The international position of modern russia. The international position of modern Russia (90s) The international position of the Russian Federation
The international position of modern Kazakhstan.
Since December 16, 1991 Kazakhstan entered the world arena as a full-fledged subject of international law. Two weeks before the end of 1991, the independence of Kazakhstan was recognized by 18 states, among them: Turkey, the United States. China. Germany, Pakistan. In the first year of independence, Kazakhstan was recognized108 70 countries of the world have opened diplomatic missions.
March 2, 1992 Kazakhstan became a full member of the United Nations. Also, Kazakhstan became a member of the World Bank of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. International Monetary Fund UNESCO.
In Helsinki, Kazakhstan, along with other countries that emerged after the collapse of the USSR and the SFRY, joined the final act of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
The geopolitical position of Kazakhstan in the center of the Eurasian continent, the complex ethnic composition, the desire to form an open market system in the economy caused the need to build a peaceful foreign policy. “The Republic of Kazakhstan builds its relations with other states on the basis of the principles of international law,” the Law on State Independence says.
Kazakhstan occupies a strategically important space connecting Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, it was very important, using this factor, to move into a new century in cooperation and friendship with Russia and China.
May 25, 1992 In Moscow, an agreement on mutual assistance, friendship and cooperation was signed betweenRussia and Kazakhstan (in the economy, military and political spheres). Of particular importance is the agreement on the inviolability of borders.
With the People's Republic of China(PRC) was concluded about50 contracts and agreements.
Kazakhstan is in close relations with its closest neighbors: Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan. Turkmenistan. Common boundaries, high degree of integration in soviet time, economic dependence on each other helps maintain traditional ties with these states.
Kazakhstan has made a lot of efforts to resolve the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan. Speaking at the UN,N.A. Nazarbayev proposed to convenemeeting of heads of Asian states and discuss measures to increase confidence and ensure security and stability in the region. The UN Secretary General accepted the offer.
In the Alma-Ata Declaration ofDecember 21, 1991 d. with regard to strategic nuclear weapons, joint control of the nuclear arsenal is envisaged the former USSR... Kazakhstan has ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Testing, and has joined the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization... April 26, 1996 In the city of Shanghai (China), the first meeting of five states "having common borders (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan. PRC, Russia. Tajikistan) took place."Later meetings were held in Moscow, Almaty and Bishkek.
The total territory of these five states occupies 3/5 of the area of \u200b\u200bEurasia, and the population is a quarter of the world's population. At a meeting inShanghai issues of military confidence in the border areas were discussed. INMoscow (1997) a document was signed on the reduction of the number of armed forces in the border areas.At the SCO summit in Almaty (1998), the main directions of relations were determined and issues of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations were discussed.
August 24-25, 1999 In Bishkek, the meeting discussed the implementation of the agreements reached, security problems in the region, the Bishkek Declaration was signed.
Kazakhstan is the second largest trade partner of China among the CIS countries. An agreement was reached on the issue of disputed territories (about 1000 sq. Km): 57% will belong to Kazakhstan, and 43% - to China.
Kazakhstan and Russia signed agreements on the use of the Baikonur cosmodrome, on the extraction, processing and transportation of oil, a Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation was adopted.
Relations of Kazakhstan with other states of the world
Kazakhstan does not have access to the open sea and is forced to seek access to the Black and Mediterranean Seas through the Caspian and southern regions. Relations between Kazakhstan and Turkey developed on a particularly large scale. Kazakh-Turkish joint ventures have appeared, the Ankara hotel has been built in Almaty. Delegations from Kazakhstan took part in conferences in Turkey, and scientists from Turkey - in Kazakhstan. Kazakh students study in Istanbul and Ankara.
Special importance is attached to the development of relations with India. Kazakhstan, Iran, Turkey strive for economic cooperation and cultural exchange.
Relations of Kazakhstan with developed powers West
With the collapse of the Union, the distribution of forces in the world acquired a multipolar character, special attention is paid to relations with the most powerful world power -USA. relations are built on the basis of equality and mutual interests. The United States is one of the main investors in our economy, providing assistance in the field of culture and education. Under the "Bolashak" program, Kazakhstani students study at universities in the USA, France, Germany. In 1992 N. Nazarbayev and the Chancellor of GermanyG.Kol signed a joint statement on the basics of the relationship. In 1992, at the Elysee Palace, the President of Kazakhstan and the President of FranceF. Mitterrand signed an Agreement of Understanding and Cooperation. Kazakhstan has established mutually beneficial contacts with Hungary, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania.
Relations of Kazakhstan with military-political organizations
After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact organization, NATO acquired a dominant position. Kazakhstan is expanding ties with NATO. Kazakhstan's relations with the wounds of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), with the countries of Northeast Asia - Japan, South and North Korea and Mongolia - inspire great hope.
Russia in the system of military-political relations in the world
The current stage of world development is characterized by the most acute socio-economic conflicts and political contradictions. Despite the fact that the problem of global and regional security is increasingly shifting to political, financial, economic, ethno-national, demographic, etc., the role of military power remains an effective deterrent factor in stabilization international relations.
The current military-political situation in the world
The world military-political situation today is characterized by a combination of two main trends: on the one hand, the desire of most states in the world to form a democratic, more just system of international economic and political relations. On the other hand, the expansion of the practice of using armed force on the basis of national decisions and outside the UN mandate. Confirmation - the wars not sanctioned by the UN Security Council against Yugoslavia and Iraq.
The current military-political situation in the world can be characterized by the following main trends.
FIRST, counteraction to new challenges stimulated by the processes of globalization comes to the fore in the global system of military-political relations. This is the proliferation of weapons mass destruction and means of delivery; international terrorism; ~ ethnic instability; activities of radical religious communities and groups; drug trafficking; organized crime.
It is impossible to effectively combat all these manifestations within the framework of individual states. Therefore, in the world, the importance of international cooperation of power structures, including the special services and the armed forces, is increasing.
SECOND, the implementation of international operations on the use of force outside the traditional military-political organizations is becoming a reality. Military force is increasingly being used in temporary coalitions. Russia, on the other hand, stands for strict observance of the norms of international law and will join such coalitions only if it is required by its foreign policy interests.
THIRD, further economization of the foreign policy priorities of states is taking place. Economic interests are becoming more important than political and military-political ones. In addition, a more complex combination of economic interests of individual states and the interests of large transnational companies arises. As a result, the understanding of the conditions for the use of armed force has changed significantly. If earlier the basis for this was most often the presence of a direct military threat to the security or interests of a particular state, now military force is increasingly used to ensure the economic interests of a particular country, which objectively expands the sphere of its foreign policy relevance.
FOURTH, there was a fusion of the internal and international terrorism... Modern terrorism is global in nature, poses a threat to most states, their political stability, economic independence, its manifestations lead to massive human sacrifices, destruction of material and spiritual values.
In modern conditions, when the emergence of an international antiterrorist international has become a reality, attempts to divide terrorist activity into domestic and international are becoming senseless. This applies both to political approaches to suppressing terrorist activity and forceful measures to neutralize terrorist activity. It is obvious that terrorism has turned from a political threat into a military-political one, and the sphere of responsibility of the armed forces, in particular the Armed Forces of Russia, has significantly expanded to counter it.
The transnational nature of the growing threats from terrorist activities and criminal extremism puts on the agenda the need for international cooperation of Russia, primarily with the CIS member states, within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.
Today the CIS states, by virtue of their geopolitical position, are at the forefront of the fight against international terrorism, which is confirmed by the events in the North Caucasus and Central Asian region. The situation may become much more complicated in connection with the collapse of the far-reaching plans of the extremists in the North Caucasus and the concentration of the main forces of the jihad in the Central Asian direction. These are not virtual scenarios, but quite specific plans for a radical "reshaping" of the political map of the whole region.
It would be naive to believe that the terrorists' plans will be limited to the framework of one separate state. The tentacles of extremism have already penetrated many countries. And if he manages to destabilize the situation in any of the Central Asian states, no borders will stop the chain reaction.
The implementation of terrorist goals by the forces of international terrorism and religious extremism can lead to a radical change in the geopolitical situation in Central Asia with unpredictable consequences. It is not just about maintaining strategic stability in the region, but about ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation and the CIS countries.
Fifthly, the importance of non-state participants in the system of international relations for determining the nature of foreign policy priorities of various states of the world has significantly increased. Non-governmental organizations, international movements and communities, interstate organizations and informal "clubs" have a broad, sometimes contradictory impact on the policies of individual states. Russia seeks active participation in the main interstate and international organizations to ensure various aspects of their foreign policy interests and interests in the field of security.
The main military threats to the national interests of Russia and the tasks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation before they are neutralized
An analysis of the military-political situation in the world allows us to conclude that for Russia there are real threats to its national interests: external, internal and cross-border.
External threats include:
Deployment of groupings of forces and assets aimed at a military attack on Russia or its allies;
Territorial claims against the Russian Federation, the threat of political or forceful rejection of some of its territories from Russia;
Implementation by states, organizations and movements of programs to create weapons of mass destruction;
Interference in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation of organizations supported by foreign states;
Demonstration of military force near the borders of Russia, conducting exercises with provocative purposes;
The presence of hotbeds of armed conflicts near the borders of the Russian Federation or the borders of its allies that threaten their security;
Instability, weakness of state institutions in bordering countries;
build-up of force groupings leading to disruption of the existing balance of forces near the borders of the Russian Federation or the borders of its allies and the sea waters adjacent to their territory;
Expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the military security of Russia or its allies;
Activities of international radical groups, strengthening the position of Islamic extremism near the Russian borders;
The introduction of foreign troops (without the consent of the Russian Federation and the sanction of the UN Security Council) on the territory of neighboring states that are friendly to the Russian Federation;
Armed provocations, including attacks on military facilities of the Russian Federation located on the territory of foreign states, as well as on facilities and structures on the state border of the Russian Federation or the borders of its allies;
Actions that impede the operation of Russian systems of state and military control, ensuring the functioning of strategic nuclear forces, warning of a missile attack, missile defense, control of outer space and ensuring the combat stability of troops;
Actions hindering Russia's access to strategically important transport communications;
Discrimination, suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states;
The proliferation of equipment, technologies and components used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as dual-use technologies that can be used to create weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles.
Internal threats include:
Attempts to violently change the constitutional order and violate the territorial integrity of Russia;
Planning, preparation and implementation of actions to disrupt and disorganize the functioning of organs state power and control, attacks on state, national economic, military facilities, life support facilities and information infrastructure;
Creation, equipment, training and operation of illegal armed groups;
Illegal distribution (circulation) in the territory of the Russian Federation of weapons, ammunition, explosives, etc .;
Large-scale organized crime activities that threaten political stability on the scale of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation;
Activities of separatist and radical religious-nationalist movements in the Russian Federation.
The concept of cross-border threats includes political, military-political or military threats to the interests and security of the Russian Federation, which combine the features of internal and external threats. Being internal in the form of manifestation, in their essence (sources of origin and stimulation, possible participants, etc.) are external.
These threats include:
Creation, equipping, support and training on the territory of other states of armed formations and groups for the purpose of their transfer for operations on the territory of the Russian Federation or the territories of its allies;
Activities of subversive separatist, national or religious extremist groups, directly or indirectly supported from abroad, aimed at undermining the constitutional system of the Russian Federation, threatening the territorial integrity of the state and the security of its citizens;
Cross-border crime, including smuggling and other illegal activities on a scale that threaten the military-political security of the Russian Federation or stability on the territory of Russia's allies;
Conducting information (information technology, information psychological, etc.) actions hostile to the Russian Federation and its allies;
Activities of international terrorist organizations;
Drug trafficking activities that pose a threat to the transportation of drugs to the territory of the Russian Federation, or the use of Russian territory to transport drugs to other countries.
Neutralization of external threats, as well as participation in neutralization of internal and cross-border threats is the task of the Russian Armed Forces and is carried out jointly with other power structures, as well as with the relevant authorities of the countries - allies of the Russian Federation.
Actions to suppress such threats are carried out taking into account the provisions of international and humanitarian law, proceeding from the interests of the national security of Russia and its legislation. Given the changes in the geopolitical situation in the world, it must be stated that ensuring Russia's security only through political opportunities (membership in international organizations, partnerships, opportunities to influence) is not effective.
As the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin in his Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on May 26, 2004, “We need combat-ready, technically equipped and modern Armed Forces for reliable protection of the state. So that we can calmly solve internal socio-economic problems ”.
We need a strong, professional and well-armed army for the prosperous and peaceful development of the country. It must be able to defend Russia and its allies, as well as effectively interact with the armed forces of other countries in the fight against common threats.
In accordance with the Federal Law "On Defense", the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are designed to repel aggression directed against the Russian Federation, for armed defense of the integrity and inviolability of the territory of Russia, as well as to perform tasks in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Federation.
The tasks of the Armed Forces are defined in more detail by the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 706 of April 21, 2000:
1. In armed conflicts and local wars, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are faced with the task of localizing the hotbed of tension and ending hostilities at the earliest possible stage in the interests of creating preconditions for resolving the conflict by peaceful means on conditions that meet the interests of the Russian Federation. Armed conflicts and local wars can, under certain conditions, develop into a large-scale war. If necessary, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will be deployed to use all the forces and means at their disposal.
To prevent wars and armed conflicts and ensure the deterrence of aggressors from unleashing any wars, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are assigned the following tasks:
Timely opening, together with the forces and means of other federal executive bodies, of an impending armed attack or a threatening development of the situation and warning the top leadership of the state about them;
Maintaining the composition and condition of the strategic nuclear forces at a level that ensures guaranteed infliction of the specified damage to the aggressor in any conditions;
Maintaining the combat potential of peacetime general-purpose groupings at a level that ensures the repulsion of aggression on a local (regional) scale;
Providing, within the framework of state measures for the transfer of the country from a peaceful to a military position, the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;
Protection of the state border in the air and in the underwater environment.
2. Separate formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation can be involved in the elimination of internal armed conflicts that threaten the vital interests of the Russian Federation and can be used as a pretext for intervention by other states in its internal affairs. The task of using troops and forces involved in localizing and suppressing such conflicts is the earliest possible normalization of the situation, the suppression of armed clashes and the separation of the opposing sides, as well as the protection of strategically important facilities.
3. When participating in peacekeeping operations conducted by decision of the UN Security Council or in accordance with Russia's international obligations, the contingent of its Armed Forces may be assigned the following tasks:
Disengagement of the armed groups of the conflicting parties;
Ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid to the civilian population and its evacuation from the conflict zone;
Blocking the conflict area in order to enforce the sanctions adopted by the international community.
The solution of these and other tasks is carried out by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in close cooperation with other troops of Russia. At the same time, the Border Service of the FSB of Russia is responsible for the protection of the state border on land, sea, rivers, lakes and other bodies of water, the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia are responsible for the protection of important state facilities and the suppression of especially dangerous offenses, sabotage and terrorist acts.
Given the changed situation in the world and the emergence of new threats to Russia's security, the tasks assigned to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have also changed. They can be structured in four main areas:
1. Containment of military and military-political threats to the security or interests of the Russian Federation.
2. Ensuring the economic and political interests of the Russian Federation.
3. Implementation of peacetime military operations.
4. Use of military force.
The peculiarities of the development of the military-political situation in the world determine the possibility of the development of one task into another, since the most problematic, from the point of view of the security of the Russian Federation, military-political situations are complex and multifaceted.
The nature of the tasks facing the Armed Forces of Russia, taking into account the specifics of armed conflicts and wars in which they may be involved, requires the formulation of new approaches to them.
The main priorities in the development of the RF Armed Forces are determined by the nature of the tasks in the field of national security and the geopolitical priorities of the country's development. We can talk about the existence of several fundamental requirements for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which will determine the main parameters of military development:
Ability to implement strategic deterrence;
High combat and mobilization readiness;
Strategic mobility;
High level of staffing with well-trained and trained personnel;
High technical equipment and resource availability.
The implementation of these requirements makes it possible to select the priorities for reforming and strengthening the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the present time and in the future. The main ones include:
1. Maintaining the potential of the Strategic Containment Force.
2. An increase in the number of formations and units of constant readiness and the formation of groupings of troops on their basis.
3. Improving the operational (combat) training of troops (forces).
4. Improving the manning system of the Armed Forces.
5. Implementation of the program for the modernization of weapons, military and special equipment and their maintenance in a state of combat readiness.
6. Improvement of military science and military education.
7. Improving the systems of social security of servicemen, education and moral and psychological training.
The ultimate goal of these measures is to eliminate duplicate links and ensure, if necessary, the comprehensive use of the Armed Forces and military formations of the power ministries and departments of the Russian Federation.
From the above, we can conclude:
1. Despite the positive changes in the international situation, a sharp reduction in the military confrontation between states, the military-political situation in the world remains complex and contradictory.
2. Due to its geopolitical position, Russia is acutely aware of the impact of negative factors and features of the current military-political situation.
3. There are real sources of threat to Russia's national security. This requires strengthening and increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.
In introductory remarks the head of the UCP must emphasize the importance of this topic, determine the purpose of the lesson, its main questions.
Expanding the first question, it is advisable to draw the attention of the audience to the fact that in recent years many different events have taken place in the world that have had a significant impact on the national security system of the Russian Federation, therefore, the primary task for our country is to ensure its military security.
When considering the second question (for all categories of UCP listeners), it is important to understand that the ongoing changes in the world have led to the emergence of new threats to Russia's military security. The greatest danger in modern conditions is represented by transboundary threats, which combine the features of internal and external threats.
It is necessary to make the audience understand that the modern Armed Forces of Russia must meet the nature of the international situation and the specifics of the country's geopolitical position, they must be built on the achievements of modern military science and practice. In this regard, the most important task remains the modernization of our Armed Forces.
The consideration of the second question should be completed by outlining the specific combat training tasks to be performed by the units in the winter (summer) periods of training.
In conclusion, it is necessary to draw brief conclusions, answer the questions of the audience, give recommendations for studying the literature and preparing for the conversation.
2. Actual tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation //
3. Message of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. - May 27. - 2004.
4. Gordlevsky A. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation // Landmark. - 2004. - No. 2.
5. Fatherland. Honour. Debt. A textbook on social and state training. Issue No. 4. - M, 1998.
phD in Philosophy, Associate Professor, Colonel
Alexander Chaevich
article. Clause 1 of the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation of July 23, 2009 No. 64 "On some issues of the practice of considering disputes over the rights of owners of premises to the common property of a building" 8 indicates that since the relationship of owners of premises located in a non-residential building arising from a common property in such a building is not directly regulated by law, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Art. 6 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, these relations are subject to the application of legislative norms regulating similar relations, in particular, Art. 249, 289, 290 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.
Since 2009, the provisions of the above Plenum have been actively used in judicial practice and in terms of recognizing the owners of premises located in a non-residential building, the rights of common shared ownership of its common property9.
As a result of our excursion in the development of legal regulation in relation to common property in non-residential premises, we believe that it is necessary at the legislative level to consolidate the status of common property in non-residential premises and thereby establish gaps in legislation.
1 Some legal aspects of building management. RELGA is a scientific and cultural journal. No. 17. 2011, Internet resource: http://www.relga.ru/ EotkopM ^ ebObjects / tgu-ww.woa / wa / Mam? Textid \u003d 3030 & 1eve1 1 \u003d tat & ^ e12 \u003d a11c ^
2 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2005. No. 4.
3 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2002. No. 12.
4 See, for example: Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Far Eastern District of December 18, 2002 No. F03-A51 / 02-2 / 2512; rulings
FAS of the Ural District of 03.09.2003 No. F09-2398 / 03-GK, dated 20.01.2005 No. F09-4495 / 04-GK; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Moscow Region No. KG-A40 / 7495-05 dated 17.08.2005. The documents have not been officially published (see ATP).
5 See, for example: V.A. Lapach Non-residential premises as objects of civil rights // Legislation. 2003. No. 4. S. 12 .; Ilyin D.I. Legislation on real estate: problems of the content of used concepts // Journal of Russian law. 2005. No. 8. P. 150; Khurtsilava A.G. Civil law grounds for acquiring rights to non-residential premises: Author's abstract. Diss ... cand. jurid. sciences. M., 2006.S. 9-10; Pidzhakov A.Yu., Nechuikina E.V. On the issue of legal regulation of the turnover of non-residential premises // Civil law. 2004. No. 2. S. 47 .; Skvortsov A. Distribution of shares in the implementation of an investment and construction project // New Legislation and Legal Practice. 2009. No. 1.
6 Suite Yu.P. Features of the ownership right to the common property of apartment buildings and non-residential buildings // Laws of Russia: experience, analysis, practice. 2011. No. 6.
7 Chubarov V.V. Problems of legal regulation of real estate: Author's abstract. Diss ... doct. jurid. sciences. M., 2006.S. 30.
8 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2009. No. 9.
9 See: Determination of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation of August 19, 2009 No. 10832/09; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the North-West District of October 22, 2009 No. A05-3116 / 2009; Resolution of the Thirteenth Arbitration Court of Appeal of St. Petersburg dated September 21, 2009 No. 13AP-7641/2009; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the North-West District in the case of November 18, 2009 No. A05-9710 / 2008; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Volga Region in the case of November 10, 2009 No. A65-3807 / 2009; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Urals District dated November 09, 2009 No. F09-8894 / 09-C5. The documents have not been officially published (see ATP).
THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF RUSSIA AT THE PRESENT STAGE
DEVELOPMENT
V.N. Fadeev,
doctor of Law, Professor, Professor of the Department of Criminology of the Moscow University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation Scientific specialty 12.00.08 - criminal law and criminology;
penal law Reviewer: Doctor of Economics, Candidate of Law, Professor Eriashvili N.D.
E-mail: [email protected] ru
Annotation. Provides an analysis of the international position of Russia at the present stage of historical development. Identified and substantiated tendencies negatively affecting the socio-political situation, viability and security of our country in modern conditions and for the future; the assessment of their current state and development prospects is given.
Key words: death of the Soviet empire; European metropolises; colonial possessions; authoritarian traditions; counterterrorism cooperation.
INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE CURRENT STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT
Doctor of Juridical Science, professor of Criminology department
of Moscow University MVD RF
Annotation. The author conducted the analysis of the international position of Russia on the current stage of historic development. The author identified and rationalized the tendencies that have negative impact on social-political situation, viability and security of our country in the modern conditions and for the future time, as well as estimated their current condition and prospect of development.
Keywords: collapse of the soviet empire; European metropolises; colonial possessions; authoritative traditions; counter terrorist cooperation.
The United States, which faces "threats" from Al-Qaeda and Iran, the growing instability in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East, and the growing power and geopolitical weight of China and India, clearly do not need new enemies. Nevertheless, their relations with Russia will objectively deteriorate every year. The intensity of mutual rhetoric on both sides is growing, previously signed security agreements are under threat, and Moscow and Washington are increasingly looking at each other through the prism of the Cold War. Radar stations in the Czech Republic and anti-missiles in Poland do not ease tensions. Ignoring the position of the UN Security Council and Russia on the issue of self-proclamation and recognition of Kosovo's independence by the United States, Great Britain, Germany and France, other NATO countries and their vassals puts the world on the brink of a new redistribution. The world order established after the Second World War began to collapse before our eyes. The United States continues to arrange the world according to its own scenario. The West echoes them and unconditionally supports them.
China has always had and will have a special opinion and a special status. India is still busy with its own problems. Russia remains. Of course, the United States would like to deal with obedient "Kozyrev" Russia, or at least the one that it was under the late Yeltsin - let it "blather", let it "clatter", but they knew that we had almost nothing behind our souls It was.
It is not that the US did not expect an oil price boom in recent years - they themselves provoked it - they did not expect the oil gin to pull Russia out of the debt swamp so quickly. Russia today is starting to rise from its knees. And this cannot but irritate the United States and the West. Note that our relations with Japan in the last years of Putin's rule somehow receded into the background. This does not mean the loss of our interest in contacts with Japan. This speaks more about the weakening of the aggregate influence of Japan on the world stage.
Undoubtedly, the main reasons for the disappointment of the United States and the West in Russia were the increasing independence in domestic politics and Moscow's assertiveness in foreign policy. However, the United States and the West also bear a considerable share of responsibility for the mutual cooling and gradual disintegration of bilateral ties. To reverse the situation, Russia has only gas in its hands. But gas alone may not be enough.
But the United States is especially irritated and the West alarmed by the “disordered” in their scenario, the transformation of Russia from an expansionist communist empire into a great Power of the traditional type, which sets itself ambitious tasks of modernizing the economy, and therefore the army. In relation to Russia, the United States will still have to rely on the prevailing opinion in Washington that the Reagan administration won the Cold War in general, alone. And only, they say, the United States is the winner in the Cold War. In the Second World War, there were two winners - the USSR and the USA and allies, and the world became bipolar. Today, according to the same logic, the world should become unipolar. In reality, this is not so, and, undoubtedly, the majority of Russian citizens perceive the collapse of the Soviet state in a completely different way.
The collapse of the USSR is undoubtedly the greatest defeat for our Fatherland, possibly in its entire history. A great state was destroyed - in fact, an empire. But this is the outside. The United States and the West did indeed win the Cold War, but in this case, the victory of one side does not mean the defeat of the other. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and their advisers believed that they, along with the United States, were also among the winners of the Cold War. They gradually came to the conclusion that the communist system was not suitable for the USSR, and especially for Russia. In their opinion, they acted in the best interests of their country, and did not need any external pressure. This psychology is akin to psi
chology of Vlasovites or other traitors during the war, who served the enemies of the Fatherland in the name of the notorious idea of \u200b\u200bfighting the Bolsheviks.
But here we must not forget about the deep goals of the destruction of our state - this is the last stronghold of Orthodoxy, a huge territory and huge resources. Even if someday, it is true, hypothetically, Russia becomes a more democratic country than the United States, the desire to destroy us will still remain. Of course, the realities of the XXI century. more than once will force the United States to reconsider its strategy in relation to Russia. From a geopolitical point of view, Russia is a bridge between East and West, between North and South. This means that Russia is a bridge between world civilizations.
Regardless of the world order (unipolar or multipolar), the world always strives for the form of communicating vessels for the movement of people and capital. And here you cannot do without a Russian bridge. Control over the bridge is a very important argument for the future policy of the superpowers. And who are they, the superpowers, today and tomorrow? The answer is obvious - the USA, Europe (West) and China. If in the XX century. the thesis was relevant - who controls Eurasia controls the world, then tomorrow the emphasis may shift to the level of the bridge. And Russia may find itself in the epicenter of the interests of the superpowers. And here, in order to dictate the rules on its own bridge and not end up under the bridge, Russia will have to be both economically and politically strong and independent. There is simply no other way. A one-sided orientation only towards the West or the East is disastrous for Russia. Remember our coat of arms. Our eagle is not a freak, not a mutant or a victim of Chernobyl. It contains the great meaning of our place and our role in the world.
It is possible that the United States will have no time for Russia in the coming years. Too many internal problems have accumulated, and not all is well in external affairs. Washington's diplomacy towards Russia has always left the impression that turning Russia into a strategic partner has never been a priority. The administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush believed that if they needed Russian cooperation, they could provide it without much effort or concessions. The Clinton administration seemed particularly inclined to view Russia as an analogue of post-war Germany or Japan, as a country that could be forced to follow the political path of the United States, and which over time should even like it. Washington seems to have forgotten that there were no American soldiers on Russian soil, and its cities were not razed to the ground. atomic bombs... Russia is the legal successor of the USSR, but Russia is not the USSR. Psychologically Russia
practically already got rid of the complex of defeat of the USSR. Russia is a different country. Therefore, Russia, on a large scale, did not suffer defeat; began to carry out transformations and "clean up" after the collapse of the "parental home". It is not the same. And this, in the main, will determine the reaction of Russia to the actions of the United States.
Since the collapse of the USSR and the fall of the Iron Curtain, Russia has not built relations with the United States as a client state, a reliable ally, or a true friend, but has not behaved as an adversary, and even less as an adversary with global ambitions and hostile to us. messianic ideology. However, the risk of Russia moving into the camp of the US opponents is quite real. In many approaches to foreign policy issues, the points of view of the United States and Russia are diametrically different. And this is a serious reason for future confrontation. The US does not yet consider Russia strong enough to take our point of view into account. And a political confrontation, backed up by real military threats (radar in the Czech Republic and anti-missiles in Poland, further expansion of NATO at the expense of Georgia and possibly Ukraine) will inevitably lead to a military confrontation, albeit based on the doctrine of containment. But this is a new round of the arms race.
For the United States and the West, this is a technological separation from Russia and China; for us, these are unbearable costs, akin to those that Reagan arranged for us with his concept of "star wars." To catch up with a weak strong means to be hopelessly behind. And this path was ordered to us by the fate of the USSR. To avoid such an outcome, Russia must understand where the US and its allies have weaknesses, where they make mistakes, and urgently take adequate measures to stop the development of the situation in a downward spiral.
Russia must understand that in the XXI century. it is not just a bridge, it is a fork, if you like, a crossroads of world civilizations. And whether there will be accidents or other cataclysms at this crossroads largely depends on Russia and you and me. In the meantime, we sat too long at a low start. Misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the events that led to the end of the Cold War have significantly influenced the formation of the US policy towards Russia. While Washington's actions were one of the important factors that precipitated the collapse of the Soviet empire, it should be credited far more than is usually done with the reformers in Moscow itself.
Let's not forget that at the beginning of the second half of the 1980s, the collapse of the USSR and even the Soviet bloc was not at all inevitable. After Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985, his goal was to solve problems that had appeared in the days of Leonid
Brezhnev. And this: the lack of free military resources, especially exposed in Afghanistan and Africa, huge defense spending, which laid an unbearable burden on the Soviet economy, the decline in the overall prestige of the USSR, accumulated problems in relations with the countries of Eastern Europe within the framework of the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact. The result was to increase the influence and prestige of the USSR.
When Gorbachev sharply cut subsidies to the countries of the Eastern Bloc, refused to support the retrograde ruling regimes in the Warsaw Pact states and initiated "perestroika", the dynamics of political processes in Eastern Europe radically changed, which turned into a largely peaceful fall of communist regimes and a weakening of Moscow's influence in the region. Ronald Reagan facilitated this process by increasing pressure on the Kremlin. But it was Gorbachev, not The White house, ended the Soviet empire.
American influence played an even lesser role in the collapse of the USSR itself. George W. Bush's administration supported the Baltic republics' aspirations for independence, and made it clear to Gorbachev that violent action against legally elected separatist governments in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia would jeopardize Soviet-American relations. However, by allowing pro-independence parties to participate and win in relatively free elections, and by refusing to take drastic measures to remove them from power with the help of security forces, Gorbachev effectively ensured the withdrawal of the Baltic states from the USSR. The final blow to it was struck by Russia itself, demanding for itself the same institutional status as that of other union republics. At a Politburo meeting, Gorbachev said: if Russia is allowed to gain sovereignty, it will be "the end of the empire." And so it happened. After an unsuccessful attempt at the reactionary putsch in August 1991, Gorbachev could no longer prevent Yeltsin, as well as the leaders of Belarus and Ukraine, from “dismantling” the Soviet Union.
The Reagan and Bush Sr. administrations were aware of all the dangers associated with the collapse of a superpower, and ensured the "controllability" of the collapse of the USSR, skillfully combining sympathy with firmness. They treated Gorbachev with respect, but did not make any significant concessions to the detriment of US interests. For example, they immediately rejected Gorbachev's desperate requests for massive economic assistance, since the United States had no reason to help him save the Soviet empire. However, when the Bush Sr. administration rejected Moscow's requests to refrain from military action against Saddam Hussein after
after the latter took over Kuwait, the White House tried very hard to show the proper politeness towards Gorbachev, "not to poke his nose" into this fact, as the then Secretary of State James Baker put it. As a result, the United States managed to kill two birds with one stone: defeat Saddam and maintain close cooperation with the Soviet Union, mainly on Washington's terms.
If the administration of George W. Bush had provided emergency economic assistance to the democratic government of independent Russia in 1992, then a large-scale "package" of financial assistance could have prevented the collapse of the Russian economy and, in the future, would have contributed to a closer "tie" of Russia to the West. However, Bush was too weak to take bold steps to help Russia. At the time, he was already losing the election battle to Democratic candidate Bill Clinton, who criticized the incumbent for being overly focused on foreign policy and inattention to the economic situation in the United States.
Although domestic political issues were central to his campaign, once in the White House, Clinton immediately sought to help Russia. His administration has organized substantial financial assistance to Moscow, mainly through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Even in 1996, Clinton was ready to speak highly of Yeltsin, so much so that he even compared his decision to use military force against separatists in Chechnya with the actions of Abraham Lincoln during the American Civil War. Yeltsin had practically sat on a "short leash" with Clinton. Actually, Clinton gave this leash to Bush. In the United States, unlike in Russia, foreign policy does not change much with the change of the owner of the White House. Americans choose a president for themselves, not for the outside world, and even more so, not for Russia.
The main miscalculation of the Clinton administration in maintaining the "short leash" was its decision to continue to take advantage of Russia's weakness. She sought to maximize the benefits for the United States in terms of foreign policy, economy, security in Europe and the post-Soviet space, until Russia recovers from the shocks of the transition period. The United States and the West did not expect that the transitional period in their relationship with Russia would end with Vladimir Putin. Many US politicians thought that Russia would not soon wake up from the "hangover syndrome" of the first president. But Russia “sober up” much earlier than the US and the West expected; moreover, in the morning she began to recall selectively and with indignation everything that had happened to her “the night before”.
Behind the facade of external friendship, officials in the Clinton administration believed that the Kremlin should unconditionally accept the American concept of Russia's national interests. In their opinion, if Moscow's preferences are not aligned with Washington's goals, they can be safely ignored. After all, Russia's economy was in ruins, the army was crumbling, and in many ways it behaved like a defeated country. Unlike other European metropolises that were leaving their former colonial possessions, Russia did not try to bargain for conditions that ensured the protection of its economic and security interests in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former USSR. As for domestic politics, Yeltsin's team of radical reformers often welcomed the pressure from the IMF and the United States, thereby justifying the tough and extremely unpopular monetary policy, which in fact they pursued of their own free will.
Soon, however, even Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who was nicknamed "Mr. Yes" for being compliant with the West, began to irritate his "cruel romance" with the Clinton administration. Once he told Talbott, who held in 1993-1994. the post of ambassador-at-large to the newly independent states: “It’s not too pleasant when you guys tell us: we will do this and that, whether you like it or not. So at least do not rub salt on the wounds, declaring that obeying your orders is also in our interests. "
But these requests of even the most loyal US Yeltsin reformers in Washington were deafened: there such an arrogant approach was gaining popularity. Talbott and his aides called this approach "feeding Russia spinach": Uncle Sam, fatherly, treats Russian leaders with political "foods" that Washington considers "good for health. new Russia”, No matter how unappetizing they may seem to Moscow. Yeltsin's reformers, like in kindergarten, followed the rule: "The more you tell them that it is for their own good, the more they choke." By making it clear that Russia should not have an independent foreign - and even domestic - policy, the Clinton administration undoubtedly generated strong rejection from sane politicians in Moscow. While they were not in power, this neo-colonialist approach of the United States, which went hand in hand with the recommendations of the IMF, which, according to most Western economists today, were absolutely not suitable for Russia and were so painful for the population that it was easy to implement them democratically impossible. However, some Yeltsin
radical reformers were ready to impose these measures on the people without their consent. At one time they were hindered by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, then by Yevgeny Primakov.
However, politicians such as former President Nixon, as well as many prominent American businessmen and specialists on Russia, recognized the flaw in Washington's course and called for a compromise between Yeltsin and the conservative parliament. Nixon, for example, was deeply alarmed when Russian officials told him that Washington had expressed a willingness to turn a blind eye to "decisive" measures by the Yeltsin administration against its Supreme Soviet if the Kremlin simultaneously accelerated economic reforms. “Encouraging a departure from democratic principles in a country with authoritarian traditions like Russia is like trying to put out a fire with gasoline,” Nixon warned. Moreover, he argued, if Washington proceeds from the "fatally erroneous assumption" that Russia is no longer a world power, and will not be so for a long time, its actions would threaten peace and democracy in the region.
However, Clinton ignored Nixon's advice, and continued to turn a blind eye to Yeltsin's most egregious excesses. Relations between President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet soon came to a standstill, followed by Yeltsin's unconstitutional decree to dissolve it, ultimately leading to violence and shelling of the parliament building with tank guns. After that, Yeltsin "pushed through" a new constitution, which provided the head of state with the broadest powers to the detriment of the legislative branch. Actually, according to this Constitution, Russia lives to this day. Then this step allowed to strengthen the power of the first president of Russia, and the Constitution marked the beginning of the "drift" towards authoritarianism. This, in turn, was the logical result of Washington's frivolous encouragement of Yeltsin's penchant for authoritarianism, enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.
Other aspects of the Clinton administration's arrogant foreign policy have only increased the discontent of sane politicians in Russia. NATO enlargement - especially its first wave, which affected Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic - was not in itself a major problem. Most Russians were ready to agree that NATO enlargement is an unpleasant event, but their country is still almost not threatened. But that was before the Kosovo crisis in 1999, when NATO launched a war against Serbia, despite Moscow's categorical objections and without the sanction of the Security Council.
the UN, the Russian elite and the people soon came to the conclusion that they had been deliberately misled. NATO is still a military bloc directed against Russia, against the Orthodox peoples.
Of course, the Russian elite, who consider themselves the custodian of the traditions of the Great Power - especially one in a state of "decline" - never liked such demonstrations of their insignificance. This played into the hands of those forces that seriously thought about the future of Russia as a sovereign state with a thousand-year history. They felt that Russia was seriously facing the Hamlet question: "to be or not to be." And this understanding by Putin's team is much more important today than the ideas of nationalization "according to Zyuganov" and Zhirinovsky's foreign policy ambitions combined.
Today Russia is emerging from the US "umbrella" and is even offering an energy umbrella to Europe itself. This is a welcome trend for us. But it will undoubtedly provoke sharp opposition from the United States and NATO. And we will feel it soon. The next cycle of the global economic crisis that began in 2008 will not bypass Russia. If Russia, not caring about its rear (domestic market), gets carried away with the expansion of capital abroad, then it will be like playing hockey without a goalkeeper. Perhaps we will score goals in other people's gates, but how many will we concede in our own? We have already almost lost our home market. The WTO will finally complete this "dirty deed". What kind of innovative or other new economy can we talk about if the domestic market, for which in normal countries up to 90% of the domestic economy works, we give to foreigners?
Moderation and accuracy, economy in everything, the protection of our national interests always and everywhere, a subtle diplomatic game on the contradictions between the powers that be, dosed assistance, taking into account our interests in solving their problems - this should form the basis of our policy in the coming years, while The USA and the West will have no time for us. At the same time, quietly and unnoticed, we must modernize our economy and armed forces. Russia has only 7-10 years for this. And the time has passed. In this regard, one cannot blabber over what should have been done yesterday.
The absence of a clear foreign policy doctrine does not allow for the time being to prevent possible threats. And there can be no clear foreign policy doctrine without a clear strategy for the internal development of the state. The United States and the West are already accustomed to disregarding Russia (which is Russia, they disregard the UN either). Therefore, we will continue to find ourselves in an uncomfortable position. In these cases, one cannot hesitate and pro
to show excessive "flexibility of the back", otherwise we will constantly be turned to events "backwards". And to get out of this pose with dignity, you need to have a filigree technique or know 1001 Shahrezada's fairy tales. Vladimir Putin has learned a few things.
There are enough such examples. Despite Russia's indignation at the Kosovo events, at the end of 1999 Vladimir Putin, while still prime minister, immediately after the introduction of troops into Chechnya, made an important demarche towards the United States. He was worried about the Chechen ties with al-Qaeda and the fact that Afghanistan, ruled by the Taliban, was the only country in the world to establish diplomatic relations with Chechnya. Guided by the above security interests, and not by a sudden "flashing love" for the United States, Putin proposed forging cooperation between Moscow and Washington in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This initiative lay on the prepared ground, as it already had its own background. After the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the US administration had more than enough data to understand what mortal danger Islamic fundamentalists pose to the United States.
At one time, Clinton and his advisers, annoyed by Russia's opposition in the Balkans and the removal of reformers from key posts in Moscow, ignored this factor of cooperation with Russia. The United States then still viewed Russia not as a potential partner, but as a nostalgic, incapacitated, financially weak state, and sought to provide the United States with maximum benefits at the expense of Russia. Under Clinton, the United States tried to consolidate the results of the collapse of the USSR, taking as many post-Soviet states as possible under Washington's wing. Therefore, they "pressed" Georgia to take part in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline connecting the Caspian Sea with the Mediterranean bypassing Russia. They encouraged the opportunist Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze to join NATO and instructed the American embassies in Central Asia to resist Russian influence.
Therefore, in 1999, the United States rejected Putin's proposal for Russian-American counter-terrorism cooperation, considering the Russian proposal as a gesture of a desperate neo-imperialist trying to restore his influence in Central Asia. The Clinton administration did not realize at the time that it was missing out on a historic chance to force al Qaeda and the Taliban
go on the defensive, destroy their bases, and possibly make it impossible to carry out major operations. Such cooperation did not begin until the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks claimed the lives of nearly 3,000 American citizens.
When George W. Bush came to power in January 2001 - eight months after Vladimir Putin became Russia's president - his administration faced new, relatively little-known figures in the Russian leadership. Trying to distance itself from Clinton's policies, the Bush team did not see relations with Russia as a priority: many of its representatives considered the Kremlin to be corrupt, undemocratic and weak. While this assessment may have been valid at the time, the Bush administration lacked the strategic foresight to reach out to Moscow. However, personal contacts between Bush and Putin were successful. During their first meeting - at the summit in Slovenia in June 2001 - Bush, as we all remember, personally "vouched" for the democratic convictions and spiritual qualities of the new Russian president.
The events of September 11, 2001 radically changed Washington's attitude towards Moscow and generated an emotional wave of support and sympathy in Russia for the United States. Putin reaffirmed a previous offer of cooperation in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Russia granted the US Air Force the right to fly over Russian territory, supporting the establishment of American bases in Central Asia, and, perhaps most importantly, helped Washington establish contact with Russian-trained and equipped military units of the Northern Alliance. Of course, Vladimir Putin acted in the interests of Russia itself. But for Putin, as a budding politician, the entry of the United States into the fight against Islamist terrorism was a real gift of fate. Like many other alliances, US-Russian counterterrorism cooperation was based on coincidence of fundamental interests, rather than shared ideology or mutual sympathy.
Despite this interaction, in other areas, relations between the two countries remained tense. Bush’s announcement in December 2001 that the United States would withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty — one of the last remaining symbols of Russia's superpower status — once again deeply hurt the pride of the Kremlin. Likewise, our dislike for NATO only intensified when the Alliance annexed the three Baltic states, two of which are Estonia and
Latvia - had territorial disputes with Russia, problems related to the situation of the Russian-speaking minority.
Around the same time, Ukraine became a major new source of mutual tension. There is no doubt that the United States' support for Viktor Yushchenko and the Orange Revolution was associated not only with the spread of democracy, but also with the desire to undermine Russian influence in a country that voluntarily joined the Moscow state in the 17th century, which is very close to Russia in its cultural plan, and had a significant Russian-speaking population. Moreover, many in Russia reasonably believe that the current Russian-Ukrainian border - established by Stalin and Khrushchev as the administrative border between the two Union republics - extends far beyond the historical territory of Ukraine, resulting in areas populated by millions of Russians. which gives rise to interethnic, linguistic and political problems.
The Bush administration's approach to relations with Ukraine - namely, the pressure it is putting on a fractured Ukraine to apply to join NATO, and the financial backing of nongovernmental organizations active in helping pro-presidential political parties - should continually fuel our concerns about not whether the US has moved to a new version of its containment policy towards Russia. Few of the Bush administration officials or congressmen thought about the consequences of opposing Russia in such an important region from the point of view of its national interests as Ukraine, Crimea, the Black Sea, and on an issue that carries a strong emotional load.
Georgia soon became another "battlefield" between Moscow and Washington. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili sought to use the support of the West, and especially the United States, as the main instrument for restoring Georgia's sovereignty over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where the indigenous peoples we support have fought for independence since the early 1990s. But Saakashvili's ambitions extended much further. He not only demanded the return of the two self-proclaimed republics under control of Tbilisi: he openly positioned himself as the main supporter of "color revolutions" in the post-Soviet region and the overthrow of leaders who sympathized with Russia. He portrayed himself as a fighter for democracy, enthusiastically supporting US foreign policy. Saakashvili went so far as to send Georgian troops to the allied contingent in 2004
Iraq. Actually, Yushchenko did the same. The fact that when he was elected president he received a suspiciously high number of votes (96%), and also took control of parliament and television, outside Georgia itself did not cause much concern. The obvious arbitrariness with which he repressed the leaders of the business community and political rivals did not raise questions. In 2005, when the popular Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania - the only one who still served as a political counterbalance to Saakashvili - died under mysterious circumstances (allegedly as a result of a gas leak), his family and friends publicly rejected the official version of what happened, transparently hinting that Saakashvili's regime was involved in the death of the politician. If the death of even little-known Russian oppositionists worries the United States, then the death of Zhvania or Patar-katsishvili in Washington did not seem to be noticed.
Farce with early resignation from the presidency in 2007, the bloody massacre of the opposition in the center of Tbilisi in November 2007, falsification of the election results in January 2008, the unexpected death of another of his implacable opponents, Badri Patar-katsishvili, should have finally , erode confidence in Saakashvili as a legitimate president. However, this does not happen. In fact, the Bush administration and influential circles in both parties have consistently supported Saakashvili in the fight against Russia, despite all his excesses. On several occasions, the US urged him to moderate his ardor so as not to provoke an open military clash with Russia. It is obvious that Washington has chosen Georgia as its main "client state" in the Transcaucasus and the Caspian region. In the Balkans, Kosovo was chosen as such a client state.
The United States is providing weapons and training to the Georgian military, thereby allowing Saakashvili to take a tougher stance toward Russia; the Georgian military even went so far as to detain and publicly humiliate Russian soldiers deployed in South Ossetia as peacekeepers and deployed on the territory of Georgia itself.
Of course, Russia's own behavior towards Georgia is far from ideal. Moscow granted Russian citizenship to most of the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and rather timidly introduced economic sanctions against Georgia.
At that time, Washington's blind support for Saakashvili was supposed to reinforce the feeling that the goal of US policy was to undermine the already sharply weakened Russian influence in the region, as a result of which in August 2008 a military conflict was provoked from the Georgian side with
Russia. The United States is more interested not so much in supporting the leaders of democracies as such, but in using them as a tool to isolate Russia in the post-Soviet space.
Despite growing tensions, Russia has not yet become an adversary to the United States. There is still a chance to prevent a further deterioration in relations between the two countries. This requires a sober assessment of the US goals in the post-Soviet region and an analysis of the situation in those numerous areas where the interests of the US and Russia coincide, especially in the fight against terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Skill diplomacy will also be required in cases where the goals of both countries are the same, but tactical approaches are different, for example, with respect to the Iranian nuclear program.
Most importantly, the US must admit that it no longer enjoys unlimited influence over Russia. Today Washington is simply unable to impose its will on Moscow, as it did in the 90s of the last century. A number of influential members of the US Congress reasonably note that it is precisely anti-terrorism and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that should be the defining directions of Russian-American relations. Another priority issue is stability in Russia itself, where thousands of nuclear warheads are located. The most important help for Washington would be Russia's support for sanctions - if necessary and the use of force - against "destructive states" and terrorist groups.
The United States is also interested in spreading and deepening democratic order in the post-Soviet region, but it is naive to expect Russia to support its efforts to introduce American democracy. Therefore, Washington will continue to strive to ensure that no one, including Russia, prevents other countries from choosing a democratic form of government and independently making foreign policy (pro-American) decisions. However, the United States will need to understand that its capacity to meet this challenge is limited.
Russia, taking advantage of high energy prices, while pursuing a sensible financial policy, which has brought the "oligarchs" in check, no longer needs large-scale foreign loans and economic assistance. Despite the growing tension in interstate relations with the West, large-scale foreign investments are willingly "flowing" into Russia. As long as stability and relative material well-being are maintained in Russia itself, a newfound sense of pride in one's country will be
restrain popular discontent with tightening state control and gross manipulation in the political sphere.
The negative image of the United States and its Western allies in Russian society, reasonably supported by the authorities, sharply limits the United States' ability to create a "support base" for its recommendations regarding internal processes in the country. In the current climate, Washington can only make it clear to Moscow that domestic political repression is incompatible with a long-term partnership with the United States. It is also not conducive to the fact that the reputation of the United States itself as a moral model has been seriously damaged in recent years. Moreover, Moscow's suspicion about Washington's intentions is only growing today. In a number of cases, Moscow began to reflexively perceive with apprehension even those decisions that are not directed against Russia. In general, this is not so bad in the current situation around Russia.
While Moscow itself looks at the West with suspicion, then Russia's use of its energy resources for political purposes is angered by Western governments, not to mention neighboring countries that are completely dependent on energy supplies from Russia.
Russia, of course, must continue to actively use the energy lever as a political tool. Unfortunately, the government is still holding Gazprom alone. But, apparently, in the future, if necessary, the matter can reach the oil companies, in particular, Rosneft has now become a global giant.
Undoubtedly, Gazprom supplies the friendly states with energy carriers at preferential prices. In essence, Russia is simply rewarding countries that maintain a special political and economic relationship with it by selling them oil and gas at below market prices. Of course, politically we can come to terms with the "NATO" choice of neighboring countries, but after that Russia is not obliged to subsidize them. It should always be borne in mind that when Washington reacts to Russia's "politicized" use of its energy resources with noble indignation, it does not look very sincere: after all, no state imposes economic sanctions on others as often and with such enthusiasm as the United States.
The United States has consistently accused Russia of obstructing Kosovo, but Moscow's publicly voiced position was that it would accept any agreement reached by the Kosovars and Serbia. Moscow has never dissuaded Belgrade from an agreement with Kosovo. But also recognize one hundred
russia did not intend to declare Kosovo's independence earlier. After the self-proclamation of Kosovo's independence, the situation has changed dramatically. The United States and Western allies "gave a damn" about international law, the UN Security Council, and Russia. This should free Russia's hands. Moscow will only benefit from the decision of the unrecognized republics on the territory of the former USSR, especially Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and subsequently Transnistria, to gain independence without the consent of the states from which they wanted to secede. Many in Russia are quite satisfied that the fate of Kosovo has become a precedent for the unrecognized post-Soviet territories, most of which yearn for independence and subsequent integration with Russia. And here Russia does not need to hold on especially to the letter of international law, which was not violated by us.
A number of other foreign policy differences only exacerbate tensions. Russia, for example, did not support Washington's decision to invade Iraq, and some key US allies in NATO, in particular France and Germany, took the same position. Russia supplies conventional weapons to some states that the United States considers hostile, such as Iran, Syria and Venezuela, but it does so on a commercial basis, without violating international law. It is understandable that the United States may perceive such actions as provocative, but many Russians view US military supplies to Georgia in the same way.
Contrary to its interests, Russia should stop participating in the policy of softly “curbing” Iran and North Korea... On the one hand, Russia does not go as far as the United States and Europe would like, but, in the end, it still supports the imposition of sanctions against both countries.
There are many disagreements between the United States and Russia, but this does not mean that Russia is an enemy of the United States. And the main thing here is that Russia does not support Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups waging a war against America, and is no longer spreading “rival” ideology, aiming at world hegemony, as it was during the Soviet era. Moreover, Russia has never invaded or threatened to invade the territory of any of the neighboring countries. Finally, Russia has decided not to inflate separatist sentiments in Ukraine, despite the presence of a significant and highly active Russian minority in that country.
The main thing for Russia is to accept that the United States is the most powerful power in the world, and there is no point in provoking it unnecessarily. However, it makes no sense for Russia to adapt to American preferences any longer, especially to the detriment of its own interests.
The opinion is deeply rooted in the United States that the day is not far off when the country will collapse
J. Friedman, political scientist
The modern world is characterized by a significant increase in the chaos of world politics. The unpredictability in this area becomes higher than in the economy
Y. Novikov, General Director of the Concern East Kazakhstan region "Almaz-Antey"
In order to answer the question about the possibility of analyzing and forecasting the current international situation, it is important, first of all, to agree on what we mean by the term "international situation", i.e. about the subject of research, and try to give it at least the most general characteristics, describe its structure, character and main modern features. In this case, the main possible directions of analysis and forecast of the MO become clear.
In this work, the term "international situation" refers to such a state of the entire system of international relations in a certain period of time, which is characterized by a number of parameters and criteria, numbering thousands of indicators:
The composition, level of development and policy of the main sovereign subjects of the Defense Ministry - first of all, local human civilizations, nations and states, as well as their unions, coalitions, and other associations;
The composition, influence and policies of the main non-state actors of the IO - both international and national - which include the entire spectrum of such actors: humanitarian, social, religious, etc .;
The main trends in the development of mankind and its HCV, as well as in individual regions.
These trends (such as globalization) can be contradictory and have multidirectional effects;
The influence of subjective factors, which are mainly derived from the development of national human capital and its institutions. These factors, associated with the "cognitive revolution" and the politics of the ruling elites, are, in fact, the area in which the most important resource of mankind and the art of using it come together;
Finally, relations and interactions between all these factors and tendencies, which create a unique international situation and the resulting military-political, financial-economic, social and other situations.
Thus, the subject of analysis and strategic forecast are numerous factors and trends and their interaction and mutual influence, which form a complex dynamic and multifactorial system. So, if we consider the modern defense and military defense only from the point of view of the military expenditures of individual countries, then the ratio of the military budgets of Russia and the United States will be 1: 12, and that of Russia and France and England 1: 1.1 and 1: 1.2, respectively. If this ratio is measured by the ratio of Russian military expenditures to the military expenditures of the Western LCZ and its allies, then this ratio will be already 1: 21.
Thus, in the recent RAND report on the comparison of the military potentials of the PRC and the United States, a huge number of indicators are given - basic, additional, auxiliary, etc. and criteria. As an example, we can only compare the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) of the United States and China by:
Range;
Based type;
BR types;
Years of testing;
Warheads;
Number, etc., as well as a short-term forecast of their state for 2017.
But the analysis of the Defense Ministry and the MPS involves not only a quantitative, but also a qualitative comparison and comparison of various parameters, including, for example, such complex ones as the survival of nuclear forces after the use of a counterforce nuclear strike. So, in 1996, such an attack by the United States against the PRC was assessed as almost complete destruction of China's strategic nuclear forces.
It is difficult to imagine that such a volume of work is being done in Russia today, anywhere. If there are forecasts of the development of individual countries and regions (by no means all and by no means all of the main parameters), if there are some forecasts of the development of world trends, then there is no general, systemic forecast of the development of the Ministry of Defense, and therefore of the military-educational establishment. This means that when assessing the necessary defense spending of Russia, for example, on the state armaments program (GPV) for the period 2018-2025, the approaches of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Defense differ by 100% (12 and 24 trillion rubles), which from a military-political point of view view requires the most serious justification.
Considering that in the same years GDP growth in the country, according to the Ministry of Finance, will not be significant, and the share of military spending in GDP (4.15%) will remain at the same level, this means that the country's financial capabilities are severely limited: it is necessary to either increase the share of military spending in GDP to the level of the belligerent countries (Israel ~ 7% or Iraq ~ more than 20%), or to reduce the items of expenditure on social needs and development, or - which is the most difficult, but also the most effective - to increase the efficiency of military spending, revising priorities. At the same time, we already have examples of this approach: in 2014, the military themselves said that due to the unification of products, they managed to reduce the GPV-2025 from 55 trillion to 35 trillion rubles.
Thus, the determination of resources and the implementation of other measures to counter external challenges and threats is largely predetermined by the most accurate analysis and forecast of the future defense and military defense, which form these challenges. When in the mid-1930s in the USSR and especially after 1938 a course was taken to maximize the pace of military development, the share of military spending and the degree of militarization of the country obviously exceeded all peaceful norms. Naturally, such political decisions were made, first of all, on the basis of an assessment of the future state of defense and military education in the world.
In order to try to more clearly and more easily imagine the complexity and scale of such an analysis, it is necessary to try to understand what MO is even in the most general terms. To do this, you can use the technique of drawing up a connection diagram (sometimes called a "mind map", which was made popular by the English psychologist Tony Buzan) - an associative map, which is a method of structuring the state of individual systems and concepts ( fig. 7 ). In it, in the most general approximation, an idea of \u200b\u200bthe state of an abstract MO in a certain period of time is given. Naturally, the dynamics and scale of changes occurring in all groups of factors, actors and tendencies and between them, turns this state into a kind of temporary "episode" of life, requiring constant dynamic adjustment.
Figure: 7. Abstract structure of MO in the XXI century
Obviously, the positions of not only individual actors and states, but also the LCV can change, and tendencies can accelerate, slow down or die off.
On this "map of thought" of ideas about the MO in the XXI century, only the main groups of factors and trends that form the MO and - as a part and consequence of it - the military-political situation, as well as other areas of the MO - the socio-cultural, financial, economic, trade , industrial, etc., which are a specific consequence and result of the development of MO.
The international situation is developing according to a variety of scenarios, which are realized in various specific versions. For example, the 1946-1990 Defense Ministry was characterized by its development according to the Cold War scenario, although there were periods when, within this scenario, it developed according to the version of the “relaxation of international tension” (1972–1979), or the version of the “exacerbation of the MO”. None of these options completely denied the specific features of the development of the indicated scenario of the MO ("cold war"), but in its specific versions, of course, influenced the formation of military defense and SO.
Accordingly, if we want to analyze state of the art, and even more so to make a strategic forecast for the development of medical institutions, then we must fully take into account not only the existing state (at least of the main) factors and trends, but also the degree of mutual influence and interaction between them, the possibility and likelihood of the development of medical institutions according scenario.
It is obvious that such a huge informational and analytical work can only be done by a sufficiently large and qualified team that unites specialists in various fields - from "regional specialists" and "country studies" to experts in science, technology, technology, psychology, finance, etc. ... It is very important that this team has not only the appropriate informational capabilities and tools, but also a sufficiently deeply developed theoretical base, methodology and specific techniques.
So, in this case, in recent years, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations has widely used the method of strategic forecasting of scenarios and options for their development of the LChC, MO, VPO and SO, to which a lot of works have been devoted.
Based on this experience, we can say that our team was only at the very beginning of the development of the theoretical and methodological foundations for the development of medical science. It is also necessary to recognize that at present, various research teams are making a variety of attempts at such a strategic analysis and forecast. In some cases (as in the United States, for example), huge combined teams of intelligence services, corporations and individual efforts of university scientists are involved. In other examples (as in Russia), relatively small teams of medical organizations and General Staff, The Russian Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other departments, working, as a rule, in accordance with the allocated grants on a medium-term basis.
In any case, it should be admitted that due to the crisis in departmental and academic humanitarian - international and military - science, the quality of analysis and forecast of the development of defense and military education has sharply decreased. A striking example is the absence of a well-known intelligible forecast of the real nature of relations with the West in 1985–2015, when the authors of such well-known (admittedly few and private) forecasts noted "the successful development of the Moscow region." In many ways, this, as well as the lack of professionalism of the political elites, led to major foreign policy mistakes comparable to the crimes that were a consequence of the foreign policy of M. Gorbachev, E. Shevardnadze, A. Yakovlev and B. Yeltsin. This course led to the collapse of the world socialist system - as a matter of fact, a local human civilization headed by the "Russian core" of the USSR, - as well as the Internal Affairs Directorate, CMEA and, ultimately, the USSR, and then underestimating the real intentions of the West with respect to Russia.
Another strategic failure in foreign policy (now Russia) was its naive orientation towards "Western partners" to the detriment of its national interests and the interests of its remaining friends and allies in the 90s of the 20th century and at the beginning of the new century, which is partly preserved today.
Finally, the most important mistake, not only foreign policy, but also civilizational, was a one-sided orientation towards the Western system of values, norms and rules that were originally created as unequal and unfair - whether in finance or sports - for other countries. This mistake led to catastrophic consequences for the Russian humanities, in fact depriving it of its theoretical and methodological foundations, scientific personnel, public and political "interest" (needs). Only in the most recent years, some old ones began to be revived and new ones (the Russian Historical and Geographical Society, for example) created.
Thus, Soviet-Russian politics and diplomacy have committed at least several strategic mistakes on a global scale over the course of 30 years, some of which even led to a "geopolitical catastrophe." This was largely due to the fact that the political and scientific mechanism for their prevention did not exist, as, incidentally, has not been fully created, and today. Moreover, it is very likely that such schools of thought were deliberately liquidated in the 1980s and 1990s so that politics would not have a national scientific foundation.
At present, the situation in the field of analysis and strategic forecast in the international and military-political spheres looks even less satisfactory than before (when the ruling elite of the USSR often simply ignored the opinion of experts from the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Staff and part of the teams of the Russian Academy of Sciences) due to the general degradation of scientific schools and declining research. At the same time, for some reason, some experts state that “For twenty years of practical implementation in our country of the American theory of ensuring national security in the Russian Federation, a fairly extensive network of forces and means of analytical support for decision-making by government bodies in the field of national security has been created (Fig. 8 ). As proof, they cite a classical scheme, which is actually of little meaning and, in my opinion, is the most general, poorly developed and interconnected, unsystematic and extremely ineffective. This, of course, inevitably affects the quality of forecasts, planning and implementation of decisions. In its most general form, this system is as follows.
The current Russian foreign policy is primarily aimed at maintaining the country's status. There is nothing wrong with this, any country is engaged in this, this is completely fair. The question is what status is meant, by what means they are trying to strengthen and support it, whether it works or not. It doesn't work out very well if you try to reconstruct. Because these things are not spelled out very clearly in the main documents, they mean the foreign policy concept, the concept of national security and other governing documents. It does not clearly spell out what goals Russian foreign policy is really striving for.
Modern Russia is striving to become a center of power in a multipolar world. This means that it seeks to extend its influence, first of all, to the countries of the former Soviet Union. To create a kind of bloc out of them, where Russian interests would have a privileged value. President Medvedev spoke about this, about the privileged nature of interests in neighboring countries, and other Russian officials continue to speak about this. The second point, which is important for the Russian establishment, for those who determine Russian foreign policy, is ensuring equality in status with the leading centers of power.
That is, Russia is the center, this is the first position. Second position: Russia is an equal center. In the international system, Russia is equal in status and position to the United States, China and the European Union. The main centers of power plus Russia - this is a multipolar world. And the third position follows from the second and sounds something like this: Russia has a decisive voice in the discussion of all the most important problems of mankind. Here, something like this. It can be described in different ways, but it seems something like this.
In principle, each of these three goals has a certain healthy grain. Indeed, Russia, as a leading country in the region that was recently called the Soviet Union, undoubtedly has significant influence in all countries of the former USSR. It is, of course, largely a magnet for these countries, for their people who come here to work. It thereby largely ensures the flow of funds to these young states. It is the center of the economic integration of the EurAsEC. It is the center of joint efforts in the field of security and defense - it is the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). And the Russian language is an important cultural component here. And now a model is being built in which Russia defines this neighboring space as a zone of its interests, and believes that it has certain rights here. Not only influence, but also the right associated with this influence. In particular, Russia essentially excludes several things for these countries. For example, their participation in those military alliances that do not include Russia: "No to NATO expansion." This means virtually eliminating the American military presence. There are some exceptions to this rule - Kyrgyzstan, for example. But in general this presence is considered unacceptable. In addition, this position also includes ensuring the unity of the Russian Orthodox Church in the territory that it calls canonical. As, for example, the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia.
It would seem that this completely follows from history, it quite follows from geographical proximity, it follows from numerous intertwining interests. After Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, not a single CIS state followed. And this was not done out of special love for Saakashvili, not because of a special fear of American sanctions. This was done for one reason. And this reason can be formulated as follows: the Russian state does not want to be considered satellites of Moscow. This is a serious thing and a serious reason to think about how relations with the CIS countries are developing.
If one looks closely at these relations even at the bilateral level, then the seemingly closest relations, even formally enshrined in the Union of Russia and Belarus, are not as problem-free as they should be. And somewhere they turn out to be more splinter than relations with other countries. If you look at the entire perimeter of the Russian borders, then in fact no country can be recognized as a zone of Russian influence. Of course, Russian foreign policy does not use the concept of "zone of influence" - it is odious, it refers us to the 19th or the beginning of the 20th century. But if we speak seriously, then there is a desire for this. So, there are no such zones of influence. Rather, there are, but very small and only two: one is called South Ossetia, and the other is Abkhazia. Moreover, Abkhazia, in some perspective, strives for real independence, and in this case it is clear from whom. But what to do with South Ossetia is a more complicated and non-obvious question.
As for relations with the CIS countries. What seems natural, what Russia seemingly has the ability to achieve, is not being achieved. Not to mention the Russian language, which is gradually being squeezed out of the countries where it used to dominate the national languages. Not to mention security - attempts to create a joint security organization so far have essentially led only to the creation of purely bureaucratic structures, I mean the CSTO. They often refer to the fact that the CSTO is young. But when NATO was as old as the CSTO is now, it was a rather serious organization. And even if we compare the CSTO with an organization like the SCO, then ... In a word, there are some problems.
The second point is equality with Western countries. Here Russia is trying to solve a really difficult problem. The Russian leadership understands how unequal are the potentials of Russia and the United States, Russia and the European Union, if we talk about the economy - and not only about the economy. The Russian leadership, when it communicates with the CIS countries or with other countries, usually proceeds from the difference in potentials. No one in their right mind considers Ukraine to be a country equal to Russia. But to regard Russia as a country equal to America is a postulate from which one cannot deviate. And Russia is forced to play the game at a deliberately high level, in fact, having a very small material base, a very small economic base. She tries to play at the level of the leading centers of power. This is a rather difficult game, of course, and quite costly. And, in general, this game is not yet in favor of Russia.
If we take China, then twenty years ago, in 1990, China's gross domestic product was roughly equal to Russia's gross domestic product. And now it is 3.5 times more than in Russia. This gap is widening, and the growth of this gap affects other elements of national power. For example, on military power, on the ratio of conventional armed forces, and so on.
Russia is seeking to circumvent this awkward position by seeking support from non-Western centers of power. Various combinations appear, about which we hear a lot lately. Combinations appear under the flag of a multipolar world where Russia is one of the leading members of temporary non-Western alliances. Not that anti-Western, but alliances competing with the West. There are several such alliances. For example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Sometimes the Shanghai Organization is compared to NATO - this is "our response to NATO", this is the "Eastern Alliance", which claims an essential place in world affairs.
If we look closely at the SCO, we will see the following thing. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is not a Moscow initiative, but a Beijing one. And the headquarters of this organization is located in Beijing. The second important point is that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is solving a problem that is important specifically for China - providing a solid rear for its western borders. In China, this organization was created mainly to prevent Uighur separatists from using the territories of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and other Central and Central Asian countries for actions that undermine the territorial integrity and unity of China. This was the main Chinese task.
But while solving this main problem, China is simultaneously solving another one, which could be roughly formulated as follows: "China in Central Asia", that is, the SCO can be deciphered in this way. Indeed, China under the flag of the SCO, within the framework of the SCO (and not only) is carrying out an ever larger, more active, more and more multifaceted penetration into Central Asia. Before the arrival of the Russians, Central Asia was part of the vast forested area that surrounded the Great Chinese Empire. From there, tributaries came to Beijing and brought their tributes. In general, if it was not part of China, then, to a certain extent, it was a territory subordinate to China. Now China has found a formula by which it can carry out the advancement of its economic interests, which is quite natural for China. It is carried out with the consent, or at least without resistance from the Russian Federation.
And finally, the last one. This is participation in international forums, participation in world governance. And here we are dealing with a rather narrow view, if you will. There is a lot of talk in Russia about the UN, about the UN Security Council, but love for the UN mainly stems from the fact that Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council. And love for the Security Council is largely determined by the veto. Take, for example, President Medvedev's project on a European security structure. If this draft was rewritten and made clearer, then in fact it could consist of just one chapter. Or even from one article. And this article would sound something like this: none of the military-political alliances in Europe will increase the number of its participants without the consent of all the members of the treaty. On the whole, this reflects the Russian position, reflects the interests of the Russian Federation, as they are represented by those who determine Russian foreign policy. But it is obvious that this is a completely impassable option, that such an agreement cannot be signed. Even if it suddenly turned out to be signed, no one would ratify it. There is a kind of dead end here.
It is very interesting to compare the significance of WTO membership for Russia and for China. It should be noted that for China, the WTO is of much greater importance, because it is a manufacturer of industrial goods. On the world market, Russia is mainly a producer of raw materials, and these raw materials do not fall under various WTO rules. Nevertheless, China viewed its WTO membership as a tool for modernizing its economy. And in Russia, WTO membership was viewed primarily from the point of view of the terms of trade, from the point of view of trade relations with other countries. I am not saying that this is bad. It is necessary to show that there are different accents. The emphasis that has been placed in Russia, to a certain extent, helps certain groups of the Russian economy, helps some kind of protectionist positions. But it does not allow the Russian economy to feel the competition of the world market.
Thus, the backwardness and uncompetitiveness of the Russian economy will self-preserve. Of course, all these things are extremely difficult, they do not lend themselves to too direct influence, but it is very important what the emphasis is on, what the emphasis is on.