Russia in the modern world and the main directions of its military policy. The tasks of the personnel to maintain combat readiness. The international position of modern Russia (90s) Relations of Kazakhstan with the developed powers of the West

The world is changing before our eyes, the right of the strong is already the prerogative of not only the United States and its satellites, as they would have written in the good old days. Russia followed the same path and used force in Syria. Beijing's official rhetoric is becoming increasingly harsh as a country that not only has economic ambitions, but is also going to become the third state in the world that is capable of resolving issues by military means. Three critical nodes - Syria, Ukraine and the Korean Peninsula, where the interests of many countries collided, determine the military-political situation in the world. Against the backdrop of these "hot" spots, Afghanistan remained a little apart from the main information flow, which is in an imbalance state and can explode at any moment.

North becomes more accessible

Global warming probably still exists. The climate in the Arctic has become warmer. This fact and the development of new technologies for the extraction of natural resources have significantly increased the interest in the region of many countries of the world. And not only the countries in the Arctic zone. China, Korea, India, Singapore want to join the development and production of hydrocarbons in the northern latitudes. Regional players - Russia, the USA, Canada, Norway, Denmark - are increasing their military presence in the polar regions of their countries. Russia rebuilds military bases in the archipelago New earth.

Allies are monitoring the air situation in the region and are also building up their intelligence and military capabilities. For the deployment of reinforcement forces in Norway, warehouses of weapons and military equipment have been organized. The head of this country made a proposal at the NATO summit in Poland to develop a new strategy for the alliance, which would allow the permanent presence of the combined naval forces in the northern latitudes. It was also proposed to more widely involve in joint exercises the armed forces of the non-regional countries of the alliance and neutral countries - Sweden and Finland. Both Russia and NATO countries conduct aerial patrols of the Arctic regions and strategic aviation flights. The political peace in the Arctic exists against the backdrop of a growing military presence.

No change in the west

Probably, few in Russia and NATO countries, except for outright hawks, believe in an open military clash. But the situation in the world shows that the policy of strategic containment and weakening of the economic potential, pursued in relation to Russia, is undoubtedly a clear threat to security. The alliance's military infrastructure is being built along the entire western Russian border. In the Baltic countries, four are being deployed and coordination centers for the reception and deployment of additional forces are being created, the same centers have been created in Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. This year, interceptor missiles will be deployed at anti-missile defense bases in Poland and Romania, about which it has long been said that they are not directed against Russia. NATO officials announced that with this they covered the southern direction from a ballistic missile attack.

The administration of US President Donald Trump intends to force the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance to spend the prescribed 3% of the country's budget on defense. That in the foreseeable future will significantly increase the number of weapons concentrated near the borders of Russia. But nevertheless, economic restrictions formally linked to certain events pose a great danger.

Ukraine is also the West

A significant threat national security Russia is represented by the conflict in the eastern regions of Ukraine. The hope for peace after the conclusion of the Minsk agreements, which defined the roadmap for the cessation of hostilities and the reintegration of certain areas of the Luhansk and Donbass regions, was never realized. The region remains highly likely to resume hostilities. Mutual shelling of the armed forces of Ukraine and the self-proclaimed republics continues. The initiative to introduce peacekeeping forces, proposed by both Russia and Ukraine, did not materialize due to a different understanding of the issue regarding where to deploy them and who would be included in these forces. This conflict will long influence the military-political situation in the world as one of the points of struggle against the global dominance of the United States. The situation in eastern Ukraine is largely a reflection of the situation in the world, where the confrontation between global players is intensifying. For Russia, this is a very unpleasant conflict, not only because of the proximity to the borders, but also because it can always serve as an informational pretext for introducing new sanctions.

South direction

Since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the threat to national security from this direction has only increased. Despite the fact that Russia does not have a direct border with this country, the possible infiltration of terrorists and allied obligations oblige to closely monitor the situation in the region. The surveys in the world note that in recent years an increase in the number of terrorist and religious-extremist bandit formations has been noticed. And this cannot but cause concern. The answer to the question of what is happening in the world today is impossible without studying the situation in Afghanistan.

Almost a third of the militants come from the former Central Asian republics, including members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has already participated in the preparation of terrorist acts in Russia, the Islamic Jihad Union and others. Unlike the largest armed force of the Taliban, which aims to create an Afghan Caliphate, these organizations want to create an Islamic state in the Central Asian republics. In the southwest, the main factor destabilizing the military-political situation in the world, since the interests of many states also collide here, is an increase in the number of countries where an armed struggle against international terrorism is being waged - Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya. The situation in the zone where Armenia and Azerbaijan confront each other is periodically aggravated. Georgia aspires to NATO and European Union and wants to restore territorial integrity. On a positive note, the Georgian Dream - Democratic Georgia party, which came to power, announced the possibility of only a peaceful way of reunification with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Syrian crossroads

The once-thriving Middle Eastern country, almost completely destroyed, is plagued by one of the 21st century's longest-running military conflicts. Starting as a civil war, this war quickly developed into a fight of all against all, in which dozens of countries participate. The clash of numerous interests affects not only the situation in the region, but also the entire modern military-political situation in the world.

The government troops of the Syrian Republic, with the support of Iranian forces and the Russian military space forces, are fighting the terrorist organization ISIS and armed opposition groups, which to one degree or another cooperate with various extremist groups. In the north of the country, Turkey introduced its military grouping, which is fighting the Kurds. The United States and its allies are confronting Russia, Iran and Syria, supporting the opposition and periodically launching missile strikes on Syrian government forces, accusing Damascus of using chemical weapons. Israel is also launching missile strikes against targets in Syria, citing its national interests.

Will there be peace

In the world, the military-political situation is already being compared with the situation during the Cuban missile crisis. So far, a direct military clash between Russian and American troops has been avoided. The Syrian government, with the assistance of the Russian center for the reconciliation of the warring parties, managed to establish a ceasefire with many armed opposition groups. The battles are being fought mainly against ISIS units; Turkish troops, with the support of the Syrian opposition units in the north, are also pushing the militants. Kurdish detachments, supported by the aviation of the Western coalition led by the United States, attack the city of Raku. ISIS-controlled territory has shrunk significantly.

On February 15-16, Astana (Kazakhstan) hosted the next round of negotiations to establish peace in Syria. With the mediation of Russia, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, the participation of the UN and the United States, representatives of the Syrian government and ten opposition groups discussed issues of maintaining the truce, exchange of prisoners and monitoring current situation... The parties are still far from starting direct negotiations, but the first step towards peace has been made. Inter-Syrian negotiations with the opposition are also taking place in Geneva, where the main obstacle was the demand for the immediate departure of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. But at the last meeting, the US tentatively agreed that Assad stayed until the new elections. There is no breakthrough, but there is hope. Another platform for peace talks is the Congress of National Dialogue being held in Sochi, co-organized by Russia, Turkey and Iran, the main guarantors of the truce in Syria.

East is a delicate matter

The main factor influencing the development of the military-political situation in the world is the strengthening of China as a regional and global player. China is modernizing its armed forces. The United States strives to maintain its leadership in the region by strengthening military ties with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Including using the contentious issues of China with Vietnam and the Philippines on the islands in the South China Sea and trying to act as an international arbiter. Under the pretext of defending against a North Korean nuclear threat, the US last year began building a THAD missile defense base in South Korea, which China viewed as a threat to its national security. China has imposed sanctions on South Korea, forcing it to promise not to further deploy its missile defense system. Japan is building up the power of its armed forces, striving to enhance the role of the army in resolving political issues and gaining the opportunity to use military force abroad.

Korean way

The main driver of news for almost all of 2017 was the squabble between US President Donald Trump and the leader North Korea Kim Jong-un. An advanced Twitter user called Kim a rocket man, in response, he was showered with unseemly nicknames, and this continued until the New Year. The occasions, of course, were not so funny. In February 2017, the DPRK launched the Kwangmensong rocket with a satellite on board. Taking into account the fourth nuclear test, which Pyongyang conducted on January 6, all countries regarded this launch as a ballistic missile test. Experts calculated that the missile's flight range could be 13 thousand kilometers, that is, it could theoretically reach the United States. In response, the UN announced the sanctions by a unanimous decision of the members of the Security Council, including Russia. Over the course of the year, the DPRK made several more launches and announced its ability to equip missiles with nuclear warheads. In response, the UN introduced a new package of sanctions, in addition, the United States introduced its own economic restrictions, regarding these launches as a threat to national security. Donald Trump said: "These are the toughest sanctions ever imposed on a single country." Also, the US President announced the possibility of a military solution to the Korean problem and sent his aircraft carriers to the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang responded by announcing the possibility of a retaliatory nuclear strike. The situation in the world has aggravated, the possibility of various military scenarios is seriously discussed by experts. All news reviews about what is happening in the world today began with the situation around nuclear program Pyongyang.

Olympic reconciliation

Everything changed on the Korean Peninsula after the New Year's conciliatory speech by the leader of North Korea, where he spoke about the possibility of participating in Olympic Games in South Korea and dialogue on the current situation. The parties held a series of high-level talks. The North Korean team took part in the Olympic Games, the countries exchanged performances by musical groups. This helped to reduce the tension in the military-political situation in the world, everyone understood that there would be no war yet.

The South Korean delegation, led by the head of the National Security Bureau under the President, Jung Eun Young, held a series of talks with all interested parties. After negotiations with Kim Jong-un, they personally reported the results to US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Japanese Prime Minister Shinjiro Abe and senior officials of their countries. Based on the results of shuttle diplomacy, an inter-Korean summit and a meeting between the US President and the DPRK leader are being prepared. Michael Pompeo, director of the CIA and future secretary of state, visited Pyongyang on April 18 and held talks with Kim Jong-un.

The rest of the world

Latin America and Africa are also making their contribution to the military-political situation in the world. The main problems of Latin American countries lie more in the political and economic plane: increased competition and struggle for natural resources, low control over some territories. The issues of combating drug trafficking and criminal armed groups, which sometimes control entire regions of the country, are very acute. In the region, the political situation is influenced by controversial territorial issues, which are still trying to be resolved through negotiations. But the countries of the region are also intensively building up the power of the armed forces. In Africa, the main threat to the stability of the military-political situation in the world is still Libya, where armed conflict continues between supporters and opponents of radical Islamization with the participation of local tribes. In many other parts of Africa, there are extremist groups that are involved in drug and arms smuggling and illegal migration.

In general, the features of the modern military-political situation in the world show a possible increase in the number of regional conflicts and challenges to Russia's national security.

Russia in the system of military-political relations in the world

The current stage of world development is characterized by the most acute socio-economic conflicts and political contradictions. Despite the fact that the problem of global and regional security is increasingly shifting to political, financial, economic, ethno-national, demographic, etc., the role of military force remains an effective deterrent in stabilizing international relations.

The current military-political situation in the world

The world military-political situation today is characterized by a combination of two main trends: on the one hand, the desire of most states in the world to form a democratic, more just system of international economic and political relations. On the other hand, the expansion of the practice of using armed force on the basis of national decisions and outside the UN mandate. Confirmation - the wars not sanctioned by the UN Security Council against Yugoslavia and Iraq.

The current military-political situation in the world can be characterized by the following main trends.

FIRST, counteraction to new challenges stimulated by the processes of globalization comes to the fore in the global system of military-political relations. This is the proliferation of weapons mass destruction and means of delivery; international terrorism; ~ ethnic instability; activities of radical religious communities and groups; drug trafficking; organized crime.

It is impossible to effectively combat all these manifestations within the framework of individual states. Therefore, in the world, the importance of international cooperation law enforcement agencies, including intelligence agencies and the armed forces.

SECOND, the implementation of international operations on the use of force outside the traditional military-political organizations is becoming a reality. Military force is increasingly being used in temporary coalitions. Russia stands for strict adherence to the rules international law and will join such coalitions only if required by its foreign policy interests.

THIRD, there is a further economization of foreign policy priorities of states. Economic interests are becoming more important than political and military-political ones. In addition, a more complex combination of economic interests of individual states and the interests of large transnational companies arises. As a result, the understanding of the conditions for the use of armed force has changed significantly. If earlier the basis for this was most often the presence of a direct military threat to the security or interests of a particular state, now military force is increasingly used to ensure the economic interests of a country, which objectively expands the sphere of its foreign policy relevance.

FOURTH, there has been a fusion of domestic and international terrorism. Modern terrorism wears global character, creates a threat to most states, their political stability, economic independence, its manifestations lead to massive human losses, destruction of material and spiritual values.

In modern conditions, when the emergence of an international antiterrorist international has become a reality, attempts to divide terrorist activity into domestic and international are becoming senseless. This applies both to political approaches to suppressing terrorist activity and forceful measures to neutralize terrorist activity. It is obvious that terrorism has turned from a political threat into a military-political one, and the sphere of responsibility of the armed forces, in particular the Russian Armed Forces, has significantly expanded to counter it.

The transnational nature of the growing threats from terrorist activities and criminal extremism puts on the agenda the need for international cooperation of Russia, primarily with the CIS member states, within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.

Today, the CIS states, due to their geopolitical position, have found themselves at the forefront of the fight against international terrorism, which is confirmed by the events in the North Caucasus and Central Asian region. The situation may become much more complicated in connection with the collapse of the far-reaching plans of the extremists in the North Caucasus and the concentration of the main forces of the jihad in the Central Asian direction. These are not virtual scenarios, but quite specific plans for a radical "reshaping" of the political map of the whole region.

It would be naive to believe that the terrorists' plans will be limited to the framework of one separate state. The tentacles of extremism have already penetrated many countries. And if he manages to destabilize the situation in any of the Central Asian states, no borders will stop the chain reaction.

The implementation of terrorist goals by the forces of international terrorism and religious extremism can lead to a radical change in the geopolitical situation in Central Asia with unpredictable consequences. It is not just about maintaining strategic stability in the region, but about ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation and the CIS countries.

Fifthly, the importance of non-state participants in the system of international relations for determining the nature of foreign policy priorities of various states of the world has significantly increased. Non-governmental organizations, international movements and communities, interstate organizations and informal "clubs" have a broad, sometimes contradictory impact on the policies of individual states. Russia strives to actively participate in major interstate and international organizations to ensure various aspects of its foreign policy interests and interests in the field of security.

The main military threats to the national interests of Russia and the tasks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation until they are neutralized

An analysis of the military-political situation in the world allows us to conclude that for Russia there are real threats to its national interests: external, internal and cross-border.

External threats include:

Deployment of groupings of forces and assets aimed at a military attack on Russia or its allies;

Territorial claims against the Russian Federation, the threat of political or forceful rejection of some of its territories from Russia;

Implementation by states, organizations and movements of programs to create weapons of mass destruction;

Interference in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation of organizations supported by foreign states;

Demonstration of military force near the borders of Russia, conducting exercises with provocative purposes;

The presence of hotbeds of armed conflicts near the borders of the Russian Federation or the borders of its allies that threaten their security;

Instability, weakness of state institutions in bordering countries;

build-up of force groupings leading to disruption of the existing balance of forces near the borders of the Russian Federation or the borders of its allies and the sea waters adjacent to their territory;

Expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the military security of Russia or its allies;

Activities of international radical groups, strengthening the position of Islamic extremism near the Russian borders;

The introduction of foreign troops (without the consent of the Russian Federation and the sanction of the UN Security Council) on the territory of neighboring states that are friendly to the Russian Federation;

Armed provocations, including attacks on military facilities of the Russian Federation located on the territory of foreign states, as well as on facilities and structures on the state border of the Russian Federation or the borders of its allies;

Actions that impede the operation of Russian systems of state and military control, ensuring the functioning of strategic nuclear forces, warning of a missile attack, missile defense, control of outer space and ensuring the combat stability of troops;

Actions hindering Russia's access to strategically important transport communications;

Discrimination, suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states;

The proliferation of equipment, technologies and components used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as dual-use technologies that can be used to create weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles.

Internal threats include:

Attempts to violently change the constitutional order and violate the territorial integrity of Russia;

Planning, preparation and implementation of actions to disrupt and disorganize the functioning of government and administrative bodies, attacks on state, national economic, military facilities, life support facilities and information infrastructure;

Creation, equipment, training and operation of illegal armed groups;

Illegal distribution (circulation) in the territory of the Russian Federation of weapons, ammunition, explosives, etc .;

Large-scale activities of organized crime that threaten political stability on the scale of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation;

Activities of separatist and radical religious-nationalist movements in the Russian Federation.

The concept of cross-border threats includes political, military-political or military threats to the interests and security of the Russian Federation, which combine the features of internal and external threats. Being internal in the form of manifestation, in their essence (sources of origin and stimulation, possible participants, etc.) are external.

These threats include:

Creation, equipping, support and training on the territory of other states of armed formations and groups for the purpose of their transfer for operations on the territory of the Russian Federation or the territories of its allies;

Activities of subversive separatist, national or religious extremist groups directly or indirectly supported from abroad, aimed at undermining the constitutional system of the Russian Federation, creating a threat to the territorial integrity of the state and the security of its citizens;

Cross-border crime, including smuggling and other illegal activities on a scale that threaten the military-political security of the Russian Federation or stability on the territory of Russia's allies;

Conducting information (information technology, information psychological, etc.) actions hostile to the Russian Federation and its allies;

Activities of international terrorist organizations;

Drug trafficking activities that pose a threat to the transportation of drugs to the territory of the Russian Federation, or the use of Russian territory to transport drugs to other countries.

Neutralization of external threats, as well as participation in neutralization of internal and cross-border threats is the task of the Russian Armed Forces and is carried out jointly with other power structures, as well as with the relevant bodies of the countries - allies of the Russian Federation.

Actions to suppress such threats are carried out taking into account the provisions of international and humanitarian law, proceeding from the interests of Russia's national security and its legislation. Taking into account the changes in the geopolitical situation in the world, it must be stated that ensuring Russia's security only through political opportunities (membership in international organizations, partnerships, opportunities to influence) is not effective.

As the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin in his Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on May 26, 2004, “We need combat-ready, technically equipped and modern Armed Forces for reliable protection of the state. So that we can calmly solve internal socio-economic problems ”.

We need a strong, professional and well-armed army for the prosperous and peaceful development of the country. It must be able to defend Russia and its allies, as well as effectively interact with the armed forces of other countries in the fight against common threats.

In accordance with the Federal Law "On Defense", the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are designed to repel aggression directed against the Russian Federation, for armed defense of the integrity and inviolability of the territory of Russia, as well as to perform tasks in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Federation.

The tasks of the Armed Forces are defined in more detail by the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 706 of April 21, 2000:

1. In armed conflicts and local wars, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are faced with the task of localizing the hotbed of tension and ending hostilities at the earliest possible stage in order to create prerequisites for resolving the conflict by peaceful means on conditions that meet the interests of the Russian Federation. Armed conflicts and local wars can, under certain conditions, develop into a large-scale war. If necessary, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will be deployed to use all the forces and means at their disposal.

To prevent wars and armed conflicts and ensure the deterrence of aggressors from unleashing any wars, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are assigned the following tasks:

Timely opening, together with the forces and means of other federal executive bodies, of an impending armed attack or a threatening development of the situation and warning the top leadership of the state about them;

Maintaining the composition and state of the strategic nuclear forces at a level that ensures guaranteed infliction of specified damage to the aggressor in any conditions;

Maintaining the combat potential of peacetime general-purpose groupings at a level that ensures the repulsion of aggression on a local (regional) scale;

Providing, within the framework of state measures for the transfer of the country from a peaceful to a military position, the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

Protection of the state border in the air and in the underwater environment.

2. Separate formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation may be involved in the elimination of internal armed conflicts that threaten the vital interests of the Russian Federation and may be used as a pretext for intervention by other states in its internal affairs. The task of using troops and forces involved in localizing and suppressing such conflicts is the earliest possible normalization of the situation, the suppression of armed clashes and the separation of the opposing sides, as well as the protection of strategically important facilities.

3. When participating in peacekeeping operations conducted by decision of the UN Security Council or in accordance with Russia's international obligations, the contingent of its Armed Forces may be assigned the following tasks:

Disengagement of the armed groups of the conflicting parties;

Ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid to the civilian population and its evacuation from the conflict zone;

Blocking the conflict area in order to enforce the sanctions adopted by the international community.

The solution of these and other tasks is carried out by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in close cooperation with other troops of Russia. At the same time, the Border Service of the FSB of Russia is entrusted with the protection of the state border on land, sea, rivers, lakes and other bodies of water, the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia - the protection of important state facilities and the suppression of especially dangerous offenses, sabotage and terrorist acts.

Given the changed situation in the world and the emergence of new threats to Russia's security, the tasks assigned to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have also changed. They can be structured in four main areas:

1. Containment of military and military-political threats to the security or interests of the Russian Federation.

2. Ensuring the economic and political interests of the Russian Federation.

3. Implementation of peacetime military operations.

4. Use of military force.

The peculiarities of the development of the military-political situation in the world cause the possibility of the development of one task into another, since the most problematic, from the point of view of the security of the Russian Federation, military-political situations are complex and multifaceted.

The nature of the tasks facing the Armed Forces of Russia, taking into account the specifics of armed conflicts and wars in which they may be involved, requires the formulation of new approaches to them.

The main priorities in the development of the RF Armed Forces are determined by the nature of the tasks in the field of national security and the geopolitical priorities of the country's development. We can talk about the existence of several fundamental requirements for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which will determine the main parameters of military development:

Ability to implement strategic deterrence;

High combat and mobilization readiness;

Strategic mobility;

High level of staffing with well-trained and trained personnel;

High technical equipment and resource availability.

The implementation of these requirements makes it possible to select the priorities for reforming and strengthening the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation now and in the future. The main ones include:

1. Maintaining the potential of the Strategic Containment Force.

2. An increase in the number of formations and units of constant readiness and the formation of groupings of troops on their basis.

3. Improving the operational (combat) training of troops (forces).

4. Improving the manning system of the Armed Forces.

5. Implementation of the program for the modernization of weapons, military and special equipment and their maintenance in a state of combat readiness.

6. Improvement of military science and military education.

7. Improving the systems of social security of servicemen, education and moral and psychological training.

The ultimate goal of these measures is to eliminate duplicate links and ensure, if necessary, the comprehensive use of the Armed Forces and military formations of the power ministries and departments of the Russian Federation.

From the above, we can conclude:

1. Despite the positive changes in the international situation, a sharp reduction in the military confrontation between states, the military-political situation in the world remains complex and contradictory.

2. Due to its geopolitical position, Russia is acutely aware of the impact of negative factors and features of the current military-political situation.

3. There are real sources of threat to Russia's national security. This requires strengthening and increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

In introductory remarks the head of the UCP must emphasize the importance of this topic, determine the purpose of the lesson, its main questions.

Expanding the first question, it is advisable to draw the attention of the audience to the fact that in recent years many different events have taken place in the world that have had a significant impact on the national security system of the Russian Federation, therefore, the primary task for our country is to ensure its military security.

When considering the second question (for all categories of UCP listeners), it is important to understand that the ongoing changes in the world have led to the emergence of new threats to Russia's military security. The greatest danger in modern conditions is posed by cross-border threats, which combine the features of internal and external threats.

It is necessary to make the audience understand that the modern Armed Forces of Russia must meet the nature of the international situation and the specifics of the country's geopolitical position, they must be built on the achievements of modern military science and practice. In this regard, the most important task remains the modernization of our Armed Forces.

The consideration of the second question should be completed by outlining the specific combat training tasks to be performed by the units in the winter (summer) periods of training.

In conclusion, it is necessary to draw brief conclusions, answer the listeners' questions, give recommendations for studying the literature and preparing for the conversation.

2. Actual tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation //

3. Message of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. - May 27. - 2004.

4. Gordlevsky A. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation // Landmark. - 2004. - No. 2.

5. Fatherland. Honour. Debt. A textbook on social and state training. Issue No. 4. - M, 1998.

phD in Philosophy, Associate Professor, Colonel
Alexander Chaevich

Simultaneously with the collapse of the Soviet Union, our country acquired a whole bunch of both internal and external problems. The current foreign policy situation is strongly influenced not only by the "achievements" of diplomats and politicians in the field of international relations, but also by the internal political and economic situation in our country.

First of all, the weakening of national security and international ties makes Russia highly vulnerable to a wide variety of threats, both external and internal. Among the most serious threats to national security, both external (international terrorism, the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism, an attempt to dictate from the United States) and internal (scientific, technical and economic lag, the threat of the collapse of Russia) are noted:

Threats national security of Russia, in%

• 61.0 - International terrorism, the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism and its spread to the territory of Russia
• 58.6 - Low competitiveness of Russia in the economic sphere
• 54.8 - The growing lag of Russia in terms of scientific and technological potential from the United States and other Western countries
• 52.9 - Further expansion of NATO to the East and the inclusion in this bloc of the former republics of the USSR (the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Georgia, etc.)
• 51.4 - Establishment of world domination by the United States and its closest allies
• 51.0 - Pressure on Russia from international economic and financial institutions to eliminate Russia as an economic competitor
• 26.2 - Threat of disintegration of Russia
• 18.6 - Information wars, information and psychological impact on Russia
• 17.1 -China's demographic expansion
• 16.7 - Weakening of UN positions and destruction of the global system of collective security
• 15.7 - Large-scale man-made disasters
• 11.9 - Unauthorized proliferation of nuclear weapons
• 10.0 - Global threats (climate warming, ozone layer depletion, AIDS, depletion of natural resources, etc.)
• 7.1 - Territorial claims against Russia from neighboring states
• 3.3 - There is no real significant threat to Russia's national security.

Draws attention is also paid to the fact that Russian experts do not attach significant importance to global threats, which are increasingly moving into the center of attention of the Western community. It seems that this is largely due to the fact that Russia as a whole, and experts in this case are no exception, has been living for a long time, which is called "today." Nobody thinks far into the future, and therefore real, but "postponed" threats (depletion of natural resources, climate warming, unauthorized proliferation of nuclear weapons, China's demographic expansion, etc.) are not perceived as urgent. This is also emphasized in the new Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, recently adopted by the government and the President of the Russian Federation: “... military-political rivalry between regional powers, the growth of separatism, ethno-national and religious extremism. Integration processes, in particular in the Euro-Atlantic region, are often selective and restrictive. Attempts to belittle the role of a sovereign state as a fundamental element of international relations pose a threat of arbitrary interference in internal affairs. The problem of arms proliferation is becoming serious mass destruction and means of delivery. The threat international peace and security are unresolved or potential regional and local armed conflicts. The growth of international terrorism, transnational organized crime, as well as illegal drug and arms trafficking is beginning to exert a significant influence on global and regional stability. "

Despite the fact that, among the threats to national security, first of all, the growing tension in relations with the United States and the Western community stands out, nevertheless, the possibility of a return to the state of the Cold War generally does not seem very likely. The fact is that, despite all the complexities of mutual relations between Russia and the West, especially with the United States, a long way has already passed not only political, but also cultural interaction: the Western mass culture became commonplace in Russia, educational, tourist contacts, etc. Currently, the majority of Russians do not believe in the likelihood of a tough confrontation between Russia and the United States (Table 2).

table 2

But Nevertheless, the main threats not only to the foundations of the country's national security, but also to its authority in the international arena, continue to be such internal problems of the country as its economic weakness, corruption and crime. The war in Chechnya as a factor undermining the authority of Russia, although it remains among the most significant, is nevertheless regarded as such today two times less often than five years ago (Table 3).

Table 3

Russia's economic weakness
Corruption and crime
War in Chechnya
Weakening of Russia's military potential
The vagueness of Russia's foreign policy doctrine
B. Yeltsin's activity / V. Putin as President of Russia
Threat to democratic rights and freedoms in Russia
Infringement of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in the Russian Federation
Russia's opposition to NATO expansion

it Many foreign observers also note, for example, Leon Firth, adviser to the US Vice President for National Security, said in an interview with Radio Liberty that the US government had done everything possible to help Russia fight corruption, but only the Russian leadership could eradicate it. At the same time, according to him, the ideas of the Russian leadership about a strong Russia seem contradictory, and sometimes even ominous.

However, if the gross national product is taken as the basis for assessing Russia's prospects in the world community, then everything looks not so threatening as it seems at first glance. Things get worse when we look at our income structure and the near term.

Areas in which Russia can count on a real strengthening of its positions in the world market in the next 8-10 years, in%

• 70.0 - in the fuel and energy complex (gas, oil)
• 53.3 - defense complex (MIC)
• 44.3 - extraction and processing of other natural resources (metal, timber, etc.)
• 36.7 - nuclear power
• 27.6 - science and high technologies
• 18.6 - energy transport infrastructure
• 15.2 - culture and education

In recent years, along with the growth of the extractive industries, the share of science-intensive production has been catastrophically falling. Russia is breaking out into the world leaders in the production of raw materials, sledgehammers and shovels. Those types of production are developing that are based on the use of heavy physical, unskilled labor. The competitiveness of Russia is created due to low wages, associated low production culture, high labor intensity. The qualifications of labor and its economic quality are rapidly and steadily falling. Over the years of uncontrollable "reforms", the output of specialists with higher education per unit of population in Russia has decreased by ten percent, while in European countries and the United States during this time it has more than doubled. By this indicator, Russia quickly fell from fifth to twenty-sixth in the world. While in Russia the share of the population working in fundamental science has decreased by fifty percent in ten years, in advanced countries this figure has almost doubled. In the countries of Europe and America, about five percent of the budget is allocated to science today, in Russia - 1.2 percent. Japan plans to double the number of jobs employed by specialists with higher education in five years, America 1.7 times, and in Russia this figure is steadily declining. The state of science in Russia is close to disaster. We will soon be forced to come to terms with backwardness.

Despite the seriousness of our country's internal problems, recent foreign policy and foreign economic strategies have played an important role in Russia's loss of prestige in the international arena. If the Soviet Union, as you know, had both unconditional supporters and obvious geopolitical opponents in the international arena, then at present the external environment of Russia is not so unambiguous and obvious. The main diplomatic and trade partners of Russia can be roughly divided into several groups:

The first group of "fraternal" countries includes Belarus, Armenia and India.

The second group of "friends" includes Yugoslavia, Kazakhstan, China, Iran and Germany.

The third group consists of "rather friendly" countries. These are Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Israel, France.

The fourth group of countries can be characterized as "neutral". These are Azerbaijan, Japan, Great Britain, Czech Republic.

The fifth group is "unfriendly". These are Afghanistan, the Baltic countries and the USA. In addition, Georgia, Poland and Hungary can also be classified as "unfriendly" countries.

Russian-American relations stand out against this background. If five years ago the number of those who considered the United States a friendly country was about the same as now (8% and 10%, respectively), then the share of experts who assess the United States' attitude towards Russia as unfriendly has now more than doubled (from 22% to 59%). There are many reasons for this, and one of them is the Balkan crisis of 1999, as a result of which a new balance of power in the world dominated by the United States was recorded. Among experts, the point of view is not widespread that, firstly, the mood of distancing from the United States has increased among the European powers, and, secondly, that as a result of this crisis, preconditions have arisen for a closer political union between Russia and Europe. Another reason for the cooling of relations between Russia and the United States, according to experts, is associated with the first steps of the new American administration headed by George W. Bush. These steps suggest that US foreign policy will become tougher towards Russia than the policy of the previous administration.

The opposite trend is observed, according to experts, in relations between Russia and Germany. Over the past five years, the share of experts who classify Germany as friendly to Russia countries has almost tripled (from 19% to 52%), while the share of those who classify it as unfriendly states (10% in 1996 and 13% in 2001). The following are noted as problems that still complicate Russian-German relations:

Debt of Russia to Germany.

The so-called "Kaliningrad factor".

Excessive integration of Germany into the EU and NATO.

Inconsistency of the economic systems of Russia and Germany (imperfection of the legislative base in Russia, lack of guarantees of the rights of owners and investors, corruption, etc.).

The problem of displaced cultural property (restitution).

There are quite a few obstacles in the way of establishing normal relations with other EU countries, and, moreover, most experts in the first place put some prejudice against Russia on the part of European states:

The main reasons for difficulties in relations between Russia and the EU, in%

• 71.9 - Certain prejudices against Russia persist in the EU.
• 57.6 - The interests of Russia and the EU do not coincide for objective reasons.
• 51.9 - The EU is not interested in Russia's integration into European structures.
• 22.9 - Russia claims a special privileged status in European affairs, unacceptable for the EU.
• 21.4 - In fact, Russia simply does not seek to integrate into European structures.

article. Clause 1 of the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation of July 23, 2009 No. 64 "On some issues of the practice of considering disputes over the rights of owners of premises to the common property of a building" 8 indicates that since the relationship of owners of premises located in a non-residential building arising from a common property in such a building is not directly regulated by law, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Art. 6 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, these relations are subject to the application of legislative norms regulating similar relations, in particular, Art. 249, 289, 290 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.

Since 2009, the provisions of the above Plenum have been actively used in judicial practice and in terms of recognizing the owners of premises located in a non-residential building, the rights of common shared ownership of its common property9.

As a result of our excursion in the development of legal regulation in relation to common property in non-residential premises, we believe that it is necessary at the legislative level to consolidate the status of common property in non-residential premises and thereby establish gaps in legislation.

1 Some legal aspects of building management. RELGA is a scientific and cultural journal. No. 17. 2011, Internet resource: http://www.relga.ru/ EotkopM ^ ebObjects / tgu-ww.woa / wa / Mam? Textid \u003d 3030 & 1eve1 1 \u003d tat & ^ e12 \u003d a11c ^

2 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2005. No. 4.

3 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2002. No. 12.

4 See, for example: Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Far Eastern District of 18.12.2002 No. F03-A51 / 02-2 / 2512; rulings

FAS of the Ural District of 03.09.2003 No. F09-2398 / 03-GK, dated 20.01.2005 No. F09-4495 / 04-GK; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Moscow Region dated 17.08.2005 No. KG-A40 / 7495-05. The documents have not been officially published (see ATP).

5 See, for example: V.A. Lapach Non-residential premises as objects of civil rights // Legislation. 2003. No. 4. S. 12 .; Ilyin D.I. Real estate legislation: problems of the content of the terms used // Journal of Russian law. 2005. No. 8. P. 150; Khurtsilava A.G. Civil law grounds for acquiring rights to non-residential premises: Author's abstract. Diss ... cand. jurid. sciences. M., 2006.S. 9-10; Pidzhakov A.Yu., Nechuikina E.V. On the issue of legal regulation of the turnover of non-residential premises // Civil law. 2004. No. 2. S. 47 .; Skvortsov A. Distribution of shares in the implementation of an investment and construction project // New Legislation and Legal Practice. 2009. No. 1.

6 Suite Yu.P. Features of the ownership right to the common property of apartment buildings and non-residential buildings // Laws of Russia: experience, analysis, practice. 2011. No. 6.

7 Chubarov V.V. Problems of legal regulation of real estate: Author. Diss ... doct. jurid. sciences. M., 2006.S. 30.

8 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2009. No. 9.

9 See: Determination of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation of August 19, 2009 No. 10832/09; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the North-West District of October 22, 2009 No. A05-3116 / 2009; Resolution of the Thirteenth Arbitration Court of Appeal of St. Petersburg dated September 21, 2009 No. 13AP-7641/2009; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the North-West District in the case of November 18, 2009 No. A05-9710 / 2008; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Volga Region in the case of November 10, 2009 No. A65-3807 / 2009; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Urals District dated November 09, 2009 No. F09-8894 / 09-C5. The documents have not been officially published (see ATP).

THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF RUSSIA AT THE PRESENT STAGE

DEVELOPMENT

V.N. Fadeev,

doctor of Law, Professor, Professor of the Department of Criminology of the Moscow University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation Scientific specialty 12.00.08 - criminal law and criminology;

criminal-executive law Reviewer: Doctor of Economics, Candidate of Legal Sciences, Professor Eriashvili N.D.

E-mail: [email protected] ru

Annotation. Provides an analysis of the international situation of Russia on the present stage historical development. Identified and substantiated tendencies negatively affecting the socio-political situation, viability and security of our country in modern conditions and for the future; an assessment of their current state and development prospects is given.

Key words: death of the Soviet empire; European metropolises; colonial possessions; authoritarian traditions; counterterrorism cooperation.

INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE CURRENT STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT

Doctor of Juridical Science, professor of Criminology department

of Moscow University MVD RF

Annotation. The author conducted the analysis of the international position of Russia on the current stage of historic development. The author identified and rationalized the tendencies that have negative impact on social-political situation, viability and security of our country in the modern conditions and for the future time, as well as estimated their current condition and prospect of development.

Keywords: collapse of the soviet empire; European metropolises; colonial possessions; authoritative traditions; counter terrorist cooperation.

The United States, which is facing "threats" from Al-Qaeda and Iran, the growing instability in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East, the growing power and geopolitical weight of China and India, clearly do not need new enemies. Nevertheless, their relations with Russia will objectively deteriorate every year. The intensity of mutual rhetoric on both sides is growing, previously signed security agreements are under threat, and Moscow and Washington are increasingly looking at each other through the prism of the Cold War era. Radar stations in the Czech Republic and anti-missiles in Poland do not ease tensions. Ignoring the position of the UN Security Council and Russia on the issue of self-proclamation and recognition of Kosovo's independence by the United States, Great Britain, Germany and France, other NATO countries and their vassals puts the world on the brink of a new redistribution. The world order established after the Second World War began to collapse before our eyes. The United States continues to arrange the world according to its own scenario. The West echoes them and unconditionally supports them.

China has always had and will have a special opinion and a special status. India is still busy with its own problems. Russia remains. Of course, the United States would like to deal with an obedient "Kozyrev" Russia, or at least the one that it was under the late Yeltsin - let it "blather", let it "clatter", but they knew that we had almost nothing behind our souls It was.

It is not that the US did not expect an oil price boom in recent years - they themselves provoked it - they did not expect the oil gin to pull Russia out of the debt swamp so quickly. Russia today is starting to rise from its knees. And this cannot but irritate the United States and the West. Note that our relations with Japan in the last years of Putin's rule somehow receded into the background. This does not mean the loss of our interest in contacts with Japan. This speaks more about the weakening of the aggregate influence of Japan on the world stage.

Undoubtedly, the main reasons for the disappointment of the United States and the West in Russia were the increasing independence in domestic politics and Moscow's assertiveness in foreign policy. However, the United States and the West also bear a considerable share of responsibility for the mutual cooling and gradual disintegration of bilateral ties. To reverse the situation, Russia has only gas in its hands. But gas alone may not be enough.

But the United States is especially irritated and the West alarmed by the "disordered" in their scenario, the transformation of Russia from an expansionist communist empire into a great Power of the traditional type, which sets itself ambitious tasks of modernizing the economy, and hence the army. In relation to Russia, the United States will still have to rely on the prevailing opinion in Washington that the Reagan administration won the Cold War in general, alone. And only, they say, the United States is the winner in the Cold War. In the Second World War, there were two winners - the USSR and the USA and allies, and the world became bipolar. Today, according to the same logic, the world should become unipolar. In reality, this is not so, and, undoubtedly, the majority of Russian citizens perceive the collapse of the Soviet state in a completely different way.

The collapse of the USSR is undoubtedly the greatest defeat for our Fatherland, possibly in its entire history. A great state was destroyed - in fact, an empire. But this is the outside. The United States and the West did indeed win the Cold War, but in this case, the victory of one side does not mean the defeat of the other. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and their advisers believed that they, along with the United States, were also among the winners of the Cold War. They gradually came to the conclusion that the communist system was not suitable for the USSR, and especially for Russia. In their opinion, they acted in the best interests of their country, and did not need any external pressure. This psychology is akin to psi

the chology of the Vlasovites or other traitors during the war who served the enemies of the Fatherland in the name of the notorious idea of \u200b\u200bfighting the Bolsheviks.

But here we must not forget about the deep goals of the destruction of our state - this is the last stronghold of Orthodoxy, a huge territory and huge resources. Even if someday, it is true, hypothetically, Russia becomes a more democratic country than the United States, the desire to destroy us will still remain. Of course, the realities of the XXI century. more than once will force the United States to reconsider its strategy in relation to Russia. From a geopolitical point of view, Russia is a bridge between East and West, between North and South. This means that Russia is a bridge between world civilizations.

Regardless of the world order (unipolar or multipolar), the world always strives for the form of communicating vessels for the movement of people and capital. And here you cannot do without a Russian bridge. Control over the bridge is a very important argument for the future policy of the superpowers. And who are they, the superpowers, today and tomorrow? The answer is obvious - the USA, Europe (West) and China. If in the XX century. the thesis was relevant - who controls Eurasia, he controls the world, then tomorrow the emphasis may shift to the level of the bridge. And Russia may find itself in the epicenter of the interests of the superpowers. And here, in order to dictate the rules on its own bridge and not to be under the bridge, Russia will have to be both economically and politically strong and independent. There is simply no other way. A one-sided orientation only to the West or to the East is disastrous for Russia. Remember our coat of arms. Our eagle is not a freak, not a mutant or a victim of Chernobyl. It contains the great meaning of our place and our role in the world.

It is possible that the United States will have no time for Russia in the coming years. Too many internal problems have accumulated, and not all is well in external affairs. Washington's diplomacy towards Russia has always left the impression that turning Russia into a strategic partner has never been a priority. The administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush believed that if they needed Russian cooperation, they could provide it without much effort or concessions. The Clinton administration seemed particularly inclined to view Russia as an analogue of post-war Germany or Japan, as a country that could be forced to follow the political path of the United States, and which over time should even like it. Washington seems to have forgotten that there were no American soldiers on Russian soil, and its cities were not razed to the ground. atomic bombs... Russia is the legal successor of the USSR, but Russia is not the USSR. Psychologically Russia

practically already got rid of the complex of defeat of the USSR. Russia is a different country. Therefore, Russia, on a large scale, did not suffer defeat; began to carry out transformations and "clean up" after the collapse of the "parental home". It is not the same. And this, in the main, will determine the reaction of Russia to the actions of the United States.

Since the collapse of the USSR and the fall of the Iron Curtain, Russia has not built relations with the United States as a client state, a reliable ally, or a true friend, but has not behaved as an adversary, and even less as an adversary with global ambitions and hostile to us. messianic ideology. However, the risk of Russia moving into the camp of the US opponents is quite real. In many approaches to foreign policy issues, the points of view of the United States and Russia are diametrically different. And this is a serious reason for future confrontation. The US does not yet consider Russia strong enough to take our point of view into account. And a political confrontation, backed up by real military threats (radar in the Czech Republic and anti-missiles in Poland, further expansion of NATO at the expense of Georgia and possibly Ukraine), will inevitably lead to a military confrontation, albeit on the basis of the doctrine of containment. But this is a new round of the arms race.

For the United States and the West, this is a technological separation from Russia and China; for us, these are unbearable costs, akin to those that Reagan arranged for us with his concept of "star wars." To catch up with a weak strong means to be hopelessly behind. And this path was ordered to us by the fate of the USSR. To avoid such an outcome, Russia must understand where the US and its allies have weaknesses, where they make mistakes, and urgently take adequate measures to stop the development of the situation in a downward spiral.

Russia must understand that in the XXI century. it is not just a bridge, it is a fork, if you like, a crossroads of world civilizations. And whether there will be accidents or other cataclysms at this crossroads largely depends on Russia and you and me. In the meantime, we sat too long at a low start. Misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the events that led to the end of the Cold War have significantly influenced the formation of the US policy towards Russia. While Washington's actions were an important factor in accelerating the collapse of the Soviet empire, it should be credited far more than is usually done with the reformers in Moscow itself.

Let's not forget that at the beginning of the second half of the 1980s, the collapse of the USSR and even the Soviet bloc was not at all inevitable. After Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985, his goal was to solve problems that had manifested themselves in the days of Leonid

Brezhnev. And this: the lack of free military resources, especially exposed in Afghanistan and Africa, huge defense spending, which was an unbearable burden on the Soviet economy, the decline in the overall prestige of the USSR, accumulated problems in relations with the countries of Eastern Europe within the framework of the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact. The result was to increase the influence and prestige of the USSR.

When Gorbachev sharply cut subsidies to the Eastern Bloc countries, abandoned support for retrograde ruling regimes in the Warsaw Pact states and initiated "perestroika", the dynamics of political processes in Eastern Europe radically changed, which resulted in a largely peaceful fall of communist regimes and a weakening of Moscow's influence in the region. Ronald Reagan facilitated this process by increasing pressure on the Kremlin. But it was Gorbachev, not the White House, who ended the Soviet empire.

American influence played an even lesser role in the collapse of the USSR itself. The George W. Bush administration supported the Baltic republics' aspirations for independence, and made it clear to Gorbachev that violent action against legally elected separatist governments in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia would jeopardize Soviet-American relations. However, by allowing pro-independence parties to participate and win in relatively free elections, and by refusing to take drastic measures to remove them from power with the help of security forces, Gorbachev effectively ensured the withdrawal of the Baltic states from the USSR. The final blow to it was delivered by Russia itself, demanding for itself the same institutional status as that of other Union republics. At a Politburo meeting, Gorbachev said: if Russia is allowed to gain sovereignty, it will be "the end of the empire." And so it happened. After an unsuccessful attempt at the reactionary putsch in August 1991, Gorbachev could no longer prevent Yeltsin, as well as the leaders of Belarus and Ukraine, from “dismantling” the Soviet Union.

The Reagan and Bush Sr. administrations were aware of all the dangers associated with the collapse of a superpower, and ensured the "controllability" of the collapse of the USSR, skillfully combining sympathy with firmness. They treated Gorbachev with respect, but did not make any significant concessions to the detriment of US interests. For example, they outright rejected Gorbachev's desperate requests for massive economic assistance, since the United States had no reason to help him save the Soviet empire. However, when the Bush Sr. administration rejected Moscow's requests to refrain from military action against Saddam Hussein after

after the latter took over Kuwait, the White House tried very hard to show the proper politeness towards Gorbachev, "not to poke his nose" into this fact, as the then Secretary of State James Baker put it. As a result, the United States managed to kill two birds with one stone: defeat Saddam and maintain close cooperation with the Soviet Union, mainly on Washington's terms.

If the administration of George W. Bush had provided emergency economic assistance to the democratic government of independent Russia in 1992, then a large-scale "package" of financial assistance could have prevented the collapse of the Russian economy and, in the future, would have contributed to a closer "tie" of Russia to the West. However, Bush was too weak to take bold steps to help Russia. At the time, he was already losing the election battle to Democratic candidate Bill Clinton, who criticized the incumbent for being overly focused on foreign policy and inattention to the economic situation in the United States.

Although domestic political issues were central to his election campaign, once in the White House, Clinton immediately sought to help Russia. His administration has organized substantial financial assistance to Moscow, mainly through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Even in 1996, Clinton was ready to speak highly of Yeltsin, so much so that he even compared his decision to use military force against separatists in Chechnya with the actions of Abraham Lincoln during the American Civil War. Yeltsin was practically sitting on a "short leash" with Clinton. Actually, Clinton gave this leash to Bush. In the United States, unlike in Russia, foreign policy does not change much with the change of the owner of the White House. Americans choose a president for themselves, not for the outside world, and even more so, not for Russia.

The main miscalculation of the Clinton administration in maintaining the "short leash" was its decision to continue to take advantage of Russia's weakness. She sought to maximize the advantages for the United States in terms of foreign policy, economics, security in Europe and the post-Soviet space, until Russia recovers from the shocks of the transition period. The United States and the West did not expect that the transition period in their relations with Russia would end with Vladimir Putin. Many US politicians thought that Russia would not soon wake up from the "hangover syndrome" of the first president. But Russia “sober up” much earlier than the US and the West expected; moreover, in the morning she began to recall selectively and with indignation everything that had happened to her “the night before”.

Behind the facade of external friendship, Clinton administration officials believed that the Kremlin should unconditionally accept the American concept of Russia's national interests. In their opinion, if Moscow's preferences are not compatible with Washington's goals, they can be safely ignored. After all, Russia's economy was in ruins, the army was crumbling, and in many ways it behaved like a defeated country. Unlike other European metropolises that were leaving their former colonial possessions, Russia did not try to bargain for conditions that ensured the protection of its economic and security interests in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former USSR. As for domestic politics, Yeltsin's team of radical reformers often welcomed pressure from the IMF and the United States, thereby justifying a tough and highly unpopular monetary policy, which in fact they pursued of their own free will.

Soon, however, even Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who was nicknamed "Mr. Yes" for being compliant with the West, began to irritate the "cruel romance" with the Clinton administration. Once he told Talbott, who held in 1993-1994. the post of ambassador-at-large to the newly independent states: “It’s not too pleasant when you guys tell us: we will do this and that, whether you like it or not. So at least do not rub salt on the wounds, declaring that obeying your orders is also in our interests. "

But these requests of even the most loyal US Yeltsin reformers in Washington were deafened: there such an arrogant approach was gaining popularity. Talbott and his aides called this approach “feeding Russia with spinach”: Uncle Sam paternally treats Russian leaders with political “foods” that Washington considers “good for the health of the new Russia,” no matter how unappetizing they may seem to Moscow. Yeltsin's reformers, like in kindergarten, followed the rule: "The more you tell them that it is for their own good, the more they choke." By making it clear that Russia should not have an independent foreign - and even domestic - policy, the Clinton administration undoubtedly generated strong rejection among sane politicians in Moscow. While they were not in power, this neo-colonialist approach of the United States, which went hand in hand with the recommendations of the IMF, which, according to the majority of even Western economists today, were absolutely unsuitable for Russia and were so painful for the population that it was easy to implement them democratically impossible. However, some Yeltsin

radical reformers were ready to impose these measures on the people without their consent. At one time they were hindered by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, then by Yevgeny Primakov.

However, politicians like former President Nixon, as well as many prominent American businessmen and specialists on Russia, recognized the flaw in Washington's course and called for a compromise between Yeltsin and the conservative parliament. Nixon, for example, was deeply alarmed when Russian officials told him that Washington had expressed a willingness to turn a blind eye to "decisive" measures by the Yeltsin administration against its Supreme Soviet if the Kremlin simultaneously accelerated economic reforms. “Encouraging a departure from democratic principles in a country with authoritarian traditions like Russia is like trying to put out a fire with gasoline,” Nixon warned. Moreover, he argued, if Washington proceeds from the "fatally erroneous assumption" that Russia is no longer a world power, and will not be so for a long time, its actions would threaten peace and democracy in the region.

However, Clinton ignored Nixon's advice, and continued to turn a blind eye to Yeltsin's most egregious excesses. Relations between President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet soon came to a standstill, followed by Yeltsin's unconstitutional decree to dissolve it, eventually leading to violence and shelling of the parliament building with tank guns. After that, Yeltsin "pushed through" a new constitution, which provided the head of state with the broadest powers to the detriment of the legislative branch. Actually, according to this Constitution, Russia lives to this day. Then this step allowed to strengthen the power of the first president of Russia, and the Constitution marked the beginning of the "drift" towards authoritarianism. This, in turn, was the logical result of Washington's frivolous encouragement of Yeltsin's penchant for authoritarianism, enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Other aspects of the Clinton administration's arrogant foreign policy have only increased the discontent of sane politicians in Russia. NATO enlargement - especially its first wave, which involved Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic - was not in itself a major problem. Most Russians were ready to agree that NATO enlargement is an unpleasant event, but their country is still almost not threatened. But this was the case before the Kosovo crisis in 1999, when NATO launched a war against Serbia, despite Moscow's categorical objections and without the sanction of the Security Council.

the UN, the Russian elite and the people soon came to the conclusion that they had been deliberately misled. NATO is still a military bloc directed against Russia, against the Orthodox peoples.

Of course, the Russian elite, who consider themselves the custodian of the traditions of the Great Power - especially one in a state of "decline" - never liked such demonstrations of their insignificance. This played into the hands of those forces that seriously thought about the future of Russia as a sovereign state with a thousand-year history. They felt that Russia was seriously facing the Hamlet question: "to be or not to be." And this understanding by Putin's team is much more important today than the ideas of nationalization "according to Zyuganov" and Zhirinovsky's foreign policy ambitions combined.

Today Russia is emerging from the US "umbrella" and even offers an energy umbrella to Europe itself. This is a welcome trend for us. But it will undoubtedly provoke sharp opposition from the United States and NATO. And we will feel it soon. The next cycle of the global economic crisis that began in 2008 will not bypass Russia. If Russia, not caring about its rear (domestic market), gets carried away by the expansion of capital abroad, then it will be like playing hockey without a goalkeeper. Perhaps we will score goals in other people's gates, but how many will we concede in our own? We have already almost lost our home market. The WTO will finally complete this "dirty deed". What kind of innovative or other new economy can we talk about if the domestic market, for which in normal countries up to 90% of the domestic economy works, we give to foreigners?

Moderation and accuracy, economy in everything, the protection of our national interests always and everywhere, a subtle diplomatic game on the contradictions between the powers that be, dosed assistance, taking into account our interests in solving their problems - this should form the basis of our policy in the coming years, while The USA and the West will have no time for us. At the same time, quietly and unnoticed, we must modernize our economy and armed forces. Russia has only 7-10 years for this. And the time has passed. In this regard, one cannot blabber over what should have been done yesterday.

The absence of a clear foreign policy doctrine does not allow for the time being to prevent possible threats. And there can be no clear foreign policy doctrine without a clear strategy for the internal development of the state. The United States and the West are already accustomed to not reckoning with Russia (which is Russia, they do not reckon with the UN either). Therefore, we will continue to find ourselves in an uncomfortable position. In these cases, one cannot hesitate and pro

to show excessive "flexibility of the back", otherwise we will constantly be turned to events "backwards". And to get out of this pose with dignity, you need to have a filigree technique or know 1001 Shahrezada's fairy tales. Vladimir Putin has learned something.

There are enough such examples. Despite Russia's indignation at the Kosovo events, at the end of 1999 Vladimir Putin, while still prime minister, immediately after the introduction of troops into Chechnya, made an important demarche towards the United States. He was worried about the Chechen ties with al-Qaeda and the fact that Afghanistan, ruled by the Taliban, was the only country in the world to establish diplomatic relations with Chechnya. Guided by the listed security interests, and not by a sudden "flashing love" for the United States, Putin proposed forging cooperation between Moscow and Washington in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This initiative lay on the prepared ground, as it already had its own background. After the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the US administration had more than enough data to understand what mortal danger Islamic fundamentalists pose to the United States.

At one time, Clinton and his advisers, irritated by Russia's opposition in the Balkans and the removal of reformers from key positions in Moscow, ignored this factor of cooperation with Russia. The United States then still viewed Russia not as a potential partner, but as a nostalgic, incapacitated, financially weak state, and sought to provide the United States with maximum benefits at the expense of Russia. Under Clinton, the United States tried to consolidate the results of the collapse of the USSR, taking as many post-Soviet states as possible under Washington's wing. Therefore, they "put pressure" on Georgia to take part in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, connecting the Caspian Sea with the Mediterranean, bypassing Russia. They encouraged the opportunist Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze to join NATO and instructed the American embassies in Central Asia to resist Russian influence.

Therefore, in 1999, the United States rejected Putin's proposal for Russian-American counterterrorism cooperation, considering the Russian proposal as a gesture of a desperate neo-imperialist trying to restore his influence in Central Asia. The Clinton administration did not realize at the time that it was missing out on a historic chance to force al Qaeda and the Taliban

go on the defensive, destroy their bases, and possibly make it impossible to carry out major operations. Such cooperation did not begin until the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks claimed the lives of nearly 3,000 American citizens.

When George W. Bush came to power in January 2001 - eight months after Vladimir Putin became Russia's president - his administration faced new, relatively little-known figures in the Russian leadership. Trying to distance itself from Clinton's policies, the Bush team did not see relations with Russia as a priority: many of its representatives considered the Kremlin to be corrupt, undemocratic and weak. While this assessment may have been valid at the time, the Bush administration lacked the strategic foresight to reach out to Moscow. However, personal contacts between Bush and Putin were successful. During their first meeting - at the summit in Slovenia in June 2001 - Bush, as we all remember, personally "vouched" for the democratic convictions and spiritual qualities of the new Russian president.

The events of September 11, 2001 radically changed Washington's attitude towards Moscow and generated an emotional wave of support and sympathy in Russia for the United States. Putin reaffirmed a previous offer of cooperation in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Russia granted the US Air Force the right to fly over Russian territory, supporting the establishment of American bases in Central Asia, and, perhaps most importantly, helped Washington establish contact with Russian-trained and equipped military units of the Northern Alliance. Of course, Vladimir Putin acted in the interests of Russia itself. But for Putin, as a budding politician, the entry of the United States into the fight against Islamist terrorism was a real gift of fate. Like many other alliances, US-Russian counterterrorism cooperation was based on coincidence of fundamental interests, rather than shared ideology or mutual sympathy.

Despite this interaction, in other areas, relations between the two countries remained tense. Bush's December 2001 announcement that the United States would withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - one of the last remaining symbols of Russia's superpower status - once again deeply hurt the pride of the Kremlin. Likewise, our hostility towards NATO only intensified when the Alliance annexed the three Baltic states, two of which are Estonia and

Latvia - had territorial disputes with Russia, problems related to the situation of the Russian-speaking minority.

At about the same time, Ukraine became a serious new source of mutual tension. There is no doubt that the United States' support for Viktor Yushchenko and the Orange Revolution was associated not only with the spread of democracy, but also with the desire to undermine Russian influence in a country that voluntarily joined the Moscow State in the 17th century, which is very close to Russia in its cultural plan, and had a significant Russian-speaking population. Moreover, many in Russia reasonably believe that the current Russian-Ukrainian border - established by Stalin and Khrushchev as the administrative border between the two Union republics - extends far beyond the historical territory of Ukraine, resulting in areas populated by millions of Russians. which gives rise to interethnic, linguistic and political problems.

The Bush administration's approach to relations with Ukraine - namely, the pressure it is putting on a fractured Ukraine to apply to join NATO, and the financial backing of nongovernmental organizations actively helping pro-presidential political parties - should continually fuel our concerns about not whether the United States has moved to a new version of its containment policy towards Russia. Few of the Bush administration officials or congressmen thought about the consequences of opposing Russia in such an important region from the point of view of its national interests as Ukraine, Crimea, the Black Sea, and on an issue that carries a strong emotional load.

Georgia soon became another "battlefield" between Moscow and Washington. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili sought to use the support of the West, and especially the United States, as the main instrument for restoring Georgia's sovereignty over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where the indigenous peoples we support have fought for independence since the early 1990s. But Saakashvili's ambitions extended much further. He not only demanded the return of the two self-proclaimed republics under control of Tbilisi: he openly positioned himself as the main supporter of "color revolutions" in the post-Soviet region and the overthrow of leaders who sympathized with Russia. He portrayed himself as a fighter for democracy, enthusiastically supporting foreign policy USA. Saakashvili went so far as to send Georgian troops to the allied contingent in 2004

Iraq. Actually, Yushchenko did the same. The fact that when he was elected president he received a suspiciously high number of votes (96%), as well as took control of parliament and television, outside Georgia itself did not cause much concern. The obvious arbitrariness with which he repressed the leaders of the business community and political rivals did not raise questions. In 2005, when the popular Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania - the only one who still served as a political counterbalance to Saakashvili - died under mysterious circumstances (allegedly as a result of a gas leak), his family and friends publicly rejected the official version of what happened, transparently hinting that Saakashvili's regime was involved in the death of the politician. If the death of even little-known Russian oppositionists worries the United States, then the death of Zhvania or Patar-katsishvili in Washington did not seem to have been noticed.

Farce with early resignation from the presidency in 2007, the bloody massacre of the opposition in the center of Tbilisi in November 2007, falsification of the election results in January 2008, the unexpected death of another of his implacable opponents, Badri Patar-katsishvili, should have finally , erode confidence in Saakashvili as a legitimate president. However, this does not happen. In fact, the Bush administration and influential circles in both parties have consistently supported Saakashvili in the fight against Russia, despite all his excesses. On several occasions, the US urged him to moderate his ardor so as not to provoke an open military clash with Russia. It is obvious that Washington has chosen Georgia as its main "client state" in the Transcaucasus and the Caspian region. In the Balkans, Kosovo was chosen as such a client state.

The United States is providing weapons and training to the Georgian military, thereby allowing Saakashvili to take a tougher stance toward Russia; the Georgian military even went so far as to detain and publicly humiliate Russian soldiers deployed in South Ossetia as peacekeepers and deployed on the territory of Georgia itself.

Of course, Russia's own behavior towards Georgia is far from ideal. Moscow granted Russian citizenship to most of the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and rather timidly introduced economic sanctions against Georgia.

At that time, Washington's blind support for Saakashvili was supposed to reinforce the feeling that the goal of US policy was to undermine the already sharply weakened Russian influence in the region, as a result of which in August 2008 a military conflict was provoked from the Georgian side with

Russia. The United States is more interested not so much in supporting the leaders of democracies as such, but in using them as a tool to isolate Russia in the post-Soviet space.

Despite growing tensions, Russia has not yet become an adversary to the United States. There is still a chance to prevent a further deterioration in relations between the two countries. This requires a sober assessment of the US goals in the post-Soviet region and an analysis of the situation in those numerous areas where the interests of the US and Russia coincide, especially in the fight against terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Skill diplomacy will also be required in cases where the goals of both countries are the same, but tactical approaches are different, for example, with regard to the Iranian nuclear program.

Most importantly, the US must admit that it no longer enjoys unlimited influence over Russia. Today Washington is simply unable to impose its will on Moscow, as it did in the 90s of the last century. A number of influential members of the US Congress reasonably note that it is precisely anti-terrorism and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that should be the determining directions of Russian-American relations. Another priority issue is stability in Russia itself, where thousands of nuclear warheads are located. The most important help for Washington would be Russia's support for sanctions - if necessary and the use of force - against "destructive states" and terrorist groups.

The United States is also interested in spreading and deepening democratic order in the post-Soviet region, but it is naive to expect Russia to support its efforts to introduce American democracy. Therefore, Washington will continue to strive so that no one, including Russia, prevents other countries from choosing a democratic form of government and making their own foreign policy (pro-American) decisions. However, the United States will need to understand that its capacity to meet this challenge is limited.

Russia, taking advantage of high energy prices, while pursuing a sensible financial policy, which has brought the "oligarchs" in check, no longer needs large-scale foreign loans and economic assistance. Despite the growing tension in interstate relations with the West, large-scale foreign investments are willingly "flowing" into Russia. As long as stability and relative material well-being are maintained in Russia itself, the newfound sense of pride in one's country will be

restrain people's discontent with tightening state control and gross manipulation in the political sphere.

The negative image of the United States and its Western allies in russian society, reasonably supported by the authorities, severely limits the ability of the United States to create a "support base" for its recommendations regarding the internal processes in the country. In the current climate, Washington can only make it clear to Moscow that domestic political repression is incompatible with a long-term partnership with the United States. Not conducive to the cause is the fact that the reputation of the United States itself as a moral model has been seriously damaged in recent years. Moreover, Moscow's suspicion about Washington's intentions is only growing today. In a number of cases, Moscow began to reflexively perceive with apprehension even those decisions that are not directed against Russia. In general, this is not so bad in the current situation around Russia.

While Moscow itself looks to the West with suspicion, then Russia's use of its energy resources for political purposes is angered by Western governments, not to mention neighboring countries that are completely dependent on energy supplies from Russia.

Russia, of course, must continue to actively use the energy lever as a political tool. Unfortunately, the government is still holding Gazprom alone. But, apparently, in the future, if need be, then it may come to oil companiesin particular, Rosneft has now become a global giant.

Undoubtedly, Gazprom is supplying friendly states with energy resources at preferential prices. In essence, Russia is simply rewarding countries that maintain a special political and economic relationship with it by selling them oil and gas at below market prices. Of course, politically we can come to terms with the "NATO" choice of neighboring countries, but Russia is not obliged to subsidize them after that. It should always be borne in mind that when Washington reacts to Russia's "politicized" use of its energy resources with noble indignation, it does not look very sincere: after all, no state imposes economic sanctions on others as often and with such enthusiasm as the United States.

The United States has consistently accused Russia of obstructing Kosovo, but Moscow's publicly voiced position was that it would accept any agreement reached by the Kosovars and Serbia. Moscow has never dissuaded Belgrade from making an agreement with Kosovo. But also recognize one hundred

russia did not intend to declare Kosovo's independence earlier. After the self-proclamation of Kosovo's independence, the situation has changed dramatically. The United States and Western allies "gave a damn" about international law, the UN Security Council, and Russia. This should free Russia's hands. Moscow will only benefit from the decision of the unrecognized republics on the territory of the former USSR, especially Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and subsequently Transnistria, to gain independence without the consent of the states from which they wanted to secede. Many in Russia are quite satisfied that the fate of Kosovo has become a precedent for the unrecognized post-Soviet territories, most of which yearn for independence and subsequent integration with Russia. And here Russia does not need to hold on especially to the letter of international law, which was not violated by us.

A number of other foreign policy differences only exacerbate tensions. Russia, for example, did not support Washington's decision to invade Iraq, and some key US allies in NATO, in particular France and Germany, took the same position. Russia supplies conventional weapons to some states that the United States considers hostile, such as Iran, Syria and Venezuela, but it does so on a commercial basis, without violating international law. It is understandable that the United States may perceive such actions as provocative, but many Russians view US military supplies to Georgia in the same way.

Contrary to its interests, Russia must stop participating in the policy of softly “curbing” Iran and North Korea. On the one hand, Russia does not go as far as the United States and Europe would like, and, in the end, still supports the imposition of sanctions against both countries.

There are many disagreements between the United States and Russia, but this does not mean that Russia is an enemy of the United States. And the main thing here is that Russia does not support Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups waging a war against America, and is no longer spreading “rival” ideology, aiming at world hegemony, as it was during the Soviet era. Moreover, Russia has never invaded or threatened to invade the territory of any of the neighboring countries. Finally, Russia has decided not to inflate separatist sentiments in Ukraine, despite the presence of a significant and highly active Russian minority in that country.

The main thing for Russia is to accept that the United States is the most powerful power in the world, and there is no point in provoking it unnecessarily. However, it makes no sense for Russia to adjust to American preferences anymore, especially to the detriment of its own interests.

International situation modern Russia (90s)

The collapse of the USSR changed Russia's position in the international arena. First of all, it was necessary to achieve recognition of Russia as the legal successor of the former Soviet Union in the UN. Almost all states have recognized Russia. Including on the recognition of the sovereignty of Russia, on the transfer to it of the rights and obligations of the former USSR in 1993-1994. declared by the countries of the European Community (EU). Partnership and cooperation agreements were concluded between the EU states and the Russian Federation.

The Russian government joined the NATO-proposed Partnership for Peace program, later agreeing with NATO to conclude a separate agreement.

At the same time, Russia could not remain indifferent to the attempts of the Eastern European countries to join NATO. Moreover, the NATO leadership has published a document formulating the conditions for the expansion of this bloc. Any country wishing to join NATO must be prepared to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on its territory. It became obvious that the United States is the only power in the world claiming global interference in the affairs of other countries.

In 1996, Russia joined the Council of Europe (created in 1949, unites 39 European states), which was responsible for issues of culture, human rights, and environmental protection. However, during the events in Chechnya, Russia began to be subjected to discriminatory criticism in the Council of Europe, which raised the question of the expediency of its participation in this organization before Russia.

The dynamism of international events demanded constant maneuvering from Russian diplomacy. Russia has become a participant in the regular annual meetings of the G7 (after Russia's joining the G8) - the leaders of the world's leading developed states, where the most important political and economic issues are discussed. On the whole, relations with France, Great Britain, Italy and especially with Germany developed positively (after the withdrawal of Russian troops in 1994 from the territory of the former GDR).

Partnerships with the United States and Western European countries took place in parallel with the turn of Russia "facing" the East. Russia is a major power and the center of Eurasia. Naturally, its geopolitical strategy should be based on an equal attitude towards the countries of both the West and the East. The policy of "Eurocentrism" carried out during the years of "perestroika" under Gorbachev's slogan "Enter the European home" was perceived with caution by the leaders of the Eastern countries, causing bewilderment among the population of the Asian regions of Russia. Therefore, the mutual visits of the heads of state of Russia and China (treaties and agreements of 1997-2001), the strengthening of relations with India (the 2001 treaty) have become a serious contribution to improving the international climate, to the development of the concept of a multipolar world as opposed to the US claims to establish a “new world order ".

A very important issue in relations between Russia and non-CIS countries, and above all the United States, is the question of the role of nuclear weapons in maintaining peace and security. Although Russia's economic status has fallen, it still retains the position of the USSR as a superpower in nuclear weapons. The political leaders of modern Russia were received on equal terms by the G8 and NATO. In this regard, the ratification in 2000 by the Third State Duma of the Treaty on the reduction of strategic weapons (START II) raised questions from civilian and military experts, who believe that this is a unilateral concession in favor of the United States. For elimination from the Russian defensive arsenal by 2003 was subject to the most formidable for any enemy ground intercontinental ballistic missiles SS-18 (they are based in almost invulnerable silos and are on alert in the variant of 10 multiple independently targetable warheads). The possession of these weapons by Russia forces the other side to abide by agreements on the reduction of nuclear stockpiles and missile defense.

In 2002, in connection with the withdrawal of the United States from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the Russian side announced the termination of its obligations under the START II Treaty.

Foreign economic relations and Russia's trade with foreign countries were developing. Our country supplies oil, gas and natural resources in exchange for food and consumer goods. At the same time, the states of the Middle East, Latin America, Southeast Asia are showing interest in Russia's participation in the construction of hydroelectric power plants, metallurgical enterprises, and agricultural facilities.

Relations with the CIS states occupy an important place in the foreign policy activities of the RF Government. In January 1993, the Commonwealth Charter was adopted. At first, negotiations on issues related to the division of property of the former USSR were central to relations between the countries. Borders were established with those countries that introduced national currencies. Agreements were signed that determined the conditions for the carriage of Russian goods through the territory of the CIS countries to the far abroad.

The collapse of the USSR destroyed traditional economic ties with former republics... Trade with the CIS states is developing, but it has a number of problems. Perhaps the most acute is the following: Russia continues to supply the former republics with fuel and energy resources, primarily oil and gas, for which the Commonwealth states cannot pay. Their financial debt in billions of dollars is growing.

The Russian leadership is striving to preserve integration ties between the former republics within the CIS. On his initiative, the Interstate Committee of the Commonwealth countries was established with a center in Moscow. Seven states (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) signed a collective security treaty (May 15, 1992). Russia, in fact, has become the only state that actually carries out peacekeeping tasks in the "hot spots" of the CIS (Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Tajikistan).

Interstate relations between Russia and some of the former republics of the USSR were not easy to develop. Conflicts with the governments of the Baltic states are caused by discrimination against the Russian population living there. In relations with Ukraine, there is the problem of Crimea, which, together with the Russian city of Sevastopol, was "presented" to Ukraine by Khrushchev's voluntarist decision.

The closest, fraternal ties are developing between Russia and Belarus (treaties of 1997, 2001). Integration relations are developing between them, leading to the formation of a single union state.

It is now clear that Russia can play a more significant role in strengthening economic, political and cultural ties between the CIS states, if it achieves success in its domestic policy, the revival of the national economy, and the rise of culture and science. And Russia's authority in the world as a whole can be ensured by the stable development of its economy and the stability of the internal political situation.