along the perimeter of this shockproof plug, which is a good one and a half meters thick. The 24-hour watch, which Dieterle, the commander of the Launch Control Center (LCC) India, has now just come to the middle, and this launch position itself was organized here at Malmstrom Air Force Base, even when the parents of this gallant Air Force captain went to school.
LCC India is connected by cables with fifty other mines scattered in a 10 km radius. Each silo contains one 18-meter Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
The Air Force command refuses to report the number of warheads on each missile, but it is known that there are no more than three. Each of the heads can destroy all living things within a radius of ten kilometers.
Having received the appropriate order, Dieterle and his henchmen can send this weapon anywhere in the world in half an hour. Hidden in silence underground, he turns an inconspicuous ranch, lost in the vastness of Montana, into one of the most strategically important points on the planet.
Malmstrom US Air Force Base controls 15 launchers and 150 silos. Her entire household is spread over an area of \u200b\u200b35,000 sq km. The control bunkers were buried so deep and so far apart that they would survive a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union and preserve the possibility of a nuclear retaliation. To disable such a system, the warheads must hit each launch position without missing.
Small but effective
The American nuclear arsenal - about 2,200 strategic warheads that can be delivered using 94 bombers, 14 submarines and 450 ballistic missiles - remains the basis of the entire national security system. Barack Obama does not tire of declaring his desire for a world completely free of nuclear weapons, but this does not contradict the fact that his administration regarding nuclear policy unambiguously postulates: “As long as the world has nuclear weapons, the United States will maintain its nuclear forces in a state of full and effective combat readiness. "
Since the end of the Cold War, the total number of nuclear warheads in the world has dropped dramatically. True, now states such as China, Iran or North Korea are deploying their nuclear programs and constructing their own long-range ballistic missiles. Therefore, despite the bombastic rhetoric and even sincere good intentions, America should not yet part with its nuclear weapons, as well as with the planes, submarines and missiles that could deliver it to the target.
The missile component of the US nuclear triad has been around for 50 years, but year after year it has been the focus of intense discussions between Moscow and Washington. Last year, the Obama administration signed a new treaty with Russia on measures to further reduce and limit strategic offensive arms - START III. As a result, the nuclear arsenals of these two countries should be limited to less than 1,550 strategic warheads within a seven-year period. Of the 450 US missiles on alert, only 30 will remain. In order not to lose support from the "hawks" and simply skeptical senators, the White House proposed adding $ 85 billion to modernize the remaining nuclear forces over the next ten years (this amount must be approved for the next meeting of the Congress). "I will vote to ratify this treaty ... as our president clearly intends to ensure that the remaining weapons are truly effective," says Senator Lamar Alexander from Tennessee.
Thousands of officers at US Air Force bases keep silo launchers on alert. Since 2000, the Pentagon has spent over $ 7 billion to modernize this type of troops. All work was aimed at ensuring that the Minuteman III model safely served until the decommissioning date, which was scheduled for 2020, but last year the Obama administration extended the life of this series for another ten years.
Nuclear missile umbrella
So why are strategic missile forces, a symbol of the end of the Cold War, remaining at the center of 21st century defensive strategy, politics and diplomacy? If we take three types of delivery vehicles (airplanes, submarines, and ballistic missiles), then ICBMs remain the means of the most prompt reaction to aggression from the enemy, and in general the most operational weapon allowing for a preemptive strike. Submarines are good because they are practically invisible, nuclear bombers are capable of delivering precision precision strikes, but only intercontinental missiles are always ready to deliver an irresistible nuclear strike anywhere in the world, and they can do this in a matter of minutes.
The American nuclear missile umbrella is now deployed over the entire world. “As representatives of the Air Force, we are convinced that America has a duty to keep in sight and under threat any enemy object, wherever it is, no matter how serious protection it may be covered, no matter how deeply it is hidden,” he said Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, who only in January left his post as head of the Strategic Strike Command (Global Strike Command), the structure that operates nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles.
The launching positions of strategic missiles represent a major engineering achievement. All of these mines were built in the early 1960s, and since then they have been on full combat readiness 99% of the time. More interestingly, the Pentagon built these launch sites for just a few decades. When the MinutemanIII missiles are removed from service, all the silos and launchers at the Malmstrom base will be mothballed and buried for 70 years.
So, the Air Force has the most powerful weapons in the world, and the equipment for controlling these weapons was created in the space age, and not at all in the 21st century of information technology. And yet, these old launching systems do their job much better than one might think. “Building a system that will stand the test of time and still perform brilliantly,” says Klotz, “is a true triumph for engineering genius. These guys in the 1960s thought through everything to the smallest detail, generously laying in several redundant levels of reliability. "
Thousands of dedicated officers at three Air Force bases - Malmstrom, F.E. Warren in Wyoming and Mino in North Dakota - they spare no effort to keep silo launchers on constant alert.
The Minuteman III was mined in the 1970s and set to retire in 2020, but the Obama administration extended its lifespan by another decade last year. In response to this demand, the leadership of the Air Force drew up a timetable for reorganizing the existing missile bases. A notable fraction of the billions of dollars that the White House recently promised should go to this.
The norm is perfection
Back to the India Launch Control Center, hidden under an inconspicuous ranch. Since Kennedy's rule, little has changed inside. Of course, paper teletype printers have given way to digital screens, and upstairs servers provide the underground team with Internet access and even live television when things are calm. However, the electronics here - huge blocks set in wide metal racks and studded with many glowing bulbs and illuminated buttons - resemble the sets from the first versions of the Star Trek television series. Something really literally asks for an antique shop. With an embarrassed smile, Dieterle pulls out a nine-inch floppy disk from the console, part of the ancient but still functioning Strategic Automatic Command and Control System.
The mines were built on small plots purchased from the previous owners. You can freely wander along the fence, but you just have to go behind it, and the security service can open fire to kill.
The missiles themselves and the equipment installed at ground level can still be somehow modernized, but with underground mines and the launch centers themselves, everything is much more complicated. But time does not spare them. It is very difficult to fight corrosion. Any ground movement can break underground communication lines.
The India Launch Control Center is one of 15 centers where Malmstrom Air Force Base missile personnel are on duty. “Take an ordinary house that's already 40 years old,” says Colonel Jeff Frankhauser, the base's maintenance team leader, “and bury it underground. And then think about how you will repair everything there. This is the same situation with us ”.
This missile base includes 150 nuclear ballistic missiles spread across 35,000 km2 of launch sites in the mountains, hills and plains of Montana. Due to the large distance between the mines, the USSR could not disable all starting positions and command posts with one massive missile strike, which guaranteed America the possibility of a retaliatory strike.
This elegant doctrine of mutual containment required the existence of a well-developed infrastructure. In particular, all these mines and command posts are interconnected by hundreds of thousands of kilometers of underground cables. Fist-thick harnesses are woven from hundreds of insulated copper wires and encased in pressurized sheaths. If the air pressure in the pipe drops, the operating team concludes that a crack has formed somewhere in the containment.
The communications system that sprawls across the surrounding area is a constant concern for the Malmstrom base personnel. Every day, hundreds of people - 30 teams at the control panels, 135 operating workers and 206 security guards - come to the service, keeping the whole economy in order. Some command posts are three hours away from the base. They grieve for the heroes offended by fate, who are called "rangers" (Farsiders) at the base. Every day, jeeps, trucks and bulky self-propelled units to retrieve missiles from the ground dart along the surrounding roads, and the total length of roads at this base is 40,000 km, and 6,000 of them are primers refined with gravel.
Here the slogan reigns: "Our norm is perfection" - and in order that no one ever forget about this rigid principle, a whole army of controllers looks after the personnel. Any error may result in suspension from duty until the offender re-passes the qualification examination. Such captious control applies to all services of the missile base.
The cook will receive a strict penalty from the officer for using expired sauce for the salad or not cleaning the hood over the stove in time. And rightly so - food poisoning can undermine the combat readiness of the launch platoon with the same success as a team of enemy special forces would do. Caution to the point of paranoid limits is a basic principle for all who serve on this base. “At first glance it may seem that we are reinsuring ourselves,” says Colonel Mohammed Khan (until the very end of 2010 he served as commander of the 341st missile division at Malmstrom base), “but look at this seriously, here we have real nuclear warheads ".
Bunker everyday life
One turn of the key is not enough to launch a nuclear ballistic missile. If the appropriate command arrives at the India launch center, Dieterle and his deputy, Captain Ted Givler, must verify the encryption sent from the White House with the code stored in the center's steel safes.
Then each of them will take up their triangular switch, fixing their gaze on the electronic clock ticking between the blocks of electronic equipment. At a given moment, they must turn the switches from the "ready" position to the "start" position. At the same moment, two missilemen on the other launcher will turn their switches - and only after that the ballistic missile will break free.
Each mine is only suitable for one launch. In the first seconds, electronic components, stairs, communication cables, safety sensors and sump pumps will burn out or melt in it. Over the hills of Montana, a smoke ring will rise, ridiculously accurate the shape of the mine vent. Leaning on a column of jet gases, the rocket will escape into outer space in a matter of minutes. Another half hour, and the warheads will begin to fall on their targets.
The striking power of the weapons entrusted to these missilemen and the entire measure of the responsibility assigned to them are clearly emphasized by the harsh situation in the bunker. In the far corner is a simple mattress, fenced off with a black curtain to keep the light out of the eyes. “It’s not a great pleasure to wake up in this nook,” says Dieterle.
And it's time for us to return to the world that the rocket scientists call "real". Dieterle pulls on the handle of the black shockproof plug until it starts to turn smoothly. He smiles discreetly goodbye, and the door slams shut behind us with a heavy bang. We go up, and down there, Dieterle remains and the same as he is - in tense eternal anticipation.
| US nuclear weapons | ||||||||||||||||||||
| History | ||||||||||||||||||||
|
US nuclear arsenal is a collection of nuclear warheads in the US military. Submarine ballistic missiles (SLBMs) \u200b\u200bform the core of the US strategic nuclear potential.
Since 1945, the United States has produced 66,500 atomic bombs and nuclear warheads. This assessment was made by the director of the nuclear information program at the Federation of American Scientists, Hans Christensen, and his colleague from the Defense Council. natural resources Robert Norris, for the 2009 Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists.
In two government laboratories, Los Alamos and Livermore. Lawrence - since 1945, a total of about 100 different types of nuclear charges and their modifications have been created.
History [ | ]
The very first atomic bombs, which entered service at the end of the 40s of the last century, weighed about 9 tons and only heavy bombers could deliver them to potential targets.
By the early 1950s, more compact bombs with a lower weight and diameter were developed in the United States, which made it possible to equip US front-line aircraft with them. A little later they entered service. Ground forces nuclear charges for ballistic missiles, artillery shells and mines. The Air Force has received warheads for surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles. A number of warheads have been created for the Navy and the Marine Corps. Naval sabotage units - SEAL received light nuclear mines for special missions.
Carriers [ | ]
The composition of the US nuclear weapons carriers and their jurisdiction have changed since the first atomic bombs appeared in service with the US Army Aviation. IN different time, the Army (medium-range ballistic missiles, nuclear artillery and nuclear infantry ammunition), the Naval Forces (missile carriers and nuclear submarines carrying cruise and ballistic missiles), the Air Force (intercontinental ground, silo and bunker-based ballistic missiles, military railway missile systems, air-launched cruise missiles, guided and unguided aircraft missiles, strategic bombers and missile-carrying aircraft). As of the beginning of 1983, offensive weapons in the US nuclear arsenal were represented by 54 Titan-2 ICBMs, 450 Minuteman-2 ICBMs, 550 Minuteman-3 ICBMs, 100 Piskiper ICBMs, about 350 Stratofortress strategic bombers "And 40 APRKs with various types of SLBMs on board.
Megatonnage [ | ]
Since 1945, the total yield of nuclear warheads has increased manifold and reached its peak by 1960 - it amounted to over 20 thousand megatons, which is approximately equivalent to the yield of 1.36 million bombs dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945.
The largest number of warheads was in 1967 - about 32 thousand. Subsequently, the Pentagon's arsenal was reduced by almost 30% over the next 20 years.
At the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the United States had 22,217 warheads.
Production [ | ]
Production of new warheads ceased in 1991, although now [ when?] [ ] its renewal is planned. The military continues to modify the existing types of charges [ when?] [ ] .
The US Department of Energy is responsible for the entire production cycle - from the development of fissile weapons materials to the development and release of ammunition and their disposal.
The businesses are run by private companies contracted by the Department of Energy. The main contractors - the operating companies of the largest manufacturing enterprises atomic weapons and its components for a long time have been and continue to be: "", "Westinghouse", "Dow Chemical", "Dupont", "General Electric", "Goodyear", "", "", "Monsanto", "Rockwell International", "".
US nuclear doctrine[ | ]
The latest version of US nuclear doctrine was published in 2018 [ ] .
Current reserves [ | ]
Under the START III treaty, each deployed strategic bomber is counted as one nuclear warhead. The number of nuclear bombs and cruise missiles with nuclear warheads that can be carried by deployed strategic bombers is not counted.
On March 27, 2017, negotiations within the UN framework on the complete renunciation of nuclear weapons started in New York. 110 countries should come to a common agreement. Among the 40 countries that refused to negotiate are the United States and Russia. Official Washington maintains that a complete ban on nuclear weapons will undermine the principle of nuclear deterrence, on which the security of the United States and its allies is based.
In a recent televised debate, Republican candidate and businessman Donald Trump stated that Russia is "expanding its nuclear forces, adding that" they have much newer capabilities than we do. "
Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, founder of Arms Control Wonk, denies this claim - "Although Russia has been updating its missiles and warheads recently, this statement about Russia's capabilities is not true."
On paper, newer, more complex and terrifying weapons include Russia's nuclear arsenal. The Russian intercontinental ballistic missile RS-24 Yars, developed in the mid-2000s, can hit anything in the United States, some reports suggest that there are ten autonomously guided nuclear warheads.
Ten of these launched warheads return to the earth's atmosphere at supersonic speeds, about 5 miles per second. China has developed similar platforms and the United States simply does not have the ability to defend against such destructive nuclear charges.
By comparison, the American Minuteman III ICBM enters the atmosphere at supersonic speeds but carries only one warhead and was produced back in the 1970s. The question of who is better is more philosophical than a direct comparison of possibilities.
Professor Lewis says that the US strategic commanders who operate the US nuclear arsenal have responded for decades to a survey that if they had a choice between US and Russian weapons, they would choose their own missiles and nuclear weapons every time.
In an interview with Business Insider, Lewis says the US arsenal, while lacking the potential to devastate an entire continent, is much better suited to the strategic needs of the US.
Russian and American arsenals
"The Russians applied a different design solution in the design of ICBMs than we did." asserts the professor - "Russia has built nuclear weapons with an increasing dynamics of modernization", or, in other words, these weapons will need to be updated every ten years.
On the other hand - “US nuclear weapons are beautiful, sophisticated, and designed for high performance. Experts say the plutonium core will last for 100 years. Moreover, the US Minuteman III ICBM stocks, despite their age, are perfect systems.
“Russia's nuclear weapons are new, but they reflect their design philosophy, which says 'there is no reason to build perfect, because we will just be upgrading in 10 years.'
“The Russians like to mount missiles on trucks,” Lewis said, while the US prefers ground-based silos, which provide accurate targeting and lack of mobility. In the midst of Cold warThe United States at some point tried to adapt ICBMs to trucks, but the safety and durability requirements of the US weapons far exceed Russian requirements.
The US cannot make systems like the Russians because we are not going to install missiles on a cheap truck, 'says Professor Lewis. Russian philosophy relies on trickery to eliminate the threat, trying to invest less money.
“The US is investing and developing reliable systems that will actually provide protection,” Lewis explained. This is the main difference between American and Russian designs.
“Sergeants are the core of the American army, compared to Russia, where the main forces are still conscripts. The US prefers precision over destructive potential. ”
“We love precision,” says Lewis. For the United States, ideally a nuclear weapon is a tiny nuclear weapon that will fly right through a window and blow up a building. “And the Russians prefer to launch 10 warheads not only at the building, but at the entire city.
A good example of this is the air campaign in Syria, as a result of which the Russians were accused of using cluster bombs, incendiary ammunition and bombing hospitals and refugee camps. This careless and brutal attitude is a defining feature of the Russian military.
One more example - russian torpedo Status 6, which can fly with 100 nodes at a distance of 6,200 miles and could not only cause a nuclear explosion, but also leave behind a radioactive field for years to come. The US does not welcome this kind of destruction.
How the US plans to hold on to Russia's nuclear power.
Professor Lewis explained that the US really cannot defend itself against Russia and the most advanced nuclear weapons. Russian nuclear ICBMs will take off into orbit, turn around, split into warheads and detonate individual targets at Mach 23. The US simply cannot develop a system that would destroy ten of these nuclear warheads, speeding towards the US at incredible speeds.
One possible solution would be to destroy the missiles before they leave the atmosphere, which means shooting them down over Russia, which could also lead to other problems. Another option would be to destroy missiles from satellites in space, but according to Lewis, the US would then have to increase satellite launches 12 times before they have enough space assets to defend the United States.
Rather than wasting time, trillions of dollars and fueling an arms race, the US hopes for a doctrine of mutually assured destruction. Lewis also explained that during the days of John F. Kennedy's presidency, the United States was puzzled about how to raise its nuclear arsenal. The Kennedy administration decided to build enough nuclear weapons to destroy the Soviet Union if necessary. The administration called the doctrine "assured destruction", but critics noted that the nuclear deal would work in both directions, so a better name would be "mutually assured destruction," which was contrary to Kennedy's policies.
Russian President Vladimir Putin once said that Russia could destroy the United States in “half an hour or less,” using its nuclear weapons. But the fact is, the Minutemen III rockets will blow up the Kremlin seconds later.
The US believes that it is more reliable to have a nuclear triad available at any time. Submarines, ground silos and bombers all have nuclear missiles. No attacks from Russia will be able to neutralize all three weapons at the same time.
Precise, professionally guided nuclear weapons are a reliable deterrent for the United States without endangering billions of lives.
The development of American nuclear forces is determined by the US military policy, which is based on the concept of "opportunity of opportunity." This concept is based on the fact that in the 21st century there will be many different threats and conflicts in relation to the United States, indefinite in time, intensity and direction. Therefore, the United States will focus its military attention on how to fight, and not on who will be the enemy and when. Accordingly, the task of the US armed forces is to have a power that can not only withstand a wide range of military threats and military means that any potential adversary can possess, but also guarantee victory in any military conflicts. Based on this goal, the United States is taking measures to maintain and improve its nuclear forces for the long term. The United States is the only nuclear power with nuclear weapons on foreign soil.
Currently, nuclear weapons are available in two branches of the US armed forces - the Air Force (Air Force) and the Navy (Navy).
The Air Force is armed with Minuteman-3 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with MIRVs (MIRVs), heavy bombers (TB) B-52N and B-2A with cruise missiles long-range airborne (ALCM) and nuclear bombs free fall, as well as tactical aircraft F-15E and F-16C, -D with nuclear bombs.
The Navy is armed with Trident-2 submarines with Trident-2 D5 ballistic missiles (SLBMs) \u200b\u200bequipped with MIRVs and long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).
To equip these carriers in the US nuclear arsenal, there are nuclear munitions (NWM) produced in the 1970-1980s of the last century and updated (renewed) during the bulkhead process in the late 1990s - early 2000s:
- four types of warheads of multiple warheads: for ICBMs - Mk-12A (with a nuclear charge W78) and Mk-21 (with a nuclear charge W87), for SLBMs - Mk-4 (with a nuclear charge W76) and its modernized version Mk-4A (with a nuclear charge W76-1) and Mk-5 (with a nuclear charge W88);
- two types of warheads of strategic air-launched cruise missiles - AGM-86B and AGM-129 with a nuclear charge W80-1 and one type of sea-based non-strategic cruise missiles "Tomahok" with YaZ W80-0 (ground-based CD BGM-109G were eliminated under the Treaty RIAC, their YAZ W84 are under conservation);
- two types of strategic aviation bombs - B61 (modifications -7, -11) and B83 (modifications -1, -0) and one type of tactical bombs - B61 (modifications -3, -4, -10).
The Mk-12 warheads with the W62 YaZ that were in the active arsenal in mid-August 2010 were completely disposed of.
All these nuclear warheads belong to the first and second generation, with the exception of the B61-11 aerial bomb, which some experts consider as a third generation nuclear warhead due to its increased penetration ability.
The modern US nuclear arsenal, according to the state of readiness for the use of its nuclear warheads, is divided into categories:
The first category is nuclear warheads installed on operationally deployed carriers (ballistic missiles and bombers, or located at weapons storage facilities of airbases where bombers are based). Such nuclear warheads are called "operatively deployed".
The second category is nuclear warheads in the "online storage" mode. They are kept ready for installation on carriers and, if necessary, can be installed (returned) to missiles and aircraft. In American terminology, these nuclear warheads are referred to the "operational reserve" and are intended for "operational additional deployment". In essence, they can be viewed as “return potential”.
The fourth category - standby nuclear power plants put into the "long-term storage" mode. They are stored (mainly in military warehouses) assembled, but do not contain components with limited service lives - they have removed tritium-containing assemblies and neutron generators. Therefore, the transfer of these nuclear warheads to the "active arsenal" is possible, but requires a significant investment of time. They are intended to replace nuclear weapons of the active arsenal (of similar, similar types) in the event that massive failures (defects) are suddenly discovered in them, this is a kind of "safety stock".
The US nuclear arsenal does not include decommissioned, but not yet dismantled nuclear warheads (their storage and disposal is carried out at the Panteks plant), as well as components of dismantled nuclear warheads (primary nuclear initiators, elements of the second cascade of thermonuclear charges, etc.).
Analysis of publicly published data on the types of nuclear warheads that are part of the modern US nuclear arsenal shows that YaZ B61, B83, W80, W87 are classified by US specialists as binary thermonuclear charges (TN), YaZ W76 - as binary charges with gas (thermonuclear ) amplification (BF), and W88 - as a binary standard thermonuclear charge (TS). In this case, the nuclear warheads of aviation bombs and cruise missiles are classified as variable power charges (V), and the nuclear warheads of ballistic missile warheads can be classified as a set of similar nuclear warheads having different power (DV).
In American scientific and technical sources, the following possible ways of changing the power are given:
- dosage of deuterium-tritium mixture when feeding it to the primary unit;
- change in the delivery time (with respect to the time process of compression of fissile material) and the duration of the neutron pulse from an external source (neutron generator);
- mechanical overlapping of X-ray radiation from the primary unit to the compartment of the secondary unit (in fact, excluding the secondary unit from the nuclear explosion process).
In charges of all types of aviation bombs (B61, B83), cruise missiles (W80, W84) and some warheads (with charges W87, W76-1), explosives are used, which have low sensitivity and resistance to high temperatures. In other types of nuclear fuel (W76, W78 and W88), due to the need to ensure a low mass and dimensions of their nuclear fuel while maintaining a sufficiently high power, explosives with a higher detonation velocity and explosion energy continue to be used.
Currently, the US nuclear warhead uses a fairly large number of systems, instruments and devices of various types that ensure their safety and exclude unauthorized use during autonomous operation and as part of a carrier (complex) in the event of various kinds of emergencies that can occur with aircraft, underwater boats, ballistic and cruise missiles, aerial bombs equipped with nuclear warheads, as well as with autonomous nuclear warheads in the process of their storage, maintenance and transportation.
These include mechanical safety devices and cocking (MSAD), code locking devices (PAL).
Since the early 1960s, several modifications of the PAL system have been developed and widely used in the United States, with the letter designations A, B, C, D, F, which have different functionalities and designs.
To enter codes in PAL installed inside the nuclear power plant, special electronic consoles are used. PAL enclosures have increased protection against mechanical stress and are located in the nuclear power plant in such a way as to impede access to them.
In some nuclear warheads, for example, with W80 nuclear charges, in addition to the KBU, a code switching system is installed, which allows cocking and (or) switching the nuclear power supply on command from the aircraft in flight.
In nuclear aerial bombs, aircraft monitoring and control systems (AMAC) are used, which include equipment installed in an aircraft (except for the B-1 bomber) capable of monitoring and controlling systems and assemblies that ensure the safety, protection and detonation of nuclear warheads. With the help of AMAC systems, the command to activate the PAL (PAL), starting with the PAL B modification, can be given from the aircraft immediately before the bomb is dropped.
The US nuclear warheads, which are part of the modern nuclear arsenal, use systems that ensure their disabling (SHS) in the event of a threat of capture. The first variants of the SAF were devices that were able to disable individual internal nuclear warheads on command from the outside or as a result of direct actions of personnel from the personnel serving nuclear warheads with appropriate authority and located near the nuclear warhead at the moment when it becomes clear that attackers (terrorists) can gain unauthorized access to it or take over it.
Subsequently, SHS were developed, which are automatically triggered when an attempt is made to unauthorized actions with a nuclear warhead, first of all, upon penetration into it or penetration into a special "sensitive" container, in which the nuclear warhead is equipped with an SHS.
Known specific implementations of SHS, allowing to provide partial decommissioning of nuclear warheads on command from the outside, partial decommissioning by means of explosive destruction, and a number of others.
To ensure the safety and security against unauthorized actions of the existing US nuclear arsenal, a number of measures are used to ensure detonation safety (Detonator Safing - DS), the use of heat-resistant pit casings (Fire Resistant Pit - FRP), low-sensitivity high-energy explosives (Insensitive High Explosive - IHE), which provide increased nuclear explosion safety (Enhanced Nuclear Detonator Safety - ENDS), the use of command disabling systems (Command Disable System - CDS), devices for protection against unauthorized use (Permissive Action Link - PAL). Nonetheless, general level the safety and security of the nuclear arsenal from such actions, as some American experts believe, is not yet fully consistent with modern technical capabilities. Seven of the eight types of nuclear charges in the existing US arsenal are not fully provided with the above set of security and protection measures.
In the absence nuclear tests The most important task is considered to ensure control and development of measures to ensure the reliability and safety of nuclear warheads in operation for a long time, which exceeds the originally defined warranty periods. In the United States, this task is being addressed by the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), which has been in effect since 1994. An integral part of this program is the Life Extension Program (LEP), within which nuclear components of nuclear warheads requiring replacement are reproduced in such a way as to match the original technical characteristics and specifications as closely as possible, and non-nuclear components are upgraded and replace those components of the nuclear power plant that have expired their warranty periods.
The screening of nuclear warheads for signs of actual or suspected aging is performed through the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign (ESC), which is one of five companies in the Engineering Campaign. Within the framework of this company, the nuclear warheads of the arsenal are regularly monitored through a thorough annual survey of 11 nuclear warheads of each type in search of corrosion and other signs of aging. Of the eleven nuclear warheads of the same type selected from the arsenal to study their aging, one is completely disassembled for destructive testing, and the remaining 10 are subjected to non-destructive testing and returned to the arsenal. Using data obtained as a result of regular monitoring with the SSP program, problems with UAD are identified, which are eliminated by the LEP programs. In this case, the main task is - "to increase the lifetime in the arsenal of nuclear warheads or components of nuclear warheads by at least 20 years with the ultimate goal of 30 years" in addition to the initial expected service life. These terms are determined based on the analysis of the results of theoretical and experimental studies on the reliability of complex technical systems and aging processes of materials and various types of assemblies and devices, as well as generalization of the data obtained in the process of implementing the SSP program for the main nodes of nuclear warheads by determining the so-called failure function, characterizing the entire set of defects that may arise during the operation of nuclear warheads.
The possible service life of nuclear charges is determined primarily by the service life of plutonium initiators (pits). In the United States, to resolve the issue of the possible lifespan of previously produced pits that are stored or operated as part of nuclear warheads included in the modern arsenal, a research methodology has been developed and used to assess the change in the properties of Pu-239 over time that characterize the aging process. The methodology is based on a comprehensive analysis of the data obtained in the course of field tests and the study of the properties of Pu-239, which is part of the pits tested in the SSP program, as well as data obtained as a result of accelerated aging experiments, and computer simulation of the processes. occurring during its aging.
Based on the results of the studies carried out, models of the plutonium aging process were developed, which make it possible to assume that nuclear reactors retain their operability for 45-60 years from the date of production of the plutonium used in them.
The work carried out within the framework of the SSP allows the United States to retain in its nuclear arsenal the types of nuclear warheads considered above, developed more than 20 years ago, most of which have subsequently undergone modernization, and provide a sufficiently high level of their reliability and safety without conducting nuclear tests. ...