Ulyanov read the origin of Ukrainian separatism online. Nikolay ivanovich ulyanov the origin of Ukrainian separatism. Where did the embryo of separatism come from?

The origin and essence of Ukrainophilism- Dr. titles: Report to the gathering of members of the Club of Russian nationalists in Kiev, November 17, 1911. The origin and essence of Ukrainophilism

The origin of the Ukrainian ideology of modern times- The origin of the Ukrainian ideology of the New Time

The origin of the name of Ukraine

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Ukrainian movement as a modern stage of South Russian separatism- This term has other meanings, see Ukrainian movement. Ukrainian movement as a modern stage of South Russian separatism Dr. titles: History of "Ukrainian" separatism (2004) Ukrainian movement as a modern stage ... ... Wikipedia

Ukraine- The origin and change in the meanings of the name "Ukraine". Contents 1 The use of the word "Ukraine" in sources and literature 1.1 Chronicles ... Wikipedia

Etymology of the word Ukraine- The origin and change in the meanings of the name "Ukraine". Contents 1 The use of the word "Ukraine" in sources and literature 1.1 Chronicles ... Wikipedia

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Shchegolev, Sergey Nikiforovich- Wikipedia has articles about other people with this surname, see Shchegolev. Sergei Nikiforovich Schegolev Sergei Nikiforovich Schegolev Date of birth: October 1, 1862 (1862 10 01) Date of death ... Wikipedia

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, Ulyanov Nikolay, N. Ulyanov considers Ukrainian separatism as artificial and contrived. The Cossacks suggested to this movement an argument from history, having invented an independent scheme of the Ukrainian past, ... Category: Politics Series: World History Publisher: Tsentrpoligraf, Buy for 494 rubles
The origin of Ukrainian separatism, N. Ulyanov, N. Ulyanov considers Ukrainian separatism as artificial and contrived. The Cossacks suggested to this movement an argument from history, having composed an independent scheme of the Ukrainian past, ... Category:

Ulyanov Nikolay

Nikolay Ulyanov

The origin of Ukrainian separatism

Introduction.

The peculiarity of Ukrainian independence is that it does not fit any of the existing teachings on national movements and cannot be explained by any "iron" laws. He does not even have national oppression as the first and most necessary justification for its emergence. The only example of "oppression" - the decrees of 1863 and 1876, restricting freedom of the press in a new, artificially created literary language - were not perceived by the population as national persecution. Not only the common people, who had nothing to do with the creation of this language, but also ninety-nine percent of the enlightened Little Russian society consisted of opponents of its legalization. Only an insignificant handful of intellectuals, who never expressed the aspirations of the majority of the people, made it their political banner. For all 300 years of being a part of the Russian State, Little Russia-Ukraine was neither a colony, nor an "enslaved nationality."

It was once taken for granted that national identity of the people is best expressed by the party that stands at the head of the nationalist movement. Nowadays, Ukrainian autonomy provides an example of the greatest hatred for all the most revered and most ancient traditions and cultural values of the Little Russian people: it persecuted the Church Slavonic language, which was established in Russia since the adoption of Christianity, and an even more severe persecution was erected on the all-Russian literary language, which lay for a thousand years at the heart of the writing of all parts of the Kiev State, during and after its existence. The self-styledists are changing the cultural and historical terminology, changing the traditional assessments of the heroes of the events of the past. All this does not mean understanding or affirmation, but the eradication of the national soul. Truly national sentiment is sacrificed to contrived party nationalism.

The scheme of development of any separatism is as follows: first, "national feeling" supposedly awakens, then it grows and gets stronger, until it leads to the idea of secession from the old state and the creation of a new one. In Ukraine, this cycle went in the opposite direction. There, at first, a striving for separation was revealed, and only then an ideological basis began to be created as a justification for such a striving.

It is no accident that the title of this work uses the word "separatism" instead of "nationalism". It was precisely the national base that Ukrainian independence was lacking at all times. It always looked like a non-people, non-national movement, as a result of which it suffered from an inferiority complex and still cannot get out of the stage of self-assertion. If this problem does not exist for Georgians, Armenians, Uzbeks, due to their pronounced national identity, then for Ukrainian self-styledists, the main concern is still to prove the difference between a Ukrainian and a Russian. Separatist thought is still working on the creation of anthropological, ethnographic and linguistic theories that should deprive Russians and Ukrainians of any degree of kinship with each other. At first they were declared "two Russian nationalities" (Kostomarov), then - two different Slavic peoples, and later theories arose according to which the Slavic origin was left only for the Ukrainians, while the Russians were attributed to the Mongols, Turks, and Asians. Y. Shcherbakivsky and F. Vovk have learned for certain that the Russians are the descendants of people ice age, akin to the Lapps, Samoyeds and Voguls, while the Ukrainians are representatives of the Near Asian round-headed race, which came from across the Black Sea and settled in places liberated by the Russians, who went north following the retreating glacier and the mammoth (1). It is suggested that the Ukrainians are the rest of the population of the sunken Atlantis.

And this abundance of theories, and the feverish cultural isolation from Russia, and the development of a new literary language cannot but catch the eye and give rise to suspicions of the artificiality of the national doctrine.

D.A.Oinets, who immersed himself in this topic and collected abundant material, was suppressed by the grandeur of German plans, persistence and scope of propaganda in order to impose independence (2). The Second World War presented an even broader canvas in this sense.

But for a long time historians, and among them such an authority as prof. I. I. Lappo, drew attention to the Poles, attributing to them the main role in the creation of the autonomist movement.

Another Pole, gr. Thaddeus Chatsky, at the same time embarks on the path of racial interpretation of the term "Ukrainian". If ancient Polish annalists, like Samuil Hrondsky, as early as the 17th century deduced this term from the geographical position of Little Russia, located on the edge of Polish possessions ("Margo enim polonice kraj; inde Ukgaina quasi provincia ad fines Regni posita") (3), then Chatsky produced it from some unknown horde of "ukrov", which allegedly came out from beyond the Volga in the 7th century (4).

The Poles were not satisfied with either Little Russia or Little Russia. They could come to terms with them if the word "Rus" did not apply to "Muscovites."

The introduction of "Ukraine" began under Alexander I, when, having polarized Kiev, covering the entire right-bank south-west of Russia with a dense network of their povet schools, founding a Polish university in Vilna and taking over the Kharkov University that had opened in 1804, the Poles felt themselves masters of mental life the Little Russian Territory.

The role of the Polish circle at Kharkiv University is well known, in the sense of promoting the Little Russian dialect as a literary language. The idea of the alienness of the general Russian literary language, of the general Russian culture was instilled in the Ukrainian youth, and, of course, the idea of the non-Russian origin of the Ukrainians was not forgotten (5).

Gulak and Kostomarov, who were students of Kharkov University in the 1930s, were fully exposed to this propaganda. She also suggested the idea of an all-Slavic federal state, proclaimed by them in the late 40s. The famous "Pan-Slavism", which caused fierce abuse against Russia throughout Europe, was in fact not Russian, but of Polish origin. Prince Adam Czartoryski as head of the Russian foreign policy openly proclaimed Pan-Slavism as one of the means of reviving Poland.

The Polish interest in Ukrainian separatism is best outlined by the historian Valerian Kalinka, who understood the senselessness of dreams of returning southern Russia to Polish rule. This land is lost for Poland, but it must be done so that it was lost for Russia (5a). There is no better means for this than the settlement of discord between southern and northern Russia and the promotion of the idea of their national isolation. The program of Ludwig Meroslawski was drawn up in the same spirit, on the eve of the Polish uprising of 1863.

"All the agitation of Little Russianism - let it be carried over the Dnieper; there is a vast Pugachev field for our belated number of Khmelnytsky. This is what our whole pan-Slavic and communist school consists of! ... That is all Polish herzenism!" (6).

An equally interesting document was published by VL Burtsev on September 27, 1917, in the newspaper General Delo in Petrograd. He presents a note found among the papers of the secret archive of the Primate of the Uniate Church A. Sheptytsky, after the occupation of Lvov by Russian troops. The note was drawn up at the beginning of the First World War, in anticipation of the victorious entry of the Austro-Hungarian army into the territory of Russian Ukraine. It contained several proposals to the Austrian government for the development and rejection of this region from Russia. A broad program of military, legal, ecclesiastical measures was outlined, advice was given on the establishment of a hetmanate, the formation of separatist-minded elements among Ukrainians, giving local nationalism a Cossack form and "possibly completely separating the Ukrainian Church from the Russian."

"The Origin of Ukrainian Separatism" is a historical monograph, the main work of the Russian historian Nikolai Ulyanov. It was first published in 1966 in New York. In 1996 and 2007 it was republished in Russia by the publishing houses Indrik and Griffon. Until now, it is considered virtually the only scientific research on the topic of Ukrainian separatism.

Born in the Russian Empire and became a historian during the Soviet period, Nikolai Ulyanov ended up in the occupied territory during the Great Patriotic War and in 1943 was sent to forced labor in Germany. After the war, he moved to Casablanca (Morocco), and in the spring of 1953 he moved to Canada, where he lectured at the University of Montreal. In 1955 he settled in the United States, where, with the assistance of the emigre historian Georgy Vernadsky, he got a job as a teacher of Russian history and literature at Yale University.

Original taken from hrono61 c The origin of Ukrainian separatism

Nikolay Ulyanov. The origin of Ukrainian separatism
First published in Madrid 1966.

The peculiarity of Ukrainian independence is that it does not fit any of the existing teachings on national movements and cannot be explained by any "iron" laws. He does not even have national oppression as the first and most necessary justification for its emergence. The only example of "oppression" - the decrees of 1863 and 1876, restricting freedom of the press in a new, artificially created literary language, were not perceived by the population as national persecution. Not only the common people, who had nothing to do with the creation of this language, but also ninety-nine percent of the enlightened Little Russian society, consisted of opponents of its legalization. Only an insignificant handful of intellectuals, who never expressed the aspirations of the majority of the people, made it their political banner. For all 300 years of being a part of the Russian State, Little Russia-Ukraine was neither a colony, nor an “enslaved nation”.

It was once taken for granted that the national identity of a people is best expressed by the party at the head of the nationalist movement. Nowadays, Ukrainian autonomy gives an example of the greatest hatred for all the most revered and most ancient traditions and cultural values of the Little Russian people: it persecuted the Church Slavonic language, which was established in Russia since the adoption of Christianity, and an even more severe persecution was erected on the all-Russian literary language, which lay in over a thousand years at the basis of the writing of all parts of the Kiev State, during and after its existence.

Independents change cultural and historical terminology, change traditional assessments of heroes and events of the past. All this does not mean understanding or affirmation, but the eradication of the national soul. Truly national sentiment is sacrificed to contrived party nationalism.

The scheme of development of any separatism is as follows: first, allegedly, “national feeling” awakens, then it grows and gets stronger, until it leads to the idea of separation from the old state and the creation of a new one. In Ukraine, this cycle went in the opposite direction. There, at first, a desire for separation was revealed, and only then an ideological basis began to be created as a justification for such a desire.

In the title of this work, it is not by chance that the word “separatism” is used instead of “nationalism”. It was precisely the national base that Ukrainian independence was lacking at all times... It always looked like a movement not popular, not national, as a result of which it suffered from an inferiority complex and still cannot get out of the stage of self-assertion. If this problem does not exist for Georgians, Armenians, Uzbeks, due to their pronounced national identity, then for Ukrainian self-styledists, the main concern is still to prove the difference between a Ukrainian and a Russian. Separatist thought is still working on the creation of anthropological, ethnographic and linguistic theories that should deprive Russians and Ukrainians of any degree of kinship with each other. At first they were declared "two Russian peoples" (Kostomarov), then - two different Slavic peoples, and later theories arose according to which the Slavic origin was left only for the Ukrainians, while the Russians were attributed to the Mongols, Turks, and Asians. Y. Shcherbakivsky and F. Vovk have learned for certain that the Russians are the descendants of people of the Ice Age, akin to the Lapps, Samoyeds and Voguls, while the Ukrainians are representatives of the Peredasian round-headed race, who came from across the Black Sea and settled in the places liberated by the Russians, gone north following the retreating glacier and the mammoth. An assumption has been made that sees in the Ukrainians the remnant of the population of the sunken Atlantis, and this abundance of theories, and the feverish cultural isolation from Russia, and the development of a new literary language cannot but catch the eye and give rise to suspicions of the artificiality of the national doctrine.

In Russian, especially emigre literature, there is a long-standing tendency to explain Ukrainian nationalism solely by the influence of external forces. It became especially widespread after the First World War, when the picture of the widespread activity of the Austro-Germans in financing organizations like the "Union for the Release of Ukraine" captured Ukrainians. DA Odinets, who immersed himself in this topic and collected abundant material, was suppressed by the grandeur of German plans, persistence and scope of propaganda in order to impose independence. The Second World War presented an even broader canvas in this sense.

But for a long time historians, and among them such an authoritative one as prof. I. I. Lappo, drew attention to the Poles, attributing to them the main role in the creation of the autonomist movement.

The Poles, in fact, can rightfully be considered the fathers of the Ukrainian doctrine. It was laid by them back in the era of the hetmanate. But even in modern times, their creativity is very great. So, the very use of the words "Ukraine" and "Ukrainians" for the first time in literature began to be implanted by them... It is already found in the writings of Count Jan Potocki. Another Pole, gr. Thaddeus Chatsky, at the same time embarks on the path of racial interpretation of the term "Ukrainian". If ancient Polish annalists, like Samuil Hrondsky, as early as the 17th century, derived this term from the geographical position of Little Russia, located on the edge of Polish possessions ("Margo enim polonice kraj; inde Ukraina quasi provincial ad fines Regni posita"), then Chatsky produced it from some unknown horde of “ukrovs” to anyone except him, which allegedly came out from across the Volga in the 7th century.

The Poles were not satisfied with either Little Russia or Little Russia. They could come to terms with them if the word "Rus" did not apply to the "Muscovites." The introduction of "Ukraine" began under Alexander I, when, having polarized Kiev, covering the entire right-bank south-west of Russia with a dense network of their povet schools, founding a Polish university in Vilna and taking over the Kharkov University that opened in 1804, the Poles felt themselves masters of mental life the Little Russian Territory.

Gulak and Kostomarov, who were students of Kharkov University in the 1930s, were fully exposed to this propaganda. She also suggested the idea of an all-Slavic federal state, proclaimed by them at the end of the 40s. The famous "Pan-Slavism", which caused fierce abuse against Russia throughout Europe, was in fact not Russian, but of Polish origin. Book. As head of Russian foreign policy, Adam Czartoryski openly proclaimed Pan-Slavism as one of the means of Poland's rebirth.

The Polish interest in Ukrainian separatism is best outlined by the historian Valerian Kalinka, who understood the futility of dreams of returning southern Russia to Polish rule. This land is lost for Poland, but it must be done so that it is lost for Russia as well. There is no better remedy for this than settlement of discord between southern and northern Russia and propaganda of the idea of their national isolation. In the same spirit, the program of Ludwig Meroslawski was drawn up, on the eve of the Polish uprising of 1863.

“All the agitation of Little Russianism - let it be carried over the Dnieper; there is a vast Pugachev field for our belated number of Khmelnichy. This is what our whole pan-Slavic and communist school consists of! ... This is all Polish herzenism! "

An equally interesting document was published by VL Burtsev on September 27, 1917, in the newspaper General Delo in Petrograd. He presents a note, found among the papers of the secret archive of the Primate of the Uniate Church A. Sheptytsky, after the occupation of Lvov by the Russian troops. The note was drawn up at the beginning of the First World War, in anticipation of the victorious entry of the Austro-Hungarian army into the territory of Russian Ukraine. It contained several proposals to the Austrian government for the development and rejection of this region from Russia. A broad program of military, legal, ecclesiastical measures was outlined, advice was given on the establishment of a hetmanate, the formation of separatist-minded elements among Ukrainians, giving local nationalism a Cossack form and "possibly completely separating the Ukrainian Church from the Russian."

The piquancy of the note lies in its authorship. Andrei Sheptytsky, with whose name it is signed, was a Polish count, the younger brother of the future Minister of War in the Pilsudski government. Having started his career as an Austrian cavalry officer, he subsequently became a monk, became a Jesuit, and from 1901 to 1944 he held the chair of the Lviv Metropolitan. Throughout his tenure in this post, he tirelessly served the cause of the rejection of Ukraine from Russia under the guise of its national autonomy. His activity, in this sense, is one of the examples of the implementation of the Polish program in the east.

This program began to take shape immediately after the sections. The Poles took on the role of a midwife in the delivery of Ukrainian nationalism and a nanny in his upbringing. They reached the point that the Little Russian nationalists, despite their long-standing antipathy to Poland, became their zealous disciples. Polish nationalism became a model for the most petty imitation, to the extent that the anthem "Ukraine has not yet died", composed by P. Chubinsky, was an undisguised imitation of the Polish one: "Poland has not perished yet."

The picture of these more than a century of efforts is full of such tenacity in energy that one should not be surprised at the temptation of some historians and publicists to explain Ukrainian separatism solely by the influence of the Poles.

But this is unlikely to be correct. The Poles could nourish and nurture the embryo of separatism, while the very embryo existed in the depths of Ukrainian society. It is the task of this work to detect and trace its transformation into a prominent political phenomenon ...

Nikolay Ulyanov

The origin of Ukrainian separatism

Introduction

The peculiarity of Ukrainian independence is that it does not fit any of the existing teachings on national movements and cannot be explained by any "iron" laws. He does not even have national oppression as the first and most necessary justification for its emergence. The only example of "oppression" - the decrees of 1863 and 1876, restricting freedom of the press in a new, artificially created literary language - were not perceived by the population as national persecution. Not only the common people, who had nothing to do with the creation of this language, but also 99 percent of the enlightened Little Russian society consisted of opponents of its legalization. Only an insignificant handful of intellectuals, who never expressed the aspirations of the majority of the people, made it their political banner. For all 300 years of being a part of the Russian state, Little Russia-Ukraine was neither a colony, nor an “enslaved nation”.

It was once taken for granted that the national identity of a people is best expressed by the party at the head of the nationalist movement. Nowadays, Ukrainian autonomy provides an example of the greatest hatred for all the most revered and most ancient traditions and cultural values of the Little Russian people: it persecuted the Church Slavonic language, which was established in Russia since the adoption of Christianity, and an even more severe persecution was erected on the all-Russian literary language, which lay for a thousand years at the heart of the writing of all parts of the Kiev state, during and after its existence. The self-styledists are changing the cultural and historical terminology, changing the traditional assessments of the heroes of the events of the past. All this does not mean understanding or affirmation, but the extermination of the national soul. Truly national sentiment is sacrificed to contrived party nationalism.

The scheme of development of any separatism is as follows: first, "national feeling" supposedly awakens, then it grows and gets stronger, until it leads to the idea of separation from the old state and the creation of a new one. In Ukraine, this cycle went in the opposite direction. There, at first, the desire for separation was revealed, and only then the ideological basis began to be created as a justification for such a desire.

It is no accident that the title of this work uses the word “separatism” instead of “nationalism”. It was precisely the national base that Ukrainian independence was lacking at all times. It always looked like a non-people, non-national movement, as a result of which it suffered from an inferiority complex and still cannot get out of the stage of self-assertion. If this problem does not exist for Georgians, Armenians, Uzbeks, due to their pronounced national identity, then for Ukrainian self-styledists, the main concern is still to prove the difference between a Ukrainian and a Russian. Separatist thought is still working on the creation of anthropological, ethnographic and linguistic theories that should deprive Russians and Ukrainians of any degree of kinship with each other. At first they were declared "two Russian peoples" (Kostomarov), then - two different Slavic peoples, and later theories arose according to which the Slavic origin was left only for the Ukrainians, while the Russians were attributed to the Mongols, Turks, and Asians. Y. Shcherbakivsky and F. Vovk learned for certain that the Russians are the descendants of people of the Ice Age, akin to the Lapps, Samoyeds and Voguls, while the Ukrainians are representatives of the Central Asian round-headed race, who came from across the Black Sea and settled in places liberated by the Russians, gone north following the retreating glacier and the mammoth. It is suggested that the Ukrainians are the rest of the population of the sunken Atlantis.

D. A. Odinets, who immersed himself in this topic and collected abundant material, was suppressed by the grandeur of German plans, persistence and scope of propaganda in order to impose independence. The Second World War presented an even broader canvas in this sense.

But for a long time historians, and among them such an authority as Professor II Lappo, paid attention to the Poles, attributing to them the main role in the creation of the autonomist movement.

Another Pole, Count Thaddeus Chatsky, then embarks on the path of racial interpretation of the term "Ukrainian". If the old Polish annalists, like Samuil Grondsky, back in the 17th century. derived this term from the geographical position of Little Russia, located on the edge of Polish possessions ("Margo enim polonice kraj; inde Ukraina quasi provincia ad fines Regni posita"), then Chatsky produced it from some unknown horde of "ukrov ", Which allegedly came out from behind the Volga in the 7th century.

The Poles were not satisfied with either Little Russia or Little Russia. They could come to terms with them if the word "Rus" did not apply to the "Muscovites."

The introduction of "Ukraine" began under Alexander I, when, having polarized Kiev, covering the entire right-bank south-west of Russia with a dense network of their povet schools, founded a Polish university in Vilna and took over the Kharkov University that had opened in 1804, the Poles felt themselves masters of the intellectual life of the Little Russian region.

The role of the Polish circle at Kharkov University is well known in the sense of promoting the Little Russian dialect as a literary language. The idea of the alienness of the common Russian literary language, of the common Russian culture was instilled in the Ukrainian youth, and, of course, the idea of the non-Russian origin of the Ukrainians was not forgotten.

Gulak and Kostomarov, who were in the 1830s. students of Kharkov University, were fully exposed to this propaganda. She also suggested the idea of an all-Slavic federal state, proclaimed by them in the late 1940s. The famous "Pan-Slavism", which caused fierce abuse against Russia throughout Europe, was in fact not Russian, but of Polish origin. Prince Adam Czartoryski, as head of Russian foreign policy, openly proclaimed Pan-Slavism as one of the means of Poland's rebirth.

The Polish interest in Ukrainian separatism is best outlined by the historian Valerian Kalinka, who understood the futility of dreams of returning southern Russia to Polish rule. This land is lost for Poland, but it must be done so that it is lost for Russia as well. There is no better means for this than the settlement of discord between southern and northern Russia and the promotion of the idea of their national isolation. In the same spirit, the program of Ludwig Meroslawski was drawn up on the eve of the Polish uprising of 1863.

An equally interesting document was published by VL Burtsev on September 27, 1917 in the newspaper Obshche Delo in Petrograd. He presents a note found among the papers of the secret archive of the Primate of the Uniate Church A. Sheptytsky after the occupation of Lvov by the Russian troops. The note was drawn up at the beginning of the First World War, in anticipation of the victorious entry of the Austro-Hungarian army into the territory of Russian Ukraine. It contained several proposals to the Austrian government for the development and rejection of this region from Russia. A broad program of military, legal, ecclesiastical measures was outlined, advice was given on the establishment of a hetmanate, the formation of separatist-minded elements among Ukrainians, giving local nationalism a Cossack form and "possibly completely separating the Ukrainian Church from the Russian."

The piquancy of the note lies in its authorship. Andrei Sheptytsky, with whose name it is signed, was a Polish count, the younger brother of the future Minister of War in the Pilsudski government. Having started his career as an Austrian cavalry officer, he later became a monk, became a Jesuit, and from 1901 to 1944 he held the chair of the Lviv Metropolitan. Throughout his tenure in this post, he tirelessly served the cause of the rejection of Ukraine from Russia under the guise of its national autonomy. His activity, in this sense, is one of the examples of the implementation of the Polish program in the east.

This program began to take shape immediately after the sections. The Poles took on the role of a midwife in the delivery of Ukrainian nationalism and a nanny in his upbringing.

They reached the point that the Little Russian nationalists, despite their long-standing antipathy to Poland, became zealous ...

Nikolay Ulyanov
The origin of Ukrainian separatism
Introduction.
The peculiarity of Ukrainian independence is that it does not fit any of the existing teachings on national movements and cannot be explained by any "iron" laws. He does not even have national oppression as the first and most necessary justification for its emergence. The only example of "oppression" - the decrees of 1863 and 1876, restricting freedom of the press in a new, artificially created literary language - were not perceived by the population as national persecution. Not only the common people, who had nothing to do with the creation of this language, but also ninety-nine percent of the enlightened Little Russian society consisted of opponents of its legalization. Only an insignificant handful of intellectuals, who never expressed the aspirations of the majority of the people, made it their political banner. For all 300 years of being a part of the Russian State, Little Russia-Ukraine was neither a colony, nor an "enslaved nationality."
It was once taken for granted that the national identity of a people is best expressed by the party at the head of the nationalist movement. Nowadays, Ukrainian autonomy provides an example of the greatest hatred for all the most revered and most ancient traditions and cultural values of the Little Russian people: it persecuted the Church Slavonic language, which was established in Russia since the adoption of Christianity, and an even more severe persecution was erected on the all-Russian literary language, which lay for a thousand years at the heart of the writing of all parts of the Kiev State, during and after its existence. The self-styledists are changing the cultural and historical terminology, changing the traditional assessments of the heroes of the events of the past. All this does not mean understanding or affirmation, but the extermination of the national soul. Truly national sentiment is sacrificed to contrived party nationalism.
The scheme of development of any separatism is as follows: first, "national feeling" supposedly awakens, then it grows and gets stronger, until it leads to the idea of secession from the old state and the creation of a new one. In Ukraine, this cycle went in the opposite direction. There, at first, a striving for separation was revealed, and only then an ideological basis began to be created as a justification for such a striving.
It is no accident that the title of this work uses the word "separatism" instead of "nationalism". It was precisely the national base that Ukrainian independence was lacking at all times. It always looked like a non-people, non-national movement, as a result of which it suffered from an inferiority complex and still cannot get out of the stage of self-assertion. If this problem does not exist for Georgians, Armenians, Uzbeks, due to their pronounced national identity, then for Ukrainian self-styledists, the main concern is still to prove the difference between a Ukrainian and a Russian. Separatist thought is still working on the creation of anthropological, ethnographic and linguistic theories that should deprive Russians and Ukrainians of any degree of kinship with each other. At first they were declared "two Russian nationalities" (Kostomarov), then - two different Slavic peoples, and later theories arose according to which the Slavic origin was left only for the Ukrainians, while the Russians were attributed to the Mongols, Turks, and Asians. Y. Shcherbakivsky and F. Vovk learned for certain that the Russians are the descendants of people of the Ice Age, akin to the Lapps, Samoyeds and Voguls, while the Ukrainians are representatives of the Central Asian round-headed race, who came from across the Black Sea and settled in places liberated by the Russians, gone north following the retreating glacier and the mammoth (1). It is suggested that the Ukrainians are the rest of the population of the sunken Atlantis.
And this abundance of theories, and the feverish cultural isolation from Russia, and the development of a new literary language cannot but catch the eye and give rise to suspicions of the artificiality of the national doctrine.
In Russian, especially emigre literature, there is a long-standing tendency to explain Ukrainian nationalism solely by the influence of external forces. It became especially widespread after the First World War, when a picture of the widespread activity of the Austro-Germans in financing organizations like the "Union for the Release of Ukraine" captured Ukrainians.
D.A.Oinets, who immersed himself in this topic and collected abundant material, was suppressed by the grandeur of German plans, persistence and scope of propaganda in order to impose independence (2). The Second World War presented an even broader canvas in this sense.
But for a long time historians, and among them such an authority as prof. I. I. Lappo, drew attention to the Poles, attributing to them the main role in the creation of the autonomist movement.
The Poles, in fact, can rightfully be considered the fathers of the Ukrainian doctrine. It was laid by them back in the era of the hetmanate. But even in modern times, their creativity is very great. Thus, the very use of the words "Ukraine" and "Ukrainians" for the first time in literature began to be implanted by them. It is already found in the writings of Count Jan Potocki (2a).
Another Pole, gr. Thaddeus Chatsky, at the same time embarks on the path of racial interpretation of the term "Ukrainian". If ancient Polish annalists, like Samuil Hrondsky, as early as the 17th century deduced this term from the geographical position of Little Russia, located on the edge of Polish possessions ("Margo enim polonice kraj; inde Ukgaina quasi provincia ad fines Regni posita") (3), then Chatsky produced it from some unknown horde of "ukrov", which allegedly came out from beyond the Volga in the 7th century (4).
The Poles were not satisfied with either Little Russia or Little Russia. They could come to terms with them if the word "Rus" did not apply to "Muscovites."
The introduction of "Ukraine" began under Alexander I, when, having polarized Kiev, covering the entire right-bank south-west of Russia with a dense network of their povet schools, founding a Polish university in Vilna and taking over the Kharkov University that had opened in 1804, the Poles felt themselves masters of mental life the Little Russian Territory.
The role of the Polish circle at Kharkiv University is well known, in the sense of promoting the Little Russian dialect as a literary language. The idea of the alienness of the general Russian literary language, of the general Russian culture was instilled in the Ukrainian youth, and, of course, the idea of the non-Russian origin of the Ukrainians was not forgotten (5).
Gulak and Kostomarov, who were students of Kharkov University in the 1930s, were fully exposed to this propaganda. She also suggested the idea of an all-Slavic federal state, proclaimed by them at the end of the 40s. The famous "Pan-Slavism", which caused fierce abuse against Russia throughout Europe, was in fact not Russian, but of Polish origin. Prince Adam Czartoryski, as head of Russian foreign policy, openly proclaimed Pan-Slavism as one of the means of Poland's rebirth.
The Polish interest in Ukrainian separatism is best outlined by the historian Valerian Kalinka, who understood the futility of dreams of returning southern Russia to Polish rule. This land is lost for Poland, but it must be done so that it was lost for Russia (5a). There is no better means for this than the settlement of discord between southern and northern Russia and the promotion of the idea of their national isolation. The program of Ludwig Meroslawski was drawn up in the same spirit, on the eve of the Polish uprising of 1863.
"All the agitation of Little Russianism - let it be carried over the Dnieper; there is a vast Pugachev field for our belated number of Khmelnytsky. This is what our whole pan-Slavic and communist school consists of! ... That is all Polish herzenism!" (6).
An equally interesting document was published by VL Burtsev on September 27, 1917, in the newspaper General Delo in Petrograd. He presents a note found among the papers of the secret archive of the Primate of the Uniate Church A. Sheptytsky, after the occupation of Lvov by Russian troops. The note was drawn up at the beginning of the First World War, in anticipation of the victorious entry of the Austro-Hungarian army into the territory of Russian Ukraine. It contained several proposals to the Austrian government for the development and rejection of this region from Russia. A broad program of military, legal, ecclesiastical measures was outlined, advice was given on the establishment of a hetmanate, the formation of separatist-minded elements among Ukrainians, giving local nationalism a Cossack form and "possibly completely separating the Ukrainian Church from the Russian."
The piquancy of the note lies in its authorship. Andrei Sheptytsky, with whose name it is signed, was a Polish count, the younger brother of the future Minister of War in the Pilsudski government. Having started his career as an Austrian cavalry officer, he subsequently became a monk, became a Jesuit, and from 1901 to 1944 he held the chair of the Lviv Metropolitan. Throughout his tenure in this post, he tirelessly served the cause of the rejection of Ukraine from Russia under the guise of its national autonomy. His activity, in this sense, is one of the examples of the implementation of the Polish program in the east.
This program began to take shape immediately after the sections. The Poles took on the role of a midwife in the delivery of Ukrainian nationalism and a nanny in his upbringing.
They reached the point that the Little Russian nationalists, despite their long-standing antipathy to Poland, became their zealous disciples. Polish nationalism became a model for the most petty imitation, to the extent that the anthem "Ukraine has not died yet", composed by P. Chubinsky, was an undisguised imitation of the Polish one: "Jeszcze Polska ne zgineea".
The picture of these more than a century of efforts is full of such persistence in energy that one should not be surprised at the temptation of some historians and publicists to explain Ukrainian separatism by the influence of the Poles alone (7).
But this is unlikely to be correct. The Poles could nourish and nurture the embryo of separatism, while the very embryo existed in the depths of Ukrainian society. It is the task of this work to detect and trace its transformation into a prominent political phenomenon.
Zaporozhye Cossacks.
When they talk about "national oppression" as the reason for the emergence of Ukrainian separatism, they either forget or do not know at all that it appeared at a time when not only Muscovite oppression, but the Muscovites themselves were not in Ukraine. It already existed at the time Little Russia was annexed to the Moscow State, and almost the first separatist was hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky, whose name is associated with the reunification of the two halves of the ancient Russian state. Less than two years have passed since the day of the oath of allegiance to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, when information began to arrive in Moscow about Khmelnitsky's disloyal behavior, about his violation of the oath. After checking the rumors and making sure of their correctness, the government was forced to send the devious Fyodor Buturlin and the Duma clerk Mikhailov to Chigirin, in order to pretend to the hetman that his behavior was unseemly. "You promised Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky with all the Zaporizhzhya army in the Holy Church of God according to the immaculate Christ's commandment before the Holy Gospel, to serve and be subject to and obedient under the high hand of his tsarist majesty and want good in everything to him, the great sovereign, and now we hear that you wish well not to his royal majesty, but to Rakocia, and, even worse, you united with the enemy of the great emperor Karl Gustav, king of Sweden, who, with the help of the army of his royal majesty Zaporozhye, seized many Polish cities. great sovereign, forgot the fear of God and his oath before the holy Gospel "(8).
Khmelnitsky was reproached for his willfulness and lack of discipline, but they still did not admit the thought of separating him from the Moscow State. Meanwhile, neither Buturlin, nor the boyars, nor Alexei Mikhailovich knew that they were dealing with a double tribute who recognized the power of two sovereigns over himself, this fact became known in the 19th century, when the historian N.I. Kostomarov found two Turkish letters Mehmet -Sultan to Khmelnitsky, from which it is clear that the hetman, surrendering to the arm of the Tsar of Moscow, was at the same time a subject of the Turkish Sultan. He took Turkish citizenship back in 1650, when he was sent from Constantinople "a piece of gold-domed" and a caftan, "so that you can confidently assume this caftan, in the sense that you have now become our faithful tributary" (9).
Apparently, only a few of Bogdan's close associates knew about this event, while it was hidden from the Cossacks and the entire Little Russian people. Going to Pereyaslavl on the Rada in 1654, Khmelnitsky did not renounce his former citizenship and did not take off his Turkish caftan, putting on a Moscow fur coat over it.
More than a year and a half after taking the oath to Moscow, the Sultan sends a new letter, from which it is clear that Bogdan did not even think of breaking with Porte, but tried in every possible way to present his connection with Moscow to her in the wrong light. He hid the fact of the new citizenship from Constantinople, explaining the whole matter as a temporary union caused by difficult circumstances. He still asked the Sultan to consider him his loyal vassal, for which he received a merciful word and an assurance of high patronage.
Khmelnitsky's double-mindedness did not represent anything exceptional; the entire Cossack foreman was in the same mood. Before she had time to take the oath to Moscow, many made it clear that they did not want to remain faithful to her. Those who broke the oath were led by such prominent people as Bohun and Serko. Serko left for Zaporozhye, where he became the chieftain of the kosh, Bohun, an Uman colonel and a hero of Khmelnytsky, having taken an oath, began to stir up the whole of the Bug region.
There have been cases of outright evasion of the oath. This applies, first of all, to the higher clergy, who were hostile to the idea of uniting with Moscow. But the Cossacks, who did not at all express such enmity, behaved no better. When Bogdan finally decided to surrender to the tsar, he asked for the opinion of the Sich, this metropolis of the Cossacks. The Secheviks responded with a letter expressing their full consent not to the transfer of "the entire Little Russian people, living on both sides of the Dnieper, under the patronage of the most powerful and most luminous Russian monarch." And after the annexation took place and Bogdan sent them to the Sich lists with the tsarist letters granted, the Zaporozhian Cossacks expressed their joy about "the consolidation and confirmation by the superior monarch of the ancient rights and liberties of the troops of the Little Russian people"; they gave "praise and gratitude to the Most Holy Trinity and to the worshiped God and the lowest petition to the Most High Sovereign." When it came to the oath of allegiance to this sovereign, the Zaporozhian Cossacks quieted down and fell silent. Covering them, the hetman in every possible way reassured the Moscow government, assuring that "the Zaporozhye Cossacks are small people, and even then they are variable from the army, and there is nothing to read about them." Only over time did Moscow manage to insist on their oath (10).
When the war with Poland began and the united Russian-Little Russian army besieged Lviv, the clerk general Vyhovsky persuaded the Lviv townspeople not to surrender the city to the tsar's name. To the representative of these bourgeois Kushevich, who refused to surrender, the Pereyaslavl Colonel Teterya whispered in Latin "you are constant and noble."
Khmelnitsky himself by the end of the war became extremely unfriendly with his colleagues - the tsarist governors; his confessor, during prayer, when they sat down at the table, stopped mentioning the royal name, while the Poles, with whom they fought, the foreman and the hetman showed signs of affection. After the war, they decided on an open crime against the state, violating the Vilna agreement with Poland concluded by the tsar and entering into a secret agreement with the Swedish king and the prince of Sedmigrad Rakochi on the partition of Poland. Twelve thousand Cossacks were sent to help Rakochi (11). For all three years that Khmelnitsky was under Moscow rule, he behaved like a man ready from day to day to lay down his oath and fall away from Russia.
The above facts took place at a time when the tsarist administration in Ukraine did not exist, and by no means of violence it could not turn the Little Russians against itself. There can be one explanation: in 1654 there were individuals and groups who were reluctant to enter Moscow citizenship, and were thinking about how to get out of it as soon as possible.
The explanation of such a curious phenomenon should be sought not in Little Russian history, but in the history of the Dnieper Cossacks, which played a leading role in the events of 1654. In general, the origins of Ukrainian independence cannot be understood without a thorough excursion into the Cossack past. Even the new name of the country "Ukraine" came from the Cossacks. On old maps, territories with the inscription "Ukraine" appear for the first time in the 17th century, and apart from the map of Boplan, this inscription always refers to the area of the settlement of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. On the map of Cornetti in 1657, between "Bassa Volinia" and "Podolia" appears along the course of the Dnieper "Ukraine passa de Cosacchi". On a Dutch map of the late 17th century, the same place is marked: "Ukraine of t. Land der Cosacken".
From here it began to spread to the whole of Little Russia. From here, the sentiments that laid the foundation for modern independence also spread. Not everyone understands the role of the Cossacks in the creation of Ukrainian nationalist ideology. This is largely due to a misconception about its nature. Most draw their information about him from historical novels, songs, legends and all kinds of works of art. Meanwhile, the appearance of the Cossack in poetry bears little resemblance to his real historical appearance.
He appears there in an aura of selfless courage, military art, knightly honor, high moral qualities, and most importantly - a major historical mission: he is a fighter for Orthodoxy and for national South Russian interests. Usually, as soon as it comes to the Zaporozhye Cossack, an irresistible image of Taras Bulba arises, and one needs a deep immersion in documentary material, in historical sources, in order to free oneself from the magic of Gogol's romance.
For a long time, two opposite views have been established on the Zaporozhye Cossacks. Some see it as a noble-aristocratic phenomenon - "lytsar". The late Dm. Doroshenko, in his popular "History of Ukraine with Malunky", compares the Zaporozhye Sich with medieval knightly orders. "There gradually developed," he says, "a special military organization like the knightly brotherhoods that existed in Western Europe." But there is another, almost more widespread view, according to which the Cossacks embodied the aspirations of the plebeian masses and were a living bearer of the idea of democracy with its principles of universal equality, elective office and absolute freedom.
These two views, not reconciled, not consistent with each other, continue to live to this day in independent literature. Both of them are not Cossack, and not even Ukrainian. The Polish origin of the first of them is beyond doubt. It dates back to the 16th century, and is first encountered by the Polish poet Paprocki. Observing the internecine strife, squabbling of magnates, oblivion of state interests and all the political debauchery of the then Poland, Paprotsky opposes them with a fresh, healthy, as it seemed to him, environment that arose on the outskirts of the Commonwealth. This is a Russian, Cossack environment. The Poles, mired in internal strife, according to him, did not even suspect that many times they were saved from death by this outlying Russian knighthood, which, like a rampart, reflected the pressure of the Turkish-Tatar force. Paprotsky admires his valor, his simple strong morals, his willingness to stand up for the faith, for the whole christian world(12). Paprotsky's works were not realistic descriptions, but poems, or rather pamphlets. They have the same tendency as in Tacitus' Germany, where a young, healthy organism is opposed to a demoralized, degenerating Rome. barbarian people.
In Poland, for example, works began to appear describing the brilliant military exploits of the Cossacks, which can only be compared with the exploits of Hector, Diomedes or Achilles himself. In 1572, an essay was published by the gentlemen Fredro, Lasitsky and Goretsky, describing the adventures of the Cossacks in Moldova under the command of Hetman Ivan Svirgovsky. What miracles of courage are not shown there! The Turks themselves said to the captured Cossacks: "In the whole kingdom of Poland there are no warlike men like you!" Those modestly objected: "On the contrary, we are the last, there is no place for us among our own, and therefore we came here to either fall in glory, or return with the spoils of war." All Cossacks who got to the Turks bear Polish surnames: Svirgovsky, Kozlovsky, Sidorsky, Yanchik, Kopytsky, Reshkovsky. From the text of the narrative it is clear that they are all gentry, but with some kind of dark past; for some, ruin, for others, offenses and crimes were the reason for leaving the Cossacks. Cossack exploits are considered by them as a means of restoring honor: "either fall with glory, or return with the spoils of war." Therefore, they are painted in such a way by the authors who themselves could be Svirgovsky's associates (13). Even P. Kulish noted that their writing was dictated by less lofty motives than Paprotsky's poems. They pursued the goal of rehabilitation of the guilty gentry and their amnesty. Such compositions, filled with the exaltation of the courage of the nobles who had gone to the Cossacks, endowed the entire Cossacks with chivalrous features. This literature, no doubt, early became known to the Cossacks, contributing to the spread of a high view of their society among them. When the "registry" ones began, in the 17th century, to seize land, turn into landowners and seek noble rights, the popularization of the version of their knightly origin acquired particular insistence. "Chronicle of Grabyanka", "A Brief Description of the Cossack Little Russian People" by P. Simonovsky, the works of N. Markevich and D. Bantysh-Kamensky, as well as the famous "History of the Rus" are the most vivid expressions of the view of the gentry nature of the Cossacks.
The inconsistency of this point of view hardly needs proof. It is simply invented and is not confirmed by any sources other than fake. We do not know of a single verified document testifying to the early Zaporozhye Cossacks as an original military organization of the Little Russian gentry. Simple logic denies this version. Be the Cossacks gentry from time immemorial, why would they seek the title of gentry in the 17th and 18th centuries? In addition, the Lithuanian Metrica, Russian chronicles, Polish chronicles and other sources provide a sufficiently clear picture of the origin of the true Lithuanian-Russian nobility, so that researchers might be tempted to trace its genesis from the Cossacks.
It is even more difficult to compare the Zaporozhye Sich with a knightly order. Although the orders arose, initially, outside of Europe, they are connected with it with all their being. They were the product of her socio-political and religious life, while the Cossacks were recruited from the elements ousted by the organized society of the states of the European East. It arose not in harmony, but in the fight against them. Neither secular nor ecclesiastical authorities, nor public initiative were involved in the formation of such colonies as Zaporozhye. Any attempt to ascribe to them the mission of defenders of Orthodoxy against Islam and Catholicism is crushed by historical sources. The presence in the Sich of a large number of Poles, Tatars, Turks, Armenians, Circassians, Magyars and other immigrants from non-Orthodox countries does not indicate the Cossacks as zealots of Orthodoxy.
The data given by P. Kulish exclude any doubts on this score. Both Khmelnitsky, father and son, and after them Petro Doroshenko, recognized themselves as subjects of the Turkish Sultan - the head of Islam. With the Crimean Tatars, these "enemies of the cross of Christ", the Cossacks did not fight so much as cooperated and together went to the Polish and Moscow Ukraine.
Contemporaries spoke of the religious life of the Dnieper Cossacks with disgust, seeing in it more atheism than faith. Adam Kisel, an Orthodox nobleman, wrote that the Zaporozhye Cossacks "have no faith" and the Uniate Metropolitan of Rutsky repeated the same. The Orthodox Metropolitan and founder of the Kiev Theological Academy - Petro Mohyla - treated the Cossacks with undisguised hostility and contempt, calling them "rebelisants" in print. To compare the Sich foreman with the chapter, and the kosh chieftain with the master of the order is the greatest parody of the European Middle Ages. And in appearance, the Cossack resembled a knight as much as a pet of any eastern horde. Here we mean not so much a lamb's hat, a donkey and wide trousers, as any absence of trousers. P. Kulish collected on this score a vivid bouquet of testimonies from his contemporaries, like the Orsha headman Philip Kmita, who in 1514 portrayed the Cherkasy Cossacks as pathetic ragamuffins, and the French military expert Dalrak, who accompanied Jan Sobessky on the famous campaign to Vienna, mentions the "wild militia" of the Cossack, which amazed him with its nondescript appearance.
Already from the beginning of the 13th century, an interesting description of one of the Cossack nests, a kind of branch of the Sich, compiled by the Moscow priest Lukyanov has survived. He had to visit Khvastov - the camp of the famous Semyon Paley and his freemen:
"An earthen rampart, it looks not strong for good, but the inmates are strong, and the people in it are like animals. There are frequent gates along the earthen rampart, and pits are dug at every gate, and straw is laid in pits. There, a paleevshin lies a man, twenty, thirty; the heads that tambourines without shirts are terribly naked. And when we arrived and stood on the square, and that day they had many weddings, they surrounded us as they are near a bear; all the Cossacks are paleevshin, and they left weddings; on the other there is not even a scrap of shirt; they are terribly scary, black, like araps and dashing, like dogs tearing out of their hands. You will not soon find such a hobbyist in the Petrovsky circle "(14).
A review of the Paleevites and the hetman Mazepa himself has been preserved. According to him, Paley "not only darkens himself by everyday drunkenness, lives without the fear of God and without reason, but he also has a one-sided gulty, which he no longer thinks about, only robbery and innocent blood."
The Zaporizhzhya Sich, according to all the information that has come down to us, is not far from the Paleyev camp - this semblance of "Lizar orders, who were drowning in Western Europe".
As for the democratic legend, it is the fruit of the efforts of Russian-Ukrainian poets, publicists, historians of the 19th century, such as Ryleev, Herzen, Chernyshevsky, Shevchenko, Kostomarov, Antonovich, Dragomanov, Mordovtsev. Raised on Western European democratic ideals, they wanted to see the common people in the Cossacks who had gone to the "bottom" from the master's captivity and carried away their eternal principles and traditions there. It is no coincidence that such a view was defined in the era of populism and was most vividly expressed in the article "On the Cossacks" ("Contemporary", 1860) where its author, Kostomarov, rebelled against the widespread view of the Cossacks as robbers, and explained the Cossack phenomenon "a consequence of purely democratic ideas."
Kostomarov's point of view still lives in the USSR. In the book by VA Golobutsky "Zaporozhye Cossacks" (15), the Cossacks are presented as pioneers of agriculture, plowing virgin lands in the Wild Field. The author sees in them not a military, but a grain-growing phenomenon, for the most part. But his argumentation, designed for the uninitiated readership, is devoid of any value for researchers. He often resorts to unworthy methods, such as the fact that the economy of the registered Cossacks of the 17th century gives out Cossack life for the pre-registry period and does not hesitate to enroll non-Cossack groups of the population in the Cossacks, the bourgeoisie, for example. In addition, he completely avoided objection to works and publications that did not agree with his point of view.
When Kostomarov, together with Belozersky, Gulak, Shevchenko, founded in Kiev, in 1847, the "Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood", he wrote "Books of Life of the Ukrainian People" - something like a political platform where the Cossack system was opposed to the aristocratic system of Poland and autocratic structure of Moscow.
"Ukraine did not love either the tsar or the lord, she compiled her cossacks, that is, that true brotherhood, where the dermal one was a brother of others, who was the former pan, who was a slave, was a Christian abi, and the Cossacks, all the troughs and elders, got out on for the sake of and blame blame for everything according to the word of Christ, and for the greedy pompie of the lord and the title did not bulo mizh the Cossacks. "
Kostomarov attributed a high mission to the Cossacks:
"The Cossacks decided to defend the holy of defense and allow their neighbors from captivity. Tim then hetman Svirgovsky went to defend Voloschino, and the Cossacks did not take misi with chervonets, as they were given for services, they did not take tim, which they shed blood for the virus for their neighbors and served God and not a golden idol "(16).
Kostomarov at that time was quite ignorant of Ukrainian history. Subsequently, he learned well who Svirgovsky was and why he went to Wallachia. But in the era of the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius, the adventurous plundering expedition of the Polish gentry easily went off for a crusade and for serving "God, not a golden idol."
According to Kostomarov, the Cossacks brought Ukraine such a truly democratic system that they could make not only this country happy, but also those neighboring it.
MP Dragomanov looked at the Zaporozhye Sich in approximately the same way. In the life of the Cossacks, he saw a communal principle and was even inclined to call the Sich "commune". He could not forgive P. Lavrov that in his speech at a banquet dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the Polish uprising of 1830, he listed the most vivid examples of the revolutionary democratic movement (Jacquerie, the Peasant War in Germany, Bohumilism in Bulgaria, Taborita in the Czech Republic) - did not mention the "Partnership (commune) of Zaporozhye" (16a). Dragomanov believed that Zaporozhye "borrowed the most system of camps from the Czech camps, which our Volynians and Podolyans of the 15th century went to help." Drahomanov considered one of the direct tasks of the participants in the Ukrainophile movement to "find memories of the former freedom and equality in different places and classes of the Ukrainian population." (He included this as a special point in the "Experience of the Ukrainian political and social program", issued by him in 1884 in Geneva. There, the popularization of Cossack self-government in the era of the Hetmanate and, especially, "Sich and the liberties of the Zaporozhye comradeship" is given exceptional importance The "program" requires the advocates of the Ukrainian idea to propagandize them worldwide "and bring them to the present concepts of freedom and equality among educated peoples" (17).
This fully explains the wide spread of this view of the Zaporozhye Cossacks, especially among the "progressive" intelligentsia. She learned it as a result of the energetic propaganda of figures like Dragomanov. Without any verification or criticism, he was accepted by the entire Russian revolutionary movement. Nowadays, he found expression in the theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia:
"In the course of the struggle of the Ukrainian popular masses against feudal-serf and national oppression," it says, "as well as against the Turkish-Tatar raids, a military force was created in the person of the Cossacks, the center of which in the 16th century was the Zaporizhzhya Sich, which played a progressive role in history. Ukrainian people ".
The authors of the theses showed considerable caution, they do not mention either Cossack communism or freedom and equality - they evaluate the Cossacks exclusively as a military force, but they note their "progressive role" in accordance with the traditional Ukrainianophile point of view.
Meanwhile, historical science has long recognized the inappropriateness of the search for "progress" and "democracy" in such phenomena of the past as the Novgorod and Pskov republics, or the Zemsky Sobors of the Moscow State. Their peculiar medieval nature has little in common with the institutions of modern times. Also the old Cossacks. An objective study of it destroyed both aristocratic and democratic legends. Kostomarov himself, as he delved deeper into the sources, significantly changed his view, and P. Kulish, unfolding a wide historical canvas, presented the Cossacks in such a light that it does not fit any comparison with European institutions and social phenomena. They were angry with Kulish for such a debunking, but they could not discredit his argumentation and the documentary material he collected. Addressing him to this day is mandatory for anyone who wants to understand the true essence of the Cossacks.
Democracy in our century is evaluated not according to formal criteria, but according to its social, cultural and moral value. No one admires the equality and electivity of office in a community that lives by robbery. We also do not consider it sufficient for a democratic system only the participation of the people in the solution of common affairs and the election of offices. Neither ancient, antique, nor modern democracy conceived of these principles outside the strict state organization and firm power. Nobody now brings the rule of the crowd closer to the concept of democracy. And the Zaporozhye Cossacks lacked precisely the state principle. They were brought up in a spirit of denial of the state. They had little respect for their own military structure, which could be considered a prototype of the state, which caused general surprise among foreigners. The most popular and strongest of the Cossack hetmans, Bogdan Khmelnitsky, suffered a lot from the willfulness and unbridledness of the Cossacks. Everyone who visited Khmelnitsky's court was amazed at the rude and familiar treatment of the colonels with their hetman. According to one Polish nobleman, the Moscow ambassador, a respectable and courteous man, was often forced to lower his eyes to the ground. The Hungarian ambassador was even more indignant at this. He, despite the warm welcome accorded to him, could not help but utter in Latin: "It brought me to these wild beasts!" {18}.
The Cossacks not only did not put the hetman's prestige into anything, but the hetmans themselves were killed with a light heart. In 1668, near Dikanka, they killed the left-bank hetman Bryukhovetsky. True, this murder was committed on the orders of his rival Doroshenko, but when he rolled out several barrels of the burner, the Cossacks, getting drunk, decided to kill Doroshenko himself in the evening. Bryukhovetsky's successor, Demyan Mnogogreshny, admitted:
"I wish to surrender the hetman before death. If death happens to me, then the Cossacks have such a custom - the hetman's belongings will destroy everything, make my wife, children and relatives beggars; and even then it happens among the Cossacks that the hetmans do not die by their death; when I lay sick , then the Cossacks were going to take all my belongings by themselves "(19).
The Cossacks were ready for the "distribution" of the hetman's belongings at any moment. A description of the banquet given by Mazepa in the Swedish camp in honor of the Cossacks who arrived to him has survived. Having got drunk, the Cossacks began to pull gold and silver dishes from the table, and when someone dared to point out the improper behavior of this behavior, he was immediately stabbed to death.
If this style reigned in the era of the Hetmanate, when the Cossacks tried to create something similar to public administration, what happened in relatively early times, especially in the famous Sich? The kosh chieftains and the foreman were lifted up on the shield or overthrown on a whim, or under a drunken hand, without even presenting charges. Rada is the supreme governing body - it was a loud, unorganized meeting of all members of the "brotherhood". Boyarin V. V. Sheremetev, taken prisoner by the Tatars and living in Crimea for many years, described in one letter to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich his impression of the Tatar Kurultai or, as he calls it, "Duma". "And the Busurmansky Duma was similar to the Cossack Rada; what the khan and the people around him would condemn, but the black yurt people did not want to, and that matter will not be done by any means." All hetmans complain about the extraordinary dominance of the unauthorized crowd. The Cossacks, according to Mazepa, "never want to have any power and leadership over themselves." Cossack "democracy" was actually an ochlocracy.
Is this not the secret of why Ukraine did not become an independent state in its time? Could it have been created by people brought up in anti-state traditions? The "Cossacks" who seized Little Russia turned it into a huge Zaporozhye, subjugating the entire region to their wild system of government. Hence the frequent coups, overthrow of hetmans, intrigues, undermining, the struggle of numerous groups with each other, treason, betrayal and the incredible political chaos that reigned throughout the second half of the 17th century. Without creating their own state, the Cossacks were the most quarrelsome element in those states with which they were connected by their historical destiny.
Explanations of the nature of the Cossacks should be sought not in the West, and not in the East, not on the soil fertilized by the Roman culture, but in the "wild field", among the Turkic-Mongol hordes. The Zaporozhye Cossacks have long been placed in a direct genetic relationship with the predatory Pechenegs, Polovtsy and Tatars who raged in southern steppes throughout almost all of Russian history. Settled in the Dnieper region and known most often under the name of Black Klobuk, they eventually became Christianized, Russified and laid the foundation, in Kostomarov's opinion, of the South Russian Cossacks. This point of view was strongly reinforced in a number of later studies, among which the study of P. Golubovsky is of particular interest. According to him, in the old days there was no sharp border between the steppe nomadic world and the Russian element, which we usually imagine. Throughout the entire space from the Danube to the Volga, "forest and steppe" mutually penetrated each other, and while the Pechenegs, Torks and Cumans settled in Russian possessions, the Russians themselves lived in numerous islets in the depths of the Turkic nomads. There was a strong mixing of blood and cultures. And in this environment, according to Golubovsky, already in the Kiev era, special militant communities began to be created, in which both Russian and nomadic alien elements were observed. Based on the well-known "Codex Camanicus" of the late 13th century, Golubovsky considers the very word "Cossack" to be Polovtsian, in the sense of an advanced guard, day and night (20).
There are many interpretations of this word and it has always been derived from oriental languages, but former researchers accompanied their statements with argumentation and corresponding linguistic calculations. Only VA Golobutsky, the author of a recently published work on the Zaporozhye Cossacks, deviated from this good academic tradition. Noting its Turkic origin and interpreting it as a "free man", he did not support his discovery in any way. It is not difficult to notice the desire that guided him - to fix philologically the meaning of the word "Cossack" that was attached to it in the nationalist journalism and poetry of the nineteenth century.
Some researchers go further than Golubovsky and look for traces of the Cossacks in the Scythian and Sarmatian times, when in our south numerous mobs asceticised, obtaining food by plunder and raids. From time immemorial, the steppe breathed with robbery, predation and that special freedom, which is so difficult to identify with the modern concept of freedom. The most striking stamp was imposed on the Cossacks by the Tatar era of steppe history, the closest to it in time. Attention has long been drawn to the Turkic-Tatar origin of the Cossack terminology. The word "shepherd", for example, meaning a shepherd of sheep, is borrowed from the Tatars. From them the word "ataman" is also borrowed, derived from "odaman", meaning the head of the shepherds of the joint herd. The joint flock consisted of ten united flocks, each with a thousand sheep. This became known as "khosh". Cossack "kosh" (encampment, camp, gathering place) and "koshevoy ataman" came out of this steppe lexicon. From the same place "kuren" and "kuren ataman". “The meaning of kuren,” according to Rashid-Din, “is as follows: when in a field the wagons in a multitude stand in a circle in the form of a ring, they call it KUREN”.
It is not so difficult to explain the penetration of the Dnieper Cossacks into the environment of the Türko-Mongol nomadic terminology, due to the proximity of the Crimea. But the most likely source of it was the Cossacks, only not their own Russians, but Tatar ones. The idea of the Cossacks as a specially Russian phenomenon is so widespread in our country and in Europe that the existence of alien Cossack assemblies is rarely known to anyone. Meanwhile, Don and Zaporozhye were, one must think, younger brothers and pupils of the Tatar Cossacks.
There are many indications of the existence of the Tatar Cossacks. Leaving aside the question of the large Kazakh Horde beyond the Caspian, which some historians, like Bykadorov and Evarnitsky, put in a kinship with the entire Cossack world, we will confine ourselves to the Black Sea region, which is closer to us.
In 1492 Khan Mengli-Girey wrote to Ivan III that his army, returning from Kiev with booty, was robbed in the steppe by "Horde Cossacks". Russian chroniclers have repeatedly written about these Horde or "Azov" Cossacks-Tatars since the time of Ivan III, describing them as the most terrible robbers who attacked border cities and made extraordinary obstacles in the relations of the Moscow State with the Crimea. "The field is not clean from the Azov Cossacks," we read constantly in the reports of ambassadors and border governors to the sovereign. The Tatar Cossacks, like the Russians, did not recognize the authority of any of the neighboring sovereigns over themselves, although they often entered their service. Thus, detachments of Tatar Cossacks were in the service of Moscow, and Poland did not disdain them either. It is known, at least, that King Sigismund-Augustus summoned the Belgorod (Ackerman) and Perekop Cossacks and sent them cloth for their salary. But most of all, the Crimean Khan attracted them to his aid, who constantly had large Cossack detachments in his troops. Plundering in the space between Crimea and Moscow Ukraine, the Tatar Cossacks were militarily, everyday and economically an independent organization, so that the Polish chroniclers, knowing the four Tatar hordes (Trans-Volga, Astrakhan, Kazan, Perekop), ranked among them, sometimes, the fifth - the Cossack (21).
After that, is it necessary to go far to the West in search of a model for the Zaporozhye Sich? The true school of the Dnieper freemen was the Tatar steppe, which gave it everything from military techniques, vocabulary, appearance (mustache, forelock, wide trousers), to customs, mores and the whole style of behavior. The famous sea voyages to Turechchina look not at all patriotic and not pious deed. Themselves, the Ukrainophiles of the last century knew that the Cossacks "smashed the Khristiyansk merchant along the Black Sea along with the Besurmen, and at home the Rus' people plied their cities with the Tatar robe" (22).
"There were 4,000 Zaporozhye Cossacks in Sweden, writes one Polish chronicle," Samuil Koshka was the hetman over them, this Samuel was killed there. they did harm, and the glorious city of Vitebsk was devastated, they took in a lot of gold and silver, they chopped down the noble bourgeoisie and repaired such sodomy that it was worse than evil enemies or Tatars. "
Under 1603, the story is told about the adventures of the Cossacks under the command of a certain Ivan Kutska in Borkulabovskaya and Shupenskaya volosts, where they imposed tribute on the population in money and in kind.
"In the same year, in the city of Mogilev, Ivan Kutska surrendered the hetmanship, because there was great willfulness in the army: whoever wants, does what he does. A messenger came from the king and the nobles, he reminded, threatened the Cossacks that they should have no violence in the city and in the villages. To this messenger one tradesman brought in his arms a six-year-old girl, nailed and raped, barely alive; then they made great losses to villages and cities, they took women, girls, children and horses with them; one Cossack led horses 8, 10, 12, children 3, 4, women or girls 4 or 3 "(23).
How does this picture differ from the sight of the Crimean horde returning with a yasir from a successful raid? The difference may be that the Tatars did not take or sell their fellow believers and fellow tribesmen into slavery, while for the Zaporozhye "knights" such subtleties did not exist.
The school in Zaporozhye was not a knightly or a laboring peasant. True, many serfs fled there, and there were many advocates of the idea of liberating the peasantry from serfdom. But brought from outside, these ideas died away in Zaporozhye and were replaced by others. It was not they who determined the image of the Sich and the general tone of her life. It had its own eternal traditions, customs and its own view of the world. A person who got here was digested and reheated, as in a cauldron, from a Little Russian he became a Cossack, changed his ethnography, changed his soul. In the eyes of their contemporaries, both individual Cossacks and their entire associations had the character of "miners". "They do not keep wives, they do not plow the land, they feed on cattle breeding, animal catching and fishing, and in the old days they exercised more in the booty received from neighboring peoples" (24). Cossacking was a special method of earning a livelihood, and the same Paprotsky, who glorified the Cossacks as knights, admits in one place that in the lower reaches of the Dnieper "the saber brought more profits than the economy." That is why not only commoners went to the Cossacks, but also the gentry, sometimes from very noble families. How lofty their goals and aspirations were can be seen from the case of the famous Samuel Zaborovsky. Going to Zaporozhye, he dreamed of a campaign with the Cossacks to the Moscow borders, but having appeared in the Sich and familiarized himself with the situation, he changed his mind and offered a trip to Moldova. When the Tatars come with a friendly proposal to go together to plunder Persia, he willingly agrees to this too. Zaporizhzhya morals and customs were well known in Poland: crown hetman Jan Zamoyski, referring to the guilty gentry, who exhibited their merits in the Zaporozhye army to justify their previous misdeeds, said: “They are not looking for a glorious death on Niz, lost rights are being returned in the wrong place. it is clear that they go there not out of love for the patronymic, but for the prey "(25).
Even in later times, at the beginning of the 18th century, the Cossacks did not hesitate to call their craft by his own name. When Bulavin raised an uprising on the Don against Peter the Great, he went to Zaporozhye in order to clean up his assistants there. The Sich was agitated. Some stood for an immediate connection with the Don chieftain, others were afraid to break with Moscow. It came to the change of the koshevoy and the foreman. A moderate group prevailed and decided not to perform throughout the Sich, but to allow those wishing to join Bulavin at their own risk. Bulavin stood up in the Samara townships and addressed the Cossacks with an appeal:
"Well done atamans, road hunters, free people of all ranks, thieves and robbers! Who wants to go with the military marching ataman Kondraty Afanasyevich Bulavin, who wants to walk with him in a clean field, walk red, drink sweetly and eat, ride good horses, then come into the black summits of Samara! " (26).
Before the establishment of a sedentary registered Cossacks in the middle of the 16th century, the term "Cossack" was used to define a special way of life. "To go to the Cossacks" meant to retire to the steppe beyond the border guard line and live there like the Tatar Cossacks, that is, depending on the circumstances, to fish, graze sheep, or rob.
The figure of the Zaporozhets is not identical with the type of the native Little Russian, they represent two different worlds. One is sedentary, agricultural, with a culture, way of life, skills and traditions inherited from Kiev times. Another walker, unearned, leading a robbery life, developed a completely different temperament and character under the influence of the way of life and mixing with steppe people. The Cossacks were not engendered by the South Russian culture, but by a hostile element that had been at war with it for centuries.
Expressed by many Russian historians, this idea is supported by the now German researcher Gunter Steckl, who believes that the first Russian Cossacks were the Russified baptized Tatars. In them he sees the fathers of the East Slavic Cossacks.
As for the legend that ascribes to the Cossacks the mission of protecting the Slavic east of Europe from the Tatars and Turks, it has now been sufficiently debunked by the accumulated documentary material and the works of researchers. Cossack service on the edge Of the wild field created by the initiative and efforts of the Polish state, and not the Cossacks themselves. This question has long been clear to historical science.
Capture of Little Russia by Cossacks
Whoever does not understand the predatory nature of the Cossacks, who confuses it with the fugitive peasantry, will never understand either the origin of Ukrainian separatism, or the meaning of the event that preceded it, in the middle of the 17th century. And this event meant nothing more than the seizure by a small handful of steppe freemen of a country huge in terms of territory and population. For a long time, the Cossacks had a dream to receive some small state for feeding. Judging by the frequent raids on Moldavo-Wallachia, this land was the first to be chosen by them. They nearly mastered it in 1563, when they went there under the command of Baida-Vishnevetsky. Even then, there was talk about the elevation of this leader to the throne of the Lord. 14 years later, in 1577, they manage to take Yassy and put Horseshoe on the throne of their chieftain, but this time the success turned out to be short-lived, Horseshoe could not resist being a king. Despite the setbacks, the Cossacks for almost a century continued their attempts to conquer and seize power in the Danube principalities. To get their hands on them, to establish themselves there as bureaucrats, to take possession of the orders - that was the meaning of their efforts.
Fate turned out to be more favorable to them than they could have imagined; it gave them a much richer and more extensive land than Moldova - Ukraine. Such happiness fell, largely unexpected for them, thanks to the peasant war, which led to the fall of serfdom and Polish rule in the region.
But before talking about this, it is necessary to note one important change that took place in the middle of the 16th century. We are talking about the introduction of the so-called "register", which meant the list of those Cossacks that the Polish government took into its service to protect the border lands from Tatar raids. Strictly limited by the number, brought over time to 6,000, subordinated to the Polish crown hetman and received their military and administrative center in the city of Terekhtemirovo above the Dnieper, the registered Cossacks were endowed with certain rights and privileges: they got rid of taxes, received a salary, had their own court, their own elective control. But, having placed this selected group in a privileged position, the Polish government imposed a ban on all other Cossacks, seeing in it the development of a harmful, walking, anti-government element.
In scholarly literature, this reform is usually seen as the first legal and economic division within the Cossacks. In the register, they see a chosen caste that has received the opportunity to acquire a house, land, economy and use, often on a large scale, the labor of workers and all kinds of servants. This provides Soviet historians with material for endless discussions about "stratification", about "antagonism."
But antagonism did not exist in the Cossack environment, but between the Cossacks and the claps. In Zaporozhye, as well as in Rzecz Pospolita itself, Khlopov was contemptuously called "rabble". These are those who, having escaped from the yoke of the master, were unable to overcome their grain-growing peasant nature and learn the Cossack habits, Cossack morality and psychology. They were not denied asylum, but they were never merged with them; the Cossacks knew the randomness of their appearance on the bottom and dubious Cossack qualities. Only a small part, having gone through the steppe school, irrevocably changed the peasant share for the profession of a dashing miner. For the most part, the servile element was scattered: who died, who went to the farm workers to the registered estates of Polish magnates.
The relationship between registered and non-registered, despite some disagreements, has never been expressed in the form of class or class strife. Sich for both was a cradle and a symbol of unity. Registered officers visit her, flee there in case of adversity or quarrels with the Polish government, often team up with the hawkers for joint robbery expeditions.
The register reform not only was not met with hostility at the bottom, but it gave wings to the whole steppe gulty; to get into the register and be counted among the "knights" has become the dream of every Zaporozhye fellow. The register was not a corrupting, but rather a unifying principle and played a prominent role in the development of "self-consciousness".
Yesterday's robber freelancer, having become a royal army, called upon to protect the outskirts of the Commonwealth, kindled with a dream of a certain place of honor in the landlord's republic; the ideology that later played such an important role in the history of Little Russia was born. It consisted in the convergence of the concept of "Cossack" with the concept of "gentry". No matter how ridiculous this claim looked in the eyes of the then Polish society, the Cossacks stubbornly adhered to it.
Shlyakhtich owns land and peasants because of his military service in favor of the state; but the Cossack is also a warrior and also serves the Rzecz Pospolita, why should he not be a landowner, especially since, side by side with him, in Zaporozhye lived, often, natural gentry from noble families, who went to the Cossacks? The Registered Army began to express its lusts in petitions and appeals to the king and the Diet. At the 1632 Convocation Diet, its representatives stated:
"We are convinced that we will someday wait for that happy time when we receive the correction of our knightly rights and we earnestly ask the Diet to report to the king so that we will be granted those liberties that belong to the people of knighthood" (27).
Accumulating wealth, acquiring land and servants, the top of the Cossacks, in fact, began to approach, economically, to the image and likeness of the gentry. It is known that the same Bohdan Khmelnitsky had land ownership in Subbotov, a house and several dozen servants. By the middle of the 17th century, the Cossack aristocracy, in terms of material wealth, was not inferior to the small and middle nobility. Perfectly understanding the importance of education for a noble career, she teaches her children the master's wisdom. Less than a hundred years after the introduction of the register, among the Cossack foreman one could meet people who used Latin in conversation. Having the opportunity, by the nature of the service, to often communicate with the nobility, the foreman makes acquaintances, connections with her, seeks to assimilate her gloss and habits. A steppe native, a Pecheneg, is ready, just about, to appear in a secular living room. He only lacks the rights of the gentry.
But here the drama begins, turning Latin, wealth, and land into nothing. The Polish priesthood, locked in its caste arrogance, did not want to hear about the Cossack claims. It is easier to conquer Moldova than to become a member of the noble class in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Neither loyalty nor faithful service helps. In this situation, many have long begun to think about acquiring the gentry with an armed hand.
Ukrainian nationalist and Soviet Marxist historiography so clouded and muddied the picture of the Cossack riots at the end of the 16th and first half of the 17th century, that it is difficult for a common reader to understand their true meaning. They least of all fit into the category of "national liberation" movements. There was no trace of a national Ukrainian idea at that time. But they can also be called "antifeudal" only to the extent that the peasants who fled to Niz took part in them in search of deliverance from the intolerable serf bondage. These peasants were the greatest martyrs of the Commonwealth. The Jesuit Skarga, a fierce persecutor and hater of Orthodoxy and the Russian people, admitted that nowhere in the world do landowners treat their peasants more inhumanly than in Poland. "The owner or the royal headman not only takes away from the poor clap all that he earns, but also kills him when he wants and how he wants, and no one will say a bad word to him for this."
The peasantry was exhausted under the burden of taxes and corvee; no work was enough to pay for the exorbitant extravagance and luxury of the gentry. Is it any wonder that it was ready for any form of struggle against its oppressors? But, having found such a ready-made form in the Cossack riots, destroying the pens' castles and farms, the peasants did not do their own thing, but served as an instrument for achieving other people's benefits. Serf rage in the fight against the Poles has always liked the Cossacks and was included in their calculations. Numerically, the Cossacks represented an insignificant group; in the most Good times it did not exceed 10,000 people, counting the registered and Sechevites together. They almost never withstood clashes with the crown troops of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Already in the earliest Cossack uprisings, there is a desire to let the men who ran beyond the thresholds to the castles of the magnates. But the mechanism and management of the uprisings were invariably in the hands of the Cossacks, and the Cossacks did not achieve the destruction of the serf system, but tried by hook or by crook to get into the feudal estate. This was not about freedom, but about privileges. It was an alliance of the peasantry with their potential enslavers, who, over time, managed to get their hands on it, taking the place of the Polish lords.
Of course, the Cossacks had to, sooner or later, either be crushed by the Polish statehood, or come to terms with the position of a special military class, like the later Donets, Black Sea residents, Tertsi, if not for the grandiose popular uprising of 1648, which opened the Cossacks the possibilities of which it could only dream. "I managed to accomplish what I never thought about" - Khmelnitsky later admitted.
The Poles feared the performances of the peasants much more than the Cossacks. "The number of his accomplices now extends to 3,000," Hetman Pototsky wrote to the king about Khmelnitsky's speech. Already the first battle at Zheltye Vody was won thanks to the fact that the Russian zholner who served with Stefan Potocki went over to the side of Bogdan. In the battle of Korsun, the assistance and assistance of the Russian population was expressed to an even greater extent. Khmelnitsky was approached from all sides, so that his army grew with extraordinary speed. Under Pilyava it was so great that its initial core, which had emerged from Zaporozhye, was drowned in a crowd of new militias. When, in the midst of the uprising, the Rada was gathered in the White Church, over 70,000 people came to it. Never before has the Cossack army reached such a figure. But it is far from expressing the entire number of the rebels. Most of them did not go with Bogdan, but crumbled in the form of so-called "corrals" around the entire region, bringing horror and devastation to the landlords' estates. The corrals were huge hordes under the command of some Kharchenko Gaichura or Lysenko Vovgury. The Poles were so afraid of them that one cry "Vovgurovites are coming" plunged them into the greatest confusion.
The pens of Ganzha, Ostap Pavlyuk, Polovian, Morozenko raged in Podol. Each of these detachments represented a solid army, and some could, at that time, be revered by huge armies. "All this bastard, as a Polish contemporary put it, consisted of a despicable peasant who flocked to the death of the nobles and the Polish people."
“There was a time,” hetman Sapega said, “when we went like a bear to tame the Ukrainian revolts; then they were in embryo, under the leadership of some Pavlyuk; now it’s another matter! We are up in arms for the faith, we give our lives for our families and our wealth We are not opposed by a gang of self-willed, but the great power of the whole Rus. The entire Russian people from villages, villages, townships, cities, bound by the bonds of faith and blood with the Cossacks, threaten to eradicate the gentry tribe and demolish R'ch Pospolita from the face of the earth. "
What not a single Cossack uprising could achieve for half a century was done in a few weeks by the "despicable peasant" - the lord's power in Ukraine was swept away like a hurricane. Moreover, the entire Polish state suffered a blow that plunged it into a state of helplessness. It seemed like one more effort - and it will collapse. The Rzeczpospolita did not have time to recover from the deafening blows at Zheltye Vody and near Korsun, when a terrible catastrophe near Pilyava followed, where the flower of Polish knighthood was put to flight like a flock of sheep, and would certainly have been exterminated if it had not been for the richest camp, the robbery of which the winners got carried away, ending the pursuit. This defeat, together with the widespread massacre of priests, priests and Jews, caused general horror and consternation. Poland lay at the feet of Khmelnitsky. Had he taken it into his head to move inland with his hordes, he would not have met resistance until Warsaw. If there are moments in the life of peoples, on which their entire future depends, then such a minute for the Ukrainians was the time after the Pilyav victory. Freedom from slavery, the destruction of the pressure of militant Catholicism, complete national liberation - everything was possible and achievable at that moment. The people instinctively felt this and burned with the desire to complete the cause of freedom. Shouts of "Pan Khmelnitsky, lead on lyakhiv, kinchay lyakhiv!"
But here the difference between the aspirations of the people and the aspirations of the Cossacks became clear. What was observed in all previous uprisings led by the Cossacks was repeated: the cynical betrayal of the peasants in the name of specially Cossack interests.
Having led by chance a fierce peasant war, Khmelnitsky clearly took the side of foreigners and landowners of other faiths against the Russian Orthodox peasants. He not only did not go to Warsaw and did not destroy Poland, but invented a maneuver deceiving for his army, moving on Lvov and then besieging Zamosc unnecessarily for a long time, not allowing it to be taken at the same time. He entered into negotiations with the Poles about the election of a king, sent his representatives to the Diet, made a solemn promise to obey the orders of the new head of state and, in fact, ended the war and retreated to Kiev at the first request of Jan Casimir.
This was a complete surprise for the claps. But another blow awaited them: before reaching Kiev, where he was supposed to wait for the king's envoys, the hetman made an important political statement sanctioning the existence of serfdom in Little Russia. In the universal addressed to the nobility, he expressed the wish that "in accordance with the will and orders of his royal majesty, you do not plot anything wrong against our Greek religion and against your subjects, but live with them in peace and keep them in your mercy" (28). The men were returned again to the state from which they had just escaped.
The betrayal continued during a new clash with Poland, in 1649. When the peasant army at Zborov utterly defeated the royal army, Khmelnytsky not only did not allow the king to be captured, but knelt before him and concluded a treaty that was a flagrant betrayal of the Little Russian people. Under this treaty, Ukraine remained under Polish rule, and not a word was said about the abolition of serfdom. But the Cossacks ascended to unprecedented heights. Its composition increased to 40,000 people, who were allotted land, received the right to have two assistants and took the cherished path of gradual transformation into "knights". The Cossack sergeant-major acquired the right to own "rank-based malignancies" - a special fund of land intended for the use of the ranks of the Cossack army at the time the person held the corresponding position. The Cossack army itself could now look at itself as the army of the king and the Commonwealth in the Russian lands; It was not for nothing that the messenger Bogdanov once said to Hetman Pototsky: "The Commonwealth can rely on the Cossacks; we are defending the fatherland." The Cossack hetman received the entire Chigirin eldership with the city of Chigirin "for a mace", and to this he took over the rich town of Mliev, which brought its former owner, Konetspolsky, up to 200,000 thalers of income (29).
But Zborov's conditions did not have to become reality. The peasantry did not put up with the situation in which only 40,000 lucky people would receive land and the rights of free people, while the rest of the mass should remain in servitude. The peasants with pitchforks and clubs greeted the gentlemen returning to their estates, which caused noisy protests from the Poles. The hetman had, in fulfillment of the contract, to punish the disobedient with death, to chop off their heads, hang them up, impale them, but the fire did not subside from this. The executions opened the eyes of the people to the role of Bogdan, and in order not to finally lose his prestige, he had no choice but to lead the people's militia again, which gathered in 1652 to repel another Polish invasion of Ukraine.
Historical literature has long noted that the terrible defeat that befell the Russians this time at Berestechko was a direct result of the antagonism between the Cossacks and the peasantry.
This is not the place to give a detailed story about the Khmelnytsky uprising, it is described in many works and monographs. Our goal is to draw attention to the nerve of events, clear to contemporaries, but unusually obscured by historians of the 19th-20th centuries. This is important both in order to understand the reason for the annexation of Ukraine to the Moscow State, and in order to understand why the "separatist" movement began there on the very next day after the annexation.
As you know, Moscow was not eager to annex Ukraine. She refused this to the Metropolitan of Kiev Job Boretsky, who sent an embassy to Moscow in 1625, and was in no hurry to respond with consent to the tearful petitions of Khmelnitsky, who repeatedly asked for citizenship. This is important to bear in mind when you read the complaints of independent historians about the "dashing neighbors" who allegedly did not allow the establishment of an independent Ukraine in 1648-1654. None of these neighbors - Moscow, Crimea, Turkey - had any views on it and they were not going to fix any obstacles to her independence. As for Poland, after the brilliant victories won over it, any conditions could be dictated to it. It was not the neighbors that was the issue, but Ukraine itself. There, simply, the idea of "independence" did not exist in those days, but there was only the idea of a transition from one citizenship to another. But she lived among ordinary people, dark, illiterate, not involved in either state or public life, who had no experience. political organization... Represented by the peasantry, city dwellers - artisans and small traders, he constituted the most numerous part of the population, but due to darkness and inexperience, his role in the events of those days consisted only in the rage with which he burned pans' castles and fought on the battlefields. All leadership was concentrated in the hands of the Cossack aristocracy. And this one did not think about independence or separation from Poland. Her efforts were directed precisely at keeping Ukraine under Poland, and the peasants under the masters, at any cost. For herself, she dreamed of getting a priesthood, which some had already achieved in 1649, after the Zborov peace.
The policy of the Cossacks, his constant betrayal were the reason that the initially victorious struggle began to turn, in the end, into failures for Ukraine. Bogdan and his henchmen were constantly repeating the same thing: "Let every one be quiet about his own, let every one look at his own - a Cossack of his liberties, and those who are not included in the register must return to their masters and pay them a tenth cop." Meanwhile, according to the reports of Moscow informants, "those de Cossacks still do not want to be near the arable land, but they say that they all stood for the Christian faith, shed their blood" (30).
Is it any wonder that the people, exhausted by treason, having distrust in their leaders, saw the only way out in Moscow citizenship? Many, without waiting for a political resolution of the issue, took off in whole villages and poviets and moved to the Moscow limits. In just six months, the Kharkiv region grew up - a formerly deserted region, now inhabited entirely by immigrants from the Polish state.
Such a spontaneous gravitation of the mass of the people towards Moscow thwarted the plans and upset the whole game of the Cossacks. They were unable to resist him openly. It became clear that the people would do anything in order not to remain under Poland. It was necessary either to keep him in the Rzecz Pospolita as before and become its outspoken enemy, or to decide on a risky maneuver to follow him to another state and, taking advantage of the circumstances, try to maintain his dominance over it. They chose the latter.
This did not happen without an internal struggle. Some of the hardened Cossacks, led by Bogun, frankly spoke out against Moscow at the Tarnopolskaya Rada in 1653, but the majority, seeing how the "rabble" burst into enthusiastic cries at the mention of the "king of the east," took the side of the cunning Bogdan.
There can be no two opinions about the true sympathies of Khmelnitsky and his entourage - they were Polonophiles; they came to Moscow citizenship with the greatest reluctance and fear. The uncertainty of the Cossack destinies frightened new government... Will Moscow want to keep the Cossacks as a special class, will it not take advantage of the spontaneous affection of the South Russian people and will not produce a universal equalization of rights, without making a difference between the Cossack and yesterday's clap? Evidence of such an alarming mood was the idea of Crimean and Turkish citizenship, which suddenly became popular among the foremen at the very moment of negotiations with Moscow. She promised the Cossack elite a complete uncontrolled domination in the region under the auspices of such a power that would not limit it at all, but from which you can always get protection.
In the middle of 1653, Ivan Vygovsky told the tsarist ambassadors about the secret council, which was attended by only colonels and the highest military ranks. The issue of Turkish citizenship was discussed there. All the colonels agreed to him, with the exception of the Kiev Anton Zhdanovich, and Vygovsky himself. Emphasizing his Moscowophilia, Vygovsky drew a rather stormy scene: "And I told the hetman and the colonel: who wants to give in to the Turk, but we are going to serve the great Christian sovereign and all your Rada's Cherkassians will tell you how you forgot God doing this. And the hetman de me for Then I wanted to execute it. And when I saw such a thing over me, I thought of giving my friend a report so that they would report that report to the whole army. And the army, having learned about it, began to say: we will all die for Vygovsky, except for him, the Tatars dare not to pray "(31). Whether Vygovsky actually behaved in this way is unknown; most likely, he showed himself in front of the Moscow ambassadors, but the fact of the gathering he described is quite probable.
The Turkish project is evidence of the confusion of the Cossack souls, but hardly any of its authors seriously believed in the possibility of its implementation, due to the odiousness of the Turkish-Tatar name for the people, and also because the people had already made their choice. Roman Rakushka Romanovsky, known under the name of Samovidts, describing in his chronicle the Pereyaslavl annexation, with special diligence emphasized its nation-wide character: “Through the efforts of Ukraine, the people were eagerly perpetrating this.”
That was a critical moment in the life of the Cossack foreman, and one can understand the nervousness with which she tried by all means to get documents from the tsar's ambassadors guaranteeing Cossack liberties. Having appeared for the oath, the foreman and the hetman suddenly demanded that the king, in the person of his ambassadors, swear allegiance to them for his part and issue encouraging letters. "Nicholas never happened and will never be," said the steward Buturlin, "and it was indecent for him to talk about it, because every subject is guilty of giving faith to his sovereign" (32). Right there, in the church, he explained to Khmelnytsky the inadmissibility of such an oath from the point of view of the autocratic principle. An equally categorical answer was given a few days after the oath, when the military clerk I. Vygovsky with the colonels came to Buturlin with the demand "to give them a letter for their own hands, so that liberties and pendulums continue." At the same time, the ambassadors were told that if they "would not give such a letter to both the steward and the noble to go to the cities for nothing, so that all the people in the towns will be confused" (33). This meant a threat to disrupt the campaign to swear in the population of Little Russia. The ambassadors were frightened by the danger of moving around the country, as a result of the rampant Tatar gangs. The ambassadors were not frightened and did not succumb to any harassment, calling them "obscene". "We told you before that the tsar's majesty does not take away your liberties, and in the towns you have been ordered by the sovereign before his sovereign to be your sergeant as before, and the sovereign does not order the sovereign to take away your rights and anxieties." Buturlin insisted only that the Cossacks, instead of requiring a guarantee document, turn to the tsar with a petition. The requested benefits can only be obtained through a grant from the monarch.
We will not go into the consideration of the self-styled legend about the so-called "Pereyaslavl constitution", about the "Pereyaslavl treaty"; it has long been exposed. All sorts of altercations on this score can drag on as long as they like in newspaper articles and in pamphlets - for science this question is clear. The sources have not retained the slightest indication of a document that at least to some extent resembles a "contract" (34). In Pereyaslavl in 1654, it was not the conclusion of a treatise between the two countries that took place, but the unconditional oath of the Little Russian people and the Cossacks to the Tsar of Moscow, their new sovereign.
Having not promised anything at the moment of taking the oath, the tsar later turned out to be unusually generous and merciful to his new subjects. Not a single, almost, of their request was left without satisfaction. The statement of M. S. Grushevsky that "by no means all of these desires were accepted by the Moscow government" must be declared a complete lie. Moscow gave an evasive answer only to the request for a salary to the Zaporozhye army. The boyars referred to a private conversation between Khmelnitsky and Buturlin in Pereyaslavl, in which the hetman said that he did not insist on a salary. Moscow, however, did not at all refuse to pay the Cossacks, it only wanted the salary to come from the amounts that would be collected from the Ukraine to the tsarist treasury, and therefore postponed this issue until the general fiscal affairs were streamlined.
It was granted to the cities that bustled before the tsar to leave the Magdeburg Law behind them, the clergy, who asked for land grants and for the preservation of their former possessions and rights, received them, the remnants of the surviving gentry received confirmation of their ancient privileges. The Cossacks were provided with everything that they "beat their foreheads" about. The Cossack register has been preserved and increased to an unprecedented figure - 60,000 people, the entire old district has been completely preserved, the right to choose a foreman and hetman whoever they want is retained, only with subsequent bringing to the attention of Moscow. Foreign embassies were also allowed to receive.
The tsarist government provided a broad opportunity for each of the estates to petition for the establishment of the best conditions and order for themselves. Such petitions came from the cities (through the hetman), from the clergy, from the Cossacks. Only the voice of the peasantry - the most numerous, but, at the same time, the darkest and most disorganized class - was never heard and was not heard in Moscow.
This happened to a large extent because the Cossacks screened the peasantry from them. This was all the easier to do because the peasantry itself did not want anything more than to be called Cossacks. As before Khmelnitsky, and during his time, it went into Cossack riots with the sole purpose of getting rid of the master's captivity. To get into the Cossack estate means to become a free man. That is why all the hundreds of thousands of peasants who rose in 1648-1649 so willingly called themselves Cossacks, shaved their heads and put on Tatar trousers, and that is why they raised an indignant cry when they learned that the Zborov treatise was returning them to their former peasant state, there are only 40,000 lucky people in the Cossack paradise. According to the reports of the Moscow border governors, who questioned the Ukrainian refugees, one can get an idea of the extraordinary crush that has arisen around the registration. Everyone wanted to be on the list and spared nothing for that. The hetman made from this a source of his own enrichment, "from those people whom he wrote to the register, gold chervonnye in 30 and 40 and more. Anyone who could give more, he wrote to the raister, so that no one he still did not want to be in servitude "(35).
The peasants, at the moment of joining Moscow, did not act as an estate and did not formulate their wishes, because they identified themselves with the Cossacks, naively believing that this is enough to not be counted as peasants. It was difficult for the Moscow government to understand the situation at that time.
Summing up the petitions and the royal letters issued in response to them, the researchers come to the conclusion that the internal structure and social relations in the Ukraine, after the Pereyaslavl annexation, such were established, which the Little Russians themselves wanted. The tsarist government formed this device in accordance with their requests and wishes. The Cossacks wanted to leave everything as it was under the Polish kings. Personally, B. Khmelnitsky, in a conversation with Buturlin, expressed the wish that “whoever in what rank was in place and now the sovereign would grant him, ordered to be so that the nobleman was a nobleman, and a Cossack a Cossack, and a philistine bourgeois; and a Cossack would not be judged by the colonels and centurions. " The same was expressed in writing in the petition to the tsar: "rights, statutes, privileges and all kinds of freedom ... no one is named from the princes and pious lords and from the kings of Poland ... "(36). In confirmation of these wishes and petitions, the hetman sent copies of letters of gratitude from Polish kings to Moscow. Both these letters and the Cossacks' own requests expressed a view of them as an estate, and their entire "ustria" was conceived as an internal estate organization. Correspondingly, the hetman power was understood as a military power, which extended only to the Zaporozhye army, but had no relation to other estates and was not at all called upon to rule the whole region.
Until 1648, the Cossacks were an outsider for Ukraine, they lived in a "wild field", on the steppe outskirts, the rest of Little Russia was ruled by the Polish administration. But during the days of the uprising, the Polish government was expelled, the region was in the grip of anarchy, and the Cossacks had the opportunity to impose their Zaporozhye customs and dominance in it. The picture of their implementation is dark, both in terms of the lack of sources and the elusiveness of the phenomenon itself. For six terrible years, when villages and cities were incessantly burning, Tatar gangs hunted for people and took thousands to the Crimea, when Haidamaks, on the one hand, Polish punitive detachments, on the other, turned entire areas into deserts, when huge territories passed from hand to hand. - it was difficult to establish any administration. Historical research has not yet dealt with this issue. If we look for similarities of government in the then Little Russia, then it was, most likely, what is commonly called "the laws of wartime," that is, the will of the head of an army or a military detachment that occupied a particular territory.
By virtue of their military experience and organization, the Cossacks took possession of all important posts in the people's militia, giving it their Zaporozhye structure, divisions, designations, their own subordination. Therefore, the Cossack ranks - colonels, centurions - also became power for the Little Russian population of those places that were occupied by their troops. And above all stood the hetman of the Zaporozhye army with the military chancellery, the clerk general, the transport train, the military judge and other Zaporozhye foreman. Developed and developed in the steppe for a small self-governing military-robber community, this system was now transferred to a huge country with a sedentary labor population, with cities that knew Magdeburg law.
How it acted in practice, we do not know, but we can guess that the "practice" was least of all guided by legal consciousness, which was not inculcated in the steppe "knighthood" brought up in anti-state traditions.
As long as there was hope to keep Little Russia under Polish rule, the hetman and his entourage viewed their power in it as temporary. Zborivsky and Belotserkovsky treatises leave no room for any hetman power in Ukraine after its reconciliation and return under the royal hand. The position of the Cossacks and their leaders, according to these treatises, is significantly improving, it is increasing in number, it is given more rights and material resources, but it is still not thought of as anything except a special type of army of the Commonwealth. The hetman is its leader, but by no means the governor of the region, he is a military person, not a state-administrative one. The same view was inspired by the foreman and the tsarist ambassadors in Pereyaslavl in the days of joining the Moscow state. From now on, the tsarist power was considered the supreme power in the region. This was so clear to everyone that neither Bogdan, nor the foreman, nor any of the Little Russians of that time, would have thought of petitioning the tsar for the creation of a regional government or some kind of autonomous, local, by its origin, administrative authority. ... Such a thought was not expressed even in oral conversations with Buturlin. According to D. M. Odinets, a very authoritative historian, "apart from the Moscow sovereign, the acts of 1654 did not provide for the existence of any other state authority on the territory of Ukraine" (37).
But in the scientific literature, for some time now, the question has been raised: did the Cossacks, who came to Moscow citizenship as the actual masters of Little Russia, have never regretted the loss of their leading position? Why is there no hint of a desire to continue ruling the country in not a single petition, not a single conversation? Some researchers (V.A.Myakotin, D.M. Odinets) explain this by the conservatism of the foreman and the hetman, who in six turbulent years failed to realize the changes that had taken place in their position and continued to hold on to the old form of Cossack benefits. It is hardly possible to agree with this consideration. Khmelnitsky, who once said in a drunken state: "I am now the only Russian autocrat" (this was in the first period of the uprising, at the end of 1648) - of course, his general regional role was clear. The foreman also understood her. If, nevertheless, not a word was said about her in Pereyaslavl, then in this one should see not myopia, but just the opposite - an extraordinary foresight and subtle knowledge of the political situation. Khmelnitsky knew that Moscow would not accept any diminution of its sovereign rights; and to put forward the idea of hetman power meant to encroach on its supreme rights. Any hitch in the matter of reunification could cost Bohdan and the Cossack elite dearly, in view of the categorical demand of the people, who did not want to hear about anything except joining Moscow. The Hetman was already tainted with his serf polonophile policy. He could at once lose everything that he had won with such difficulty in six years. It is now clear to us that if the Moscow government had a better understanding of the social situation of those days, it could completely ignore the hetman, the foreman, and all the Cossacks in general, relying on one mass of the people. The sergeant major understood this perfectly and this explains her modesty and accommodatingness in Pereyaslavl. She did not dispute the tsarist right to collect taxes from Little Russia. On the contrary, Khmelnitsky himself suggested to Buturlin, "that the great sovereign, his imperial majesty, should point out from cities and places that the birans for the king and for the Roman monasteries and for the nobles should be collected for himself." General clerk Vygovsky said the same, suggesting that tax officials should be sent as soon as possible to carry out the census. The only thing that Khmelnitsky asked for was that the collection of taxes to the tsarist treasury be provided to local people in order to avoid misunderstandings between the population and Moscow officials, who are not used to the Little Russian order and Little Russian psychology. Moscow this request seemed quite reasonable and was granted without objection.
The boyars, of course, had no idea what use the Cossacks would make of it. Remaining true to their steppe nature of prey, they never sacrificed real, practical benefits to abstract principles. "Sovereign rights", "national independence" had no value in comparison with the actual ability to rule the country, dispose of its wealth, plunder the land, enslave the peasants. O national independence they did not even think, both because at that time no one knew what to do with it, and because of the extreme danger of this matter for the Cossack's welfare. In independent Ukraine, the Cossacks would never have been able to turn into the ruling class, let alone become landowners. The revolutionary peasantry, which had just escaped from the yoke of the landlord and was not going to go to any other, would have rushed entirely into the Cossacks and forever destroyed the privileged position of this class. But the Cossacks did not fill half a century with riots in the name of acquiring gentry rights, it was not for this that they passed through the bloody epic of the Khmelnytsky region, so as to simply abandon their age-old dream. It chose the surest method - to talk about her as little as possible. Fussing about the Cossack estate rights and pronouncing privileges, Bogdan and his comrades thought about much more - about retaining the real power they had seized. Their cunning in averting suspicions was reflected in the unconditional recognition of the order established during the uprising in Ukraine as temporary. In fact, this was the order they dreamed of and which they intended to maintain by all means. They only tried to gain time, better study Moscow politicians, penetrate into their plans and find out their weak points.
When this was done, when the tsarist government made several mistakes that contributed to strengthening the position of Bogdan, the situation began to develop favorably for him. From that time on, he did not even think about the temporality of the hetman's regime, but he became such an unlimited ruler in Little Russia, which the Polish king had never been. From the leader of the army, he became the ruler of the country. As for the Russian tsar, his administrative apparatus was simply not allowed into Little Russia until the 18th century. Power in Ukraine was usurped by the Cossacks.
The struggle of the Cossacks against the establishment of the state administration of Little Russia
It was considered self-evident that after the oath and other formalities associated with the annexation of Little Russia, the Moscow governors should take the place of the Polish governors and police officers. So the common people thought, so the Cossacks and the foreman, Vygovsky and Khmelnitsky said. Two years later, after the Pereyaslavl Rada, Pavel Teterya, sent by Khmelnitsky, assured the Duma people in Moscow that the Zaporozhye army wanted "all the cities and places that are in the Zaporozhye army to be owned by one royal majesty."
But the Moscow government did not bother to do this until the very death of Khmelnitsky. All his attention and forces were directed to the war with Poland, which had flared up because of Little Russia. It succumbed to the persuasion of Bogdan, who asked to postpone both the inventory on the subject of taxation and the dispatch of the governor, referring to wartime, to the constant presence of the Cossacks on campaigns, to the incompleteness of the registration. For three years, Moscow refrained from exercising its rights. And during this time, the hetman and the foreman, giving orders as complete masters, acquired an extraordinary taste for power and for enrichment they collected taxes from all strata of the population in their favor, judged, issued generally binding orders. Cossack institutions have appropriated the character of the departments of supreme power. If Moscow governors appeared in Little Russia immediately after the Pereyaslavl oath, the Cossacks would have no reason for such an experiment. Now they have done it successfully and, inspired by success, became bold and arrogant. When the government, in 1657, decisively raised the issue of introducing governors and levying taxes, Khmelnitsky rejected his own words in Pereyaslavl and from his speeches sent to Moscow. It turned out that "even in his thought it was not that the tsarist majesty in the big cities, in Chernigov, in Pereyaslavl, in Nizhyn, ordered his tsarist majesty to be the voivods, and while collecting the income, give the tsar's majesty to the governors. Being he, hetman, at the treatises of the tsarist majesty with the close boyar V.V. Buturlin and his comrades, they only said that the governors should be in the same city of Kiev ... "(38).
The death of Bogdan prevented an acute conflict from flaring up, but it broke out under Khmelnytsky's successor Ivan Vyhovsky, who began a long chain of hetman's betrayals and perjury. In his person, the foreman embarked on the path of open opposition to the imposition of the tsarist administration and, thereby, on the path of violating Moscow's sovereign rights. The "voevodsky" question acquired exceptional political significance. Strictly speaking, he was the cause of all the troubles that filled the second half of the 17th century. The governors became a monster, a nightmare that haunted the Cossack foreman in sleep and in reality. The slightest hint of their appearance plunged her into a feverish state. The governors tried to intimidate the entire people, presenting them as people cruel, greedy, heartless; they said that they would forbid the Little Russians to wear boots and introduce sandals, that the entire population would be driven to Siberia, that local customs and church rituals would be replaced by their own Moskal ones, that babies would be ordered to be baptized by immersion in water, and not by pouring them ... appearances in the region.
The abundance of complaints about all kinds of Moscow violence is characteristic of the entire second half of the 17th century. But it would be futile to get to the real foundations of these complaints. They were always expressed in a general form, without reference to specific facts, and always came from the foreman. This was done more often orally, and not in writing, at noisy councils when electing hetmans or when explaining about some Cossack betrayal. Neither in Moscow nor in the Little Russian archives were found office work and investigations concerning the insults or harassment perpetrated against the Little Russians by the tsarist officials, there is no indication of the very appearance of such documents. But there are many reasons to think that they did not exist.
Here is an episode dating back to 1662. The order hetman Samko complained to the tsar about the Moscow military men, who allegedly beat, robbed Pereyaslavtsy and called them traitors. According to him, even the governor of Prince. Volkonsky took part in this and peacefully allowed the brawlers, instead of punishing them. But when the tsar sent the steward Pyotr Bunakov to Pereyaslavl to find the guilty, Samko refused to investigate and made every effort to hush up the case. He said that some of the offended fell in the war, others were taken prisoner, and the third had no one to prosecute, because the offenders had disappeared. Bunakov lived in Pereyaslavl for a month - from May 29 to June 28 - and during all this time only one dragoon, caught in theft, was brought to him. He was beaten with a whip on a goat and led through the line. Summoning the Cossack chiefs, Bunakov asked: will there finally be petitions from the people of Pereyaslavl against the Moscow military men? They replied that many people from Pereyaslavl had already made peace with their offenders, and, in their opinion, there would be no new petitions soon, and therefore they believe that it makes no sense for him, Bunakov, to live here any longer (39). At the Hlukhiv council, when D. Mnogoshnykh was elected to hetman, in 1668, the tsar's sent prince. Romodanovsky, in response to the petty officer's statements that servicemen set fires for the purpose of robbery, said: there would have been a search, but according to the search, depending on the fault, that thief would have been committed for their theft and execution. It’s notable that you are now starting this business so that the governors would not be in the cities ”(40). The hetman and the foreman could not find what to object to this. Not being reflected in the act, documentary material, the abuses of the tsarist authorities are painted, but unusually magnificently, in all kinds of pamphlets, proclamations, anonymous letters, in the legendary stories of Ukraine. This kind of material is so abundant that it seduced some historians of the 19th century, like Kostomarov, who accepted it without criticism and repeated in his scholarly works the version about the abuses of the Moscow authorities.
It is well known that the Moscow bureaucracy of the 17th century cannot serve as a model of virtue. But whatever she was at home, she had a rare political tact in the annexation and colonization of foreign lands. In contrast to the British, Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutch, who exterminated entire peoples and civilizations, flooded the islands and continents with blood, Moscow possessed the secret of keeping the conquered peoples not only by coercion. Least of all she had a tendency to use cruel methods against the numerous, consanguineous, same-believing people of Little Russia, who voluntarily joined her. The government of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich and all subsequent ones knew perfectly well that such a people, if they wanted to leave, could not be held back by any force. The example of his recent departure from Poland was in everyone's mind. In Moscow, therefore, they jealously watched that the officials who got to Little Russia did not give their behavior a reason for dissatisfaction. It was difficult to protect oneself from isolated, petty abuses, but an energetic struggle was waged against them. When the steward Kikin, in the mid-60s, discovered that the lists of the taxable population included Cossacks brought there by negligence or by the evil will of the tsar's scribes - these scribes were severely punished. The same search and punishment were subjected to all the scribes noticed in extortion, for which reason the hetman with all the Poltava Cossacks brought gratitude to the tsar. In Moscow, they made sure that the Little Russians, even with a bad word, did not offend. After the betrayal of the hetmans Vyhovsky, Yuri Khmelnitsky, Bryukhovetsky, after countless transitions of the Cossacks from Moscow to Poland, from Poland to Moscow, when the most correct people could not restrain their irritation at such inconstancy, some Russian governors, in the cities adjacent to Ukraine, took the habit of calling the Little Russians who came to them for bargaining as traitors. When it became known in Moscow, a decree was sent to the voivods with a warning that "if in the future such inappropriate and obscene speeches are heard from them, they will be severely punished without any mercy." Even the most noble persons were sharply reprimanded for the slightest violation of Little Russian "liberties". We have received an unsubscribe from Moscow addressed to the prince. M. Volkonsky - the governor of Kanevsky. In 1676, this voivode fell into the hands of a spy from the right bank of the Dnieper, who confessed that he had gone from the hostile hetman Doroshenko with a "thieves' list" to Colonel Gursky. This was confirmed by the Colonel's servant. Volkonsky, without warning the left-bank hetman Samoilovich, to whom Gursky was subordinate, began a case of his treason. Samoilovich took offense and complained to Moscow. From there Volkonsky received a resignation and a reprimand: "Then you do not much with your foolishness, you intercede in their rights and liberties, forgetting our decree; and we instructed you to put you in jail for a day, but how will you be in Moscow, and then our decree, in addition it will be done to you "(41). Peter also forbade to reproach the Ukrainians with Mazepa's betrayal. In some important cases, he even threatened with the death penalty for this.
With such strictness and with such respect for the rights granted to them, the Cossacks had the opportunity to seek the elimination of the voivodship abuses, if there were any, in a peaceful, loyal way. But there was less abuse than talk about it. The Moscow administration in Ukraine, not having time to appear and take root, was formally ousted from there. It was not she who violated the rights and privileges granted to Ukrainians, but the Cossacks constantly violated the supreme rights of Moscow, which were accepted and sealed in Pereyaslavl.
For the first time, hetman Vygovsky was announced about the introduction of troops into Little Russia, at the end of 1657. For this purpose, the steward Kikin was sent to Little Russia with the news that troops were going there under the command of Prince. G. G. Romodanovsky and V. B. Sheremetev. In addition, to participate in the Rada, the royal sent to Prince. A.N. Trubetskoy and B.M. Khitrovo. Troops were sent to the cities as ordinary garrisons and the governors were not given administrative rights - neither the court, nor the collection of taxes, nor any branches of government concerned them. They were viewed as a simple military force to hold the king's possessions. Kikin was ordered to explain to the city dwellers that their liberties are not in danger, and that troops are sent to protect the region from the Poles and the Tatars. The Poles, at one time, did not allow the construction of fortresses in Ukraine, as a result of which it remained defenseless in the event of an external attack. Khmelnitsky and the foreman asked for its strengthening and protection with the help of the tsarist troops in 1654, including in their March petition a special point on this matter. And later, both Khmelnitsky and Vygovsky insisted on satisfying this request. Pavel Teterya petitioned for the sending of troops in 1656, when he was ambassador in Moscow. From the side of the Cossacks, Moscow least of all could expect any kind of opposition. But then it became clear how poorly she knew her enemies and her friends in Ukraine. It so happened that in the cities and villages the news of the arrival of the Moscow troops was met with approval, even with enthusiasm, while a hostile reaction followed from the hetman and the Cossacks. Bourgeois, muzhiks and ordinary Cossacks expressed to the tsar solicitor Ragozin, when he was on his way to Vygovsky, a desire to completely replace the Cossack administration with the tsarist administration. Kotlyar voyt in Lubny - said: "We were all happy when we were told that there would be tsarist governors, boyars and military men; we are philistines with the Cossacks and the rabble at the same time. to beat the great sovereign with his forehead, so that we have governors. " Poor Cossacks said the same: "We are all happy to be under the sovereign's hand, but our elders will not be dashing, they are reeling, only the whole rabble is glad to be behind the great sovereign." Protopop Maksim Filimonov of Nizhyn wrote directly to boyar Rtischev: "Please, my dear sir, advise the tsar to take the local lands and Cherkassk cities on himself and put his own governors, because everyone wants, all the mob is glad to have one true sovereign, so that there is someone to rely on. They are only afraid of two things: that they should not be driven from here to Moscow, and that the customs of the local church and secular ones should not be changed. .. We all wish and ask that we have one Lord in heaven and one king on earth. Some elders oppose this for their own profit: having loved the power, they do not want to give up on it. ”(42) Approximately the same was said by the Zaporozhian Cossacks who sent their embassy to Moscow secretly from Vygovsky.
In June 1658, when the voivode VB Sheremetev went to Kiev, the inhabitants greeted him all the way, came out to meet with icons, asked to send the tsar's voivods to the other cities (43). On the other hand, the news of the arrival of the tsarist troops caused panic and angry alertness among the hetman and the foreman. It intensified when it became known that the steward Kikin, on the way, was making explanations to the Cossacks regarding the non-payment of their salaries. The tsarist government did not demand any taxes from Little Russia for four years. Even now it did not insist on their immediate payment, but it was alarmed by rumors about the dissatisfaction of the simple Cossacks, who systematically did not receive salaries. Fearing that this discontent would not turn to Moscow, it ordered Kikin to inform the people that all extortions from Ukraine go not to the tsarist, but to the hetman's treasury, are collected and spent by the Cossack authorities.
Vyhovsky sensed a considerable danger for himself in such explanations. We already know that Moscow, having agreed to Bogdan's request to pay salaries to the Cossacks, linked this issue with taxation; she wanted the salary to come from the sums of the Little Russian levies.
Neither Khmelnitsky nor his sent Samoilo Bogdanov and Pavel Teterya made any objections to this, and it is difficult to imagine any objections, but Bogdan's petition, which contained a salary clause, which he sent to Moscow in March 1654, turned out to be hidden from the entire Cossacks, even from the foreman. Only a few persons, including the military clerk Vygovsky, knew about the requests set forth there (44). The old hetman apparently did not want to draw anyone's attention to the issue of collecting taxes and to the financial issue in general. In the "budget" of Little Russia, no one, except for the hetman district, should have been dedicated. It is impossible not to see in this new evidence of the baseness of the goals with which power was seized over Southern Russia. For the first time, Khmelnitsky's articles were read out in 1659 during the election of his son Yuri to hetmans, but in 1657 Vyhovsky was as little interested in their publicity as Bogdan. Kikin's explanations hastened his break with Moscow. He arrived in Korsun, summoned the colonels there and laid down the mace. “I don’t want to be your hetman; the tsar is taking away our former liberties, and I don’t want to be in captivity.” The colonels returned the mace to him and promised to stand together for the freedom. Then the hetman uttered a phrase that signified outright treason: "You colonels must swear allegiance to me, but I did not swear allegiance to the sovereign, Khmelnitsky swore." This, apparently, even for the Cossack foreman was not quite a decent statement, so that Poltava Colonel Martyn Pushkar responded: "All the Zaporozhye army swore allegiance to the great sovereign, and what did you swear to, saber or squeak?" (45). In Crimea, the Moscow envoy Yakushkin managed to find out that Vygovsky was probing the ground in case of transferring to citizenship to Khan Megmet Girey. The reason is also known: "the tsar sends them a voivode to the Cherkasy cities, but he does not want to be under their command, but wants to own the cities himself, as Khmelnitsky owned them" (46).
Meanwhile, the book. G. G. Romodanovsky with the army waited seven weeks for the hetman in Pereyaslavl, and when Vygovsky appeared, he reproached him for his slowness. He pretended that he had come at the request of Khmelnitsky, and Vygovsky himself, while now, they do not give him feed in Pereyaslavl, which is why he pissed off the horses, and people began to run away from lack of food. If they don’t give food in the future, then he, the prince, will retreat back to Belgorod. The hetman apologized for the problem, but strongly asked not to retreat, referring to the instability in Zaporozhye and elsewhere. It is quite possible that he was sincere in this case. Vyhovsky was extremely unpopular among the "rabble"; in him they rightly saw the conductor of the idea of the full supremacy of the foreman to the detriment of the simple Cossacks. The Cossacks also did not like him because he forbade them to fish and keep wine for sale. They were ready to rebel against him at the first opportunity. The hetman knew this and was afraid. In this sense, the presence of Moscow troops in Ukraine played into his hands. He told Romodanovsky: "After Bohdan Khmelnitsky, there were mutinies and vacillations and riots in many Cherkasy cities, but when you came with the army, everything calmed down. And in Zaporozhye, there is a great mutiny ...". But, apparently, the danger of the stay of the tsarist troops in the region outweighed in his eyes the benefits that they brought him. It was at this moment, that is, with the arrival of Romodanovsky, that his decision about treason finally matured.
Meanwhile, Martin Pushkar, a Poltava colonel, rebelled against the hetman. Among other early people, there was also a vacillation, so that Vygovsky executed some of them in Gadyach, and set out on a campaign against Pushkar, summoning the Crimean Tatars to help him. Moscow was alarmed. Ivan Apukhtin was sent to the hetman with an order not to deal with his opponents without permission and not to bring the Tatars, but to wait for the tsarist army. Apukhtin wanted to go to Pushkar to persuade him, but Vygovsky would not let him. At that time he was already rude and unceremonious with the royal messengers. He laid siege to Poltava, took Pushkar by treachery and gave the city to a horrific pogrom against the Tatars. Moscow, meanwhile, managed to fully learn about his intentions. From the words of the Metropolitan of Kiev, clergy, relatives of the late Khmelnytsky, Kiev bourgeois and all ranks of people, it became known about Vygovsky's relations with the Poles with a view to transferring to them. On August 16, 1658, workers from the forests came running to Kiev with the news that the Cossacks and Tatars were marching under the city, and on August 23 Danilo Vygovsky, the hetman's brother, came to Kiev with a twenty thousand Cossack-Tatar army. Voivoda Sheremetev did not allow himself to be caught by surprise and repulsed the attack with great damage for Vygovsky. Thus, the Cossacks declared a real war on Moscow. On September 6, 1658, Hetman Vyhovsky concluded a treaty in Gadyach with the Polish ambassador Benevsky, according to which the Zaporozhye army renounced the tsarist citizenship and laid down for the king. Under this treaty, Ukraine was united with the Commonwealth on the rights of an allegedly original state called the "Grand Duchy of Russia". The hetman was elected by the Cossacks and was confirmed by the king for life. He belonged to the supreme executive branch... The Cossack register was defined as 30,000 people. Of these, the hetman had the right to present several people to the king every year for elevation to the dignity of the gentry so that their number from each regiment did not exceed 100. The agreement was drawn up in such a way that many vital issues for Ukraine were left unresolved and vague. That was the problem of the Union. Little Russians did not want to see her at home, but the fanaticism of Polish Catholics was no less. They flew into a rage at the mere thought of possible concessions to the schismatics. The Polish commissar Benevsky, who concluded an agreement with Vygovsky, had to persuade the deputies of the Diet in Warsaw for a long time. “We now have to agree to destroy the Union in order to lure them with this,” he said, “and then ... we will create a law that everyone can believe as he pleases, - so the Union will remain intact. the form of a special principality will also not be long: the Cossacks, who are now thinking about it, will die, and their heirs will not cherish it so ardently and little by little everything will take its former form "(47). The Poles had the same insidious plan for the restoration of serfdom. Neither the powers of the land owners, nor the rights of the peasants who will live on their lands were absolutely not stipulated in the treatise. Vyhovsky and the foreman tacitly sold the common people into slavery, from which he came out with such torment during the Khmelnichyna. Despite the fact that the Rada consisted of a select part of the Cossacks, the treaty aroused so many doubts in her that it was almost rejected. He saved Teterya's situation by shouting: "Hey! Zgodimosa, good fellows, zgodimos - we will be mother, obeyingly move the calf to the mother!" At the feast that followed, Vyhovsky assured the Cossacks that they would all be promoted to the gentry under this agreement (48).
It turned out, however, that not all of the Zaporozhye army followed Vygovsky, many remained loyal to Moscow, and having chosen a new hetman Bespaly, they began a war with Vygovsky. January 15, 1659, Prince. A.N. Trubetskoy with a large army came to the aid of Bespaliy. But at the end of June, this army suffered a cruel defeat near Konotop. The Tatar Khan and Vygovsky with their followers came there. One of the Russian leaders, book. SR Pozharsky, carried away by the pursuit of the Cossacks, fell into a trap, was crushed by the Tatars and found himself with his army in captivity. He himself was executed for his violent behavior (he spat in the face of the khan); the rest of the Russian prisoners, in the amount of 5,000 people, were taken out to the field by the Cossacks and slaughtered like rams (49). Having learned about the death of Pozharsky's detachment, Trubetskoy retreated to Putivl in a terrible disorder. If the Tatars wanted, they could at that moment easily reach Moscow itself. But the khan, having quarreled with Vygovsky, took his troops to the Crimea, and Vygovsky had to return to Chigirin. He tried to act against the Muscovites from there, sending his brother Danilo with an army to them, but on August 22 Danilo was utterly defeated.
On August 30, voivode Sheremetev wrote from Kiev to the tsar that the colonels of Pereyaslavl, Nezhinsky, Chernigov, Kiev and Lubensk again swore allegiance to the tsar. Hearing about this, the western side of the Dnieper also began to worry and almost all moved away from Vyhovsky. The Cossacks gathered around Yuri Khmelnitsky, the son of Bogdan, who on September 5 wrote to Sheremetev that he and the entire Zaporozhye army wanted to serve the sovereign. On the same day, the governor Trubetskoy moved from Putivl to Ukraine and was met everywhere with triumph, with the thunder of cannons. Pereyaslavl arranged a particularly solemn meeting. The population everywhere swore allegiance to the king.
It turned out as Andrei Pototsky predicted, seconded by the Poles to Vyhovsky and commander of a Polish auxiliary detachment with him. Observing the events, he wrote to the king: "Do not please your royal grace to expect anything good for yourself from this land. All local residents (Pototsky meant the inhabitants of the right bank) will soon be Moscow, for they will be drawn to the Dnieper region (eastern side), and they want this and are only looking for an opportunity to achieve what they want in a more plausible way "(50). Vyhovsky's betrayal showed how difficult it is to tear Ukraine away from the Moscow State. Some four years have passed since the day of the accession, and the people have already got used to the new citizenship so that they did not want to hear about anything else.

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