Soviet stupid ammunition. An overview of ammunition to small arms encountered in the places of former bonds of the European part of the USSR. Mines of the former German army
Any beginner, or an experienced search engine, knows how often the cartridges or sleeves come across, the Second World War. But besides the sleeves, or cartridges, there are even more dangerous finds. It is about this that we will talk about the safety techniques on a kope.
For my 3 years of search activity, I dug, more hundreds of shells of various calibers. Starting from ordinary cartridges, finishing 250 mm airbabs. In my hands we visited, grenades F1 with rolled rings that did not explode mortar mines, etc. My limbs are still due to the fact that I know how to behave with them.
Immediately let's talk about the cartridge. The cartridge is the most common and common find, come apart everywhere, on any field, farm, forest, etc. Operated or not a shooting cartridge is safe, until you throw it into the fire. Then he will work in any case. Therefore, this should not be done.
Next, more dangerous finds, which are also very often located and are raised by our colleagues search engines. These are grenades of RGD-33, F1, M-39, M-24 and more rare varieties. Of course with such things, it is necessary more accurate. If the check or sang grenades are whole, then you can easily take it in your hands and drown in the nearest lake. If, from the grenade was hidden a check and she did not work, which happens very often. And you accidentally stumbled upon a shovel on such a find, it is better to get around it and call the Ministry of Emergency Situations. But, as a rule, they ignore your challenge, and they will not say in such places to walk.
Mortar mines are very often come across the fighting places. They are less dangerous than grenades, but with such a find you need to be more careful, especially if a min not worked.
Up Mina, this is her dangerous place. There is an explosion when Mina shot from a mortar, she flew out of the trunk, she flew the fuse down, and hitting the land that the fourth was triggered. But if Mina fell into a swamp or very mild land, it could not work. Therefore, if you found something similar to this projectile in Earth, be careful with the top of the min.
Of course you can transport it and convey to the nearest reservoir to drown. But you need to be careful. And no, no, do not drop and do not beat the shovel on it.
And of course, more large shells, these are fragmentation of fuhaasny shells that are better not to touch due to their size and volume of affected area. If you can determine the copper rouse, it is shooting or not. If he is not shooter, then it can be attributed to the river and drown, and if he arrived and for some reason he did not work. Then it is better not to touch and do not move.
The photo shows a 125 mm caliber projectile:
In general, shells are not so dangerous as everyone is told about them. Observing the elementary safety technique, and the short rules that you met in this article, you will protect yourself from dangerous finds, and you can safely engage in excavations without fear of undermining.
And by the way, do not forget about the law of Art. 263 CK "illegal storage of ammunition and weapons", and even a small cartridge can be attributed.
In the first weeks of the war, the fronts suffered significant losses and accumulated in the troops of the border military districts in the pre-war years. Most of the artillery factories and ammunition enterprises were evacuated from the threatened areas to the East.
The supply of weapons and ammunition by military factories of the south of the country has ceased. All this has significantly complicated the production of weapons and ammunition and ensuring their existing army and new military formations. The shortcomings in the work of the main artillery governance also adversely affected the supply of troops with arms and ammunition. GAU did not always know exactly the status of the safety of the front troops, since the strict reporting for this service before the war was not established. The term of urgent interviewes for ammunition was introduced at the end., And by armament - in April
Soon, changes were made to the organization of the main artillery department. In July 1941, the management of supply of land-based artillery weapons was formed, and on September 20 of the same year, the position of the head of artillery of the Soviet Army, with the subordination of HAU, was restored. Head of GAU became the first deputy head of the artillery of the Soviet army. The adopted structure of the GAU has not changed throughout the war and fully justified itself. With the introduction of the post of the head of the rear of the Soviet Army, close interaction between the GAU, headquarters of the rear of the Soviet Army and the central administration of military communications were established.
The heroic work of the working class, scientists, engineers and technicians at military enterprises of the Central and Eastern regions of the country, the firm and skillful leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, local party organizations of the restructuring of the entire national economy for military units allowed the Soviet military industry to release for the second half of 1941 30.2 thousand guns, including 9.9 thousand 76 mm and larger calibers, 42.3 thousand mortars (of which 19.1 thousand caliber 82 mm and larger), 106.2 thousand machine guns , 89.7 thousand automata, 1.6 million rifles and carbines and 62.9 million shells, bombs and min 215. But since these deliveries of weapons and ammunition only partially covered the loss of 1941, the provision with the provision of troops of the acting troops The army of weapons and ammunition continued to remain tense. It took the huge voltage of the military industry, the work of the central binder bodies, the Gau's artillery supply service in order to satisfy the needs of fronts in service, and especially in ammunition.
During the period of defensive battle near Moscow, due to the current production, which continuously grew in the eastern regions of the country, first of all were provided by the armament of the reserve of the Supreme Command Rate - 1st Impact, 20th and 10th Army, formed in the country's depth and transmitted By the beginning of the counteroffensive under Moscow to the Western Front. At the expense of the current production of weapons, the needs of troops and other fronts participating in the defensive battle and counteroffensive in Moscow were also satisfied.
Great work on making different species Weapons in this difficult period for our country have completed Moscow plants. As a result, the amount of weapons in the Western Front to December 1941 on some of its species increased from 50-80 to 370-640 percent. A significant increase in weapons in the troops of other fronts.
During the counterattack near Moscow, a massive repair of arms farewell and military equipment was organized in military repair workshops, at the enterprises of Moscow and the Moscow region. And yet, the provision with the provision of troops during this period was so heavy that the Supreme Commander I. V. Stalin personally distributed anti-tank guns, automata, anti-tank 76-mm regimental and division guns between the fronts.
As military factories come into account, especially in the Urals, in Western and Eastern SiberiaIn Kazakhstan, in the second quarter of 1942, it began to noticeably improve the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition. In 1942, the military industry put the front of tens of thousands of 86 mm caliber tools and larger, over 100 thousand mortars (82-120 mm), many millions of shells and mines.
In 1942, the main and most difficult task was to ensure the troops of the fronts, operating in the region of Stalingrad, in the Great Emitting of Don and in the Caucasus.
The consumption of ammunition in the defensive battle near Stalingrad was very large. For example, from July 12 to November 18, 1942, the troops of the Don district, Stalingrad and South-Western fronts were spent: 7,610 thousand shells and mines, including about 5 million shells and mines of the Stalingrad Front 216.
Due to the huge loading of railways by operational transportation, transports with ammunition moved slowly and unloaded at the stations of the front-line railway station (Elton, Janbek, Kaisatskaya, Red Kut). In order to quickly deliver ammunition to the troops, the control of the artillery supply of the Stalingrad front was highlighted two car battalions, which in extremely limited deadlines were able to transport over 500 wagons of ammunition.
The provision of armament and ammunition of the troops of the Stalingrad Front was complicated by a continuous bombing enemy by crossing the Volga. Due to the raids enemy aviation and shelling artillery warehouses of the front and armies were forced to change the dislocation. The unloading of the echelons was produced only at night. In order to disperse supply railway trains, the ammunition went to army warehouses and in their branches located at the railway, stews, 5-10 cars in each, and then in the troops in small car columns (10-12 cars), which usually followed Different routes. This method of the provision ensured the safety of ammunition, but at the same time lengthened the delivery time for their troops.
The removal of weapons and ammunition with the troops of other fronts operating in the area of \u200b\u200bVolga and Don, during this period was less complex and time consuming. For the period of the defensive battle near Stalingrad, all three fronts were submitted 5388 ammunition cars, 123 thousand rifles and automata, 53 thousand machine guns and 8 thousand guns 217.
Along with the current provision of troops, the rear organs of the center, fronts and armies during the defensive battle near Stalingrad carried out the accumulation of weapons and ammunition. As a result of the work done, the troops were mainly ensured by ammunition (Table 19).
Table 19.
Security of the troops of three fronts ammunition (in ammunition) as of November 19, 1942 218
| Ammunition | Front | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Stalingradsky | Donskaya | Southwestern | |
| Rifle cartridges | 3,0 | 1,8 | 3,2 |
| Cartridges for pistols | 2,4 | 2,5 | 1,3 |
| Cartridges for anti-tank guns | 1,2 | 1,5 | 1,6 |
| Manual and anti-tank grenades | 1,0 | 1,5 | 2,9 |
| 50mm min | 1,3 | 1,4 | 2,4 |
| 82 mm min | 1,5 | 0,7 | 2,4 |
| 120 mm min | 1,2 | 1,3 | 2,7 |
| Shots: | |||
| 45mm cannon | 2,9 | 2,9 | 4,9 |
| 76 mm cannon-artillery | 2,1 | 1,4 | 3,3 |
| 76 mm Cannon Division Artillery | 1,8 | 2,8 | 4,0 |
| 122 mm Maubic | 1,7 | 0,9 | 3,3 |
| 122-mm cannon | 0,4 | 2,2 | — |
| 152 mm Gabichic | 1,2 | 7,2 | 5,7 |
| 152-mm Gaubile-Cannon | 1,1 | 3,5 | 3,6 |
| 203 mm Maubic | — | — | — |
| 37 mm anti-aircraft | 2,4 | 3,2 | 5,1 |
| 76 mm anti-aircraft | — | 5,1 | 4,5 |
| 85-mm anti-aircraft | — | 3,0 | 4,2 |
In this period, the heads of artillery supplies of fronts were greatly to ensure the troops in this period: Stalingradsky - Colonel A. I. Markov, Donskoy - Colonel N. M. Bocharov, South-West - Colonel S. G. Algasov, as well as a special Gau group Head of the Deputy Head of the GAU Lieutenant General of Artillery K. R. Musicov, who died on August 10, 1942, during an enemy aviation, Stalingrad.
Simultaneously with the battles that deployed on the banks of the Volga and in the steppes of the Don, on the huge space from the Black Sea to the Caspian began the battle for the Caucasus. The supply of the Troops of the Transcaucasian Front (Northern and Black Sea Group) weapons and ammunition was an even more difficult problem than under Stalingrad. The supply of weapons and ammunition was carried out with a steep way, that is, from the Urals and from Siberia through Tashkent, Krasnovodsk, Baku. Separate transports went through Astrakhan, Baku or Makhachkala. The big way of following transports with ammunition (5170-5370 km) and the need for a repeated transshipment of goods from railway transport to water and back or from the railway to the car and mining and binding was much increased their delivery time for front and army warehouses. For example, transport No. 83/0418, sent on September 1, 1942 from the Urals to the Transcaucasian Front, arrived at the destination only on December 1. Transportation No. 83/0334 did the way from Eastern Siberia in Transcaucasia, equal to 7027 km. But, despite such huge distances, transports with ammunition regularly walked into the Caucasus. For six months of hostilities by the Transcaucasian (North Caucasian) front, about 2 thousand ammunition cars 219 were filed.
A very difficult delivery of ammunition from front-line and army warehouses in troops, defended mountain passes and passes of the Caucasian Range. The main means of the court here were army and military facilities. In the 20th Guards Rifle Division, the defendant Belorechensk direction, shells from Sukhumi to Sochi were served by sea, further to the Division warehouse - by car, and before the shelf items of combat nutrition - in factory transport. For the 394th rifle division, the ammunition was brought by the U-2 aircraft from the Sukhumi airfield. The ammunition was similarly delivered in almost all divisions of the 46th army.
Workers' Transcaucasia was provided to the front of the front. Up to 30 mechanical plants and workshops of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were brought to the manufacture of hand-held garnet, mines and shells of medium calibers. From October 1, 1942 to March 1, 1943, they produced 1.3 million corps of hand grenades, 1 million min and 226 thousand projectile buildings. The local industry of Transcaucasia manufactured in 1942. 4294 50mm mortars, 688,82-mm mortars, 46,492 automaton 220.
Heroically worked the working class of the blocked Leningrad. Delivery of weapons and ammunition in a precipitated city was extremely difficult, so the production of them on the spot was often crucial. Only from September and until the end of 1941, the city's industry gave the front of 12,085 machine guns and signal pistols, 7682 mortars, 2298 artillery guns and 41 reactive installation. In addition, Leningraders manufactured 3.2 million shells and mines, over 5 million hand held grenades.
Leningrad supplied weapons and other fronts. In the difficult days of November 1941, when the enemy rushed to Moscow, 926 mortars and 431 76-mm regimental gun were sent to Moscow by decision of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front. The guns in a disassembled form were loaded on airplanes and went to the Cherepovets station, where the artillery shop was equipped for their assembly. Then wearing the collected form were loaded on the platform and were delivered by rail to Moscow. In the same period by air transport, Leningrad sent 39,700 76-mm armor-piercing shells to Moscow.
Despite the difficulties of the first period of war, our industry from month to month has steadily increased production. In 1942, GAU received 125.6 thousand mortars from military plants (82-120 mm), 33.1 thousand guns of 76 mm caliber and larger without tank, 127.4 million shells without aviation and min 221, 2,069 thousand reactive shells 222. This made it possible to fully fill the combat loss of weapons and consumption of ammunition.
The provision of troops of the army of the army and ammunition remained complex and in the second period of the war, which was marked by the beginning of a powerful counteroffensiveness of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad. By the beginning of the counterattack southwest, the Don and Stalingrad fronts had 30.4 thousand tools and mortars, including 16,755 units of 76 mm caliber and above 223, about 6 million shells and mines, 380 million cartridges for small arms and 1.2 million hand grenades. The supply of ammunition from the central bases and GAU warehouses for all the time the counteroffensive and elimination of the surrounded enemy grouping was performed continuously. Stalingrad Front Since November 19, 1942. But on January 1, 1943, 1095 ammunition cars were filed, Donskoy (from November 16, 1942 to February 2, 1943) - 1460 wagons, southwestern (from November 19, 1942 January 1, 1942) - 1090 wagons and the Voronezh Front (from December 15, 1942 to January 1, 1943) - 278 wagons. Only four fronts for the period November 1942 - January 1943, 3923 ammunition carriages were filed.
The total consumption of ammunition in the battle for Stalingrad, starting from July 12, 1942, reached 9539 cars 224 and did not have equal in the history of previous wars. He compiled a third consumption of ammunition of the entire Russian army in four years of the First World War and had twice the flow rate of the ammunition of both warring parties under the verte.
A huge amount of weapons and ammunition was necessary to submit in the second period of the war by the Transcaucasian and North Caucasian fronts, who freed the North Caucasus from the German fascist troops.
Thanks to the effective measures of the Communist Party, the Soviet government, the State Defense Committee, the local party and Soviet bodies, the heroic work of the working class in 1942, the release of weapons and ammunition was significantly increased. This made it possible to increase their supply of troops. The increase in the number of weapons in the front troops in early 1943 compared with 1942 is shown in Table. 20 225.
Table 20.
The fighting, which turned in 1943, set new, even more complex tasks on the timely accumulation and the current supply of armament and ammunition troops to the artillery supplies to the Soviet Army.
Especially increased the volume of weapons and ammunition deliveries during the training of the battle near Kursk. During March - July 1943, the fronts were sent from the central bases and GAU warehouses over half a million rifles and automata, 31.6 thousand manual and machine machine guns, 520 large-caliber machine guns, 21.8 thousand anti-tank guns, 12,326 guns and mortars, or only 3100 weapons wagons 226.
When preparing for the Kursk battle, the artillery supply authorities of the center, fronts and armies have already had a certain experience of planning the provision of troops of the armament of arms and ammunition. It was carried out as follows. Monthly, the General Staff gave the Directive, which indicated, which front, which is, how many ammunition (in ammunition) and to which deadlines should be sent. Based on these guidelines, the time-reported tables of the fronts and their GAU applications planned to be sent to the troops of the existing army of ammunition, based on the presence of them at the bases and warehouses of NGOs, production opportunities during the month, the provisions and needs of the fronts. When the GAU has not yet been necessary resources, it in coordination with General Staff I made adjustments to the established amount of ammunition leave. The plan was considered and signed by the commander of the artillery of the Soviet army by Colonel-General, then the main marshal of artillery N. N. Voronov, his deputy - the head of GAU General N. D. Yakovlev, and was a supreme commander-in-chief for approval.
Based on this plan, the organizational and planned management of GAU (Head of General P. P. Volkotrubenko) reported data on vacation and sending ammunition to the fronts and gave a discharge control of the supply of ammunition. The latter, together with the CCTP, planned to send transports by timing in the range of five days and reported the front numbers of the transport, place and timing of their dispatch. As a rule, sending transports with ammunition to the front of the front began the 5th and ended on the 25th of each month. Such a methodology for planning and sending ammunition to the fronts from the central bases and warehouses of NGOs was preserved until the end of the war.
By the beginning of the battle near Kursk (as of July 1, 1943), the Central and Voronezh fronts had 21,686 weapons and mortars (without 50mm mortars), 518 installations of jet artillery, 3489 tanks and SAU 227.
A large number of weapons in the front of the fronts operating in the Kursk arc, and the tensions of hostilities in the planned offensive operations demanded an increase in the submission of ammunition. During April - June 1943, the Central, Voronezh and Bryansky fronts were filed over 4.2 million shells and mines, about 300 million small arms ammunition and almost 2 million hand-held grenades (over 4 thousand cars). By the beginning of the defensive battle, the fronts were provided with: 76 mm shots - 2.7-4.3 ammunition; 122-mm weld shots - 2.4-3.4; 120 mm mines - 2.4-4; Ammunitions of large calibers - 3-5 ammunition 228. In addition, during the Kursk battle, the above-mentioned fronts were filed from central bases and warehouses 4781 cars (over 119 full trains) of various types of ammunition. The average daily supply of their central front was 51 cars, Voronezh - 72 Wagon and Bryansky - 31 wagon 229.
The consumption of ammunition in the battle under Kurk was especially great. Only for the period on July 5-12, 1943, the troops of the central front, reflecting the fierce tank attacks of the enemy, spent 1083 ammunition cars (135 cars per day). The main part falls on the 13th Army, which in eight days spent 817 ammunition cars, or 100 cars per day. In just 50 days of the Kursk battle of three fronts, about 10,640 ammunition cars were spent (not counting jet shells), including 733 ammunition cartridges small arms, 70 wagons of cartridges to anti-tank guns, 234 cars of hand grenades, 3369 cars min, 276 wagons of shots of anti-aircraft artillery and 5950 wagons of ground artillery fans 230.
The artillery supply in the battle near Kursk was led by headlines of the artillery supply of fronts: Central - Colonel engineer V. I. Sheebanin, Voronezhsky - Colonel T. M. Moskalenko, Bryansky - Colonel M. V. Kuznetsov.
In the third period of the war, providing the troops of fronts with weapons and ammunition improved significantly. By the beginning of this period, the Soviet military industry could smoothly supply the troops of the current army and new military formations The rates of the Supreme Command. In the bases and warehouses of the GAU, significant reserves of guns, mortars and especially rifle armament. In this regard, in 1944, the production of small arms and tools of ground artillery declined somewhat. If in 1943 the military industry supplied 130.3 thousand tools to the Soviet army, then in 1944 - 122.5 thousand. Deliveries and reactive installations decreased (from 3330 in 1943 to 2564 in 1944). Due to this, the production of tanks and self-propelled guns continued to grow (29 thousand in 1944 against 24 thousand in 1943).
At the same time, the provision of troops of the army by the ammunition continued to remain tense, especially with a caliber of 122 mm and above, due to their extensive consumption. The total reserves of these ammunition fell: 122-mm shots - by 670 thousand, 152-mm projectiles - by 1.2 million and 203-mm projectiles - by 172 thousand 231
Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the State Committee of Defense, having considered the provision established with the production of promification projectiles on the eve of the decisive offensive operations, set the task of the fundamental revision of production programs for 1944 towards a sharp increase in the issue of all types of ammunition, and especially scarce.
By decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and GKO, the production of ammunition in 1944 was significantly increased compared with 1943: especially 122-mm and 152-mm shells, 76 mm - by 3,064 thousand (9 percent), M-13 - by 385.5 thousand (19 percent) and M-31 shells - by 15.2 thousand (4 percent) 232. This made it possible to ensure the troops of the fronts by all types of ammunition in the offensive operations of the third period of war.
On the eve of the Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts had about 50 thousand guns and mortars, 2 million rifles and automata, 10 thousand machine guns 233, 12.2 million shells and mines, 700 million ammunition For small arms and 5 million hand-held grenades, which was 1-2 front-line ammunition. During the operation, more than 1,300 wagons of all types of ammunition 234 were submitted to these fronts. There were no interruptions in the supply. However, due to the early spring of the spring, the dishthele on the military roads and the military transport pathways, the movement of road vehicles was impossible, and the fronts began to experience great difficulties in bringing the ammunition for the troops and fire positions artillery. We had to use tractors, and in some cases, to attract soldiers and local people on non-coming areas of roads for tray of shells, cartridges, grenades. For the delivery of ammunition on the front edge, transport aviation was also used.
To ensure ammunition of the tank compounds of the 1st Ukrainian Front, who defended the operational depth of the enemy's defense, aircraft were used by 2. On February 7 and 8, 1944, the Fursi airfield was taken to the settlements of Baranie and the Bruzians of 4.5 million cartridges, 5.5 thousand hand grenades, 15 thousand 82- and 120-mm min and 10 thousand 76- and 122 mm shells. Daily 80-85 aircraft delivered ammunition with tank parts, making three or four flights per day. All the aircraft advancing for the 1st Ukrainian Front were delivered over 400 tons of ammunition 235.
Despite the great difficulties with the delivery, divisions, parts and compounds participating in Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation, were completely secured by ammunition. In addition, their consumption in this operation was relatively small. Total two fronts troops spent only about 5.6 million shots, including 400 thousand shells of anti-aircraft artillery, 2.6 million terrestrial artillery shells and 2.56 million min.
The provision of troops by ammunition and weapons were led by the heads of artillery supplies of the fronts: 1st Ukrainian - Major General Artillery N. E. Manzurin, 2nd Ukrainian - Major General Artillery P. A. Rozhkov.
A huge amount of weapons and ammunition was required during the preparation and conduct of the Belarusian offensive operation, one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War. For complete staffing of the armament of the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3, 2 and 1st Belarusian fronts who took part in it, in May - July 1944, were filed: 6370 guns and mortars, over 10 thousand machine guns and 260 thousand rifles and automata 236. To the beginning of the operation, the fronts had 2-2.5 ammunition for small arms, 2.5-5 ammunition min, 2.5-4 ammunition of anti-aircraft shots, 3-4 ammunition 76-mm shells, 2.5-5 , 3 ammunition 122-mm warm shells, 3.0-8.3 ammunition 152-mm shells.
There were no such high security forces of the front of the front troops in any of the previously carried out offensive operations of a strategic scale. For shipment of weapons and ammunition, the fronts of the base, warehouses and arsenals of NGOs worked with maximum load. The personnel of all links of the rear, railway transport workers did everything in them in a timely manner to deliver arms and ammunition troops.
However, during the Belarusian operation due to the rapid separation of troops from the bases, as well as due to the insufficiently high rates of restoration of the front-destroyed opponents of railway communications, the supply of front strucks was often complicated. Automobile transport worked with great tension, but one could one cope with a huge amount of court in the operational and military rear.
Even relatively frequent nomination of the head offices of front-line and army artillery warehouses did not solve the tasks of the timely delivery of ammunition with the troops, which were advancing in a wooded-swampy terrain, in off-road conditions. The scattering of ammunition reserves along the front line and deeply affected. For example, two warehouses of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front As of August 1, 1944 were posted in six points at a distance from 60 to 650 km from the front line. A similar position was in a number of armies of the 2nd and 1st Belarusian fronts. The advancing parts and connections could not raise all the reserves of ammunition accumulated in them when preparing the operation. Military Tips of the fronts and armies were forced to allocate a large number of road transport for collecting and serving the troops of the amiss in the rear of ammunition. For example, the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front allocated 150 cars for this purpose, and the head of the rear of the 50th Army of the 2nd Belarusian Front - 60 cars and the working company consisting of 120 people. On the 2nd Belarusian front in the districts of Krichev and Mogilev, by the end of July 1944, the reserves of ammunition were 85 points, and on the initial positions of the troops of the 1st Belarusian Front - in 100. The command was forced to move them by airplanes 237. Leaving ammunition on the source turns, fireproof artillery positions and in the way of promotion of parts and compounds led to the fact that the troops began to lack them, although there was a sufficient amount of ammunition in fronts and armies.
The total consumption of ammunition of all calibers during the Belarusian strategic offensive operation was significant. But if you proceed from a large existence of weapons, it was generally relatively small. During the operation, 270 million (460 wagons) of ammunition to small arms were spent during the operation, 2,832 thousand (1,700 wagons) min, 478 thousand (115 cars) of shots of anti-aircraft artillery, about 3434.6 thousand (3656 wagons) terrestrial shots Artillery 238.
In the course of the Belarusian offensive operation, the headlines of the artillery supply of fronts were led by an ammunition of the artillery supplies: the 1st Baltic - Major General of Artillery A. P. Baikov, 3rd Belorussky - Major General of the Engineering and Technical Service A. S. Volkov, 2nd Belarusian - Colonel Engineer E. N. Ivanov and the 1st Belorussky - Major General of the Engineering and Technical Service V. I. Sheebanin.
The consumption of ammunition in Lviv-Sandomira and Brest-Lublin offensive operations was also significant. For July and August, the 1st Ukrainian Front spent 4706 cars, and the 1st Belarusian front - 2372 ammunition car. As in the Belarusian operation, the delivery of ammunition was associated with serious difficulties due to the high rates of the onset of troops and the large part of them from the artillery warehouses of fronts and armies, bad road conditions and a large amount of the provision, which lay on the shoulders of road transport.
A similar position was in the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts participating in the Yaskovo-Chisheneous operation. Before the beginning of the offensive, directly in the troops was focused from two to three ammunition ammunition. But during the breakthrough of the defense of the enemy, they were not fully spent. The troops quickly moved forward and taken with them only those ammunition that could raise their automotive transport. A significant amount of ammunition remained on division warehouses on the right and left banks of the Dniester. Because of the big stretching of the military routes, the coverage of them ceased in two days, and in five to six days after the start of the onset of the onset of the troops began to experience much need in ammunition, despite their small consumption. After the decisive intervention of military councils and bodies of the fronts, all vehicles were mobilized, and soon the situation managed to fix it. This allowed us to successfully complete the Yaskovine-Chisinau operation.
During the offensive operations of 1945, there were no special difficulties in ensuring military troops and ammunition. The total reserves of ammunition as of January 1, 1945, against 1944 increased: on mines - by 54 percent, on the shooters of the anti-aircraft artillery - by 35, on the shooters of ground artillery - by 11 percent 239. Thus, in the final period of the war of the Soviet Union with Fascist Germany were not only fully ensured by the needs of the troops of the current army, but also managed to create additional inventory reserves on front-line and army warehouses The 1st and 2nd Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts.
The beginning of 1945 was marked by two large offensive operations - East Prussian and Vistul-Oder. During their preparation, troops were fully secured by weapons and ammunition. It did not imagine serious difficulties and their branches during operations due to the presence of a well-developed network of iron and highways.
The East Prussian operation, which lasted for about three months, was distinguished by the greatest consumption of ammunition for the entire Great Patriotic War. In the course of its troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belarusian fronts, 15,038 ammunition cars were consumed (in the Vagon-Oder operation 5382 of the car).
After the successful completion of the taste-Oder offensive operation, our troops came out on the line. Oder (Odra) and began to prepare for the storm of the main citadel of Nazism - Berlin. According to the degree of equipment of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belarusian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, military equipment and weapons, the Berlin offensive operation exceeds all the offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet rear and the actual rear of the Armed Forces were well provided with troops with everything necessary to apply the last crushing strike on fascist Germany. In the preparation of surgery, the 1st of the Belarusian and the 1st Ukrainian fronts were sent over 2 thousand guns and mortars, almost 11 million shells and mines, over 292.3 million cartridges and about 1.5 million hand-held grenades. By the beginning of the operation, they had over 2 million rifles and automata, over 76 thousand machine guns and 48 thousand guns and mortars 240. During the Berlin operation (from April 16 to May 8), 1945, 7.2 million were filed. (5924 wagon) shells and mines, which (including stocks) fully ensured the flow and allowed to create the necessary reserve by their end of the operation.
In the final operation of the Great Patriotic War, over 10 million shells and min, 392 million cartridges and almost 3 million hand-held grenades are only 9715 ammunition cars. In addition, 241.7 thousand (1920 wagons) of jet shells were spent 241. Ammunition during the preparation and during the operation were drove through the railways of the Allied and Western European King, and hence the troops - front-line and army road transport. At the joints of the railways of the Allied and Western European Kish, the transshipment of ammunition in areas of specially created transshipment bases was widely practiced. It was a rather time consuming and difficult job.
In general, the filing of the mosses of the fronts in 1945 significantly exceeded the level of the last years of the Great Patriotic War. If in the fourth quarter of 1944, 31,736 ammunition cars (793 trains) arrived at the fronts, then in four months 1945 - 44,041 cars (1101 train). To this figure it is necessary to add and submit an ammunition for military air defense systems, as well as parts marine infantry. Taking into account its total amount of ammunition sent from central bases and warehouses by the troops of the current army in four months of 1945, was 1327 trains 242.
The Domestic Military Industry and Bar of the Soviet Army successfully coped with the task of supplying the troops of fronts and new weapons and ammunition formations in the past war.
The operating army spent over 10 million tons of ammunition during the war. As you know, the military industry supplied separate elements of shots on artillery bases. In total, about 500 thousand cars of these elements were delivered to the war, which were going to finished shells and went to the fronts. This colossal in volume and complex work Performed on the artillery bases GAU mostly women, old people and teenagers. They stood from conveyors to 16-18 hours a day, several days did not come out of the workshops, they took food and rested immediately, from the machines. Their heroic, selfless work during the war years will never forget the grateful socialist Fatherland.
Summing up the work of the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army during the past war, it should once again emphasize that the basis of this type of material support of the Armed Forces was the industry, which several million small arms units, hundreds of thousands of guns and mortars, hundreds of millions, was the basis of this type of material support of the armed forces. shells and mines, tens of billions of cartridges. Along with the steady growth of mass production of weapons and ammunition, a number of qualitatively new samples of terrestrial and anti-aircraft artillery were created, new samples of small arms were developed, as well as podkaliber and cumulative shells. All this weapon was successfully applied by Soviet troops in the operations of the Great Patriotic War.
As for the import of weapons, he was very insignificant and, essentially, did not great influence on the equipment of the Soviet troops. In addition, imported weapons in their tactical and technical data were inferior to Soviet armament. Several complex artillery complexes obtained in the third period of war were only partially used in air defense troops, and 40-mm anti-aircraft guns remained at the GAU bases until the end of the war.
A good quality of weapons and ammunition supplied by the Domestic Military Industry of the Soviet Army during the war years was largely provided with a wide network of warfolders (military acceptance) GAU. Important importance in the timely supply of troops of the armament of arms and ammunition was also the fact that it was based on strictly planned production and provision. By setting out the system of accounting and reporting of weapons and ammunition in the troops, armies and fronts, as well as the planning of filing their fronts, the artillery supply service continuously improved and improved organizational forms, methods and ways to ensure the troops of the current army. Rigid centralization of leadership from top to bottom, close and continuous interaction of the service of artillery supplies of the center, fronts and armies, connections and parts with other rear services, and especially with the headquarters of the rear and military service, the intense work of all types of transport allowed for the troops of fronts and new rates Supreme Commands with weapons and ammunition. In the main artillery department, who worked under the direct leadership of the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Command Committee, a slim system of the systematic and targeted provision of military armament and ammunition, corresponding to the nature of war, its scope and methods of conducting hostilities were established. This system has fully and fully justified itself throughout the war. Uninterrupted provision of the current army and ammunition was achieved thanks to the enormous organizational and creative activities of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, the Soviet Government, the rates of the Supreme Command, the clear work of Murnan of the USSR, the workers of the defense drug addicts and all the links of the Soviet Army, the Defenseless and Heroic Work Class Work .
By the end of the 1930s, almost all participants in the coming world war have formed general directions in the development of small arms. The range and accuracy of the lesion was reduced, which was compensated for greater density of fire. As a result, it is the beginning of mass rearming of parts by automatic small arms - machine guns, machine guns, assault rifles.
The firing accuracy began to go to the background, while the soldiers, the chain, began to train shooting from the course. With the advent of airborne troops, there was a need to create special lightweight arms.
A maneuverable war also affected the machine guns: they became much easier and mobile. New varieties of small arms appeared (which was dictated, first of all, the need to combat tanks) - rifle grenades, anti-tank rifles and RPGs with cumulative grenades.
Lifeline weapons of the USSR of the Second World War
The Rifle Division of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War was very formidable - about 14.5 thousand people. The main type of rifle armament was rifles and carbines - 10420 pieces. The share of machine guns was insignificant - 1204. Machine, manual and anti-aircraft guns were 166, 392 and 33 units, respectively.
The division had its artillery from 144 guns and 66 mortars. Fire power complemented 16 tanks, 13 armored vehicles and a solid park of auxiliary automotive equipment.
Rifles and carbines
The main rifle weapons of the infantry parts of the USSR of the first period of war was unconditionally glorified three-year-old - 7.62 mm Rifle S. I. Mosina of the sample 1891. Upgraded in 1930. Its merits are well known - durability, reliability, unpretentiousness in service combined with good ballistic qualities, in particular, with sighting distance - 2 km. 
The three-year one is the perfect weapon for newly designed soldiers, and the simplicity of the design created tremendous opportunities for its mass production. But like any weapon, the three-year one had shortcomings. Constantly stuck bayonet in combination with a long barrel (1670 mm) created inconvenience when moving, especially in wooded terrain. Serious complaints caused the shutter handle when recharging.
On its base was created sniper rifle and a series of carbines of the sample of 1938 and 1944. Fate firsted a three-year long century (the last three-year one was released in 1965), participation in many wars and astronomical "circulation" in 37 million copies.
Sniper with a mosine rifle (C optical sight PREVENTION 1931)
Aiming range SVT-40 - up to 1 km. SVT-40 honored with honor at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. She appreciated our opponents. Historical fact: Capturing at the beginning of the war, rich trophies, among whom was a lot of SVT-40, the German army ... took it into service, and the Finns created their rifle on the basis of SVT-40 - Tarako.
The creative development of ideas implemented in SVT-40 has become an automatic rifle AVT-40. From its predecessor, she was distinguished by the ability to automatically shoot with a pace of up to 25 shots per minute. The lack of aut-40 - low firing, a strong demasking flame and a loud sound at the time of the shot. In the future, as the mass arrival in the troops of the automatic weapon, it was removed from weapons.
Pistol machine guns
Great Patriotic War I became the time of the final transition from the rifles to the automatic weapon. The Red Army began to fight, having a small amount of PPD-40 - a gun of machine guns of an outstanding Soviet designer Vasily Alekseevich Degtyarev. At that time, the PPD-40 was not inferior to his domestic and foreign analogues. 
Calked for a pistol cartridge feces. 7.62 x 25 mm, PPD-40 had an impressive ammunition of 71 cartridges placed in a drum type store. Having a weight of about 4 kg, it provided a shooting at a speed of 800 shots per minute with an efficient range of up to 200 meters. However, after a few months after the start of the war, he was replaced by the legendary PPS-40 Cal. 7.62 x 25 mm.
Before the creator of the PPS-40 - designer, George Semenovich, Shpagin was the task of developing extremely easy to operate, reliable, technological, cheap in production mass weapons. 
From its predecessor - PPD-40, PPS inherited a drum shop at 71 patron. A little later, a simpler and reliable sector horn store was developed for 35 ammunition. The mass of curved machines (both variants) was 5.3 and 4.15 kg respectively. PPS-40 rapidity reached 900 shots per minute with a sight distance of up to 300 meters and with the ability to conduct a single shooting.
For the development of PPS-40 there were enough lessons. It easily disassembled 5 parts made by the method of stamping and welded technology, so that during the war years the Soviet defense was released about 5.5 million automata.
In the summer of 1942, the young designer Alexei Sudarev presented his brainchild - a 6,62 mm caliber machine gun. He was very distinguished from his "senior fellow" PPD and PPS-40 rational layout, higher technological and ease of making parts by arc welding. 
PPS-42 was 3.5 kg easier and demanded three times less time to manufacture. However, despite quite obvious advantages mass weapons He never became, leaving the PPS-40 championship palm tree.
By the beginning of the war, the manual machine gun DP-27 (Degtyarev Infantry, Kal 7.62mm) was in service with the Red Army for almost 15 years, having the status of the main manual machine gun of infantry parts. Its automation operated by the energy of powder gases. The gas regulator reliably protected the mechanism from pollution and high temperatures.
DP-27 could only lead an automatic fire, but even a newcomer was enough for several days in order to master the shooting short queues of 3-5 shots. The ammunition of 47 ammunition was located in the disk store bullet to the center in one row. The store itself was attached from above the trunks. The mass of a non-accidenting machine gun was 8.5 kg. The equipped store increased it for almost 3 kg.
It was a powerful weapon with a sight distance of 1.5 km and combat speeds up to 150 shots per minute. In a combat position, the machine gun relied on the bumps. At the end of the trunk, a plane sensor was injured, significantly reducing his demasking effect. DP-27 was served by the shooter and his assistant. In total, about 800 thousand machine guns were released.
Lifeline Wehrmacht of World War II
The main strategy of the German army is an offensive or blitzkrieg (Blitzkrieg - a lightning war). The decisive role in it was allocated to large tank compounds, carrying out profound enemy defense breakthroughs in cooperation with artillery and aviation.
Tank parts managed powerful fortifications, destroying management centers and rear communications, without which the enemy quickly lost efficiency. The defeat was completed motorized parts of the ground forces.
Rifle armament of the infantry division of the Wehrmacht
The staff of the German Infantry Division of the 1940 Sample assumed the presence of 12609 rifles and carbines, 312 machine guns (machine guns), manual and machine guns - respectively 425 and 110 pieces, 90 anti-tank guns and 3,600 pistols.Rifle Wehrmacht's arms generally complied with high wartime requirements. It was reliable, trouble-free, simple, convenient in production and maintenance, which contributed to its serial release.
Rifles, carbines, automata
Mauser 98K.
Mauser 98K - Improved version of the Mauser 98 rifle, developed in late XIX. A century by Powl brothers and Wilhelm Mausers, founders of the world famous weapon company. Equipment to them by the German army began in 1935. 
Mauser 98K.
Weapon equipped with five 7.92 mm ropes. The prepared soldier could actively shoot 15 times within a minute to a distance of 1.5 km. Mauser 98K was very compact. Its main characteristics: Mass, length, length of barrel - 4.1 kg x 1250 x 740 mm. Numerous conflicts with its participation, longevity and truly transcendent "circulation" speak of the indisputable advantages of the rifles - more than 15 million units.
Automatic MP-40 "Schmisser"
Perhaps the most famous small arms of the Wehrmacht of the Second World War was the famous MR-40 machine gun, the modification of its predecessor - MR-36 created by Heinrich Volmer. However, the will of the fate is more famous under the name "Schmisser", obtained, thanks to the stamp at the store - "Patent Schmeisser". The stigma simply meant that in addition to the city of Folmer, Hugo Schmisser participated in the creation of MR-40, but only as a shop creator. 
Automatic MP-40 "Schmisser"
Initially, MR-40 was intended for armament of the command composition of infantry parts, but later it was transferred to the disposal of tankers, drivers of armored vehicles, parachuts-paratroopers and fighters of special units.
However, for the infantry parts of MR-40 was absolutely not suitable, since there was a weapon of extremely melee. In the fierce battle in open locality, there was a weapon with a range of shooting from 70 to 150 meters meant for a German soldier to be practically unarmed in front of his opponent, armed Mosina and Tokarev rifles with a shooting range from 400 to 800 meters.
Storm rifle STG-44
Assault rifle STG-44 (STURMGEWEHR) Cal. 7.92mm - another legend of the Third Reich. This is certainly an outstanding creation of Hugo Schmisser - a prototype of many post-war assault rifles and automata, including the famous AK-47. 
STG-44 could conduct a single and automatic fire. Her weight with a full store was 5.22 kg. IN sighting distance - 800 meters - "Sturmheverber" has not yielded to its main competitors. There were three versions of the store - at 15, 20 and 30 shots with a pace of up to 500 shots per minute. The option of using a rifle with a bait grenade launcher and an infrared sight is considered.
It was not without flaws. The assault rifle was heavier Mauser-98K for a whole kilogram. Her wooden butt could not stand the hand-to-hand combat and just broke. The flame breaking out of the trunk squeezed the place of finding the arrow, and the long store and the aimed devices were forced to highly raise her head in the lying position.
MG-42 Caliber 7.92 mm is quite true called one of the best machine guns of the Second World War. It was designed in Grossfus by Werner Shorter and Kurt Horoon. Those who experienced him fire powerwere very frank. Our soldiers called him a "lawn mile, and the allies - the" Circular saw of Hitler ".
Depending on the type of shutter, the machine gun was targeted at a speed of up to 1500 V / min for a distance of up to 1 km. The bippet was carried out using a machine-gun tape by 50 - 250 ammunition. The uniqueness of the MG-42 was supplemented with a relatively small number of parts - 200 and the high manufacturability of their production using the method of stamping and point welding.
The barrel spinned from the shooting was replaced by a spare in a few seconds with a special clamp. In total, about 450 thousand machine guns were released. Unique technical developments embodied in MG-42 were borrowed by gunsmiths of many countries of the world when creating their machine guns.
Here is a little illustration:
Suppose I read in 12-Tonnik (which usually exaggerates the power of the Germans and Sattelitov opposing us), which, by the beginning of 1944, at the Soviet-German front, the ratio of forces on artillery tools and mortars was 1.7: 1 (95.604 Soviet versus 54,570 opponents). More than one-time general superiority. That is, on active sites, it could be brought to three times (for example, in the Belarusian operation 29,000 Soviet against 10,000 enemy) means that the opponent's head could not raise under hurricane fire soviet artillery? No, an artillery tool is just a tool for the passage consumption. No shells - a useless toy gun. And the provision of projectiles is just the task of logistics.
In 2009, Vife Isaev posted a comparison of the consumption of ammunition of the Soviet and German artillery (1942: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1718/1718985.htm, 1943: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/ Forum / 0 / 1706490.htm, 1944: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1733/1733134.htm, 1945: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/ 0 / Archive / 1733/1733171.htm). I gathered everything in a sign, supplemented with jet artillery, in the Germans added from Hannah Consumption of trophy calibers (often it gives a non-volatile additive) and the flow rate of tank calibers for comparability - in Soviet figures, tank calibers (20 mm Schwak and 85-mm non-zenith) present. Posted. Well, grouped a little differently. It turns out quite interesting. Despite the superiority of Soviet artillery in the number of trunks, shot of shells in pieces, if we take artillery calibers (i.e., the guns 75 mm and above, without anti-aircraft), the Germans are more:
USSR Germany 1942 37,983,800 45,261,822 1943 82,125,480 69,928,496 1944 98,564,568 113,663,900
If we translate into tons that superiority is even more noticeable:
USSR Germany 1942 446,113 709,957 1943 828,193 1,121,545 1944 1,000,962 1,540,933
Tons here are taken by the weight of the projectile, not shot. That is, the weight of the metal and explosives, which causes directly on the head of the nasty side. I note that behind the Germans I did not count the armor-piercing projectiles of tank and anti-tank guns (I hope it is clear why). For the Soviet side, they are not possible to exclude possible, but, judging by the Germans, the amendment will be insignificant. In Germany, consumption is provided on all fronts, which begins to play a role in 1944.
IN soviet army On average, the trunk of the tools from 76.2-mm and above the existing army (without RGC) was shot per day 3.6-3.8 shells. The figure is quite stable both by year and by calibrations: In 1944, the average day shot on all calibra - 3.6 per barrel, on a 122-mm Gaubitsa - 3.0, by 76.2 mm trunks (regimental, division, tank) - 3.7. The middle day shot on the trunk of a mortar is growing from the year: from 2.0 in 1942 to 4.1 in 1944.
In the Germans, I do not have the presence of guns in the existing army. But if you take the overall presence of guns, then the middle day shot on the trunk of the 75-mm caliber and above in 1944 will be about 8.5. At the same time, the main workhorse of the Division artillery (105-mm of the Gaubitsa - almost a third of the total tunches of the shells) shot on an average of 14.5 shells on the trunk, and the second main caliber (150 mm Division Maubits - 20% of the total tonnage) approximately 10, 7. Mortarites were used much less intense - 81 mm mortar tired per day 4.4 projectiles on the trunk, and 120-mm only 2.3. Weapons of regimental artillery gave consumption closer to the average (75 mm infantry weapon 7 shells on the barrel, 150-mm infantry weapon - 8.3).
Another instructive metric is the flow charges for the division.
The division was the main organizational brick, but the typical division was sought by parts of strengthening. It is interesting to see what the average division was maintained in the cut of fire power. In 1942-44, the USSR had about 500 settlement divisions in the current army (without RGC) (weighted average: 1942 - 425 divisions, 1943 - 494 Divisions, 1944 - 510 divisions). IN ground forces The existing army was about 5.5 million, that is, the division accounted for about 11 thousand years. "I had" it naturally, taking into account both the composition of the division and all parts of strengthening and ensuring that they worked on it both directly and in the deep rear.
In Germans, the average number of troops per divisions of the Eastern Front, calculated in the same way declined from 16,000 in 1943 to 13,800 in 1944, about 1.45-1.25 times the "thicker" Soviet. At the same time, the average daily shot on the Soviet division in 1944 was about 5.4 tons (1942 - 2.9; 1943 - 4.6), and on German - three times more (16.2 tons). If you calculate the current army by 10,000, then from the Soviet side to support their actions in 1944, 5 tons of ammunition was spent, and with a German 13.8 tons.
The US division on the European TVD in this sense is still stronger. It was three times more people Than on Soviet: 34,000 (this is without Supply Command), and the daily consumption of ammunition was almost ten times more (52.3 tons). Or 15.4 tons per day per 10,000 people, that is, more than three times more than in the Red Army.
In this sense, it was the Americans who carried out the recommendation of Joseph Vissarionovich "to fight with a small blood, but the extensive cost of shells." You can compare - in June 1944, the distance to Elbe was about the same from Omaha Beach and from Vitebsk. The Russians and Americans also came to the Elbe simultaneously. That is, the speed of advancement they provided themselves the same. However, the Americans on this path spent on 15 tons per day per 10,000 person personnel and lost an average of 3.8% of troops per month killed, injured, prisoners and missing. Soviet troops moved up at the same speed (determined) three times less shells, but also lost 8.5% per month. Those. The speed was provided by the flow rate.
It is not interesting to see the distribution of the weight consumption of ammunition by the type of guns:
I remind you that all the numbers here for artillery are 75 mm and above, that is, without anti-aircraft guns, without 50 mm mortars, without battalion / anti-tank guns by caliber from 28 to 57 mm. German guns with this name fall into infantry tools, Soviet 76-mm regifolds and american 75-mm Gaubita. The remaining guns with weight in a combat position of less than 8 tons are counted as field. Such systems as Soviet 152-mm Gaubitz-20 and German S.FH 18 are falling here on the upper limit, such as Soviet 203-mm Gaubitiza B-4, American 203 mm M1 or German 210 Merrtira, as well as 152-155-170-mm long-range cannons on their boilers fall into the next class - heavy and long-range artillery.
It can be seen that in the Red Army, the lion's share of fire falls on mortars and regimental guns, i.e. on fire in the near tactical zone. Heavy artillery plays a completely minor role (in 1945 more, but not much). IN field artillery The efforts (by weight of the shells released) are approximately evenly distributed between the 76 mm gun, a 122-mm warmness and a 152-mm warm-powder / wool-gun. What leads to the fact that the average weight of the Soviet projectile is one and a half times less than German.
In addition, it should be noted that the further the goal, the (on average) it is less covered. In the near tactical zone, most of the goals are somehow in the same way or otherwise, in the depths there are such unscrewed goals as navigating reserves, enemy troops in the places of cluster, the location of the headquarters, etc. In other words, the shell fell into the goal in the depths of average causes more damage than the shell released at the leading edge (on the other hand, the scattering of shells on distant distances is higher).
Then, if the enemy has a parity on the weight of the shells released, but at the same time he holds half of people at the front, thereby twice the goals of our artillery.
All this works on the observed loss ratio.
(As an exposed comment to