Non-use of force or threat of force. The principle of non-use of force or the threat of force in the context of strengthening global processes. International law on the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force: theory and practice
Undoubtedly, the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force is central to the principles of international law. History shows the dire consequences of wars, when the right to war ("jus ad bellum") was considered the sovereign right of the state. That is why the modern system of international relations is inconceivable without observing the requirements of this principle.
The principle of non-use of force or threat of force as a universal norm is formulated in paragraph 4 of Art. 2 of the UN Charter. The normative content of this principle, in addition to the UN Charter, is disclosed in the Declaration of Principles of International Law 1970 p., UN General Assembly Resolution M 3314 (XXIX) of December 14, 1974 "Definition of Aggression" in the 1975 CSCE Final Act and in many other documents.
According to the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force, each state is obliged to abstain in its international relations from the threat or use of force as against territorial integrity or the political independence of any state, or in any other way incompatible with the goals of the UN. This is, first of all, about the inadmissibility of the use of force or the threat of it. "Use for the purpose of resolving international disputes. Moreover, both the direct use of force (for example, the invasion of the armed forces of one state into the territory of another state or military occupation) and the indirect use of force (for example, rendering assistance to one of the parties in a civil war or in organizing terrorist acts in another state).
The UN Charter and the Declaration of Principles of International Law do not indicate what should be understood by force, however, based on the content of other norms of the UN Charter and the aforementioned Declaration, we can conclude that this principle is aimed at non-use of previously armed forces against another state, but is not limited to only by them. Note that this principle prohibits the use of both force itself and the threat of its use. The latter can manifest itself, for example, in the form of an ultimatum that in case of failure to comply with the relevant requirements, force will be used against the state.
The use of armed forces against another state is considered aggression. The definition of aggression was filed in the UN General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1974 p. From which it follows that aggression is the use of armed force of a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state.
The principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force - Part 2
The first use of armed force by a state, contrary to the provisions of the UN Charter, is “prima facie” evidence of an act of aggression, but the UN Security Council may, according to the UN Charter, not recognize the relevant actions as an act of aggression due to other circumstances, in particular the fact that such actions or their consequences are not are of a rather serious nature. The said Resolution includes the following as acts of aggression: invasion or attack by the armed forces of a state on the territory of another state; any military occupation, if it was the result of an invasion or attack, the use of any weapon by one state against the territory of another state, even if it was not accompanied by an invasion of the armed forces; an attack by the armed forces of one state on the armed forces of another, the use of the armed forces of one state located by agreement with the host party on its territory, in violation of the terms of such an agreement, or any continuation of their stay on such territory after the termination of the agreement, the action of a state allowing its territory, which it placed at the disposal of another state, was used by the latter to commit an act of aggression against a third state; sending by a state of armed bands, groups, irregular forces or mercenaries for the purpose of using armed force against another state.The UN Charter provides for the use of force only in two cases. First, by decision of the UN Security Council in the event of a threat to peace, any violation of the peace or an act of aggression. Secondly (Articles 39, 42 of the UN Charter), in order to exercise the right to self-defense in the event of an armed attack, until the Security Council takes the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security (Article 51 of the UN Charter). In addition, this principle does not apply in the case of the use of force in domestic relations (for example, to suppress an uprising).
For analysis peacekeeping the priority is to consider the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force, first recorded in the UN Charter (paragraph 4 of article 2 and article 51).
The idea of inadmissibility of resolving controversial issues between states by means of war has been expressed by thinkers and politicians of many countries since ancient times. However, it was able to find its embodiment in a contractual form only in the twentieth century.
With regard to the realities that arose on the territory of the former Soviet Union after its collapse, the issue of the non-use of force was very acute. As you know, the Russian leadership was often accused of being ready to use armed force to restore the USSR or to achieve concessions from its closest neighbors (for example, to change borders). Moreover, some of Russia's actions in the so-called. the "near abroad" were unambiguously interpreted as aggression against the newly independent states. It was in this formulation that the Georgian leadership assessed the actions of the Russian military on the territory of Abkhazia in the first months of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict; President of Moldova M. Snegur also announced Russia's "military aggression" after the intervention of the 14th army in the conflict in Transnistria. At present, part of the Tajik opposition insists that the presence of the Russian 201st division on the territory of Tajikistan can also be qualified as Moscow's "aggression" against this country. Accordingly, Russia was accused of violating "generally recognized norms of international law," including the UN Charter, and the "victims of aggression" were demanded from the UN itself, represented by its Security Council, to take immediate and most severe measures to punish the aggressor.
Appearing in international law between the two wars, first as the principle of prohibiting aggressive war, the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force replaced the previously existing right of states to war (jus ad bellum).
According to the principle of prohibition of the use of force or the threat of force, all UN member states "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force either against the territorial inviolability or political independence of any state or in any other way incompatible with the goals of the United Nations" ( clause 4 of article 2).
An analysis of the documents disclosing the content of the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force leads to the conclusion that it is prohibited to:
1) any actions that constitute a threat by force or direct or indirect use of force against another state;
2) the use of force or the threat of force in order to violate the existing international borders of another state or to resolve international disputes, including territorial disputes and issues concerning state borders, or to violate international demarcation lines, including armistice lines;
3) reprisals with the use of armed force; these prohibited actions include, in particular, the so-called "peaceful blockade", i.e. blocking of ports of another state, carried out by the armed forces in peacetime;
4) organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries;
5) organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts civil war or the connivance of organizational activities within their own territory, aimed at the commission of such acts, in the event that the said acts are associated with the threat or use of force;
6) military occupation of the territory of the state, resulting from the use of force in violation of the UN Charter:
the acquisition of the territory of another state as a result of the threat or use of force;
acts of violence that deprive peoples of the right to self-determination, freedom and independence.
The practice of recent years confirms that the task of unconditionally affirming the principle of the non-use of force in international life, unfortunately, has not disappeared, but, on the contrary, has become even more urgent. Since the creation of the UN, humanity has come a long way, the world has changed significantly. These changes are simultaneously fraught with new opportunities and new dangers.
International security, as noted in the Declaration on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the Principle of Renunciation of Threats or its Use in International Relations, approved at the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly in 1987, should be based on the principles of non-use of force, peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and the right of free choice and independent development of each country.
The Declaration consistently promotes the idea that international security consists of security in various regions, and indicates that States parties to regional agreements or bodies should consider the possibility of wider use of such agreements and bodies to resolve issues related to the maintenance of international peace and security. , in accordance with Art. 52 of the UN Charter. Thus, the declaration reflected the idea, which has not lost its relevance today, that in the struggle for universal security, for the exclusion of war from the life of society, all international institutions and forms, and above all such a universal body of cooperation between states as the United Nations.
Thus, the provisions of the UN Charter and the declarations developing them oblige all UN members to settle peacefully all disputes that may threaten international peace and security. The fact that these provisions of the UN Charter reflect profound changes in international law and are of exceptional importance has found wide recognition among both lawyers and governments. Far from being an expression of utopian hopes for the restructuring of international relations, contained in Art. 2 of the UN Charter, legal norms regarding the use of force reflect a deep and realistic assessment of the destructive potential modern warfare and a greatly increased commitment by governments to prevent such a war from occurring.
The principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes is also closely linked to the principle of the non-use of force. According to him, all disputes between states, of whatever nature and whatever their origin, should be resolved only by peaceful means.
The peaceful settlement (or resolution) of disputes is unanimously regarded as one of the basic international legal principles.
Hardly anyone would object to the assertion that conflict situations arising on the territory of the former Soviet Union should be resolved by peaceful means. The question is different: can this principle be absolutized in relation to post-Soviet realities, and if not, then under what circumstances and under what conditions should this principle be abandoned? Are there any objective criteria for the development of a conflict situation that make the use of forceful methods of conflict resolution acceptable and justified?
The creation of the UN and the adoption of its Charter led to the consolidation of the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes in international law, which has become generally recognized and universally binding. It should be noted that "the UN Charter ... introduces a major innovation in international law, unconditionally requiring the resolution ... of a dispute between states by one of the peaceful means and, thus, excluding the possibility of declaring war." The consolidation of the principle in a more specific and precise form allowed the UN Charter to take a step forward compared to the previously existing formulations of the principle, since in it, in addition to the obligation of states to resolve all disputes between them only by peaceful means, the obligation of states not to use force or the threat of force in the settlement their disputes.
In the UN Charter, the provision on the peaceful settlement of international disputes referred to in paragraph 1 of Art. 1, p. 3, Art. 2, paragraph 4 of Art. 3, Art. 14, art. 52, in chap. VI, VII, etc. Chapter VI provides the Security Council with the opportunity to “investigate any dispute or any situation that may lead to international tensions” and “recommend such conditions for resolving the dispute as it deems appropriate”, however, they should not be related to the use of the armed forces. In Art. 33 lists the methods of peaceful settlement of disputes: negotiation, examination, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, litigation, recourse to regional bodies or agreements, or other peaceful means at the discretion of the parties to the dispute. In addition, according to Art. 41 (Chapter VII), the Security Council may apply to restore peace a set of measures that are also not related to the use of armed forces, which constitute a "full or partial interruption economic relations, rail, sea, air, post, telegraph, radio or other means of communication, as well as the severance of diplomatic relations. "
Thus, the UN Charter not only enshrined the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes in a precise and concrete form, but also obliged states to resolve all disputes between them exclusively by peaceful means, without resorting to force or use of weapons.
For the analysis of the content of the Principle of the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, it seems essential to determine the scope of this principle's application.
In the practice of international legal analysis of disagreements, in addition to the category of "dispute", the category "situation" is also used. At the present stage, a clear distinction between the concepts of "dispute" and "situation", as well as precise definition these concepts are missing. The Charter also does not provide a definition of the concepts of "dispute" and "situation", and an analysis of those articles of the Charter in which these concepts are encountered cannot serve as a basis for their clear delineation.
There are two types of disputes and situations: the continuation of some threatens international peace and security, the continuation of others is not associated with such a threat. In the light of the goals of the UN, it is more important to settle disputes and situations of the first type, at the same time, in the context of these same goals, any disputes and situations must be settled, because those of them that do not threaten international peace and without danger still cause international friction. The presence of such frictions complicates the development of friendly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation between states, complicates the process of creating comprehensive international security.
The UN Charter does not establish criteria for dividing disputes and situations into these two categories. The resolution of this issue is within the competence of the Security Council. According to Art. 34 of the Charter, "The Security Council is empowered to investigate any dispute or any situation that may lead to international friction or a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuation of this dispute or situation may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." Has not developed general criteria for dividing disputes and situations into the indicated categories and UN practice. This difficult task cannot be satisfactorily resolved primarily because the question of whether or not a dispute or a situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security is due to the specific circumstances of each particular dispute, and also largely depends on the nature of foreign policy disputing or involved in the situation of the parties. In any case, it seems indisputable that the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes includes in its sphere of action all international disputes and situations, regardless of whether they threaten or do not threaten international peace and security.
The essence of the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes lies not only in the fact that international disputes should be resolved by peaceful means, but in the fact that they should be resolved only by peaceful means, exclusively by peaceful means, i.e. no use of force is allowed in the settlement of international disputes. Prof. I.P. Blishchenko and M.L. Entin note that the provisions of the UN Charter and the 1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law that the settlement of an international dispute should be carried out "in such a way as not to endanger international peace and security and justice" and "in accordance with the principles of international law" also indicate into three essential elements that characterize the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes. The result of a peaceful settlement should in no case pose a threat to international peace and security, hurt the interests of third countries, create new conflict situations or, without resolving the dispute in essence, without eliminating the causes of the conflict, leave a constant possibility of aggravating the "latent conflict between states."
The principles of the non-use of force or the threat of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes are reflected in the basic empirical provisions on which the UN peacekeeping activity is based. Principles of consent of the parties, impartiality peacekeeping forces and the non-use of force are generally recognized and fundamental to both UN peacekeeping practices and peacekeeping operations by national governments and international organizations (e.g., British Commonwealth Observer Force in Rhodesia / Zimbabwe, Multinational Force in Beirut, Arab Defense Force in Lebanon).
The advantage of peacekeeping operations based on the above principles is obvious. They are distinguished by the ability to achieve the objectives of the operation with minimal material costs and the use of a small number of military observers or military contingents. In addition, adherence to the principles of impartiality and neutrality, as a rule, ensures the support of the local population, without which all efforts of peacekeepers may be fruitless (this is clearly demonstrated by the experience of peacekeeping operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia), and, equally important, guarantees the day-to-day security of the military. bases and personnel.
However, in the event of an escalation of violence, this approach does not provide real opportunities to influence the conflicting parties. Its negative side was demonstrated in a very brutal way during the crisis in the Middle East in 1967 - the expulsion of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) from Egypt and the subsequent unleashing of war between Israel and a number of Arab countries. The UN presence in Cyprus in 1972 and in Lebanon in 1982 did not prevent the disturbance of order, foreign aggression and the seizure of territories.
The obvious limitations of the principles of impartiality and the non-use of force, the desire to get rid of the inherent drawbacks of peacekeeping and the urgent need to resolve the flaring conflicts have led to a shift in emphasis towards the use of force.
The successes achieved by the UN through the use of force cannot be denied. Thus, the successful holding of elections in Namibia in 1989 was ensured, among other things, by the approval of UN representatives, or at least their tacit consent to the use of force against agents of the South West African People's Organization. The preemptive deployment of troops in Macedonia, which is, in fact, an overtly military operation, has prevented possible attacks on the former Yugoslav Republic. The UN-approved war in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and the NATO bombing strikes against Serb positions in the former Yugoslavia in 1995 certainly helped to achieve the objectives of the ongoing operations and prevent further escalation of conflicts. However, they raised the following questions, which, at the moment, cannot be answered unambiguously.
To what extent is the abandonment of the principles of the non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes consistent with the goals and objectives of the United Nations? And is not peacekeeping in this case just a flexible technique, the legal basis, goals and method of which can be radically adjusted depending on the opportunistic political interests? Is it worth using the peacekeeping mechanism at all and using UN troops in situations that obviously require a forceful approach? Resolving these issues would give a new impetus to peacekeeping operations and bring them to a new qualitative level.
It is no less relevant to the problem of resolving conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Distinguishing conceptually between peacekeeping operations and the conduct of hostilities, this decision seems to allow Russia to develop a more balanced and definite approach to the settlement of conflicts in the CIS. It would prevent the involvement of Russia in situations like Tajikistan, when peacekeeping tasks are assigned to regular combat units simultaneously with tasks to protect the borders and prevent a third party from becoming involved in the conflict. This confusion of tasks inevitably leads to uncertainty and a lack of legitimacy for the status of peacekeepers, and willy-nilly forces them to side with the existing regime.
The principle of territorial integrity and the right of nations to self-determination
In a unified formulation with the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force, paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN Charter enshrines the principle of the territorial integrity of states. The Charter obliged all UN members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial inviolability of states.
This principle was further developed in the 1970 Declaration of Principles, although it did not mention its name and did not separately set out its content. Nevertheless, the content of the first principle of the Declaration literally reproduces the wording of paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN Charter, which combines two principles: the principle of non-use of force or threat by force and the principle of territorial integrity of states. Revealing the content of paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN Charter, the Declaration reflected many elements of the principle of territorial integrity, in particular, it was established that each state "must refrain from any actions aimed at violating the national unity and territorial integrity of any state or country." It was also noted that the territory of a state should not be an object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in violation of the use of force, in violation of the provisions of the UN Charter, "and that" the territory of a state should not be an object of acquisition by another state as a result of the threat or use of force. "
Despite the seemingly obvious unambiguity of this principle, its application to problems arising in the territory of the former Soviet Union has raised and continues to raise numerous questions. Being one of the most important signs of independence and statehood, territorial integrity has become one of the most painful problems that arose after the transition of the USSR as an integral political entity to fifteen new independent states. The main difficulty lies in changing the status of "internal", in fact, administrative borders in the former Soviet Union, to state ones. The fact that many of these borders are not perceived as legitimate could not but pose a serious challenge to relations between the newly formed states. In this situation, any real or potential claims inevitably become a source of serious conflicts at the interstate level.
This problem manifested itself most dramatically in the armed clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria and Chechnya. In the last four conflicts, Russia, to a greater or lesser extent, was directly involved.
Thus, Russia is faced with topical conceptual issues that are directly related to the principle of territorial integrity. What concrete actions of Russia in relation to neighboring states can be interpreted as an encroachment on their territorial integrity? For example, how true are the statements of the Ukrainian leaders that a number of resolutions The State Duma Russia with regard to the situation in Crimea, is it nothing more than encouraging separatism and undermining the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state? Or statements by some politicians in Latvia and Estonia in the sense that Russia's support for the Russian-speaking population of these countries is incompatible with the principle of the territorial integrity of states?
One of the pressing problems of modern international law is the problem of the relationship between the principle of territorial integrity and the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations, which often underlies many ethnic conflicts.
According to E.A. Lukasheva, “interethnic relations is one of the burning problems of our time. on the one hand, and with the preservation of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, on the other; they require a solution to the problem of the legal status of national minorities, a harmonious combination of human rights and the rights of the people, legal regulation of interethnic conflicts. "
The principle of self-determination of peoples as a mandatory norm was developed after the adoption of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, it should be noted that one of the most important goals of the UN is to develop friendly relations between nations based on respect for the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples ... "(Clause 2, Article 1). This goal is specified in many provisions of the Charter. In Article 55 , for example, it is closely associated with the task of raising the standard of living, the decision international issues in the economic and social spheres, in the spheres of health care, education, culture, observance of human rights, etc.
For some time after the adoption of the UN Charter, the Western doctrine of international law expressed doubts about the legal basis of the principle of self-determination of peoples. However, the intensive process of decolonization in the late 50s - early 60s and the adoption on December 14, 1960 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples put an end to such doubts. The Declaration began to be viewed as the UN's official interpretation of the content of the principle of self-determination of peoples.
Without dwelling in detail on the evolution of views on the principle of self-determination, since this is not part of our task, we can state that its content, based on the analysis of documents and doctrine, by the end of the 70s included the following main elements:
a) all peoples and nations have the right to self-determination;
b) all participants in international communication are obliged to respect this right;
c) it is realized through the free expression of the will of a given people or nation;
d) its implementation excludes any pressure, coercion or interference from the outside;
e) it means the possibility of choosing between the state separation of a given people or nation and the entry of him (her) on certain conditions into another state, that is, a free choice of political status;
f) it also means the ability to choose the form of the state (i.e. the form of government, state structure, political regime);
g) it, finally, means the possibility of choosing the socio-economic system and the paths of its development.
Naturally, these elements are interconnected, and one choice can predetermine the other. For example, the entry of a people (or nation) into a state also means the choice of the existing socio-economic system, etc.
It should be noted that in relation to the principle of self-determination of peoples, both Western and Russian researchers split into two opposite camps. Some glorify the role and significance of the right of nations to self-determination, while others see it as a manifestation of overt nationalism and separatism.
During the Cold War, in the conditions of East-West confrontation, the interpretation of the principle of self-determination of peoples was strongly politicized. The USSR and its allies actively supported the anti-Western orientation of the interpretation of this principle.
Various resolutions of UN bodies, directly or indirectly, repeatedly stressed the right of states and the international community as a whole to provide assistance to peoples fighting for their liberation. So, in Art. 7 The definition of aggression, approved by the UN General Assembly on December 14, 1974, states: "Nothing in this definition can in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence of peoples that are forcibly deprived of this right, in particular peoples under the rule of colonial and racist regimes or under other forms of foreign domination, as well as the right of these peoples to fight this goal and to seek and receive support ... "
In Western legal practice, disagreement was expressed with the fact that foreign states have the right to provide material assistance to national liberation movements. Western countries believed that aid should be limited to moral and diplomatic support, while Afro-Asian and former socialist states interpreted the term "support" used in the definition of aggression to include material support (for example, weapons).
However, by the end of the 80s - the beginning of the 90s. Western and Russian positions on the question of self-determination of peoples began to converge. During this period, both Western and Russian literature began to express the opinion that state separation is not the form of self-determination that plays the main role in the exercise of the right to self-determination. So, Yu.A. Reshetov supports the point of view of M. Kampelman (USA), who believes that the right to secession is not a right under international law, although it can be part of a constitutional procedure, he calls the reduction of the right to self-determination to the right to secession an extremist interpretation of this right. At the same time S.V. Chernichenko disagrees with the categorical denial that the right to self-determination includes the right to secession. In his opinion, the right to secession is by no means always a mandatory component of the right to self-determination. In other words, the right to self-determination can include the right to secede only if certain conditions are met.
The inadmissibility of national self-determination leading to the destruction of the national unity and territorial integrity of the country is emphasized in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960. It says: "... Any attempt aimed at partially or completely destroying national unity and the territorial integrity of the country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations ... ".
The same provision was reflected in the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on June 25, 1993. In this document, after the provisions confirming the right of all peoples to self-determination and, accordingly, their right to take any legal action in accordance with the Charter The UN to implement it, states: "According to the Declaration of Principles of International Law ..., the above should not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that violates or undermines, in whole or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states that respect the principle equality and self-determination of peoples, and therefore have governments that represent the interests of all the people on their territory without any distinction. "
In order to understand the principle of self-determination, it seems important to find the conclusions reached in his research on minorities by A. Eide, a member of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. He argues that the right to self-determination belongs to peoples living in colonial territories outside Europe, over which colonial or similar control has been established by European states or states subsequently settled by immigrants from Europe. Attempts to use the concept of colonialism in other situations complicate this problem and should not be considered within the framework of the concept of "decolonization". He goes on to say that the right to self-determination belongs to peoples living in territories occupied or annexed after the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945.
In his opinion, members of federations have the right to withdraw, if this right is enshrined in their constitutions. At the same time, he emphasizes that: "In such situations, the right to self-determination, based on the principle of voluntary association, applies only to the union republics, and not to smaller formations that could have different regimes of autonomy under the previous order."
"In other cases, the question of the unilateral right to self-determination is extremely doubtful. This right is secondary to the fundamental principle of territorial integrity, provided that the state observes the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples and has a government that includes representatives of the entire population, without any -or differences on the basis of race, religion or skin color. It should be remembered that the basis of the principle of self-determination is the right of the population to participate in the government as an entity. When the government does not create opportunities for participation in this process of all segments of the population and all peoples, then the question of the right to self-determination of various groups of the population becomes more pressing. "
Thus, it seems that the question of secession can be raised only when the state does not respect the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples and when the corresponding people are not given the opportunity to participate in the management of this state.
However, the question of how states that believe that the people living within their borders cannot claim the right to secede must prove that they respect the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples, and their governments represent the entire people, without distinction of race, religion or color, is not amenable to detailed legal regulation and remains open at the moment.
The correlation between the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination of nations is by no means only a theoretical problem of international law, it is no less relevant for the UN peacekeeping practice. First of all, this is due to the tendency that emerged in 1991 towards an increase in the importance of territorial problems as a source of conflicts. Since 1990, all major armed conflicts in Europe have been, in one way or another, associated with territorial problems. This statement is also true for Asia and the Near and Middle East.
On the one hand, the brutality, high level of violence and the large number of refugees that distinguish ethnic conflicts require decisive measures from the UN to resolve them, on the other hand, difficulties in reaching an agreement between the conflicting parties, the lack of sustainable agreements and a high risk for UN military personnel ( the risk of turning from peacekeepers into hostages, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia) lead to the conclusion that a more cautious and careful approach is needed when developing a mandate for such operations. And first of all, it concerns the conceptual approach.
How productive can UN involvement in ethnic and territorial conflicts be? As the very recent experience shows, the UN presence could not stop the mass extermination of Hutu in Rwanda, the international community and the UN participation in the operation in the former Yugoslavia are ambiguously perceived by the world community. What goals should be pursued by such operations: is not the stabilization of the conflict in this situation a violation of the right of nations to self-determination, since in such cases it is beneficial to the official government? At what point does the right of nations to self-determination turn into separatism?
The practice of UN peacekeeping does not provide answers to these questions; moreover, it reveals the complexity and ambiguity of this problem. As an illustration, it suffices to cite the problem of the Kurdish population in Iraq and Turkey. The world community, and in particular the UN Security Council, approve of the measures taken by the United States to protect the Kurdish population in Iraq: US aircraft flights over Iraqi territory, the creation of special zones and even bombing strikes on Baghdad. However, the same problem with the same national minority in Turkey does not make the world community want to take such drastic measures to resolve it and does not go further than speculations about the violation of human rights in Turkey. Thus, one example is enough to illustrate that support for the right of a national minority to self-determination is not always caused by the real concern of the world community about it, sometimes it hides the national interests of one or several powers that stand up for the observance of international law.
The question of self-determination remains very acute for the entire post-Soviet space. According to statistics, about 25 million ethnic Russians and over 11 million representatives of other ethnic groups who consider Russian their native language ended up outside the Russian Federation, and the total number of people who, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, found themselves outside the territories that they could consider as According to the national criterion, "ours" exceed 70 million. As a result, a huge part of the population of all the former Soviet republics faced serious psychological difficulties in adapting to the new conditions. In addition, the situation is aggravated by the fact that, on the one hand, states that have compactly living national minorities or autonomies on their territory are extremely sensitive to the idea of self-determination up to secession (the problem of Karabakh in Azerbaijan and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia). On the other hand, in many cases, the underdevelopment of democratic institutions and political ethnocentrism actually exclude minorities from the management process (for example, it is no secret to anyone that the political elite of Kazakhstan is predominantly mono-ethnic, despite the clearly multi-ethnic nature of the state and the formal equality of all citizens of Kazakhstan before law).
In addition, the presence of ethnically close groups on the territory of neighboring countries, which, moreover, are subjected to discrimination, gives rise to the temptation to emphasize the principle of self-determination. Above all, such a situation poses a danger to Russia, where arguments in favor of using force to protect Russians are widely supported by certain political circles. It is unclear how the security of millions of Russians, who may become potential or real victims of conflicts in the near abroad, will be ensured with the help of regular armed forces, but it is quite obvious that the approval of such a policy will irreparably damage both the international prestige of Russia and the entire post-Soviet development.
The principle of sovereign equality, human rights and the problem of interference in the internal affairs of states
The basis of modern international relations is the sovereign equality of states, which in its most general form is reflected in paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the UN Charter. This clause states that "The Organization is founded on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members."
With regard to the new states that have emerged on the territory of the former Soviet Union, the issue of state sovereignty is especially acute. Despite the numerous statements by the political leaders of these new formations about independence and sovereignty, it is not yet possible to speak about the finally formed statehood of at least some of these countries. This is primarily due to the lack of experience and structures in most of them for the formation of an independent state apparatus; economic crisis; the lack of formation of national armies, the loyalty of which is manifested rather at the local than at the national level; lack of experience in decision-making in the military sphere; unresolved territorial and regional disputes. To a lesser extent, these issues are relevant for Russia, the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
Nevertheless, the political and economic instability of the situation even in the state-established republics of the former Soviet Union, aggravated by numerous armed conflicts flaring up in the immediate vicinity of their borders, raise a number of questions directly related to the problem of state sovereignty. To what extent can Russia or other post-Soviet states interfere in the internal affairs of their neighbors without violating the principle of sovereign equality? What forms should this intervention take if it is recognized as necessary? To what extent and at what point is it necessary for international organizations to intervene in conflicts in the post-Soviet space?
In addition, a number of aspects of the conduct of peacekeeping operations also directly affect the principle in question. In theory, in multilateral peacekeeping operations (for example, in Tajikistan), all participating states should have equal responsibilities and have equal rights. In fact, multilateral peacekeeping operations in the CIS are transnational, i.e. in essence, they are carried out by Russia with one or another symbolic participation of other states of the Commonwealth. Is it permissible to raise the question of sovereign equality - including with regard to the management of peacekeeping operations - in the context of the clearly unequal contribution of individual participants in the conduct of these operations?
In this regard, interpretation of the principle of sovereign equality and its reflection in the UN peacekeeping practice seems to be especially important for the post-Soviet states.
The classic interpretation of the concept of sovereign equality, reflected in the 1970 Declaration of Principles, includes the following elements:
a) states are legally equal;
b) each state enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;
c) each state is obliged to respect the legal personality of other states;
d) the territorial integrity and political independence of the state are inviolable;
e) each state has the right to freely choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems;
f) each state is obliged to fulfill fully and in good faith its international obligations and to live in peace with other states.
Other elements of the principle of sovereign equality include the right of states to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be parties to bilateral and multilateral treaties, including union treaties, as well as their right to neutrality. It should be noted that attempts to compile a complete list of elements of the principle under consideration are futile, bearing in mind the dynamics of international relations.
In the classical interpretation of sovereignty, instability and unrest were considered a serious obstacle to the formation of a durable society, which could only be overcome with the help of a strong and viable government, which established "sovereignty" over the territory and its population with a firm hand. Although the forms of government could be different - monarchy, aristocracy, democracy - it was essential that governments retained the ability to establish order precisely by asserting and strengthening sovereignty.
However, at the moment, the objective laws of the development of international relations, their gradual democratization have led to a significant narrowing of the content of the concept of sovereignty. The strengthening of the interdependence of countries in the world, the globalization of all ongoing processes lead to the fact that the fragmentation and even more so the disintegration of individual countries are becoming more dangerous and to a greater extent affect the system of international relations as a whole; in these conditions, even the great powers become more dependent in making their decisions from less developed and weaker states. In addition, moral and legal recognition of the importance of areas such as the protection of human rights, the limitation of weapons and the conservation environment, create the preconditions for expanding the understanding of states of their national interests. All this leads to the need for the international community to intervene in conflicts that previously belonged to the internal competence of states.
Moreover, according to many experts, it is the internal conflicts at the present stage that pose the main threat to international peace and security. Apparently, in general, the whole global politics the end of the XX - beginning of the XXI century will be characterized to a greater extent by internal upheavals, civil wars and social cataclysms in individual countries than by wars between them. In these conditions, the preservation and even strengthening of stability at the level of international relations may turn out to be a dangerous illusion concealing destabilization at other levels. [Some authors believe that many recent interstate conflicts are de facto internal conflicts, or at least directly generated by the latter. According to one study, of the 200 largest conflicts since World War II, 85% were internal rather than interstate.]
Such a prospect is capable of creating new difficulties in the activities of the United Nations, since the UN Charter does not provide for the participation of the Organization in resolving internal conflicts. Moreover, in paragraph 7 of Art. 2 states that "this Charter in no way gives the United Nations the right to intervene in matters essentially within the internal competence of any state", except in cases related to "the use of coercive measures pursuant to Chapter VII."
At the same time, it should be noted that modern international law does not contain an exclusive list of cases related to the internal jurisdiction of states. Moreover, in last years there was a tendency towards narrowing the sphere of the so-called "internal competence of states."
Based on the UN practice, according to O. Shakhtar, at least three types of armed internal conflicts cannot be regarded only as an internal affair of states:
Conflicts that threaten international peace and security.
Conflicts between the people of a Non-Self-Governing Territory and the administering Power.
Conflicts accompanied by massive and gross violations of human rights.
In addition, the situation loses the character of internal competence in the event of the threat of hunger, epidemics, large-scale environmental disasters (Somalia and Angola); mass deaths of civilians, flows of refugees from the conflict zone (Cambodia and especially the persecution of Kurds in northern Iraq), threats of proliferation nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction (Iraq, potentially North Korea).
Sometimes the threat of terrorism emanating from a given state or from its territory is also added to this list; the threat to democratic norms and human rights in this territory (Haiti), the need to ensure access to vital sources of raw materials and energy for the world economy; restrictions on the arms trade, etc.
The above list of factors that determine possible international intervention in internal conflicts clearly demonstrates the growing trend of the role of humanitarian and ethical aspects in the decision to intervene by the international community. The practical experience of peacekeeping operations, in turn, testifies that the ethical prerequisites for intervention are only valid when they are supported by the national interests of the intervening party, a low degree of risk to peacekeeping forces, real chances for a quick stabilization of the situation in the conflict zone and the availability of financial resources for carrying out operations. The American "humanitarian intervention" in Somalia is a clear example of this.
However, even in the presence of all the necessary factors that determine the successful implementation of the goals of the intervention, it legal basis is fundamental. The solution to this issue is directly related to the problem of criticism of the concept of state sovereignty.
In the Western tradition, there are several main lines of justification of the admissibility of international intervention (up to armed intervention) in the affairs of independent states by the world community. The first direction is the statement of the stability of the international system as the highest value and, as a consequence, the recognition of the possibility of using military force to restore the balance of power in cases of its violation.
Another line of criticism of sovereignty and justification of foreign intervention goes back to the traditional Western European division of the world into "civilized" and "uncivilized" countries. The sovereignty of the latter (China, Ethiopia, Persia, Morocco, etc.) was questioned, and sometimes even rejected as an international legal category. International interference in their internal affairs was seen as a kind of police action, and not as an action against an independent state. A police action does not require international legal registration; the task is only to ensure that police departments of different states do not operate on the same territory.
In any case, intervention was considered more acceptable if it was carried out not by one state, but by a group of powers (or at least with the consent of the main participants in the international system).
Most often, interference in the internal affairs of new states is justified by references to their inferiority in relation to the stable countries of the West. Moreover, in American political science in recent times the term "failed state" appeared, i.e. a state that can no longer regulate the life of society, economic and political relations, and which, therefore, can no longer claim sovereignty. In 1993, Somalia, Liberia, Peru, Haiti and some others are considered to be such "failed states". Of course, relations with "failed states" cannot be built on the basis of generally recognized norms of international law. In particular, Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter concerning non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states cannot be applied to “failed states”.
Conceptually, the task is how to define the "failed state", what social, political, institutional and other criteria should be taken into account. The most consistent supporters of classical international law argue that interventions are permissible only when the state is unable to ensure the safety of citizens or foreigners on its territory; the objectives of the intervention should be strictly limited to the task of ensuring such security.
At the moment, the "civilizational approach" is used rather to protect the Western world from excessive involvement in internal conflicts of countries with transitional economic and political systems, fraught with large human and material losses. The idea of value incompatibility and the danger or uselessness of introducing the universal Western norms of political democracy on an alien soil is being developed. These sentiments are reinforced by the disappointment of a number of governments, in connection with the expansion of the sphere of peacekeeping, in the ability of the UN to act productively in the context of the confusion of ethnic conflicts and civil wars, and their unwillingness to increase the costs of these operations in such conditions.
Some American authors are attempting to develop a strict rule of thumb that protects the United States from excessive involvement in foreign affairs, including in UN peacekeeping operations, which consists of a speculative division of the world into "zones of peace" and "zones of unrest." With this classification, 85% of the world belongs to zones of unrest and little can be done about this.
With regard to Russia, this approach presupposes a significant interest of the international community in its peacekeeping actions, and in general Russian policy, carried out in the European part of the post-Soviet space, while for the events taking place in Central Asia and the Caucasus, it disclaims responsibility, leaving behind itself the right only to correct Russian actions. The absence of any significant support from the UN and OSCE in peacekeeping actions in Abkhazia or Tajikistan is a direct confirmation of this. The OSCE's interest in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which it has shown recently, is linked more with the problem of Caspian oil than with a change in the intended trend. All this can lead not so much to the solution of emerging conflicts as to their localization within the borders acceptable to the West, which will lead to the isolation of the former Soviet republics with the dubious role of Russia.
In the UN peacekeeping practice, the issue of the relationship between the principle of sovereign equality and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs with the principle of universal respect for human rights is of the greatest importance.
On the one hand, the UN Charter cannot be the basis for interference in the internal affairs of any state, and on the other hand, the issue of moral responsibility of the UN, which proclaimed the highest values of respect for human rights and the dignity and value of the human person, requires it to take measures in case of political weakness. power and social self-government, leading to the threat of starvation, as was the case in Somalia, or the barbaric campaigns of "ethnic cleansing" carried out in Bosnia.
Raised by Pérez de Cuellar, UN Secretary General, the question of the need to develop a "new concept that reconciles law and morality", and supported by his successor B. Boutros-Ghali in his report to the Security Council, in which he notes that "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty passed ", and emphasizes the need to" find a balance between the need for correct leadership of the country and the requirements of the current increasingly interdependent world ", at the moment has not found its final solution.
According to UN peacekeeping practice, it has become generally accepted to consider an intervention to be legitimate if it is carried out with the consent of the host government. This position compels even the great powers that engage in unilateral intervention to provide such an excuse for themselves. (As an example, we can consider the US operation under the auspices of the UN in Korea 1950-1952.)
Apparently, such a basis for intervention is the most acceptable from the point of view of Russia, since intervention on the basis of the consensus of the members of the UN Security Council, accepted by the international community with increasing readiness, has very dim prospects for Russia. As a rule, the Security Council mandate is issued in the event of a complete political and economic collapse of one or another state, when the central government no longer controls the situation on the country's territory - as in the case of the American "humanitarian intervention" in Somalia. Or when the position of the central government is so weak that UN mediation seems to be the last straw for the crumbling regime to grab.
In any case, the preferable is the intervention carried out on multilateral basis... It lends itself more easily to legitimization, since it looks quite convincingly as an expression of the common will of a certain collective on the basis of generally accepted values, and does not reflect only the special interests of a separate state. In this sense, the problem of resolving conflicts in the post-Soviet space lacks the support of international organizations such as the UN and the OSCE, or at least the political will of the CIS members.
Principle of non-use of force or threat of force appeared in international law in the period between the two world wars, first as a principle of prohibition of aggressive war. This principle replaced the pre-existing right of a state to war (jus ad bellum) in international law, according to which each state could resort to war against another state in the event of any dispute between them.
The principle of prohibition on the use of force or the threat of force- regulation of social relations associated with the non-violation of the world, with the observance of the right of all members of the international community and the individual to live in a non-violent world, with the prohibition to resolve controversial issues of international relations by force.
For the first time, the principle of non-use of force or threat of force was proclaimed in the UN Charter. Clause 4 of Art. 2 of the Charter states: "All Members of the United Nations shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force either against the territorial inviolability or political independence of any state or in any other way incompatible with the Purposes of the United Nations."
The authoritative interpretation of the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force is given in such documents as the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, 1970, Definition of Aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974, Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1975 and the Declaration on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1987.
After analyzing these documents, we can conclude that the following are prohibited:
1) any actions that constitute a threat by force or direct or indirect use of force against another state;
2) the use of force or the threat of force in order to violate the existing international borders of another state or to resolve international disputes, including territorial disputes and issues relating to state borders, or to violate international demarcation lines, including armistice lines;
3) reprisals with the use of armed force; these prohibited actions include, in particular, the so-called "peaceful blockade", i.e. blocking of ports of another state, carried out by the armed forces in peacetime;
4) organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenary activities;
5) organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil war, or terrorist attacks in another state or the connivance of organizational activity within its own territory, aimed at the commission of such acts, in the event that the said acts are associated with the threat of force or its use;
6) military occupation of the territory of the state, resulting from the use of force in violation of the UN Charter;
7) the acquisition of the territory of another state as a result of the threat or use of force;
8) violent actions depriving peoples of the right to self-determination, freedom and independence.
The 1974 definition of aggression establishes a list (not exhaustive) of these actions prohibited by international law, which are the most serious and dangerous forms of illegal use of force and aggression.
One of the important norms of modern international law, closely related to the principle of prohibition of the use of force or the threat of force, is the right to self-defense. This rule is formulated in Art. 51 of the UN Charter; it provides, inter alia: "This Charter does not in any way affect the inalienable right to individual or collective self-defense in the event of an armed attack on a Member of the Organization, until the Security Council takes the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." ...
The International Court of Justice, in its Nicaragua-US judgment, rejected the US's reference to the use of armed force against Nicaragua in self-defense. The court stated: “In the case of the right to individual self-defense, the exercise of this right can only take place if the State concerned has been the victim of an armed attack.
The 1987 Declaration on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Threat or Use of Force in International Relations states: "States have the inalienable right to individual or collective self-defense should an armed attack occur, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations."
It is very important to keep in mind that paragraph 4 of Art. 2 of the UN Charter contains a general prohibition on the use of force or the threat of force in relations between states. The 1974 definition of aggression establishes the most frequent cases of the prohibited use of armed force and, finally, Art. 51 of the UN Charter highlights the most dangerous use armed force - an armed attack, providing in this case the right to self-defense.
As stated in Art. 51 of the UN Charter, states can exercise the right to self-defense in the event of an armed attack "until the Security Council takes measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." So, when Iraq committed aggression against Kuwait in the summer of 1990, the right to self-defense could be used by Kuwait and, at its request, any other state.
After the Security Council accepted the case of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait for its consideration, further actions against the aggressor were carried out in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council.
The principle of non-use of force does not apply to actions taken by order of the Security Council on the basis of chap. VII of the UN Charter. The use of armed force against Iraq is one of the important examples of the use of this provision of the UN Charter.
Naturally, the principle of non-use of force does not apply to events taking place within a state, since international law does not regulate domestic relations.
An integral part of the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force is the prohibition of war propaganda, which can also be regarded as an independent norm. The 1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law states: "In accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, states are obliged to refrain from propagating aggressive wars." This is confirmed in the 1987 Declaration.
This norm means that states are obliged to prevent the conduct of war propaganda by their agencies; in addition, states are obliged to take measures to ensure that no war propaganda is waged on their territory by individuals, organizations, etc.
6. PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE AND THREAT BY FORCE
The democratization of international relations inevitably leads to the limitation of the use of force and the threat of force. For the first time, this objective regularity was enshrined as a principle of international law in the UN Charter, developed during the liberation struggle against fascism and reflecting the democratic aspirations and hopes of peoples for a just post-war device international relations. According to paragraph 4 of Art. 2 of the Charter "all members of the United Nations shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force either against the territorial inviolability or political independence of any state or in any other way incompatible with the goals of the United Nations."
The duty of non-use of force extends to all states, since the maintenance of international peace and security requires that all states, and not only UN members, adhere to this principle in relations with each other.
According to the UN Charter, not only the use of armed force is prohibited, but also unarmed violence, which is in the nature of the unlawful use of force.
The term "strength" contained in paragraph 4 of Art. 2 of the Charter, like the principle itself, cannot be considered in isolation, but must be interpreted in the totality of the rights and obligations of states defined by the Charter. The OSCE Final Act (the section dealing with the implementation of the agreed principles) explicitly states that the participating States will “refrain from all manifestations of force with the aim of coercing another participating state”, “refrain from any act of economic coercion”.
All this undoubtedly testifies to the fact that modern international law prohibits the unlawful use of force in any of its manifestations.
The principle of the non-use of force envisages, first of all, the prohibition of aggressive wars. According to the 1974 Definition of Aggression the first use of armed force by a state can be qualified as war of aggression, which is an international crime and gives rise to international legal responsibility of states and international criminal responsibility of guilty individuals. V post-war years the content of the principle also included the duty of states to refrain from propaganda of aggressive war.
In addition to the concept of aggression, international law distinguishes the concept of "armed attack". With all the similarity of the actions of states in both cases, the legal consequences of their commission may be different, since the United Nations Security Council may qualify actions that are not related to a direct armed attack as aggression.
Violations of the principle of the non-use of force should also be considered violent actions against international demarcation lines and armistice lines, the blockade of ports or coasts of the state, any violent actions that prevent peoples from exercising their legitimate right to self-determination, as well as a number of other violent actions.
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The principle of non-use of force concerns the central problem of any legal system - the relationship between force and law. Due to the lack of the international system supranational power, the power is at the disposal of the subjects themselves.
The establishment of the principle of the non-use of force as a customary norm of general international law was finally established with the adoption of the UN Charter.
The Charter set the main goal - to save future generations from the scourge of war. The armed forces can be used only in the general interests. The use of not only armed force, but also force in general is prohibited. Moreover, the threat of force in any way incompatible with the goals of the UN is prohibited. The charter places the threat and use of force on a par. It follows from this that the threat of force will be unlawful in the same cases as its use. This position is confirmed The International Court of Justice UN
The Charter provides for the use of force or the threat of force in only two cases. First, by decision of the Security Council in the event of a threat to peace, any violation of the peace or an act of aggression (Chapter VII). Secondly, in order to exercise the right to self-defense in the event of an armed attack, until the Security Council takes the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security (Article 51). By decision of the Security Council, coercive measures can also be taken by the parties to regional agreements. Without the authority of the Council, such measures cannot be taken on the basis of regional agreements.
The concept of force includes, first of all, a war of aggression, which is qualified as a crime against peace, and so dangerous that the propaganda of an aggressive war is also prohibited. Aggression is the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another state. It is clear from this that we mean sufficiently large-scale military actions capable of jeopardizing the sovereignty and territorial inviolability of the state. Border incidents are not.
The definition of aggression, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974, contains a list of actions that constitute acts of aggression, regardless of whether there has been a formal declaration of war. These include the following actions.
1. An invasion or attack by the armed forces of a state into the territory of another state; any military occupation, however short-lived, if it is the result of an invasion or attack. This also applies to the annexation of state territory as a result of the use of force.
2. The use of any weapon by one state against the territory of another state, even if it is not accompanied by the invasion of the armed forces.
3. An attack by the armed forces of one state on the armed forces of another.
4. The use of the armed forces of one state, which are by agreement with the host country on its territory, in violation of the terms of such an agreement.
5. Actions of a state allowing the territory given to it at the disposal of another state to be used by the latter for committing acts of aggression.
6. Sending by a state of armed bands, groups, as well as regular forces or mercenaries to the territory of another state for the purpose of using armed force against it.
Both the subject and the object of aggression can only be the state - the subject of international law. This list is not exhaustive. Other actions can also be recognized as acts of aggression, but this can only be done by the UN Security Council.
The right to self-defense should be exercised only when necessary and the measures taken should be proportionate. They should not go beyond what is required to repel aggression.
The UN Charter provides for the right not only to individual but also to collective self-defense, which can take place only at the request of the attacked state.
44. The principle of territorial integrity of states.
The territory serves as the material basis of the state. There is no state without territory. Therefore, states pay special attention to ensuring its integrity. The UN Charter obliges to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial inviolability of the state (part 4 of article 2). The 1970 Declaration does not distinguish this principle as an independent one. Its content is reflected in other principles. The principle of the non-use of force obliges to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial inviolability of any state. For this purpose, political, economic or other pressure cannot be used either.
The territory of a state should not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in violation of the UN Charter, or the object of acquisition by another state as a result of the threat or use of force. Acquisitions of this kind are not considered legal.
The latter provision does not apply to treaties on territorial issues concluded prior to the adoption of the UN Charter. A different situation would call into question the legitimacy of many long-established state borders. The legality of the seizure of part of the territory of states responsible for the outbreak of World War II is recognized by the UN Charter (Article 107). The 1975 CSCE Final Act highlighted an independent principle of territorial integrity, the content of which reflects what was said earlier. Territorial integrity is stated in the constituent acts of regional associations. The Charter of the Organization of American States defined the protection of territorial integrity as one of the main goals (Article 1). A similar provision is contained in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (Articles 2 and 3). The principle in question is reflected in constitutional law. According to the Constitution: " Russian Federation ensures the integrity and inviolability of its territory "(part 3 of article 4).