Russia in global affairs. Systemic history of international relations Systemic history of international relations of the bogaturs volume 1
Document No. 4
From the proposals of the USSR on the creation of a collective security system in Europe, approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)
1) The USSR agrees to join the League of Nations on certain conditions.
2) The USSR does not object to the conclusion of a regional agreement on mutual protection against aggression from Germany within the framework of the League of Nations.
3) The USSR agrees to the participation of Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland or some of these countries in this agreement, but with the obligatory participation of France and Poland ...
5) Regardless of the obligations under the agreement on mutual protection, the parties to the agreement must undertake to provide each other with diplomatic, moral and, if possible, material assistance also in the event of a military attack, not provided for by the agreement itself, and also to influence their press accordingly.
6) The USSR will join the League of Nations only if the following conditions are met: a) the USSR has serious objections to Articles 12 and 13
League statutes providing for compulsory arbitration. Going towards the proposal of France, the USSR agrees, however, to remove these objections if it is allowed, upon joining the League, to make a reservation that arbitration for it will be obligatory only for disputes that arise from conflicts, events and actions that will take place after the Union entered the League. b) Exclude the second part of the 1st paragraph of Art. 12 authorizing war to resolve international disputes ... c) Delete Art. 22, which gives the right to mandate management of foreign territories, without insisting on the opposite effect of excluding this paragraph, i.e. on the abolition of existing mandates. d) Include in Art. Clause 23 of the obligation for all members of the League of Racial and National Equality. e) The USSR will insist on the restoration of normal relations with it by all other members of the League, or, in extreme cases, on the inclusion in the charter of the League or on the holding by a meeting of the League of a resolution that all members of the League are considered to have restored normal diplomatic relations among themselves and mutually recognized each other. friend.
System history international relations in four volumes. Events and documents. 1918-2003 / Ed. HELL. Bogaturov. Volume two. Documents. 1918-1945. M., 2004.S. 118-119.
Document No. 5
Convention on the definition of aggression
Article 1. Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to recognize in their relations with each of the others, starting from the date of entry into force of this Convention, the definition of the attacking party, explained in the report of the Security Committee of May 24, 1933 (Politis report) at the Conference on disarmament, made on the basis of the proposal of the Soviet delegation.
Article 2. Accordingly, the state that first committed one of the following actions will be recognized as an attacker in an international conflict, taking into account the agreements in force between the parties involved in the conflict:
1) declaring war on another state;
2) the invasion of the armed forces, even without declaring war, into the territory of another state;
3) an attack by land, sea or air armed forces, even without declaring war, on territory, sea or air force another state;
4) naval blockade of coasts or ports of another state;
5) assistance to armed gangs formed on their own
territory and invading the territory of another state,
or a refusal, despite the demands of the attacked state, to take all possible measures on its own territory to deprive the named gangs of all assistance or protection.
Article 3 No considerations of a political, military, economic or other nature can serve as an excuse or justification for an attack provided for in article two ...
Peace between wars. Selected documents on the history of international relations 1910-1940 / Ed. HELL. Bogaturov. M., 1997.S. 151-152.
Document number 6
Resolution on Germany's violation of the war terms of the Treaty of Versailles, adopted by the Council of the League of Nations
Advice, considering
1. That strict respect for all treaty obligations is a fundamental rule of international life and
the primary condition for maintaining peace;
2. That an essential principle of international law is that each power can release itself from treaty obligations or change their terms only by agreement with other contracting parties;
3. That the promulgation by the German government of the military law on March 16, 1935, is contrary to these principles;
4. That this unilateral action could not create any rights;
5. That this is a unilateral action, contributing to the international
situation a new element of concern, could not help but present
threats to European security;
Considering, on the other hand,
6. That the British government and the French government
in agreement with the Italian government as early as February 3, 1935.
presented to the German Government a program of general disarmament through free negotiations with a view to organizing without
the danger in Europe and the implementation of a general limitation of arms under a regime of equality, while ensuring active cooperation of Germany in the League of Nations;
7. That the aforementioned unilateral action by Germany was not only incompatible with this plan, but was carried out at the time of the negotiations;
I. Declares that Germany has failed to comply with the obligation on all members of the international community to respect the
commitments, and condemns any unilateral rejection of international obligations;
II. Invites governments that initiated or joined the February 3, 1935 program,
continue the negotiations they have begun and, in particular, seek
concluding agreements within the League of Nations which, taking into account
the obligations of the Covenant would appear to be necessary to achieve the goal specified in this program in terms of ensuring the maintenance of the League;
III. Considering that the unilateral rejection of international obligations could endanger the very existence of the League of Nations as an institution entrusted with ensuring the maintenance of peace and organizing security,
That, without prejudice to the application of the provisions already provided for in international agreements, such a deviation should, when it comes to obligations of interest to the security of peoples and the maintenance of peace in Europe, entail all necessary measures from the League and within the framework of the Pact;
Instructs the Committee, composed of ..., to propose, for this purpose, provisions that would make the League of Nations Pact more effective in organizing collective security and, in particular, to clarify the economic and financial measures that could be applied in the event that further, any state, member or not a member of the League of Nations, would endanger the world by unilaterally rejecting international obligations.
M .: 2010 .-- 520 p.
This tutorial is a development of the second volume of the two-volume "Systemic history of international relations" edited by A.D. Bogaturov. The corrected and supplemented, restructured presentation of the material is given in accordance with the needs of the teacher and student on the experience of the educational process at MGIMO (U) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov. The book is reinforced with methodological appendices (chronology, index), the text gives definitions to key concepts.
The textbook retains a systematic approach to the study of the history of international relations, emphasizes the development and gradual degradation of the Yalta-Potsdam order, the consequences of the collapse of the USSR and the formation of a new world order. The development of the situation in regional subsystems - in Europe, East Asia, Near and Middle East, in Latin America. In the period after 1991, priority attention is paid to Russia's foreign policy.
The publication is addressed to a wide range of readers, primarily students, undergraduates and graduate students who are preparing for the exam in the history of international relations, as well as everyone who is interested in history. foreign policy Russia.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword 7
Introduction 12
Section I FORMATION OF THE BIPOLAR SYSTEM (1945-1953)
Chapter 1. Main features of the Yalta-Potsdam order (Yalta-Potsdam system) 15
Chapter 2. Formation of the foundations of world economic and political regulation after the Second World War 19
Chapter 3. Decisions of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition on the German question in 1945 24
Chapter 4. Foreign policy strategy of the USSR after the war. Ideology and Reality 28
Chapter 5. The first crises of the Cold War (Greece, Turkey, Iran) 30
Chapter 6. The origin of the concept of "containment of the USSR" and its formalization in the "Truman Doctrine" 35
Chapter 7. The situation in Central and Eastern Europe after World War II 38
Chapter 8. The fall of the colonial system in Southeast Asia 47
Chapter 9. The German question in 1946-1947. and peace treaties with Germany's former allies in Europe 50
Chapter 10. The emergence of India and Pakistan. First Indo-Pakistani War 53
Chapter 11. The Palestinian problem after World War II and the formation of the State of Israel 57
Chapter 12. The Marshall Plan and Its International Political Significance 61
Chapter 13. Communization of Central and Eastern Europe by the end of the 1940s 66
Chapter 14. The emergence of security structures in the West (1947-1949) (Western European Union, NATO) 74
Chapter 15. “The First Berlin Crisis” and Its International Significance 78
Chapter 16: The Education of the PRC and the Split in China: 82
Chapter 17. Consolidation of the split in Germany: the formation of the FRG and the German Democratic Republic 87
Chapter 18. The beginning of European integration: the ECSC and the Pleven plan. The problem of Germany's inclusion in Western security structures 88
Chapter 19. Prospects for the national-communist revolution in Asia. The Korean War and Its International Consequences 93
Chapter 20. Preparation of the San Francisco Conference and its results 100
Section II CONTRADICTIONS OF THE BIPOLAR SYSTEM: OFFENSIVE STRATEGIES AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE (1953-1962)
Chapter 21. Development of new approaches of the USSR in foreign policy after the change of power. Anti-communist demonstrations in the GDR 107
Chapter 22. The concept of "discarding communism." Its political and military components 112
Chapter 23. Creation of the ATS and Germany's entry into NATO (1955) 116
Chapter 24. Bandung and Belgrade conferences. Asian-African Solidarity Movement and Non-Aligned Movement 120
Chapter 25. The concept of "peaceful coexistence" and the crisis in the socialist community 123
Chapter 26 The Suez Crisis and Its International Consequences 132
Chapter 27. Treaty of Rome and the creation of the EEC. Integration processes in Western Europe 135
Chapter 28 Second Berlin Crisis. Soviet-American Relations ... 138
Chapter 29. The Responsiveness Concept 145
Chapter 30. The Cuban Missile Crisis and Its International Consequences 149
Section III THE FIRST STAGE OF CONFRONTATION STABILITY: DISCHARGE AND STABILIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1962-1975)
Chapter 31. Formation of confrontational stability in the 1960s. Arms Control Negotiations 1963-1968 155
Chapter 32. The turn of France and Germany to the East. France's withdrawal from the NATO military organization and the "new eastern policy" of Germany .... 162
Chapter 33. Contradictions of Western European integration and the first expansion of the EEC 170
Chapter 34. Middle East conflict in 1967-1973. and the first "oil shock" 174
Chapter 35. The situation within the socialist community in the 1960s. Events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the "doctrine of socialist internationalism" 185
Chapter 36: Soviet-American Agreements 1969-1974 191
Chapter 37. The Soviet-Chinese conflict in the 1960s. China's place in the world in the 1960s - early 1970s 197
Chapter 38. Normalization of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan and the position of the USSR on the issue of the 1956 Joint Declaration .. 204
Chapter 39. Pan-European process and main provisions of the Helsinki Act 208
Chapter 40. The US Vietnam War and Its International Consequences (1965-1973) 216
Section IV SECOND STAGE OF CONFRONTATION STABILITY: DISCHARGE CRISIS AND RESTORATION OF BIPOLAR CONFRONTATION (1975-1985)
Chapter 41. Formation of mechanisms of world political regulation in the conditions of the "energy crisis" (1973-1974). World petrodollar cycle 225
Chapter 42. Creation of a network of partnership relations between the USSR and African countries. Expansion of the military-political presence of the USSR in the world 230
Chapter 43. Human rights issues and their impact on Soviet-American relations and the general European process ... 236
Chapter 44. The role of Vietnam in Indochina. Conflicts between China and Vietnam, Cambodia conflict 243
Chapter 45. Formation of "triangular" relations between the USSR-USA-China and the situation in East Asia at the end of the 1970s 247
Chapter 46. Formation of a special foreign policy line of the countries of Southeast Asia: neutralism and economic regionalism 250
Chapter 47. Conflicts over Palestine and Lebanon 256
Chapter 48. Escalation of conflicts in the Middle East: Iran and Afghanistan in 1977-1980. Foreign interference problem 263
Chapter 49. The collapse of detente and NATO's “double solution” 271
Chapter 50. Conflicts within the zones of influence of the superpowers: the Polish crisis and the Central American conflict 275
Chapter 51. US foreign policy approaches in the first half of the 1980s. Foreign policy strategy of the USSR 280
Chapter 52. A new round of the arms race and the economic and ideological depletion of the USSR 287
Section V DECAY OF THE BIPOLAR SYSTEM (1985-1996)
Chapter 53. New political thinking and international relations of the Soviet Union 294
Chapter 54. The pan-European process and the change in the attitude of the USSR to human rights issues 298
Chapter 55: The Roll Back of Soviet Foreign Policy Activity: Settling the Central American, Afghan, and African Conflicts 302
Chapter 56. The new policy of the USSR in East Asia 308
Chapter 57. Mikhail Gorbachev's “Doctrine of Non-intervention” and Anti-Communist Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe 313
Chapter 58. The complex of international agreements on disarmament (RIAC, CFE, START-1) 321
Chapter 59. International consequences of the self-destruction of the USSR and the emergence of the CIS 325
Chapter 60. Middle East peace settlement in the late 1980s - first half of the 1990s 335
Chapter 61: Accelerating European Integration: The Maastricht Treaty 341
Chapter 62. Conflicts in the post-socialist space: the collapse of Yugoslavia and civil War in Afghanistan 344
Chapter 63. Formation of the CIS. The problem of the nuclear legacy of the USSR 352
Chapter 64. Conflicts in Tajikistan, Transcaucasia and Moldova 357
Chapter 65. The concept of "expanding democracy". The UN crisis and mechanisms of informal regulation of international relations 371
Chapter 66. Russian-American relations in the 1990s. Conflict in Bosnia and the first NATO intervention in the Balkans 375
Section VI FORMATION OF A UNIPOLAR WORLD (1996-2008)
Chapter 67. Globalization and Humanitarian Intervention 385
Chapter 68. Changes in Russia's international positions in connection with the first NATO enlargement 392
Chapter 69. Freezing conflicts on the territory of the CIS 396
Chapter 70. Conflict in the Serbian province of Kosovo and the second NATO intervention in the Balkans, inter-ethnic conflict in Macedonia 404
Chapter 71. Problems around the CFE Treaty, Russia-NATO relations and the growing disagreements on the problem of creating a missile defense system in Europe 410
Chapter 72. Caucasian knot of conflict: Chechnya, Russian-Georgian relations and the "five-day war" of August 2008 419
Chapter 73. Deepening Russian-Chinese cooperation and the development of the SCO 427
Chapter 74. Development of conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia 430
Chapter 75. Religious extremism and transnational terrorism. September 2001 events in the USA 440
Chapter 76. Integration trends in the Northern and South America 445
Chapter 77. The third and fourth enlargement of the EU and the development of European integration in the 2000s 457
Chapter 78: The Situation on the Korean Peninsula 464
Chapter 79. The American strategy of "regime change" and the change in the situation in the Persian Gulf as a result of the destruction of Saddam Hussein's regime 470
Application. Timeline 478
Author Index 510
Recommended Sites 519
The purpose of the publication is to provide systematic coverage of the development of international relations. Our approach is called systemic because it is based not just on a chronologically verified and reliable presentation of the facts of diplomatic history, but on showing the logic and driving forces of the most important events in world politics in their not always obvious and often not direct interconnection. In other words, international relations for us are not just a sum, a combination of some individual components (world political processes, foreign policy of individual states, etc.), but a complex, but unified organism, the properties of which, in general, are not limited to the sum of properties , inherent in each of its components separately. Bearing in mind just such an understanding to designate the whole variety of processes of interaction and mutual influence of the foreign policy of individual states among themselves and with the most important global processes, we use in this book the concept of the system of international relations. This is the key concept of our presentation.
Section I. FORMATION OF THE MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR.
Chapter 1. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE FINAL STAGE OF COMBAT ACTIONS (1917 - 1918).
The final stage of the world war was characterized by three fundamental features.
First, there were clear signs of economic exhaustion on both sides of the front line. The material, technical, financial and human resources of the belligerents were at their limit. This primarily concerned Russia and Germany as the countries that most intensively spent their vital resources in the course of hostilities.
Secondly, both in the Entente and in the Austro-German bloc there were quite serious sentiments in favor of ending the war. This created a real possibility of attempts to conclude a separate peace in one configuration or another. The problem of the destruction of the united allied front was so acute that on August 23 (September 5) 1914 France, Great Britain and Russia signed in London a special Agreement on the non-conclusion of a separate peace, which was supplemented there on November 17 (30), 1915 with a separate Declaration of the allied powers, including Italy and Japan, not to conclude a separate peace. But even after that, keeping the Romanov empire in the war remained the most important international political task of the bloc of Germany's opponents, since - this was obvious - without the support of Russia, only the West European members of the anti-German alliance were unable to provide themselves with the necessary military and power advantage over the Quadruple Alliance.
Thirdly, in Russia, and partly in Germany and Austria-Hungary, during the world war there was a sharp exacerbation of the socio-political situation. Under the influence of military difficulties, the working classes, national minorities, as well as a significant part of the elite strata, opposed both the war in general and their own governments, which showed inconsistency in achieving military victory. The growth of anti-government sentiments in these countries significantly influenced their foreign policy and the general international situation. The war turned out to be an unbearable pregnancy for the economies and socio-political systems of the belligerents. Their ruling circles clearly underestimated the danger of social explosions.
Foreword
Introduction. SYSTEM BEGINNING AND POLARITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE XX CENTURY
Section I. FORMATION OF THE MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR
Chapter 1. International relations at the final stage of hostilities (1917 - 1918)
Chapter 2. The main components of the Versailles order and their formation
Chapter 3. The emergence of a global political and ideological split in the international system (1918 - 1922)
Chapter 4. International relations in the zone of the near perimeter of the Russian borders (1918 - 1922)
Chapter 5. Post-war settlement in East Asia and the formation of the foundations of the Washington order
Section II. PERIOD OF STABILIZATION OF THE MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD (1921 - 1932)
Chapter 6. Struggle to strengthen the Versailles order and restore European equilibrium (1921 - 1926)
Chapter 7. "Small detente" in Europe and its extinction (1926 - 1932)
Chapter 8. Peripheral subsystems of international relations in the 20s
Section III. DESTROYING THE POST-WORLD REGULATION SYSTEM
Chapter 9. "Great Depression" of 1929-1933 and the collapse of the international order in Pacific Asia
Chapter 10. Crisis of the Versailles order (1933 - 1937)
Chapter 11. The elimination of the Versailles order and the establishment of German hegemony in Europe (1938 - 1939)
Chapter 12. Aggravation of the situation in East Asia. Dependent Countries and the Threat of World Conflict (1937 - 1939)
Chapter 13. Peripheral subsystems of international relations in the 30s and during the Second World War
Section IV. SECOND WORLD WAR (1939 - 1945)
Chapter 14. The beginning of World War II (September 1939 - June 1941)
Chapter 15. Entry into the Second World War of the USSR and the USA and the initial stage of anti-fascist cooperation (June 1941 - 1942)
Chapter 16. Questions of coordinated regulation of international relations in the anti-fascist coalition (1943 - 1945)
Chapter 17. International relations in the Pacific zone and the end of World War II
Conclusion. COMPLETION OF THE FORMATION OF THE GLOBAL SYSTEM OF WORLD POLITICAL RELATIONS
Chronology
Name index
About the authors
1-2. Bretton Woods Accords.
[The agreements were negotiated at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference. They were two major documents - the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature on July 22, 1944. Entered into force on December 27, 1945.
On October 30, 1947, these two agreements were supplemented by the multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which actually formed a single whole with them. In 1995, the GATT agreement was replaced by the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The Soviet Union participated in the development of the Bretton Woods agreements, but then refused to ratify them.
Russia joined the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund on June 1, 1992]
1. Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Bretton Woods (USA). July 22, 1944
(In extract)
Article I. Objectives
Objectives of the International Monetary Fund:
I) promote development international cooperation in the monetary and financial sector within a permanent institution providing a mechanism for consultation and collaboration on international monetary and financial issues:
Ii) promote the process of expansion and balanced growth of international trade and thereby achieve and maintain high levels of employment and real incomes, as well as the development of productive resources of all member states, considering these actions as priorities of economic policy.
Iii) promote the stability of currencies, maintain an orderly exchange rate regime among member states and leverage the use of devaluation rolls in order to gain a competitive edge;
Iv) to assist in the creation of a multilateral system of settlements for current transactions between member states, as well as in the removal of currency restrictions that impede the growth of world trade:
(V) by temporarily providing the general resources of the Fund to member states, subject to adequate safeguards, to give confidence to their actions, thereby ensuring that imbalances in their balance of payments can be corrected without the use of measures that could harm national or international welfare;
VI) in accordance with the above - to reduce the duration of imbalances in the external balance of payments of member states, as well as to reduce the scale of these violations.
SECTION I. FORMATION OF POLITICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD SYSTEM REGULATION
SECTION II. FORMATION OF THE BIPOLAR STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1945 - 1955)
A. PRIMARY POST-WARRANTY SETTLEMENT
IN EUROPE AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS
B. "THE SPLIT OF EUROPE" AND THE FORMATION OF TWO EUROPEAN SUBSYSTEMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
B. PROCESSES OF NATIONAL-STATE CONSOLIDATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE PERIPHERAL ZONES OF THE WORLD
D. FORMATION OF SAN FRANCIS ORDER IN PACIFIC ASIA
Section III. CRISES AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE MILITARY-POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD (1955 - 1962)
A. RELEASING INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF INTEGRATION PROCESSES IN EUROPE
B. THE STRIP OF CRISES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Section IV. THE INITIAL STAGE OF FORMATION OF CONFRONTATIONAL STABILITY (1963 - 1974)
A. RELEASING INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND ESTABLISHING A SYSTEM OF GLOBAL TALKS ON POLITICAL MILITARY PROBLEMS
B. THE BIRTH OF THE EUROPEAN DISCHARGE
B. GLOBAL ASPECT OF DISCHARGE AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS
D. REPLACEMENT OF INSTABILITY TO THE PERIPHERALS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Politicization of the PROBLEMS of the "North and South"
Situation in the APR
Conflict in the Middle East
Section V. CULTURE AND GLOBAL DISCHARGE CRISIS (1974 - 1979)
A. CONTRADICTIONS ON EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
B. EXPERIENCE OF CONFLICT IN THE INTERNATIONAL PERIPHERAL
Section VI. THE DECAY OF THE BIPOLAR WORLD (1980 - 1991)
A. THE MILITARY-ECONOMIC CONFRONTATION OF THE USSR AND THE USA AND ITS RESULTS
B. NEW POLITICAL THINKING AND ATTEMPT TO CREATE A COOPERATIVE BIPOLARITY MODEL
B. OVERCOMING THE DIFFERENCE IN EUROPE
D. EXPANDING THE NEW THINKING POLICY TO THE WORLD PERIPHERALS
D. USSR DECAY
Section VII. THE CRISIS OF WORLD SYSTEM REGULATION AND THE FORMATION OF "PLURALISTIC UNIPOLARITY" (1992 - 2003)
A. STRATEGY “EXPANDING DEMOCRACY,
B. GLOBAL INTEGRATION TRENDS
B. POLITICAL-MILITARY ASPECTS OF WORLD SYSTEM REGULATION
D. "SOFT" SAFETY AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Section VIII. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Main publications used
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Center for Convertible Education of the Moscow Public Science Foundation Institute of the USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences, Faculty of World Politics, State University for the Humanities. SYSTEM HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN FOUR VOLUMES. 1918-1991 Volume one. Events 1918-1945 Edited by Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor A. Bogaturov "Moscow Worker" Moscow 2000 Editorial Board Academician G. A. Arbatov, D. Sc. Z.S. Belousova, D.Sc. A.D. Bogaturov, D.Sc. A.D. Voskresensky, Ph.D. A.V. Kortunov, Doctor of History V. A. Kremenyuk, Doctor of History S.M. Rogov, Doctor of Historical Sciences Ar.A. Ulunyan, Ph.D. MA Khrustalev The team of authors ZS Belousov (chap. 6, 7), A.D.Bogaturov (introduction, chap. 9, 10, 14, 17, conclusion), A.D. Voskresensky (chap. 5 ), Ph.D. E. G. Kapustyan (chap. 8, 13), Ph.D. V.G. Korgun (chap. 8, 13), Doctor of History D.G. Najafov (chap. 6, 7), Ph.D. A.I. Ostapenko (chap. 1, 4), Doctor of Science K.V. Pleshakov (chap. 11, 15, 16), Ph.D. V.P. Safronov (chap. 9, 12), Ph.D. E.Yu.Sergeev (chap. 1, 9), Ar.A. Ulunyan (chap. 3), D.Sc. A.S.Khodnev (chap. 2), M.A.Khrustalev (chap. 2, 8, 13) Chronology compiled by Yu.V. Borovsky and A.V. Shchipin The four-volume edition presents the first attempt after the collapse of the USSR to comprehensively study the history of international relations the last eight decades of the twentieth century. The odd volumes of the publication are devoted to the analysis of the events of world political history, and the even ones contain the basic documents and materials necessary in order to get a more complete picture of the events and facts described. The first volume examines the period from the end of the First World War to the end of the Second. Particular attention is paid to the subjects of the Versailles settlement, international relations in the near perimeter zone Soviet Russia , the eve and the first stage of World War II before the entry of the USSR and the USA into it, as well as the development of the situation in East Asia and the situation in the peripheral zones of the international system. The publication is addressed to researchers and teachers, students, graduate students of humanitarian universities and everyone who is interested in the history of international relations, diplomacy and externally; th policy of Russia. Published with the support of the MacArthur Foundation ISBN 5-89554-138-0 © AD Bogaturov, 2000 © SI Dudin, emblem, 1997 CONTENTS Preface Introduction. THE SYSTEM BEGINNING AND POLARITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE XX CENTURY Section I. THE FORMATION OF A MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR Chapter 1. International relations at the final stage of hostilities (1917 - 1918) Chapter 2. The main components of the Versailles order and their global formation Chapter 3. The emergence political and ideological split in the international system (1918 - 1922) Chapter 4. International relations in the zone of the near perimeter of Russian borders (1918 - 1922) Chapter 5. Post-war settlement in East Asia and the formation of the foundations of the Washington order Section II. PERIOD OF STABILIZATION OF THE MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD (1921 1932) Chapter 6. Struggle to strengthen the Versailles order and restore European equilibrium (1921 - 1926) Chapter 7. "Small detente" in Europe and its extinction (1926 - 1932) Chapter 8. Peripheral subsystems of international relations in the 1920s Section III. DESTROYING THE POSTWARE SYSTEM OF WORLD REGULATION Chapter 9. The Great Depression of 1929-1933 and the Collapse of the International Order in Pacific Asia Chapter 10. The Crisis of the Versailles Order (1933-1937) Chapter 11. The Elimination of the Versailles Order and the Establishment of German Hegemony in Europe (1938-1939 ) Chapter 12. Aggravation of the situation in East Asia. Dependent countries and the threat of world conflict (1937 - 1939) Chapter 13. Peripheral subsystems of international relations in the 30s and during the Second World War Section IV. SECOND WORLD WAR (1939 - 1945) Chapter 14. Beginning of World War II (September 1939 - June 1941) Chapter 15. Entry into World War II of the USSR and the USA and the initial stage of anti-fascist cooperation (June 1941 - 1942) Chapter 16. Questions coordinated regulation of international relations in the anti-fascist coalition (1943 - 1945) Chapter 17. International relations in the Pacific zone and the end of World War II Conclusion. THE COMPLETION OF THE FORMATION OF THE GLOBAL SYSTEM OF WORLD POLITICAL RELATIONS Chronology Name Index About the authors Anatoly Andreevich Zlobin, teacher, pioneer researcher and enthusiast of the MGIMO systemic school To colleagues, friends, like-minded people who started the first teaching of the system of international relations in other cities PRESIDENTED FOR RUSSIA IN OTHER Cities over fifteen years in Russian historiography, an attempt to build an integral picture of the entire period of world political history from the end of the First World War to the destruction of the Soviet Union and the collapse of bipolarity. From the main works of predecessors - the fundamental three-volume History of International Relations and Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, published in 1967 under the editorship of Academician V.G. Trukhanovsky and in 1987 under the editorship of Professor G.V. Fokeev1, the proposed work differs at least three lines. First, it was written in conditions of relative ideological looseness and pluralism of opinions. It takes into account many of the major substantive and conceptual innovations of recent years in the development of domestic and world historical and political science. Second, the analysis of the foreign policy of the USSR was not the most important thing for the authors. In principle, the work is based on the rejection of a view of international relations primarily through the prism of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and / or the Comintern. It was not at all about writing another version of a critical analysis of Soviet foreign policy, especially since this problem is already being successfully developed by several scientific teams2. The four-volume edition is primarily a history of international relations, and only then an analysis of the foreign policy of individual countries, including the Soviet Union. The authors did not try to deduce all the significant events of world history either from the victory of the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd in November 1917 and the policy of Soviet Russia, or from the world-revolutionary experiments of the Comintern. The focus is on the problems of international stability, war and peace, and the creation of a world order. This does not mean that little attention has been paid to the "Soviet" subjects. On the contrary, the influence of Soviet Russia and the USSR on international affairs is being monitored extremely closely. But showing it does not become an end in itself. For the presentation, it is important mainly because it helps to understand in more detail the reasons for the growth of some and the fading of other tendencies that were objectively developing in the international system. In other words, the task consisted not so much in showing the significance and insignificance of the foreign policy of the Bolsheviks, but in identifying how much it corresponded or, on the contrary, was knocked out of the logic of the objective processes of the development of the international system. Third, the four-volume edition, while not being a textbook itself or a typical monograph, is nevertheless oriented towards teaching goals. This is related to its dual event-documentary nature. An account of the events of each of the two main periods in the history of international relations 1918-1945 and 1945-1991. accompanied by detailed illustrations in the form of separate volumes of documents and materials so that the reader can independently clarify his own understanding of historical events. The first volume of the publication was completed in 1999, in the year of the 85th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War (1914-1918) - an event in world history, unique in the tragedy of its consequences. It's not about the number of victims and the brutality of the fight - the Second World War (1939-1945) far surpassed the First in both respects. The tragic uniqueness of the mutual destruction of 1914-1918 was that the depletion of the resources of the warring parties, which it generated unprecedented by the standards of previous eras, dealt such a blow to the foundations of society in Russia that it lost its ability to contain internal indignation. This indignation resulted in a chain of revolutionary cataclysms that put Russia into the hands of the Bolsheviks and doomed the world to decades of ideological split. The book begins with questions related to the preparation of the Versailles peace settlement, with the necessary excursions into the events of the last 12 months of the First World War. Further, the issues of the political and diplomatic struggle around the creation of a new international order and the results of this struggle, which resulted in a slide towards World War II, at the final stages of which, in turn, began to ripen again the prerequisites for global regulation and renewed attempts to ensure world stability on the basis of collective effort. Since the mid-1980s, teaching the history of international relations in our country has faced difficulties. In part, they were caused by the lack of a systematic course in the history of international relations, adequate to the current state of historical and political knowledge. The problem of creating such a course was all the more acute because the capital's monopoly on teaching international relations, security and diplomacy was eliminated. In the 90s, in addition to the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, these subjects began to be taught in at least three dozen universities both in Moscow and in St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Tomsk, Vladivostok, Kazan, Volgograd, Tver, Irkutsk. Novosibirsk, Kemerovo, Krasnodar, Barnaul. In 1999, a second educational institution for the training of specialists in international affairs was opened in Moscow, where a new faculty of world politics was created at the State University of the Humanities (on the basis of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences). New teaching centers were provided with less teaching materials. Attempts to overcome the difficulties were undertaken primarily by the efforts of the Institute of General History and the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Moscow Public Science Foundation and the MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Of the regional centers, the University of Nizhniy Novgorod was the most active, publishing a whole series of interesting documentary publications on the history of international relations and a number of textbooks. In this work, the authors tried to use the developments of their predecessors3. To the older generation of specialists, much in the four-volume edition may seem unusual - the concept, interpretations, structure, assessments, and finally, the approach itself - an attempt to give the reader a vision of the development of international relations through the prism of consistency. Like every pioneering work, this one is also not free from omissions. Realizing this, the authors regard their work as a version of the interpretation of events - not the only option, but stimulating scientific research and encouraging the reader to think independently about the logic and laws of international relations. The publication became possible thanks to the cooperation of the Research Forum on International Relations with the Moscow Public Science Foundation, the Institute of the USA and Canada, the Institute of General History, the Institute of Oriental Studies, the Institute of Latin America of the Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as teachers of the Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow state university them. MV Lomonosov and Yaroslavl State Pedagogical University named after K.D. Ushinsky. The team of authors was formed in the course of scientific and educational events of the Methodological University of Convertible Education of the Moscow Public Science Foundation in 1996-1999. and the project "New Agenda for International Security", which was implemented in 1998-1999. with the support of the MacArthur Foundation. Neither the team of authors, nor the project, nor the publication would have been possible without the benevolent understanding of TD Zhdanova, the director of the Moscow office of this fund. A. Bogaturov October 10, 1999 INTRODUCTION. SYSTEM BEGINNING AND POLARITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE XX CENTURY The purpose of the publication is to provide a systematic coverage of the development of international relations. Our approach is called systemic because it is based not just on a chronologically verified and reliable presentation of the facts of diplomatic history, but on showing the logic and driving forces of the most important events in world politics in their not always obvious and often not direct interconnection. In other words, international relations for us are not just a sum, a combination of some individual components (world political processes, foreign policy of individual states, etc.), but a complex, but unified organism, the properties of which, as a whole, are not limited to the sum of properties , inherent in each of its components separately. Bearing in mind just such an understanding to designate the whole variety of processes of interaction and mutual influence of the foreign policy of individual states among themselves and with the most important global processes, we use in this book the concept of the system of international relations. This is the key concept of our presentation. Understanding the irreducibility of the properties of the whole only to the sum of the properties of the parts is the most important feature of the systemic worldview. This logic explains why, say, taken separately, the steps taken by the diplomacy of the USSR, the two Atlantic powers (France and Britain) and Germany during the preparatory period and during the Genoa Conference of 1922, seemingly aimed at restoring Europe as a whole, led to the consolidation of its split, which sharply reduced the chances of pan-European cooperation in the interests of maintaining stability. Another is the emphasis on connections and relationships between the individual components of the international system. In other words, we will be interested not only in how in the late 1930s Nazi Germany moved along the path of aggression, but also in how Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia and the United States influenced the formation of the driving forces of its foreign policy in the previous decade. which themselves were the object of active German politics. Similarly, Second world War will be considered by us not just as a milestone event in world history, but primarily as an extreme result of the inevitable breakdown of that particular model of international relations that took shape after the end of the First World War (1914-1918). In principle, interstate relations acquired a complexly interconnected, mutually conditioning nature rather early, but not immediately. In order to acquire the traits of consistency, systemic interconnection, certain relations and groups of relations had to mature - that is, acquire stability (1) and achieve a sufficiently high level of development (2). For example, we can talk about the formation of a global, global system of international economic relations not immediately after the discovery of America, but only after a regular and more or less reliable connection between the Old and New Worlds was established, and the economic life of Eurasia turned out to be firmly linked with American sources of raw materials and markets. The global world political system, the system of international political relations developed much more slowly. Until the final stage of the First World War, when, for the first time in history, American soldiers took part in hostilities in Europe, the New World remained politically, if not isolated, then clearly isolated. There was no understanding of world-political unity yet, although it was undoubtedly already in the stage of formation, a process that began in the last quarter of the 19th century, when there were no "no-man's" territories left in the world and the political aspirations of individual powers were no longer only in the center, but also in the geographical periphery of the world turned out to be closely "ground in" to each other. The Spanish-American, Anglo-Boer, Japanese-Chinese, Russian-Japanese and, finally, the First World War became bloody milestones along the path of the formation of a global world political system. However, the process of its folding by the beginning of the period described below did not end. A single global, worldwide system of political relations between states was only just taking shape. The world basically continued to consist of several subsystems. These subsystems were the earliest to develop in Europe, where relations between states, due to natural, geographic and economic factors (relatively compact territory, a fairly large population, an extensive network of relatively safe roads), turned out to be the most developed. Since the beginning of the 19th century, the most important subsystem of international relations has been the European, Vienna. Along with it, a special subsystem in North America ... In the east of the Eurasian continent around China, one of the most archaic subsystems, the East Asian, existed in a chronically stagnant state. About other subsystems, say, in Africa, at that time it is possible to speak only with a very large degree of convention. Later, however, they began to gradually develop and evolve. By the time the First World War ended, the first signs of a tendency towards the development of the North American subsystem into the Euro-Atlantic subsystem, on the one hand, and the Asian-Pacific, on the other, were outlined. The outlines of the Middle East and Latin American subsystems began to be guessed. All these subsystems developed in a trend as future parts of the whole - the global system, although this whole itself, as already noted above, in the political and diplomatic sense was just beginning to take shape; only economically, its contours were already more or less clearly visible. There was a gradation between the subsystems - a hierarchy. One of the subsystems was central, the rest were peripheral. Historically, up to the end of World War II, the central place was invariably occupied by the European subsystem of international relations. It remained central both in the importance of the states that formed it and in its geographical position in the intertwining of the main axes of economic, political and military-conflict tensions in the world. In addition, the European subsystem was far ahead of others in terms of the level of organization, that is, the degree of maturity, complexity, development of the links embodied in it, so to speak, in terms of their inherent specific weight of consistency. Compared to the central level, the level of organization of peripheral subsystems was much lower. Although the peripheral subsystems on this basis could be very different from each other. So, for example, after the First World War, the central position of the European subsystem (the Versailles order) remained indisputable. Compared to it, the Asia-Pacific (Washington) was peripheral. However, it was incomparably more organized and mature than, for example, Hispanic or Middle Eastern. Occupying a dominant position among the peripheral, the Asia-Pacific subsystem was, as it were, "the most central among the peripheral" and second in world political importance after the European one. The European subsystem at different periods in historical literature, and partly in diplomatic use, was called differently - as a rule, depending on the name of international treaties, which, due to certain circumstances, were recognized by most European countries as fundamental for interstate relations in Europe. So, for example, it is customary to call the European subsystem from 1815 to the middle of the 19th century - Vienna (according to the Vienna Congress of 1814-1815); then Paris (Congress of Paris 1856), etc. It should be borne in mind that the names "Vienna system", "Paris system", etc. are traditionally widespread in the literature. The word "system" in all such cases is used to emphasize the interconnected, intricately intertwined nature of obligations and the resulting relations between states. In addition, this use reflects the opinion that has been rooted in the minds of scientists, diplomats and politicians for centuries: "Europe is the world." Whereas from the standpoint of the modern worldview and the current stage of development of the science of international relations, strictly speaking, it would be more accurate to say "Vienna subsystem", "Parisian subsystem", etc. In order to avoid terminological overlaps and based on the need to accentuate the vision of specific events in international life against the background of the evolution of the global structure of the world and its individual parts, in this edition the terms "subsystem" and "system" will, as a rule, be used when necessary to highlight the relationship of events in individual countries and regions with the state of global political processes and relations. In other cases, when we are talking about sets of specific agreements and the relations arising on their basis, we will strive to use the word "order" - the Versailles order, the Washington order, etc. At the same time, in a number of cases, taking into account the tradition of use, expressions such as "Versailles (Washington) subsystem" are preserved in the text. To understand the logic of the international political process in 1918-1945. the key is the concept of multipolarity. Strictly speaking, the entire history of international relations proceeded under the sign of the struggle for hegemony, that is, the undoubtedly prevailing positions in the world, more precisely, in that part of it, which at a particular moment in historical time was considered the world-universe or ecumene, as the ancient Greeks called it. For example, from the standpoint of Herodotus, the historian of the time of Alexander the Great, the Macedonian state after the conquest of the Persian kingdom was undoubtedly a world state, an empire-hegemon, so to speak, the only pole of the world. However, only the world that was known to Herodotus and was limited, in fact, to the Mediterranean, the Near and Middle East and Central Asia. Already the image of India seemed so vague to the Hellenistic consciousness that this land was not perceived in the plane of its possible interference in the affairs of the Hellenistic world, which for the latter was only a world. In this sense, there is no need to talk about China at all. In the same way, Rome was perceived as a state-world, the only world pole-source of power and influence; his monopoly position in international relations was such only to the extent that the ancient Roman consciousness sought to identify the really existing universe with its ideas about it. From the standpoint of the Hellenistic and Roman consciousness, respectively, the modern world, or, as we would say, international system were unipolar, that is, in their world there was a single state that almost completely dominated the entire territory that was of real or even potential interest for the then "political consciousness", or, as we would say in modern language, in the "civilizational space ". From the standpoint of today, the relativity of "ancient unipolarity" is obvious. But this is not important. It is significant that the feeling of the reality of a unipolar world - albeit false - passed on to the political and cultural heirs of antiquity, even more distorted during transmission. As a result, the longing for universal domination, insisted on historical information and legends about the great ancient empires, if not completely prevailed in the political consciousness of subsequent eras, still strongly influenced the state minds in many countries, starting from the early Middle Ages. It has never been possible to repeat the unique and in all respects limited experience of the empires of Alexander the Great and the Roman Empire. But most of the most powerful states in one way or another tried to do this - Byzantium, the Empire of Charlemagne, the Habsburg monarchy, Napoleonic France, unified Germany - these are only the most obvious and vivid examples of attempts and failures of this kind. We can say that most of the history of international relations from the standpoint of consistency can be explained as the history of attempts by one or another power to construct a unipolar world of attempts, we note, in many respects inspired by the falsely understood or deliberately distorted interpreted experience of antiquity. But with the same success we can state something else: in fact, since the collapse of "ancient unipolarity" in interstate relations, a real multipolarity has developed, understood as the existence in the world of at least several leading states, comparable in terms of the totality of their military, political, economic capabilities and cultural and ideological influence. Perhaps initially it arose more or less by chance - due to a combination of unfavorable circumstances, a power claiming hegemony, say Sweden during the Thirty Years War (16181648), was unable to mobilize the necessary resources to realize its goals. But very soon other countries began to view the preservation of multipolarity as a kind of guarantee of their own security. The logic of behavior of a number of states began to be determined by the desire to prevent an overly obvious increase in the geopolitical capabilities of their potential rivals. Geopolitical means the totality of the capabilities of the state, determined by natural and geographical factors in the broad sense of the word (geographic location, territory, population, configuration of borders, climatic conditions, the level of economic development of individual territories and the associated infrastructure), which initially determine the position of a particular country in system of international relations. The traditional way of enhancing geopolitical opportunities was the annexation of new territories - either through direct capture by military force, or - in the dynastic tradition of the Middle Ages - through acquisition through marriage or inheritance. Accordingly, diplomacy also paid more and more attention to preventing situations that could result in an "excessive" increase in the potential of some already sufficiently large state. In connection with these considerations, the concept of the balance of power has long been established in the political vocabulary, which is almost infinitely widely used by both Western authors and researchers from various schools in Russia and the USSR. The abuse of this catchy term has led to a blurring of its boundaries and even partial meaninglessness. Some authors used the term "balance of power" as a synonym for the concept of "balance of opportunities". The other, not seeing a rigid semantic link between "balance" and "equilibrium," viewed the "balance of forces" simply as the ratio of the capabilities of individual world powers in a particular historical period. The first trend was guided by the linguistic meaning that the word "ballance" has in Western languages; the second was based on understanding the word "balance" inherent in Russian. In this book, the authors will use the phrase "balance of power" in the second sense, that is, in the meaning of "balance of opportunities." Thus, it will be clear that the "balance of power" is some kind of objective state that is always inherent in the international system, while the balance of power, even an approximate one, did not always develop in it and, as a rule, was unstable. The balance of power, therefore, is a special case of the balance of power as an objectively existing relationship between individual states, depending on the totality of military, political, economic and other capabilities that each of them possesses. According to this logic, international relations in Europe were built on the basis of the Westphalian (1648) and Utrecht (1715) treaties, which crowned the Thirty Years' War and the War of the Spanish Succession, respectively. The attempt of revolutionary and then Napoleonic France to drastically change the balance of power in Europe provoked a response from Western European diplomacy, which, starting with the Vienna Foundations of 1815, made the preservation of the "European equilibrium" almost the main task of the foreign policy of the Habsburg Empire, and then Great Britain. ... The preservation of the multipolar equilibrium model was seriously threatened by the emergence in 1871 of the German Empire on the basis of the unification of German lands into a powerful continuous geopolitical massif, which included mainly French Alsace and Lorraine. Germany's control over the resources of these two provinces (coal and iron ore) at a time when metal-intensive industries began to play a decisive role for the military-technical capabilities of states, contributed to a situation when the containment of a united Germany within the framework of the traditional "European equilibrium" by diplomatic and political methods turned out to be impossible. These were the structural prerequisites of the First World War - a war that can be described as an attempt to strengthen the structure of multipolarity through the forcible incorporation of the "out of line" Germany in its new, united, quality into the archaic structure of multipolarity in the form the ideal of which from the standpoint of many European politicians at the beginning of the 20th century, the Vienna order of the beginning of the 19th century was still seen. Looking ahead, and appealing to the geopolitical lessons of the First and Second World Wars, we can say that by the beginning of the twentieth century, in principle, there were theoretically at least two ways to stabilize the international system by political and economic methods - that is, without resorting to large-scale use of military force ... The first presupposed a much more active and wider involvement of Russia in European politics, which in this case could effectively contain Germany from the east by projecting its power, rather than using it directly. But this scenario required such an important additional condition as a significant acceleration of the economic and political development of Russia, which would make its non-military presence in Europe more convincing and tangible. However, all Western European states, including Germany itself, and its rivals France and Britain, although for different reasons, were afraid of strengthening Russian influence in Europe, suspecting a new European hegemon in Russia. They preferred to see Russia as capable of shackling and limiting Germany's ambitions, but not strong and influential enough to acquire a voice in a "European concert" that would more fully correspond to its gigantic, by European standards, potential, but not realizable opportunities. The tragedy was that due to both internal circumstances (the inertia of the Russian monarchy) and external reasons (hesitation and inconsistency of the Entente in supporting the modernization of Russia), by the beginning of the First World War, the country was unable to effectively implement the adopted (we do not touch on the issue about the justification of its decision) by it on itself the function. The result was an unprecedentedly protracted nature of the war by the criteria of the 19th century, terrible exhaustion and the accompanying inevitable political collapse of Russia, as well as a sharp, almost instantaneous breakdown of the existing world structure - a breakdown that caused a shock and a deep crisis of European political thinking, which it - as will be shown in pages of this work - and could not completely overcome until the outbreak of World War II. The second way to stabilize international relations could be to go beyond the Eurocentric thinking. For example, if Russia, for all its importance as a potential counterbalance to Germany, nevertheless inspired - not without reason - Britain and France fears with its potential, then Russia itself could have looked for a counterbalance - for example, in the person of a non-European power - the United States. However, for this it was necessary to think in "intercontinental" categories. The Europeans were not ready for this. The United States itself was not ready for this either, which was clearly oriented almost to the end of the 10s of the twentieth century on non-participation in European conflicts. Moreover, let us not forget that at the beginning of the twentieth century Great Britain was considered in the United States as the only power in the world capable, thanks to its naval power, to pose a threat to the security of the United States itself. London's orientation towards an alliance with Japan, in which Washington already saw an important Pacific rival, did not in any way contribute to the growth of the United States' readiness to act on the side of the British Empire in the looming European conflict. Only on final stage The First World War, the United States overcame its traditional isolationism and, having abandoned part of its military power to the aid of the Entente powers, provided her with the necessary superiority over Germany and, ultimately, victory over the Austro-German bloc. Thus, the "breakthrough" of the Europeans beyond the framework of the "Eurocentric" vision did take place. However, this happened too late, when it was not about the political containment of Germany, but about its military defeat. In addition, and this will also be discussed in the chapters of this work, this "breakthrough" turned out to be only a short-term intuitive insight, and not a radical reassessment of the priorities that European diplomacy of the period between the two world wars inherited from the classics, as we would say today , political science of the XIX century, brought up on the traditions of K. Metternich, G. Palmerston, O. Bismarck and A. M. Gorchakov. This dominance of the 19th century school of political thinking, which was lagging behind in understanding new geopolitical realities and the new state of global political relations, determined the fact that the main task of regulating international relations after the First World War was essentially understood not so much as a radical restructuring of the world structure, in in particular, overcoming the relative self-sufficiency, political isolation of the European subsystem from the United States, on the one hand, and the area of \u200b\u200bEastern Eurasia, on the other, and more narrowly: as the restoration of the classical "European equilibrium" or, as we would prefer to say, a multipolar model of the international system based on the traditional , predominantly European based. This narrow approach no longer corresponded to the logic of the globalization of world political processes and the constantly growing political interdependence of the subsystems of world politics. This contradiction between the European, and often even only the Euro-Atlantic, vision of the international situation and the emergence of new centers of power and influence outside Western and Central Europe - in Russia and the United States - left a decisive imprint on the entire world politics of the period 1918-1945. The Second World War dealt a crushing blow to multipolarity. Even in its depths, the preconditions for the transformation of the multipolar structure of the world into a bipolar one began to mature. By the end of the war, there was a colossal gap between the two powers - the USSR and the United States - from all other states in terms of the totality of military, political, economic opportunities and ideological influence. This gap determined the essence of bipolarity, almost in the same way as the meaning of multipolarity historically consisted in the approximate equality or comparability of the capabilities of a relatively large group of countries in the absence of a pronounced and recognized superiority of any one leader. Immediately after the end of World War II, there was no bipolarity as a stable model of international relations. It took about 10 years for its structural design. The period of formation ended in 1955 with the creation of the Warsaw Pact Organization (ATS) - the eastern counterweight formed 6 years earlier, in 1949, in the West of the NATO bloc. Moreover, bipolarity, before it began to take shape, in itself did not imply confrontation. The "Yalta-Potsdam order" that originally symbolized it was associated more with a "conspiracy of the strong" than with their confrontation. But, naturally, the idea of \u200b\u200ba two-state government of the world caused the desire of "less equal" states (a role that was especially difficult for Britain) to divide their strong partners in order to give the missing weight to themselves. "Jealousy" for the Soviet-American dialogue has become a feature of the policy not only of Britain, but also of France and of the governments of Central European countries that are semi-formally recognized by Moscow. The actions of all of them together fueled mutual distrust between the USSR and the USA. Against this background, the "counter-escalation" of Soviet and American geopolitical claims, which began soon after, led to the displacement of the cooperative principle in Soviet-American relations by the confrontational one. In less than three years - from the second half of 1945 to approximately 1947 - a vector of mutual repulsion between the two powers was formed. Landmarks to it were American attempts to politically beat their nuclear monopoly, Soviet ambitions in the southern Black Sea region and Iran, and Eastern European countries' rejection of the Marshall Plan, which visibly marked the outlines of the future Iron Curtain. The confrontation began to turn into reality, although the Cold War had not yet begun. Its first fact, the Berlin crisis, one way or another provoked by the financial reform in the western sectors of Germany, dates back to the summer of 1948. This was preceded by the "push" actions of the USSR in the "Soviet zone of influence" - the elections to the legislative Seim of Poland in January 1947 and the political crisis provoked by the communists in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. It was no longer necessary to speak of coordinated management of the world in the interests of the USSR and the United States, first of all, and in the interests of other countries - to the extent that they were represented by these two ... The idea of \u200b\u200ban order based on collusion was replaced by the presumption of the possibility of maintaining the achieved balance of positions and at the same time ensuring freedom of action. Moreover, in fact, there was no freedom of action and could not be: the USSR and the USA were afraid of each other. Self-induction of fear determined their natural interest in improving offensive weapons, on the one hand, and "positional defense," searching for allies, on the other. The turn to relying on the allies predetermined the split of the world. The United States became the head of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The USSR did not immediately see full-fledged allies in its Eastern European satellites and spent a lot of time for political preparation for the creation of the Warsaw Bloc. But until the collapse of the Paris conference of the "Big Four" in May 1960, the USSR did not give up hopes of returning to the idea of \u200b\u200bSoviet-American co-management. Be that as it may, since 1955, the creation of two blocks, bipolarity in a confrontational version has been structurally fixed. The bifurcation of the world was set off not only by the emergence of "divided states" - Germany, Vietnam, China and Korea - but also by the fact that most of the world's states were forced to orient themselves in relation to the axis of NATO's central confrontation - the ATS. The weak had to either ensure a satisfactory level of representation of their interests in the coupling of great-power regulation, or try to act at their own peril and risk, defending national interests independently or in alliance with political outsiders like them. This is the structural and political basis of the idea of \u200b\u200bnon-alignment, which began to be realized in the mid-1950s almost simultaneously with the emergence of schemes among the theorists of Chinese communism, which later resulted in the theory of the three worlds based on distancing from the "superpowers". The "spirit of confrontation" seemed to be an expression of the essence of world politics also because from 1956 to 1962 the military-political methods of resolving crises especially clearly prevailed in the international system. It was a special stage of evolution post-war world... Its most striking features were ultimatums, formidable statements, force and para-force demonstrations. Characteristic in this sense are N.S. Khrushchev's threatening messages to the governments of Great Britain and France about their joint aggression with Israel against Egypt in 1956, American actions in Syria in 1957 and in Lebanon in 1958, demonstrative Soviet underground nuclear tests in 1961 after American threats, in turn, following the construction of the Berlin Wall. Finally, the almost erupted world nuclear conflict due to the USSR's attempt to secretly deploy its missiles in Cuba, the very idea of \u200b\u200bwhich, however, was also taken by Moscow from the American practice of installing missiles aimed at the USSR in Turkey and Italy. The predominance of military-force methods in relations between the opposing powers did not exclude elements of their mutual understanding and partnership. The parallelism of the steps taken by the USSR and the United States during the aforementioned Franco-British-Israeli aggression in Egypt is striking - especially curious against the background of the USSR's intervention in Hungary. The repeated application for global partnership was also meant during the 1959 Washington-DC dialogue between Khrushchev and Eisenhower. Due to unfavorable circumstances in 1960 (the scandal caused by the flight of an American reconnaissance aircraft over Soviet territory), these negotiations could not make detente a fact of international life. But they served as a prototype for a discharge that was implemented 10 years later. In general, in the 50s and early 60s, political and power regulation clearly dominated international relations. Elements of constructiveness existed, as it were, semi-legally, preparing changes, but for the time being they showed little at the highest level. And only the Caribbean crisis decisively pushed the USSR and the USA out of the framework of thinking in terms of rough power pressure. After him, the indirect projection of power at the regional level began to come to the place of direct armed confrontation. A new type of two-state interaction gradually crystallized during the Vietnam War (1963-1973) and against its background. Undoubtedly, the USSR indirectly opposed the United States in this war, although even the shadow of the likelihood of their direct collision was not visible. And not only because, while providing assistance to North Vietnam, the USSR did not participate in hostilities. But also because, against the background of the Vietnam War in the mid-1960s, an unprecedented intensity of the Soviet-American dialogue on global problems unfolded. Its peak was the signing in 1968 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Diplomacy supplanted force and turned out to be the dominant instrument of international politics. This situation persisted from about 1963 until the end of 1973 - these are the boundaries of the period of predominantly political regulation of the world system. One of the key concepts of this stage is "strategic parity", understood not as the total mathematical equality of the number of combat units of the Soviet and American strategic forces, but rather as a mutually recognized exceeding of the qualitative boundary by both sides, beyond which their nuclear conflict under all circumstances would guarantee each side damage, obviously exceeding all conceivable and planned gains from the use of nuclear weapons. It is significant that parity began to determine the essence of the Soviet-American diplomatic dialogue since the time when President R. Nixon, who came to power in 1968, officially announced its presence in his message to the American Congress in February 1972. It would hardly be legitimate to assert that that during this entire period the superpowers were guided only by constructive interaction. But if in the 50s the highest positive of Soviet-American relations were limited parallel actions and isolated attempts to conduct a dialogue, then in the 60s there was real cooperation. An essential shift took place: without stopping mutual criticism, the USSR and the USA in practice began to be guided by geopolitical considerations rather than ideological postulates. This circumstance has not remained unchanged. The administration of R. Nixon, and then J. Ford, suffered from both the Democrats and the extreme right-wing Republicans for "disregard of American ideals." The leadership of China also inscribed criticism of social-imperialism in the person of the Soviet Union on its banner. The weakening of the positions of AN Kosygin, who stood behind the new Soviet pragmatism, indicated the presence of strong purist opposition to his flexible course in the USSR itself. However, all this did not prevent Moscow and Washington from adjusting the political dialogue, adjusting the mechanism for interpreting political signals and clarifying the intentions of the parties. The line of direct communication was improved, a network of shock-absorbing devices was created, similar to the one that, at a critical moment in the Caribbean crisis, made it possible to organize in Washington a meeting of the Soviet ambassador AF Dobrynin with the president's brother Robert Kennedy. In May 1972, summarizing the accumulated experience, the parties signed a fundamentally important document in this sense, "The Fundamentals of Relations between the USSR and the United States." The growth of mutual tolerance and trust made it possible, in the same year, to conclude in Moscow the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures in the Field of Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-1). Both treaties paved the way for a series of agreements that followed. The result of these scattered efforts was a common Soviet-American understanding regarding the lack of aggressive intentions on both sides, at least towards each other. This did not directly apply to others. But the desire of Moscow and Washington to avoid a head-on collision in itself exerted a restraining influence on their policies in third countries, constricting the framework of international conflict, although, of course, not blocking its growth completely. In any case, not without taking into account the reaction of Washington, Moscow's position in the Soviet-Chinese confrontation in the summer and autumn of 1969, the peak of which was the persistent messages in the West, which were not refuted in the USSR, about the possibility of preventive strikes by Soviet aviation from airfields on the territory of the MPR against nuclear facilities in PRC. Another crisis was averted not only thanks to the flexibility of Soviet diplomacy, but also under the influence of the United States, which, without exultation, firmly declared the unacceptability of the unpredictable growth of the Soviet-Chinese conflict. This, by the way, is one of the globally strategic prerequisites for the "sudden" Sino-American normalization of 1972, and, in a broader sense, for detente on its entire Asian flank, still omitted in Russian studies. Given that in the United States, the easing of tension in the 70s is generally perceived primarily through the prism of ending the Vietnam War and establishing new relations with China, while in Russia it is mainly focused on recognizing the inviolability of post-war borders in Europe. By the mid-1970s, from the decade of the "era of negotiations", both superpowers had drawn a very significant conclusion: there is no threat of attempts to abruptly, forcefully break down the basic relationships of their positions. In fact, a mutual agreement was reached on the "conservation of stagnation", the very idea of \u200b\u200bwhich fit so well into the internal political situation of the Soviet Union, which was losing momentum, under the leadership of its decrepit leader. This, of course, did not exclude a mutual desire to achieve dominance gradually. A compromise in the "conservation of stagnation" could not be particularly strong because the underlying idea of \u200b\u200bdividing the interests of the USSR and the United States, which assumed greater or lesser stability of "zones of preferential interests," contradicted the logic of development. After the all-European settlement fixed in Helsinki in 1975, the challenges associated with the unpredictable awakening of the developing world came to the fore in international relations. The more impulsive the shifts that arose there, the closer the framework of Soviet-American mutual understanding seemed. Moreover, both the main and the implied meaning of this mutual understanding were interpreted in the East and in the West in different ways. In the USSR, it is restrictive. Maintaining "basic" relationships was considered compatible with the expansion of positions on the regional periphery, especially a neutral one that does not fall within the zone of traditional American dominance. It is no coincidence that in the mid-1970s, there was an increase in the interest of Soviet ideologists in the issues of proletarian, socialist internationalism and peaceful coexistence, which was still combined with the thesis of the intensification of the ideological struggle. Nobody was going to give up solidarity with like-minded people in the "third world" (real or perceived). For its part, the United States treasured its agreement with the USSR largely because of the obligations it received from it, as it seemed to the administration, of its restraint with respect to "undivided territories", that is, countries that did not have time to bind themselves with a pro-American or pro-Soviet orientation. The matter was complicated by the ideological situation in the United States, where after the end of the Vietnam War and in the wake of the syndrome inherited from it, there was a powerful surge of political moralism, with its characteristic painful attention to the ethical basis of American foreign policy and the protection of human rights around the world. Against the background of Moscow's tough measures against dissidents and its intransigence in the issue of increasing Jewish emigration, these tendencies inevitably acquired an anti-Soviet direction. Attempts by the administration first by J. Ford (1974-1977) and then by J. Carter (1977-1981) to moderate the onslaught of human rights defenders were unsuccessful. In the latter case, the presidential aide for national security Z. Brzezinski also actively opposed the compromise with Moscow, in whom even during his tenure in office, the wounded national feeling of a descendant of Polish emigrants cast a shadow on the professional impeccability of the "expert on communism." Events, as if on purpose, favored America's heightened perception of Soviet politics. After the Paris agreements on Vietnam (1973), the United States sharply reduced the size of the army and abolished the general military duty imposed during the war. The general sentiment in Washington was against any intervention in the Third World. The focus of US public opinion turned out to be recipes for the treatment of internal ailments of American society. In Moscow, the United States noticed its focus on itself and drew conclusions. It was decided that detente created favorable conditions for the deployment of an ideological offensive and assistance to like-minded people. In 1974, the military overthrew the monarchy in Ethiopia. The victory in the same year, the "revolution of carnations" in Lisbon caused the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire and the formation in 1975 in Angola and Mozambique of the next authoritarian-nationalist regimes, without further ado, proclaiming a pro-communist orientation. The USSR did not overcome the temptation and rushed into the opened gaps, "half a corps" ahead of Cuba. But that was not all. In 1975, the weak and unpopular South Vietnamese regime in Saigon collapsed under the onslaught of the communists, and Vietnam united under the leadership of the North on the basis of loyalty to the socialist choice. In the same year, with the most active participation of the "people's revolutionary" factor, a change of regimes took place in Laos and Cambodia. True, in the latter case, the predominant influence was not Vietnam or the USSR, but China. Be that as it may, both Cambodia and Laos have proclaimed loyalty to the socialist perspective. The unambiguous role that Vietnam began to claim in Indochina could give reason to accuse the USSR of spreading communist expansion and exporting revolution. Events did not allow the fire of suspicion to die out even for a short while. In 1978, the intrigues of some "progressive" forces overthrew the monarchy in Afghanistan that was quite friendly to the USSR, which turned out to be a prologue to the next ten-year tragedy. And in the summer of 1979, the communists took power in Nicaragua by force of arms. By this time, in the USSR, the military had already achieved the adoption of a new naval program. The distant world periphery occupied the minds of Soviet politicians - more densely than could be justified by the country's real geopolitical interests. The predominance of their broad interpretations was significantly influenced by the aspirations of the military-industrial complex, whose capabilities in the early 70s made the export of arms to partner states a powerful political-forming factor. The United States, of course, did not remain indifferent. True, they still did not think about a clash with the USSR. American political science has proposed a variant of the "asymmetric" containment of the Soviet advance. Measures were taken to increase indirect pressure on the Soviet Union from its long and vulnerable East Asian borders. Building on the success of US-Chinese normalization, the Carter administration began to work to consolidate China in the position of confrontation with the USSR, maintaining a consistently high level of their mutual hostility. At the same time, American diplomacy helped "strengthen the rear" of the PRC, helping to improve Sino-Japanese relations, which developed steeply along the ascending line with the rapid cooling of Japan's ties with the Soviet Union. Things reached the point that by the end of the 70s, in some of the Soviet political-forming spheres, there was an opinion about the transformation of the Chinese, or rather the united Sino-American, threat into the main challenge to the security of the Soviet Union. In theory, this danger far outweighed all conceivable and inconceivable threats to US security from Soviet activity in the Third World. The closed archives make it difficult to judge how seriously American leaders might have considered the possibility of such a conflict. J. Carter's clear attempt to distance himself from China at the time of his military conflict with Vietnam in 1979 does not incline to overestimate the prospects of the then US-Chinese strategic partnership. Another thing is indisputable: the tension on the eastern border did not allow the Soviet Union to suspend the arms buildup, despite the improvement in the situation in Europe and the presence of strategic parity with the United States. At the same time, Moscow's high defense spending was taken into account by the American side, which formulated the concept of economic exhaustion of the USSR. This idea was also prompted by the shocks that gripped international relations in the mid-1970s, the "oil shock" of 1973-1974, which was repeated in 1979-1980. It was he who turned out to be a pressure that prompted a part of the international community, which relied on imports of cheap oil, to switch to energy and resource-saving models of economic growth in 6-7 years, abandoning the long-term practice of squandering natural resources. Against the background of relatively high global stability, the issues of reducing the economic vulnerability of states, ensuring their industrial growth and production efficiency have shifted to the center of world politics. These parameters have become more explicit in determining the role and status of states. Japan and West Germany began to advance into the ranks of the first figures in world politics. Qualitative shifts have shown that since 1974 the world system has entered a period of predominant economic regulation. The dramatic nature of the situation was that the USSR, relying on self-sufficiency in energy resources, missed the opportunity to re-lay research programs aimed at a new stage in the industrial and technological revolution. This predetermined a decrease in Moscow's role in managing the world - a decrease proportional to the weakening of its economic and technical-economic capabilities. The 1975 meeting in Helsinki, which formally crowned the first detente, took place at a time when the tendency to improve Soviet-American mutual understanding was already fizzling out. Inertia lasted for several more years. Anti-Shah revolution in Iran and the beginning afghan war outlined only the formal outline of the event, which has already become a fact of the failure of detente. Since the beginning of the 1980s, international tension has sharply increased, in the conditions of which the West was able to realize its technological advantages accumulated in the wake of developments in the second half of the 1970s. The struggle for the economic exhaustion of the USSR through its scientific and technological isolation has entered a decisive stage. The grave crisis of governance within the Soviet Union, which from 1982 to 1985 acquired the caricatured form of "leapfrog of general secretaries", combined with the end of the era of expensive oil, which turned into budget ruin for the USSR due to a sharp decline in revenues, completed the job. Having come to power in the spring of 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev in foreign policy had no other rational alternative except for the transition to global negotiations on an agreed revision of the "Yalta-Potsdam order." It was about transforming the confrontational version of bipolarity into a cooperative one, since the Soviet Union was unable to continue the confrontation with the United States and other powers. But it was clear that the United States would not go along with the "restructuring on a global scale" scenario proposed by Moscow so easily. It was necessary to agree on the conditions under which the West, the United States, first of all, would agree to guarantee the USSR, albeit somewhat less than before, but a paramount and honorable place in the international hierarchy. The search for a mutually acceptable price, in fact, was devoted five to six years until Mikhail Gorbachev was deprived of the presidency at the end of 1991. This price, as far as can be judged from the unprecedentedly increased political authority of the Soviet Union - against the background of all the obvious weakening of its capabilities - in principle has been found. He actually achieved the right to non-discriminatory cooperation with the West while maintaining his privileged global status. Despite the fact that the grounds for this were not indisputable, for example, against the background of artificial removal from the decisive world-political role of new economic giants, primarily Japan. Perestroika diplomacy won its round of struggle for a place in the world, even if the price for winning was the unification of Germany and the refusal in 1989 to support the communist regimes in the countries of former Eastern Europe. The position of the USSR, which it took in early 1991 with regard to the suppression of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait by the armed forces of the United States and a number of other Western states acting under UN sanctions, was a kind of approbation of a new Soviet-American understanding of complicity in international governance with the asymmetry of the functions of each from powers. This new role of the USSR, obviously, was very different from its position in pre-perestroika times, when ceremonial, more than once letting down, almost ritualized and prolonged coordination of opinions was considered the standard. But even under the new conditions, the Soviet Union retained a rather influential role as a key partner of the United States, without which world governance was impossible. However, the model was not given the opportunity to make full use of this. As a result of the radicalization of internal processes in 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The Yalta-Potsdam order disintegrated, and the international system began to slide towards deregulation. Section I. FORMATION OF THE MULTIPOLAR STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR Chapter 1. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE FINAL STAGE OF COMBAT ACTIONS (1917 - 1918) The final stage of the world war was characterized by three fundamental features. First, there were clear signs of economic exhaustion on both sides of the front line. The logistical, financial and human resources of the belligerents were at their limit. This primarily concerned Russia and Germany as the countries that most intensively spent their vital resources in the course of hostilities. Secondly, both in the Entente and in the Austro-German bloc there were quite serious sentiments in favor of ending the war. This created a real possibility of attempts to conclude a separate peace in one configuration or another. The problem of the destruction of the united allied front was so acute that on August 23 (September 5), 1914, France, Great Britain and Russia signed in London a special Agreement on the non-conclusion of a separate peace, which was supplemented there on November 17 (30), 1915 with a separate Declaration of the allied powers, including Italy and Japan, not to conclude a separate peace. But even after that, keeping the Romanov empire in the war remained the most important international political task of the bloc of Germany's opponents, since - this was obvious - without the support of Russia, only the West European members of the anti-German alliance were unable to provide themselves with the necessary military-power advantage over the Quadruple Alliance. Thirdly, in Russia, and partly in Germany and Austria-Hungary, during the world war there was a sharp exacerbation of the socio-political situation. Under the influence of military difficulties, the working classes, national minorities, as well as a significant part of the elite strata opposed both the war in general and against their own governments, which showed inconsistency in achieving military victory. The growth of anti-government sentiments in these countries significantly influenced their foreign policy and the general international situation. The war turned out to be an unbearable pregnancy for the economies and socio-political systems of the belligerents. Their ruling circles clearly underestimated the danger of social explosions. 1. The strategic situation and the balance of forces in the world at the beginning of 1917 Despite the enormous efforts and sacrifices that during two and a half years of bloody battles on the fronts of Europe, Asia and Africa were brought to the altar of victory by the peoples of the two opposing coalitions, in the winter of 1916- 1917 the prospects for the end of the war seemed rather unclear to contemporaries. The Entente, which was based on the military alliance of the five leading powers - Russia, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan in manpower and logistical support undoubtedly surpassed the bloc of the Central Powers as part of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. But this superiority to a certain extent was compensated by the extensive territorial seizures of the Austro-German bloc, the smooth functioning of the transport communications system and better coordination of joint actions within the Quadruple Alliance. A series of inter-allied conferences held by members of the Entente coalition in 1915-1916 made it possible to qualitatively improve the interaction of Petrograd, Paris and London for the complete defeat of the empire of Kaiser Wilhelm II and his allies. However, the contradictions between the leading members of the anti-German bloc, which emerged in the early period of the world war and were associated with the foreign policy programs of each of the allied countries, continued to have a negative impact on strengthening the ranks of the Entente. 2. Contradictions in the ranks of the Entente These contradictions were caused by the clash of claims of each of the Entente powers to the countries of the Quadruple Alliance in the form of territorial acquisitions (annexations) for themselves and patronized small European states (Belgium, Denmark, Serbia), providing various trade and economic benefits and receiving compensation for the damage caused (contributions) from the defeated enemy. For example, the maximum foreign policy program of the imperial government of Russia provided for the "correction" of the Russian border in East Prussia and Galicia, the establishment of control over the Black Sea straits, the unification of all Polish lands, including their German and Austro-Hungarian parts, under the scepter of the Romanov dynasty, the annexation of those inhabited by Armenians and partly by the Kurds of the regions of Asian Turkey, as well as a significant expansion of the territory of Serbia at the expense of Austria-Hungary, the return of Alsace and Lorraine to France, and the return of Schleswig and Holstein to Denmark. This essentially implied the fragmentation of the Hohenzollern empire, the reduction of Germany to the scale of the former Prussia and a return to the map of Europe in the middle of the 19th century. Relying on the support of Paris in the cardinal weakening of Germany, Russian diplomacy, however, faced in this matter with the more than cautious position of London, which primarily sought to eliminate the naval power of the Kaiser's Reich and, consequently, to destroy the German fleet and divide the German colonies in Africa. and Asia. As for Europe, the British intended to annex the Rhine regions of Germany to Belgium or Luxembourg, and by no means to their ally France. At the same time, the cool attitude of Paris to Russia's plans to seize the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which became an unpleasant surprise for tsarist diplomacy at the initial stage of the war, was balanced by London's principled consent to the implementation of this "Russian historical task", which the Russian Foreign Minister had unexpectedly easily achieved from the British government SD Sazonov in March 1915 The disagreements between London and Paris on the issue of the left bank of the Rhine were obvious. France demanded at least the creation of a buffer zone there under its unlimited influence, and Britain believed that such a decision would lead to an unreasonably excessive weakening of Germany and would allow Paris to claim hegemony on the mainland. In such a situation, by the end of the war between Russia and France, an informal bloc was formed, sealed on February 1 (14) and February 26 (March 11) 1917 by an exchange of letters between Petrograd and Paris. In accordance with a confidential agreement, both powers promised each other mutual support in establishing their future borders with Germany, without informing London about this. The disagreements between Great Britain, France and Russia regarding the post-war settlement in the Middle and Far East ... They talked about the principles of the division of the "Turkish inheritance" and the fate of the German possessions in China, which fell into the hands of Japan. Regarding the first problem, Russia and Britain were worried about the excessive territorial claims of the French in Syria, and the second - by the Japanese in China. In addition, the London cabinet, unlike the Parisian one, was suspicious of the formation of the Russian-Japanese military-political alliance on June 20 (July 3) 1916, rightly seeing in it a means to belittle the significance of the Japanese-British alliance of 1902, which was one of the pillars UK policy in East Asia. On the problem of the Arab-populated territories of the Ottoman Empire, London and Paris barely reached an agreement on the delimitation of interests only by May 1916 (the Sykes - Picot agreement, named after the British negotiator Mark Sykes and the French negotiator Georges Picot). At the same time, both powers recognized Russia’s right to Turkish Armenia as compensation for its agreement with the terms of the French-British partition. Italy and Romania also counted on territorial acquisitions from fragments of the Austro-Hungarian possessions, which, after long calculations, considered it more profitable for themselves to join the Entente. And yet, at the conferences of representatives of the allied armies, first in Chantilly (November 1916), and then in Petrograd (January-February 1917), a spirit of optimism reigned. Neither the growing fatigue of the broad masses from the victims and hardships of the war, nor the expanding activity of pacifists and extreme left organizations, which in 1916 caused the first anti-government demonstrations on the territory of the "Hearty Concord" powers, nor the rise of the national liberation struggle in the colonies could "spoil the mood." leaders of the Entente, who decided to start a general offensive on all fronts in the spring of 1917, having 425 divisions against 331 enemy divisions. Characteristic is the statement of the Russian Emperor Nicholas II, made in a conversation with one of the governors just a month before the February Revolution: “Militarily, we are stronger than ever. Soon, in the spring, there will be an offensive, and I believe that God will give us victory ... "3. Attempts to turn towards a peaceful settlement. Certain hopes of Petrograd, Paris and London to achieve a decisive turning point in the war were also associated with the information received about the economic exhaustion of Germany and Austria-Hungary, whose ruling circles in December 1916 came up with a proposal about peace negotiations. At the same time, they took into account the real state of affairs on the fronts by this time. Berlin and Vienna intended to conduct a dialogue with their opponents on the basis of the recognition of the territorial conquests of the Central Powers, capable of initiating the practical implementation of the Pan-Germanist plans to create a Central European political and economic union under the auspices of Germany. Added to this were demands for the establishment of a new border with Russia, German tutelage over Belgium and the granting of new colonies to Germany. It must be said that all the years of the war were marked by mutual diplomatic soundings and demarches by members of the opposing blocs. At the same time, successes or failures on the fronts, as a rule, intensified the efforts of the "creators of armchair diplomacy" on both sides, who sought to attract "fresh" states to their camp. So, it was as a result of a complex backstage bargaining that Italy (in 1915) and Romania (in 1916) joined the Entente, and Turkey (in October 1914) and Bulgaria (in 1915) joined the bloc of the Central Powers. In December 1916, the situation seemed to favor the maneuver of the Kaiser's diplomacy. After the defeat of Serbia and Romania, the Balkan Peninsula came under the control of the Quadruple Alliance, which opened the way for the German armies to the Middle East. In the Entente countries, the food crisis has worsened, caused by crop failure and interruptions in the supply of colonial raw materials to the metropolitan countries. On the other hand, the restrained attitude of Great Britain and France to the attempts of the United States to impose on the Europeans their own vision of the goals and objectives of the war, based on the rejection of the concept of "balance of power" and recognition as criteria of the international order of democracy, collective security and self-determination of nations (note by US President Woodrow Wilson December 18, 1916), allowed Berlin to use the stalemate on the French and Russian fronts for its own, albeit propaganda, purposes. Thus, in December 1916, the members of the Entente, who had just agreed on broad offensive plans, were faced with the need to give an adequate response to the peace initiatives not only of Germany, but also of the United States. If in relation to Berlin the Allies focused on exposing the hypocrisy of the Kaiser's diplomacy, then the address to the US President emphasized the unanimous desire of the anti-German coalition to reorganize Europe on the principle of national self-determination and the right of peoples to free economic development, the basis for which was to be the defeat of the Central Powers. "Peace cannot be lasting if it is not based on the victory of the Allies," summed up the position of the Entente members, Lord Arthur Balfour, who replaced Edward Gray as head of the British Foreign Office. 4. The February revolution in Russia and the change in the international situation Two of the most important events of this year were, perhaps, the decisive factors in the radical transformation of the world order, which received its legal justification in the documents of the Paris Conference of 1919-1920: revolutionary events in Russia and the entry into the war of the United States of America on the side of the anti-German forces. Initially, the news of the February Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd provoked a wary reaction on the banks of the Seine and Thames, although it seemed that after the overthrow of the monarchical regime, the Entente propaganda machine received an additional argument, since from now on this bloc acted in the eyes of the world community as a union of democratic states, which fighting for the freedom of peoples oppressed by the empires of the Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs, Sultan Turkey and Tsarist Bulgaria. In addition, Paris and London could finally breathe a sigh of relief regarding rumors of secret contacts between the court camarilla of Nicholas II and German emissaries in attempts to conclude a separate Russian-German peace. A certain hope to the leaders of the Entente for the continuation of the war by Russia was given by the declaration of the Provisional Government outlining the foreign policy program of March 27 (April 9) and especially the note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs P.N. Milyukov sent on April 18 (May 1) to all the Entente powers. True, already in these documents there was a certain shift in emphasis towards the transition from the classical logic of territorial reconstruction based on the policy of "balance of forces" and "European equilibrium" to "revolutionary defencism" and the rejection of the "forcible seizure of foreign territories", although "confidence in the victorious end of the present war in full agreement with the allies. " At the same time, at this stage, the Provisional Government refused to accept the demand of the Petrograd Council to proclaim the goal new Russia a world without annexations and indemnities, while respecting the right of peoples to self-determination. The ensuing government crisis led to the resignation of Milyukov himself and the Minister of War A.I. Guchkov. Reorganized cabinet, which included representatives socialist parties , accepted the peaceful formula of the Petrograd Soviet. This change in priorities was noticeable in the message of the Provisional Government (in which the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs was already transferred to M.I. Tereshchenko) dated April 22 (May 5) 1917 with an explanation of Milyukov's note. The new accents in the Russian position, combined with signs of a crisis in the Russian military-industrial complex with the progressive weakening of the central government in the country, seriously worried France and Great Britain. Perhaps only in Washington, until the fall of 1917, they continued to harbor illusions about the possibility of "reanimating" Russian military power through new financial injections, reorganization of transport, and the activities of numerous charitable organizations sent from overseas to Russia. The beginning of the decline in confidence in the Russian ally was observed already in March - April 1917, when at the meetings of the leaders of the Entente, without the participation of representatives of the Provisional Government, the issue of taking measures to prevent Russia from withdrawing from the war was discussed. A clear symptom of a decrease in its weight in the ranks of "Hearty Concord" was the decision to detail the map of the division of Turkey without agreeing with it in order to provide Italy with territories lying in the previously agreed zone of Russian interests near the Aegean coast of Asia Minor (Dodecanese Islands). The failure of the summer offensive of A.F. Kerensky and the crushing counterattack of the German-Austrian troops near Tarnopol finally buried the Entente's plans to achieve an early victory. The situation could in no way be saved by China's declaration of war on Germany in August 1917, especially since the anti-government uprising in Turin and the preparation of the Austrian offensive against Italy (it took place in October of the same year) threatened to put another member of the Entente out of the game, as happened with Romania, which in January 1918, after a crushing military defeat, withdrew from the war and later signed a separate Peace of Bucharest with Germany on May 7, 1918. Thus, the only way out of this situation for the Entente was to involve the United States of America in the war on its side. 5. US Entry into the War The United States entered the conflict on March 24 (April 6), 1917, citing the unacceptability of Germany's January 31, 1917 policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. This was preceded by dramatic collisions and behind-the-scenes diplomatic maneuvers. The point was not only that by the spring of 1917, Washington realized the impossibility of further maintaining its neutral status. US President W. Wilson also hoped to take advantage of the situation to deliver a decisive blow to the old, pre-war world order, which doomed the overseas republic to a marginal, secondary role in the system of international relations. Entering the war, the United States did not formally join the Entente alliance, but only proclaimed itself its associate member. Thanks to this, the American leadership remained legally free from any inter-allied mutual wartime obligations, including those related to territorial reorganization, annexations, etc. The Entente felt an increasing need for American aid not only in finances and military materials, but also in manpower. However, the goals of the United States in the war, proclaimed by Wilson, contradicted the traditional European concept of "balance of power" even at the cost of violating the rights of peoples to self-determination. Indeed, according to the Washington administration, the reason for the instability of the pre-war world order was precisely not the difficulties on the way to achieving equilibrium, but the constant violation by the great powers of the principle of self-determination of nations, the observance of which, according to Wilson, could in itself ensure the stability of the world order. That is why the United States proposed the creation of a new permanent international collective security body, which would ensure the fair settlement of international disputes on the basis of a certain set of agreed principles, including the principle of self-determination of nations. First, in confidential diplomatic correspondence, and then in public speeches of the American president, the projected institution was called the League of Nations. From the point of view of Wilson, this organization, the first in history of this kind, was supposed to be a "universal association of nations to maintain the undisturbed security of sea routes, their universal, unrestricted use by all states of the world, and to prevent any kind of war. started either in violation of treaty obligations, or without warning, with the complete subordination of all the issues under consideration to world public opinion ... "It is quite understandable that the declaration by Washington of such, in the opinion of Paris and London, abstract, far from the real situation on the fronts of the post-war world order is not aroused enthusiasm among Western European leaders - French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who sought to "replace" Russia with the United States as quickly as possible in the matter of building up joint military efforts. Paris and London were pushed to this by the deterioration of the situation in the rear, the growth of the strike movement and the intensification of pacifist organizations, partly under the influence of the Vatican's initiative on August 1, 1917, to mediate between the belligerent powers. At the same time, faced with attempts by the allies to revise the specific terms of a future peace treaty with the Central Powers at the expense of Russian interests in Europe and the Middle East, the Provisional Government took a series of diplomatic steps towards rapprochement with the United States, seeking to rely on their military and economic assistance and enlist the assistance of the Wilson administration in achieving foreign policy goals. This was evidenced by the exchange between the two countries of emergency missions led by special representatives Elikhu Rut and B.A. Bakhmetev, which took place in the summer of 1917. The rapid deterioration of the internal political situation and the acute economic crisis in Russia against the background of the collapse of the Eastern Front and the Russian army in the fall of the same years forced the Entente and the United States to work out an agreement on the coordination of their activities to preserve an unreliable ally in the bloc. Thus, Great Britain was instructed to "supervise" sea transportation for Russia, France - to maintain the combat capability of the army, and the United States - rail transport. The Provisional Government itself was intensively preparing for the next inter-allied conference in Paris (November 1917), by active participation in which it was supposed to once again demonstrate the desire of republican Russia for a common struggle to a victorious end. 6. The October Revolution in Russia and the Peace Program of the Bolsheviks (Decree on Peace) The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks on October 25 (November 7) 1917 and the proclamation of the Decree on Peace by the Second Congress of Soviets made significant adjustments to the development of international relations. For the first time since the Great French Revolution, the new government of one of the great European powers openly proclaimed the goal of overthrowing the existing social order on a worldwide scale. In the Lenin's Decree adopted on October 26 (November 8) by the II All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which contained a proposal to end hostilities and immediately begin negotiations on a democratic peace without annexations and indemnities on the basis of the unconditional implementation of the principle of self-determination of nations, regardless of where in the world it will be implemented ... Although this document made a reservation about the possibility of considering other conditions for the end of the global conflict, the Bolshevik leadership as a whole was rigidly oriented in the first months after the October coup, as it followed from the speeches of its leaders and their practical steps in the international arena, to incite a world revolution and a revolutionary exit from the war of all nations. In these conditions, the ranks of adherents of the old European social democracy and supporters of traditional liberal values \u200b\u200bwere split. A certain part of the public opinion of the belligerent states, neutral and dependent countries, undoubtedly, was impressed by the call from Petrograd for an immediate end to the bloody massacre and the shift of the Bolsheviks' attention to ensuring the rights of both large and small nations, not only in Europe, but also in other parts of the world. However, the radicalism of the Peace Decree program, the propaganda campaign launched in the pages of the Entente press against the Soviet government and the fear of general chaos and anarchy that would await Europe in the event of a victory of the pro-communist forces on the "Russian model", along with the patriotic, anti-German sentiments of the French and British, contributed to the much greater popularity of another program for withdrawing from the war, proclaimed on December 26, 1917 (January 8, 1918) by US President W. Wilson. 7. US Peace Program (Wilson's 14 Points) This 14-point American "peace charter" should be viewed as a kind of compromise between the annexationist projects of the members of the opposing blocs and the Soviet Peace Decree (which was issued two months earlier), although there was it would be erroneous to believe that Wilson simply borrowed certain provisions from various sources without introducing new ones into them. The strength and attractiveness of Wilson's program was in its relative moderation in comparison with the peace program of the Bolsheviks. Wilson proposed a new international order and mechanisms for its maintenance. But he did not encroach on breaking the socio-political structure of states in the process of creating a certain global supranational community. The program of the US leader was the fruit of the president's many years of meditation, the analysis of the current situation by his closest aides and the recommendations of numerous experts. Among the first eight points that Wilson called "mandatory" were the principles of open diplomacy, freedom of navigation, general disarmament, removal of barriers to trade, a fair solution to colonial disputes, the re-establishment of Belgium, the withdrawal of troops from Russian territory and, most importantly, the establishment of a body for coordination of world politics - the League of Nations. The remaining six more specific provisions provided for the return of Alsace and Lorraine to France, the granting of autonomy by the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, the revision of Italy's borders at the expense of Austria-Hungary, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Balkans, the internationalization of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and the creation of independent Poland with an access to Baltic Sea. With regard to Russia, Wilson's program contained a demand for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the occupied Russian lands. In addition, it was guaranteed non-interference in internal affairs and a full and unhindered opportunity to make an independent decision regarding its own political development and its national policies. This platform did not rule out a dialogue between the West and the Bolsheviks and Russia's return to the international community. Thus, the post-war world order in the American way was to be maintained not at the expense of the former "balance of power" of the great European powers that divided the world into spheres of influence, and not by creating a "world proletarian republic" without governments and borders, as the Bolsheviks proposed, but based on principles of democratic law and Christian morality, which would ensure collective security and social progress. It is quite understandable that such a vision of a new system of international relations was in disharmony with the line of Lloyd George and Clemenceau, who advocated that the Central Powers, and especially Germany, "would pay in full all the bills presented." Therefore, verbally supporting Wilson's ideas, the ruling circles of Great Britain and France viewed the 14 points as more of a utopia, designed to disguise the true goal of Washington - to acquire the position of a global leader after the end of the war. 8. The Factor of National Self-Determination in International Relations and the Politics of Great Powers The question of self-determination of the European and Asian peoples, who were primarily part of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman empires, occupied a very important place in international politics throughout the war. Even at the beginning of the war, Russia came up with the idea of \u200b\u200bcreating separate states of Czechs and Hungarians on the territories separated from Austria-Hungary (the plan of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.D. Sazonov), the transfer of lands inhabited by South Slavic peoples to Serbia, as well as the annexation of Polish and Ukrainian possessions monarchy of the Habsburgs to Russia itself. In fact, this was the first attempt to base the territorial reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe on the limitedly interpreted, selectively applied principle of national self-determination in the spirit of 19th century diplomacy and the classical understanding of the balance of power as the basis for the stability of international relations. This plan frightened France and Great Britain, since its implementation would lead to the complete destruction of Austria-Hungary and, more importantly, to a very significant strengthening of Russia's geopolitical positions in Europe. Nevertheless, the Western allies were forced to agree to the future unification of the Polish lands within Russia, provided they were granted autonomy rights. Russia's allies, as well as its opponents in the person of Germany and Austria-Hungary, grasped the national liberation expectations of the peoples of Eastern Europe better than the Russian government. They sought to gain influence on political organizations nationalists and, if possible, to win over to their side any national-patriotic forces and organizations and to subjugate the national-revolutionary impulse, the potential of which by the end of the war became more and more impressive. Germany and Austria-Hungary actively used the slogans of self-determination of the Poles against Russia in the territories of the Kingdom of Poland seized during the occupation, as well as other lands inhabited by Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Latvians. The German and Austro-Hungarian governments provided metered support to the Polish and Ukrainian nationalists, and the Austro-German troops sought to act as liberators of peoples from Russian domination. For its part, France also actively participated in the game with the national-patriotic forces, whose capital by the end of the war became, in fact, the center of the Polish and Czech national movements. Both blocs competed fiercely for the sympathies of the nationalists. The national-revolutionary factor would have been fully taken into account in the Bolshevik Peace Decree. However, the Bolsheviks rejected the selective implementation of the principle of self-determination of nations in the spirit of nineteenth-century European politics. They proclaimed it universal, applicable to all ethnic groups and any international political situation. In the Bolshevik interpretation, the principle of self-determination acquired an unlimited and extremely militant, militant character. Following the Decree, on November 15, 1917, the Bolsheviks issued the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, which proclaimed (in accordance with the Bolshevik party program) the right of all peoples of the Romanov empire to self-determination up to secession. On December 3, 1917, the Bolsheviks also announced an Appeal to all working Muslims of Russia and the East, imbued with a revolutionary liberation spirit, which undoubtedly indicated the desire of the Soviet government to lead the national liberation processes both in the West and in the East, directing them into a revolutionary channel. Occupying among the champions of self-determination by no means a priority place, US President W. Wilson in his program, willingly or unwillingly, synthesized the initiatives of his predecessors and, in his own compromise (in relation to the Sazonov plan and the Bolshevik Decree), interpreting the self-determination of nations. Wilson's interpretation downplayed the destructive charge inherent in the principle of self-determination and made it possible to count on the compatibility of the practice of self-determination with the specific interests of the most powerful world powers, including the United States itself and the "old imperial" powers such as Great Britain and France. Therefore, the Wilsonian interpretation of self-determination eventually became the most famous and authoritative in the world. It acquired a decisive character for the construction of most nation-building programs up to the 90s of the twentieth century. The entry into the war of the United States, which led to the popularization of the Wilson program, contributed to an increase in the role of the ethno-national and national-psychological components of international relations and all international negotiations regarding a new interstate order. Despite their wary attitude to the principle of self-determination, Great Britain and France began to reckon with it, pursuing their own interests whenever possible. 9. The peace initiatives of Soviet Russia and the reaction of the Entente countries and the Quadruple Alliance to them The Entente States, not without reason, saw in the Peace Decree the threat of violation of the Agreement and the Declaration of 1914 and 1915 on the non-conclusion of a separate peace, especially since already on November 6 (19), 1917 The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, General N.N. Dukhonin, received an order from the Bolshevik government to immediately propose an armistice to all states participating in the world war. Almost simultaneously, a note with proposals of similar content was handed over to the ambassadors of the Entente countries in Russia on November 9 (22). After Dukhonin's refusal to obey the order, he was removed, and the Soviet government began negotiations with Germany on its own, relying on the support of the masses of soldiers, who, at the call of the Bolsheviks, began to take power in their places of deployment. The Allied Powers watched in bewilderment. The central powers, on the contrary, immediately appreciated the prospects of a separate peace with the Bolsheviks, and on November 14 (27), 1917, Germany agreed to enter into peace negotiations. On the same day, the Council of People's Commissars again sent the Entente countries its proposals to take part in the peace conference. There was no response to this appeal, as well as to the previous and subsequent ones. In these conditions, the Bolsheviks decided to agree to an armistice with Germany. Brest-Litovsk, where the command of the German troops on the Eastern Front was located, was chosen as the venue for the armistice negotiations. The Soviet delegation was headed by A.A. Ioffe (a longtime associate of L.D. Trotsky). General M. Hoffmann was at the head of the German delegation. The intention of the Bolsheviks to negotiate on the basis of the principles set forth in the Decree on Peace was formally taken into account by the opposite side. But in reality the German side preferred to consider only military and territorial problems. The work of the delegations lasted with a break from November 20 (December 3) to December 2 (15), 1917.The parties reached an interim agreement on the cessation of hostilities for a period of 28 days. 10. Separate negotiations between Soviet Russia and the Austro-German bloc in Brest-Litovsk. Negotiations directly on a peace treaty between Russia and Germany with its allies in Brest-Litovsk opened on December 9 (22), 1917. Germany played the leading role at the peace conference. Its delegation was led by Foreign Minister Richard von Kühlmann, and the Austro-Hungarian delegation was led by Foreign Minister Count Ottokar Czernin. A.A. Ioffe was still at the head of the delegation of Soviet Russia. Proceeding from the principles set forth in the Decree on Peace, the Russian delegation put forward a program of peace talks, consisting of the following six points. "1) No forcible annexation of territories seized during the war is allowed. The troops occupying these territories are withdrawn from there as soon as possible. 2) The political independence of those peoples that were deprived of this independence during the present war is restored in full. groups that did not enjoy political independence before the war are guaranteed the opportunity to freely decide on their belonging to a particular state or on their state independence through a referendum ... 4) In relation to territories shared by several nationalities, minority rights are protected by special laws that ensure to him cultural and national independence and, if there is an actual possibility, administrative autonomy. 5) None of the belligerent countries is obliged to pay other countries the so-called "military costs" ... 6) Colonial issues are resolved in compliance with the principles stated in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 ". The program of the Soviet side was based on the ideas of a world without annexations and indemnities and the right of nations to self-determination. It was addressed, rather, to the working people of European states and peoples striving to gain independence, and was supposed to stimulate the development of revolutionary and national liberation movements. Russia wanted to avoid accusations of a separate deal with Germany, and it tried, at least formally and indirectly, to involve the Entente countries in the negotiations. The powers of the Quadruple Alliance accepted the rules of the game and decided to also use them for propaganda purposes. On December 12 (25), they announced that the conditions of the Russian delegation could be realized if all the powers participating in the war pledged to abide by them. This reservation was made with the understanding that the Entente countries, which negatively regard the separate negotiations between Russia and Germany, would not discuss the Russian program, as it happened. Territorial issues were the main ones at the conference. Each side interpreted the formula for peace without annexations and indemnities from the point of view of its own interests. Soviet - proposed to withdraw Russian troops from the parts of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Persia occupied by them, and the troops of the Quadruple Alliance from Poland, Lithuania and Courland and other regions of Russia. Promising to let the population of Poland and the Baltic states independently decide the question of the state structure, the Bolshevik leadership counted on the establishment of Soviet power there in the near future. The preservation of these lands in the orbit of German influence would exclude such a possibility. The German delegates refused to withdraw troops from Poland and the Baltic provinces, citing the declarations of the Bolsheviks themselves and their recognition of the principle of self-determination of the peoples of the former tsarist Russia. In the interpretation of Germany, the principle of self-determination in relation to Poland and the Baltic peoples was already implemented in practice on the lands occupied by German troops, with the agreement of the German military authorities and the local population. In response, the Russian side objected, pointing out the need for an open expression of the will of the population of the occupied territories regarding their self-determination with the obligatory preliminary withdrawal of the occupying troops. Due to the seriousness of the discrepancies, issues of territorial structure were even excluded from the preliminary draft of the treaty. On December 15 (28), 1917, at the suggestion of the Bolsheviks, a ten-day break was announced in the negotiations in order to enable other states to join them. The delegations left Brest-Litovsk for consultations. The Bolsheviks dragged out the negotiation process, believing that a revolution was about to take place in Germany, and this would significantly weaken its negotiating positions. 11. The Ukrainian question at the Brest-Litovsk Conference Work resumed on December 27, 1917 (January 9, 1918). The Russian delegation was headed by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.D. Trotsky. At the first meeting, R. von Kühlmann said that since the Entente countries have not accepted the formula of peace without annexations and indemnities proposed by Russia, the Quadruple Alliance will not negotiate on its basis either. The separate nature of the settlement in Brest-Litovsk was finally revealed. To put pressure on the Russian delegation, Germany and Austria-Hungary began to use the claims of the Ukrainian Central Rada for the formation of an independent Ukraine. This body, representing the interests of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist parties of Ukraine, was created in March 1917, immediately after february revolution in Petrograd, but really had no power. However, in the wake of events after the October coup of the Bolsheviks on November 3 (16), 1917, the General Secretariat of the Rada proclaimed it an organ of state power throughout Ukraine. On November 7 (20), 1917, the Central Rada, headed by M.S. Hrushevsky, V.K. Vinnichenko and S.V. Petlyura, published the III Universal, which proclaimed the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR). On November 11 (24), 1917, Petliura, who headed the armed forces of the new regime, announced that the Central Rada did not recognize the powers of the Council of People's Commissars in Petrograd and was taking the initiative to form a new central government for all of Russia from "representatives of nationalities and centers of revolutionary democracy." Provoking rivalry between the Bolshevik government in Petrograd and the Central Rada in Kiev, the Austro-German bloc blackmailed the Council of People's Commissars by threatening to involve the Kiev delegation in the negotiations. Meanwhile, in Ukraine, there was a struggle between the nationalist movements of the Rada supporters (based in Kiev) and the supporters of the Soviet regime (whose forces were concentrated in the Kharkiv region). Moreover, the leaders of the Rada tried to find support both at the Entente and at the Quadruple Alliance. On their way to Brest-Litovsk, they hoped that the German army would help them to establish themselves in power. At the same time, the leaders of the Rada claimed to annex to Ukraine a part of the Kholmsk province, which was part of Russia, the former Kingdom of Poland (Kholmskaya Rus' or Zabuzhie, where a significant Ukrainian population lived) and the Austro-Hungarian provinces of Bukovina and Eastern Galicia. The last demands inevitably clashed the Ukrainian delegation with Austria-Hungary. If its demands were met, the Rada was ready to provide the Central Powers with food, ore and agree to the establishment of foreign control over the railways passing through Ukraine. On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), even before the resumption of negotiations, the delegation of the Central Rada arrived in Brest-Litovsk, where its confidential consultations with representatives of Germany and Austria-Hungary began. The latter did not have a unified position on the Ukrainian issue. Austria-Hungary did not agree to the transfer of Bukovina and Galicia, or to the separation of Kholmshchyna. Meanwhile, the Rada's claims to Polish-Ukrainian lands were skillfully used by the German delegation to put pressure on the Austrian delegation, which, due to the internal instability of the situation in Austria-Hungary, was much more interested in Germany in concluding an early peace with Russia. Difficulties in the "Polish-Ukrainian" issue were partly due to the fact that the German high command objected to the transfer of Polish lands to anyone and insisted on their complete annexation to Germany. The position of the head of the German delegation to Germany, von Kühlmann, was more cautious, he objected to open annexation and preferred to talk about any version of an "amicable" agreement, which, without formally including Polish territory in Germany, would provide unlimited German influence on them. On the eve of the discussion of the most complex territorial problems on December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918), the Central Powers put the Ukrainian question on the agenda. It concerned the status of the Rada. The head of her delegation V. Golubovich made a statement on this matter. He stressed that Ukraine enters into international relations as an independent state, and therefore at the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, the delegation of the Ukrainian People's Republic is completely independent. At the same time, trying to soften the acuteness of his statement, Golubovich stressed that the declared independence of Ukraine does not exclude any form of state unity between Russia and Ukraine in the future. The note read by the General Secretariat of the UPR to all the belligerent and neutral powers said: "In an effort to create a federal union of all republics that have arisen at the moment on the territory of the former Russian Empire, the Ukrainian People's Republic, represented by the General Secretariat, is taking the path of independent international relations before time until a nationwide federal link is created in Russia and international representation is divided between the government of the Ukrainian Republic and the federal government of the future Federation. " Golubovich's reservations were explained by the fact that the territory actually controlled by the Rada was steadily shrinking under the blows of the Kharkov Soviet government, which was supported by Petrograd. Kiev leaders were afraid to make a complete break with the Bolsheviks, but at the same time, the weakness of the Rada's internal political positions forced it to seek international recognition at any cost in order to get official status as soon as possible and turn to foreign states for help. The Soviet delegation found itself in a difficult situation. If the government in Petrograd did not recognize the independent status of the Central Rada delegation by the government in Petrograd, Germany would receive formal grounds for conducting separate negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation, which in fact would mean the formation of an anti-Russian Ukrainian-German bloc. But if the claims of the Rada were supported, the Council of People's Commissars would in fact agree not only with the idea of \u200b\u200bindependence of Ukraine, but also with the fact that this new independent Ukraine would be represented by the government of the Central Rada hostile to the Bolsheviks, and not friendly soviet leadership Of Ukraine in Kharkov. Trotsky chose the middle option - to agree to the participation of the Rada delegates in the negotiations, but not to recognize the Rada as the government of Ukraine. Kuhlmann, who presided over the meeting that day, tried to get the Soviet delegation to provide a more complete explanation of the official position of the Russian side, but Trotsky evaded him. Nevertheless, on December 30, 1917 (January 12, 1918), Count Chernin made a general statement on behalf of the countries of the Quadruple Alliance. Determining the status of the delegation of the Central Rada and its government, he said: "We recognize the Ukrainian delegation as an independent delegation and as a plenipotentiary representation of the independent Ukrainian People's Republic. Formally, recognition by the Quadruple Union of the Ukrainian People's Republic as an independent state will find its expression in a peace treaty." 12. Problems of Poland and the Baltic States. "Hoffmann's Line" Along with Ukraine, the Soviet delegation attached great importance to the future of the outlying provinces of the former Russian Empire. In the very first days after the resumption of the conference, it was proposed to discuss territorial issues. The main disagreements concerned Poland, Lithuania and Courland. On December 30, 1917 (January 12, 1918), the Bolsheviks formulated their demands on controversial issues. They insisted that Germany and Austria-Hungary confirm their lack of intentions to seize any territory of the former Russian Empire from Soviet Russia.