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1. Introduction

5. Strengthening of the NPT

7. Iran's problem

9. Conclusion

List of sources

1. Introduction

The first prerequisites for nuclear weapons appeared in the 19th century, and in the middle of the 20th century, the first tests of the newest type of weapons were conducted in the United States - a nuclear bomb. The first bomb is blown up in the USA in July 1945. In order of testing. The second and third were discarded by the Americans in August of the same year to the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - this is the first and only in the history of mankind the case of the combat use of nuclear weapons. In 1949, nuclear weapons appeared in the USSR, in 1952 in the UK and in 1960 in France. The presence of a nuclear weapon attached to it the status of the superpower and guaranteed certain military safety and stability. In subsequent years, China joined the number of owners of nuclear weapons. Evaluation possible consequences The use of nuclear weapons during the armed conflict led to the fact that the UN member states came to an agreement on the need to ban free access to nuclear weapons and the need for international control over nuclear technologies and use nuclear energy.

2. Agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

The military use of atomic energy began in 1945, when the Americans held a test in the Alamogordo desert, and then applied nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From this point on, the countdown of the development of atomic weapons began. In 1954, the world's first nuclear power plant was opened in Obninsk. There was a balance between the military use of atomic energy and peaceful use. The international community faced the question of how H6e to allow nuclear weapons to propagate, as this can cause the deepening of instability in the world, and at the same time discover the path to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It is from this time that work begins on the development of international norms to limit nuclear weapons, which in the final form were called "Agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."

It participates all states of the world, except India, Israel, DPRK and Pakistan. Thus, on coverage, it is the most comprehensive arms control agreement. The contract divides the participating States into two categories - nuclear and non-nuclear. The nuclear countries attributed to the nuclear explosive device at the time of signing the contract: Russia, the USA, China, the United Kingdom and France. All of them are at the same time constant members of the UN Security Council. Non-nuclear countries are not eligible for the creation of nuclear weapons.

The NPT came into force in 1970 and originally had a period of 25 years. In 1995, the Conference of the Participating Countries and the Extension of the NPT extended a contract for an indefinite period, making it an indefinite.

3. The main provisions of the contract

The Agreement establishes that the state with nuclear weapons is considered that which produced and exploded such a weapon or device before January 1, 1967 (that is, the USSR, USA, the United Kingdom, France and China).

Under the contract, each of the States Parties to the Agreement with nuclear weapons undertakes not to transmit anyone this weapon or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as control over them either directly nor indirectly; Equally, as in no way help, do not encourage and not encourage any state that does not possess nuclear weapons, to the production or acquisition by any other way of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as control over them.

Each of the States Parties to the Agreement not possessing nuclear weapons undertakes not to take from anyone to nuclear weapons and / or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as control over them either directly nor indirectly; Equally, how not to produce and do not acquire any other way of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to make any help in their production.

The contract establishes the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in accordance with the Treaty. The contract obliges its participants to exchange equipment, materials, scientific and technical information for these purposes, to promote the receipt of non-nuclear states from any peaceful use of nuclear explosions.

An important addition to the Agreement is the UN Security Council resolution of June 19, 1968 and identical applications for three nuclear powers - USSR, USA and Great Britain on the security guarantees of non-nuclear member states of the treaty. The resolution provides that in the case of a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear state or the threat of such an attack, the Security Council and above all, its permanent members with nuclear weapons will immediately act in accordance with the UN Charter to reflect aggression; It also confirms the right of states on individual and collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter until the Security Council will adopt the necessary measures to maintain international Mira and security. In the statements with which each of the three powers made when adopting this resolution, it is indicated that any state that committed aggression with the use of nuclear weapons or threatening such aggression should be aware that its actions will be effectively reflected with the help of measures taken in accordance with UN Charter; They also proclaimed the intention of the USSR, the USA and the UK to assist the non-nuclear member of the contract, which will be subjected to a nuclear attack.

Five states with nuclear weapons assumed commitments to not apply it against states who do not have such a weapon, with the exception of the situation when they respond to a nuclear strike or an attack with the use of conventional funds committed in alliance with a nuclear state. These obligations, however, were not included in the text of the contract itself, and the specific form of such obligations could change over time. The United States, for example, indicated that they can apply nuclear weapons in response to an attack with the use of non-nuclear "weapons of mass destruction", such as biological or chemical weapons, since the United States cannot apply in response. UK Defense Minister Joff Hong indirectly pointed to the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to an attack with the use of ordinary weapons implemented by any of the "Iraev states".

The article VI and the preamble of the contract states that nuclear states will strive to reduce and destroy their nuclear reserves. Nevertheless, for more than 30 years of the existence of the contract, little was done in this direction. In Article I, nuclear states undertake not to "encourage any state that does not possess nuclear weapons ... to acquire nuclear weapons" - however, the adoption by the nuclear state of military doctrine, based on the possibility of applying a proactive strike, as well as other understanding of the application armed Forces, it is possible in principle to consider as such a motion. The X article states that any state has the right to get out of the contract if it considers that it is forced to do this in view of any "emergency event" - for example, in view of the alleged threat.

The contract itself does not establish a mechanism for checking its compliance, as well as an international body that monitors its implementation. Such a monitoring is carried out by review conferences convened every five years. As a rule, review conferences are held in New York in May. In the breaks between them, by decision of the 1995 Conference, the sessions of the Preparatory Committee are collected - two sessions in the period between conferences.

In practice, the International NPC compliance function is performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with which each Participant of an Agreement not possessing nuclear weapons is obliged to conclude the appropriate agreement.

4. International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) was established in 1957 in accordance with the UN Decision of December 4, 1954 and enters the UN system with which a special agreement is associated. It annually presents a report on its activities to the UN General Assembly and, if necessary, to the UN Security Council. The main area of \u200b\u200bactivity is the peaceful use of atomic energy. The IAEA convenes international scientific forums to discuss the development of nuclear energy, sends to various countries Specialists for assistance in research work provides intermediary interstate services for the transfer of nuclear equipment and materials. Much attention in the activities of the IAEA is given to the issues of ensuring the safety of nuclear power, especially after the accident at the Chernobyl NPP in 1986. However, one of the most important functions is to control the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular, with the control of the observance of the NPT. Each contract not possessing nuclear weapons is obliged to conclude an appropriate agreement with the IAEA, which is the world's only international inspector on nuclear guarantees and monitoring security measures in the field of civilian nuclear programs.

According to agreements signed with states, the IAEA inspectors regularly visit nuclear facilities for reconciling the location of nuclear materials, testing tools established by the IAEA and observational equipment, inventory of nuclear materials. Together, these and other control measures provide an independent international certificate that States follow their commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. To control the implementation of current agreements on guarantees signed by the Agency with 145 Member States of the IAEA (as well as Taiwan,), 250 IAEA experts daily in all parts of the world conduct inspections on places to verify the action of guarantee agreements. The purpose of inspections is to make sure that nuclear materials are applied in legitimate peaceful purposes, and are not used for military purposes. Thus, the IAEA contributes to international security and multiplies efforts to terminate the distribution of weapons and the movement to the world free from nuclear weapons.

With the IAEA, warranty agreements may be concluded of various typesSuch as a guarantee agreement relating to the non-proliferation agreement, these agreements require non-nuclear states to provide all their activities associated with the full nuclear fuel cycle from non-nuclear states. Other types of agreements relate to warranties at single enterprises. The guarantees of the IAEA under an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are an integral part of the international non-proliferation regime and are indispensable to ensure the implementation of the contract.

Currently, 146 states consist in the IAEA. Management bodies - convened annually General Conference (General Conference) of all member countries, the Board of Governors of 35 people, guiding the Agency's practical activities, and the Secretariat that carries out the current work (is headed by the Director General). The headquarters of the IAEA is located in the International Vienna Center. In addition, the IAEA contains regional offices in Canada, Geneva, New York and Tokyo, Laboratories in Austria and Monaco and a research center in Trieste (Italy), which manages UNESCO. With 2005, the organization is headed by Mohammed Al-Baradei.

Speaking at the 2005 conference, Al-Baradei presented proposals to strengthen and tighten the non-proliferation regime. In particular, he proposed to tighten the actions of the UN Security Council against any country that comes out of the day; tighten the investigations and prosecution of any illegal trade in nuclear materials and technologies; accelerate the nuclear disarmament of the NPT participants with nuclear weapons; Take measures aimed at eliminating the existing security deficit in regions similar to the Middle East and Korean Peninsula.

The tightening of requirements, he explains that at present, about 40 countries in the world have the potential opportunity to create nuclear weapons. In the world there is a real "black market" of nuclear materials, more and more new countries are attempting to acquire technologies for the production of materials suitable for use in nuclear weapons. There is also an obviously pronounced desire of terrorists to get weapons of mass destruction.

This is the most important disadvantage of this regime. Member countries themselves defined which objects to put under the guarantees of the IAEA. This opened the opportunity to violate the contract, since any state could hide the presence of infrastructure for the creation of nuclear weapons, and to test his IAEA did not have the right. At the same time, even such limited inspections allowed to open some facts of illegal activities. First of all, in the early 1990s, during the inspections conducted by the IAEA in North Korean facilities, the implementation of Pyongyan secret and highly large-scale nuclear program was revealed.

This lack of inspection regime became particularly obvious after during the first war in the zone of the Persian Gulf 1990-91. It was found that Iraq quite actively performed a secret nuclear program. As a result, in 1996, an agreement was reached under the IAEA on the model additional protocol to guarantee agreements. Such protocols were invited to sign all states, including nuclear. The IAEA inspectors received the right to visit objects not declared by the receiving party as nuclear. This significantly expanded the possibilities of Verification Verification Agency.

To control the supply of hazardous nuclear materials, the States Parties that have nuclear technologies in the 1970s. Created two informal "club" - a group of nuclear suppliers (GPE) and the Tsangger Committee. Although the decisions of these structures are not legally binding, the participating countries voluntarily fulfill them. At the meetings of the "clubs" uniting several dozen countries, control lists of materials and technologies are agreed, the export of which is subject to control by the competent bodies of the States parties. In addition, political decisions are also considered there. In particular, in 1992, a group of nuclear suppliers decided to prohibit the transfer of any nuclear technologies (including peaceful purposes) to countries that did not provide all their nuclear facilities under the guarantee of the IAEA, naturally, with the exception of five nuclear powers in NPT.

5. Strengthening of the NPT

non-proliferation nuclear weapon Iranian

Recently, discussions were revived on revising or strengthening a number of NPT positions. However, the document reflects the carefully verified global balance of interests and compromises between almost two hundred countries of the world. Under these conditions, making changes and additions to it contains the risk that the "opening" of the package may lead to avalanche-like growth of proposals and requirements from many states. As a result, the existing contract itself may be buried under the load of these queries. Therefore, the majority of states do not show the readiness to "open" the document for new negotiations on its improvement.

Nevertheless, the discussion is conducted. The yield of the DPRK from the NPT in 2004 and the subsequent nuclear testing has attracted attention to article 10 of the document regulating the output from it. This article allows any member state to emerge from the NPT, if the highest interests of its national security are jeopardy. Such a state should send a notification of the exit to the depository and UN to the states and by the UN, and after 6 months. It can consider itself free of obligations under the contract.

The DPRK took advantage of this right to twice - in 1994 and 2004. The precedent created by Pyongyan showed that states may be within the NPT, it is quite legally legally to develop nuclear technologies (hiding military components of atomic programs), and if necessary, to exit the contract and not suffer from punishment. The understanding of the unacceptability of this provision began to grow.

A number of proposals have been put forward. First, it is generally prohibited from the day. This radical idea did not meet any serious support, since it contradicts the sovereignty of states and there is a contrary to the established general international legal practice. Another proposal is to oblige the states emerging from the NPT, refuse the benefits of them as a result of membership in the contract. They would have to return nuclear equipment, materials and technologies to suppliers. They would also deprive the right to continue such deliveries. But such a proposal that does not require compulsory amendments to the document itself, was negatively met by most developing countries. These states pointed out that in practice, the materials and technologies obtained by the state received by the published state would be extremely difficult and indirectly such a position would actually weaken the use of military force against countries who left the treaty.

The lively debate is conducted and around Article 4, recognizing all participating States by the right to the peaceful use of atomic energy and a binding state with nuclear technologies, to assist those countries that do not have such technologies. At the same time, there are technological similarities between peaceful and military nuclear programs. So, if the state acquires uranium enrichment technology to the levels required for the production of fuel for nuclear power plant (several percent of the content of uranium-235 isotope), it will be in virtually all necessary knowledge and technologies for its further enrichment to the weapon level (over 80% of uranium-235). In addition, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) NPP reactors are raw materials for obtaining another weapon material - plutonium. Of course, the creation of Radiochemical enterprises is required to develop Plutonium from SNF, but the very presence of high-tech raw materials for such production is an important stage of realizing a possible weapon program. Under these conditions, the production of weapons uranium and plutonium suitable for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device is only a matter of time and political will.

Since the direct prohibition of the creation of national industries for the enrichment of uranium and recycling in the contract is absent, a number of countries have put forward the following proposal. Countries, not yet have such production, could voluntarily refuse him. In exchange for this, states already providing these technologies would guarantee them to supply nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants and research reactors at a fair price. To give such guarantees a greater reliability, international production centers, joint ventures involving interested countries, as well as the "fuel bank" under the auspices of the IAEA, could be created for the production of reactor fuel. Of course, the suppliers would repatriate the SNF, which would remove the concerns about its possible use for the operation of weapons plutonium.

This initiative also did not cause enthusiasm in developing countries. They are afraid that in the case of its adoption of the country of the world will be separated on those who have the right to the scientific production of nuclear materials and devoid of such law. Concern causes the fact that the refusal to geographical expansion of such capacities will supply existing manufacturers to a privileged position and allow them to monopolize the fast-growing market of peaceful nuclear energy. As a result, prices will grow even more, and this will strike at least developed countries. No exception that manufacturing countries will be able to manipulate supply to achieve political goals and providing pressure on recipient states.

In general, the question of the discriminatory nature of the NPT is very acute. As mentioned above, this document divides the country of the world on those who have the right to possess nuclear weapons (nuclear "five"), and on those who do not have such a right (all others are more than 180 countries). During the negotiations on the conclusion of the NPT, non-nuclear countries went on such a decision in exchange for two conditions: first, the acquisition of access to nuclear energy (recorded in Article 4, see above) and, secondly, the promise of nuclear powers to strive for nuclear disarmament (Article 6).

According to many non-nuclear states, not only developing, nuclear powers do not fulfill their obligations under Article 6. The main discontent causes the fact that four of them (USA, Russia, United Kingdom and France) are not ready to talk about universal and complete nuclear disarmament. Some nuclear powers are trying to react to such criticism. So, the Government of Great Britain conducted a study of the conditions under which we can talk about full nuclear disarmament. China declares its commitment to universal and complete nuclear disarmament, but refuses to go to any disarmament steps until other nuclear powers disarm to a relatively low level of Chinese nuclear potential. Probably Russia carrying the main burden of nuclear disarmament would be helpful to nominate any positive initiative with respect to universal and complete nuclear disarmament.

Criticia causes the refusal of the same four nuclear powers to make a commitment not to apply the first nuclear weapons. China declares adherence to this principle, although this promise cannot be checked and is clearly propaganda. Unfoliated non-nuclear countries and the reluctance of nuclear powers to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in their national security concepts.

Many non-nuclear countries, primarily developing, require the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons by analogy with already signed conventions prohibiting other species, chemical and biological. Although it is obvious that in the foreseeable future, such a convention has no prospects, this issue is constantly rising at review conferences of the NPT member states and meetings of preparatory committees.

Recently, the US and the United Kingdom have been criticized, which has begun to modernize their programs nuclear power. The concern of the fate of the Russian-American process of reducing strategic offensive arms after the expiration of the START Treaty in 2009 and the Russian-American Moscow Treaty (SNP Treaty) in 2012 regularly put forward requirements, primarily to Russia and the United States on the beginning of the negotiation process. to reduce tactical nuclear weapons. In particular, they need to submit a report on the implementation of the presidential nuclear initiatives 1991-1992, according to which a significant part of the tactical nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation and the United States was removed from combat duty, and in the future or eliminated or placed on central storage facilities. How much can be judged by open informationRussia has not fully fulfilled these decisions that are not legally binding.

6. Unrecognized nuclear states

Another challenging problem is to give a universal NPT. Outside it remains 4 states - India, Israel, Pakistan and DPRK. All these countries are nuclear, although this is not recognized as a contract, since three of them produced nuclear tests after the document entered into force, and Israel does not recognize at all (but also does not reject) the presence of nuclear weapons. The accession of these states by the NPT is possible only as non-nuclear, i.e. In the event that, according to the example of South Africa, the late 1980s - early 1990s, they will agree to destroy their nuclear potential. Otherwise, we would have to revise the relevant provisions of the document, to which the participating States are clearly not ready.

The DPRK in 2006 agreed to eliminate its nuclear program in exchange for assistance from the United States, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, as well as in response to the political concessions of Washington. Currently, Pyongyang is starting to implement commitments. Therefore, in the future, the return of the DPRK in the NPT is not excluded.

Israel officially expresses in support of the creation in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, but only after achieving a sustainable world in the region. Given the uncertainty of the prospects for durable Arab-Israeli settlement, the foggy remains the prospects for the denuclearization of Israel. Officially, Israel also did not test the nuclear weapons. At the same time, there are reason to believe that such a test was produced by it together with South Africa in the late 1970s.

Unlike Israel, India and Pakistan are ready to return to nuclear-free status only with recognized nuclear powers. India for the first time experienced a nuclear explosive device in 1974, stating that he made it in the "peaceful" purposes. After that, she abstained from such tests until 1997, although it had the necessary technologies and materials. Such restraint was most likely due to the reluctance to provoke Islamabad. From the point of view of conventional weapons and armed forces, India significantly exceeds Pakistan and, therefore, does not need nuclear deterrence.

However, in 1997, Delhi decided to hold nuclear tests. It provoked Pakistan to respond. As a result, India lost its military advantages. Most likely, Delhi decided to conduct nuclear tests to try out the nuclear warheads created after 1974, prior to the entry into force of a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests (CTBT).

Currently, the international community actually completed with the nuclear status of India and Pakistan. Sanctions introduced by a number of countries against these states after they conduct nuclear tests in 1997, mostly removed. The emphasis is that Delhi and Islamabad have become sources of distribution of nuclear materials and technologies. They do not enter into a pile, nor in the Tsenger Committee and, therefore, have no obligations to export control.

At the same time, Pakistan is a special danger. If India unilaterally created an effective national export control mechanism, Pakistan, on the contrary, has become the main source of illegal supplies of nuclear materials and technologies. At the beginning of the current decade, the activities of the underground international network led by the "Father" of the Pakistani nuclear bomb of A.K. Khan. There is reason to believe that this network has delivered technology and materials for the implementation of North Korea, Iran and Libya nuclear programs. Special alarm is the fact that A.K. Khan apparently had a "cover" in organs state power Pakistan. In this country, it is extremely unlikely that such deliveries were carried out bypassing the power structures. Indirectly this information confirms the fact that after the disclosure of the underground network A.K. Khan was pardoned by the president of Pakistan and is under house arrest. However, there are no guarantees that Khan's accomplices and his patrons in Pakistani power structures do not continue to supply the emerging international nuclear "black market".

In addition, there are concerns about the security of the storage of Pakistani nuclear ammunition and the possibility of their unauthorized use. It is assumed that for security reasons, they are rejected from the means of delivery and are located on one of the most protected military bases, where the actual residence of the President of Musharraf is located. Nevertheless, the risk that they may be in foreign hands as a result of the state coup were preserved. It was reported that the tracking of Pakistani nuclear warheads is a priority for the US Securities and Israel. The United States also grieves Islamabad in the implementation of some technical measures to strengthen nuclear safety.

In relation to India, a course was taken to gradually withdraw it from the international "nuclear" isolation. According to the decision of the GPE from 1992, it is forbidden to supply any nuclear materials and technologies to this country. This creates serious problems for the development of Indian nuclear power, since Delhi cannot import nuclear reactors and fuel for them. Russia built a reactor for nuclear power plants in Kudankulam, referring to the fact that the corresponding agreement was achieved before the decision of the PC (the completion of the existing contracts in 1992 was permitted). However, the Russian Federation and India faced serious problems in the supply of fuel for this NPP, allowing the gyap refused. According to available information, fuel was still delivered.

In 2005, India and the United States concluded a nuclear deal. In accordance with it, Washington removes the supply restrictions in India materials and technologies in exchange for a number of concessions from the Indian side. Among them is the division of civil and military nuclear facilities and the statement of the first warranties of the IAEA. According to Americans, such a decision will allow to fix the dimensions of the Indian nuclear complex of military assignment and limit the extension of the country's nuclear potential. When concluding a nuclear transaction in Washington, the fact that India responsibly relates to the fight against illegal exports of nuclear materials and technologies and has never been a source of deliveries to a nuclear "black market".

The implementation of the transaction requires sanction by the PCP, since it contradicts its decision from 1992. The United States officially appealed to this organization asking India "as an exception" special status. This request caused discontent of a number of non-nuclear states, first of all, with the technical capabilities of creating nuclear weapons, but making a political decision to abandon the acquisition of nuclear status. Among those countries - Japan, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Norway. At one time, they refused to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for a number of privileges, including those related to obtaining unhindered access to the international market of peaceful nuclear technologies. Therefore, from their point of view, the provision of similar privileges of India, who did not sign the NPT and created nuclear weapons, undermines their status and creates an incentive for other countries to follow the Indian example in violation of its non-proliferation obligations. The opposition in the gyp was unexpectedly strong, and while the request of the United States was not satisfied.

Thus, through various pressure and cooperation measures, the international community encourages unrecognized nuclear states to voluntarily adopt at the national level measures for effective control over the export of nuclear materials and technologies. At the same time, they are involved in international regimes capable of limiting their nuclear potentials. Thus, joining the CTBT or at least compliance with the voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing prevents the modernization of nuclear forces of unrecognized nuclear powers that do not have effective means of computer simulation of such tests. In the case of the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of testing of splitting materials, they will also not be able to produce armory nuclear materials and, therefore, increase their nuclear potential.

7. Iran's problem

The disadvantages of the NPT mode very brightly shows the situation around the Iranian nuclear program. In this situation, two aspects should be allocated. The first is the Iranian uranium enrichment program, the second is to resolve the issues of compliance with Tehran Agreement on the guarantees with the IAEA, which was signed back in 1974 in the doubt that Iran fulfills its obligations under an agreement, a long time ago. However, only in 2002, cosmic snapshots were published, where nuclear facilities are visible. Contrary to its obligations, Tehran did not inform the IAEA on creating these facilities and on other types of activities in the nuclear field. The IAEA demanded the provision of all information on an undeclared activity of Iran. However, for several years, Iranian leadership could not satisfy the requirements of the Agency.

If the situation around the agreement of 1974 is a violation of the international non-proliferation regime, the question of Iran's uranium program is more complicated. In accordance with Article 4 days, Iran, as well as any other non-nuclear member state, has the right to develop peaceful nuclear energy. Tehran argues that he seeks to acquire technical opportunities for uranium enrichment solely to establish its own fuel production for nuclear power plants. So far there is no reason to believe that Iran managed to produce highly enriched uranium, not to mention the weapon. However, having received power to enrich uranium to the level to use it as fuel, it will be able to apply the same technology for its further enrichment before the weapon level. But these are only concerns, and they are not coded in the text of the NPT and other international legal documents.

The United States and their allies insist that Iran should stop the uranium program. In their opinion, he can realize his rights arising from article 4 days, only when performing all other provisions of the contract. Such argument is controversial. Therefore, Washington made serious international efforts to delegitimize the Iranian program. At the same time, he fully took advantage of Tehran's reluctance to resolve questions from the IAEA. Infinite tightening with the provision of necessary documentation, constant problems with the admission of international inspectors, the aggressive rhetoric forced all major powers to agree that the issue of Iran is assigned to the UN Security Council. But then the Iranian leadership did not go for concessions, which opened the way to adopt several resolutions of the SS, requiring from Tehran to resolve issues from the IAEA and stop the uranium enrichment program. Iran in the caller manner rejected these resolutions than violated its obligations as a UN member. This allowed Americans to legally reinforce their position.

At the same time, the requirements of the UN Security Council resolutions included requirements for Iran's uranium program, which are unlikely to be consistent with the current international legal regime of non-proliferation. Why the Russian Federation and China agreed with this, it is not clear. Such a position had a great promotion of Washington and made it difficult to find a diplomatic solution to the problem. If Iran even worst questions from the IAEA, that he finally promised to do, Moscow and Beijing will still be subject to the strongest pressure from the West in order to introduce new, more stringent, sanctions at the UN Security Council level against Tehran.

8. Other elements of the international legal regime, complementing the NPT

There are a number of international legal instruments that complement the NPT. Some of them were signed before the conclusion of this contract. These documents prohibit or limit the deployment of nuclear weapons in separate geographic zones and spatial environments, as well as impose limits on certain types of weapons nuclear activities. International legal documents are complemented by voluntary measures taken by states unilaterally.

There are four regional treaties for the creation of nuclear weapons free zones. Tlatello contract prohibits such deployment in Latin America and the Caribbean countries, the Rarotong Agreement - in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean, the Pelinda Paul Agreement - and Africa and the Bangkok Agreement in Southeast Asia. Back in the late 1950s. Non-surfactant was announced Antarctica. In addition, Mongolia declared a nuclear zone. There is a discussion of creating such a zone in Central Asia, but so far this idea is not implemented. The initiative to create a nuclear-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe was rejected by Central European countries. They feared that the creation of such a zone would prevent them with admission to NATO.

As a result, all southern hemispheres and a small part of the northern are declared as a result of nuclear weapons. However, the jurisdiction of these documents is limited by the national territory of the signatory countries, as well as their territorial waters. International waters remain open to swimming ships of nuclear states with nuclear weapons on board. A number of states do not prevent the entry of ships, which are likely to have nuclear weapons on board, in their territorial waters and ports, as well as the flight of military aircraft, capable of carrying nuclear weapons through their airspace.

Two documents forbade the deployment of nuclear weapons in two natural environments - on the seabed and in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. But these documents are also not free from flaws. First of all, they do not contain verification mode, which allows securingly deployment there.

In 1963, the USSR, the USA and the United Kingdom signed a nuclear test agreement in three environments - in the atmosphere, on the surface and under water. Other nuclear powers did not join this contract. France continued to carry out nuclear tests under water on the Mururoa atoll, China - terrestrial nuclear tests at the Lobnor Polygon in the province of Xinjiang. South Africa, probably, together with Israel, conducted a nuclear test under water.

In 1996, an agreement on a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests (CTBT) was opened for signing. He had to enter into force after its ratification with 44 states with nuclear technologies. Among them are all unrecognized nuclear powers. Most of the 44 countries, including Russia, France and the United Kingdom, have already ratified this agreement. China and the United States signed it, but not ratified. Nevertheless, the prospects for the entry into force of this document remain uncertain due to the obstructionist policy of the United States administration, which announced that it would not put this contract for ratification.

Nevertheless, all official nuclear powers are voluntarily refrain from nuclear testing: Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom - from the late 1980s., And France and China - from the mid-1990s. India, Pakistan and the DPRK conducted nuclear tests underground, clearly seeking to limit the international criticism of their actions. At the same time, since 1997, India and Pakistan also adhere to a voluntary moratorium. The organization of the CTBT continues to function, designed to ensure compliance with this contract. It is curious that the contributions to this organization are made by the United States.

Within the framework of the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, multilateral preliminary negotiations are being conducted to conclude an international convention on the prohibition of the production of weapons-splitting materials. Such a convention would be an additional barrier on the way of the emergence of new nuclear states, and would also limit the material base to build the nuclear potential of countries with nuclear weapons. However, these negotiations went to a dead end. Initially, they were blocked by China, demanding that the US agreed to conclude an arms deployment contract in space. Then Washington announced that he did not see the meaning in such a contract, since, from his point of view, his observance is not verifiable.

The current international legal regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which has developed around the day, managed to slow down the spread of nuclear weapons in the world. More than a dozen states with technical capabilities to create nuclear weapons voluntarily refused to acquire nuclear status. There is a precedent, when one of the countries, South Africa, went to the elimination of the already established nuclear potential. This mode had a deterrent impact on the states who did not join the NPT. They were forced to make self-restraints when conducting nuclear tests, as well as take measures to prevent leaks of their nuclear technology. Even the most problematic case of the DPRK, which created nuclear weapons in violation of obligations under the Agreement, still suggests that the fact of violations mobilized the international community for active actions aimed at eliminating the nuclear program of this country and returning to the NPT. At the same time, the inspection regime created under the IAEA revealed the facts of violations and was a newly involved in monitoring the implementation of the denuclearization of this country.

At the same time, designed in the 1960s. The document needs adaptation to new realities. The spread of scientific and technical knowledge allows increasing number of countries to develop nuclear technologies and using loopholes in the contract, close to the creation of nuclear weapons. Another problem is the risk of nuclear distribution among non-state groups that actually does not regulate practically.

All this requires an international community intensive efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime - both within the framework of the existing measure of measures and by developing new solutions.

9. Conclusion

The non-proliferation regime of nuclear weapons is aimed at ensuring stability and security in the world. In 1963, when only four states had nuclear arsenals, the United States government made a forecast that over the coming decade will appear from 15 to 25 states possessing nuclear weapons; Other states predicted that this number may even increase to 50. Concerns about the emergence of nuclear weapons in a politically unstable state led to the formation of a closed "nuclear club" from the five first developers of nuclear weapons. The rest of the countries could only use the "peaceful atom" under international control. These initiatives did not arouse the contradictions of the global community, most countries signed a contract voluntarily refusing to obtain nuclear weapons, moreover, agreements prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in a number of regions of the world were concluded. These regions received the status of nuclear-free zones. Near the conventions, any tests of nuclear weapons were prohibited not only on Earth, but also in space.

However, now a number of countries find a desire to join the "nuclear club", whenever they have the presence of nuclear weapons caused by their national security requirements. These countries include India, Pakistan. However, their official recognition as nuclear powers is hampered not only to counter the contract member countries, but also the nature of the contract itself. Israel officially does not officially confirm the presence of nuclear weapons, but does not join the contract as a non-nuclear country. A completely special situation consists of North Korea. Ratifying the NPT, North Korea led the development of peaceful nuclear programs under the control of the IAEA, but in 2003 North Korea officially emerged from the day and closed access to the IAEA inspectors to their nuclear laboratories. Later was officially announced about the first successful tests. The world community, headed by the UN, has taken a number of attempts to persuade the Northern Korea to turn its nuclear program, but this has not led to anything. As a result, it was decided to convene the UN Security Council to resolve the issue of sanctions for North Korea. In the secret development of nuclear weapons, Iran is also suspected.

The case with North Korea creates a dangerous precedent when the development of nuclear weapons comes out from under international control. There is a risk of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist organizations. To prevent these hazards, the IAEA demands to tighten the sanctions against the country's violators, strengthen control over nuclear fuel and equipment.

All these questions were raised at the next conference in 2005, but then countries could not come to a common opinion on these issues.

Among the most striking trends in the sector under consideration can be noted. There are no necessary conditions in the world to ensure maintaining the non-proliferation regime of nuclear weapons: individual states are actively preventing the creation of an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence on the basis of generally accepted principles and norms of international law; For many years there is no progress on disarmament forums and negotiations; Attempts are being made to replace measures to non-proliferate the legal nature with one-sided actions and various political initiatives.

The state of affairs in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament issues is concerned about the UN General Assembly. In his resolution adopted at the 55th session in 2000, this UN main authority requested the Secretary-General to prepare a study of the essence modern education In the designated sphere, its current state and methods of development of L and promotion. The prepared study was highly appreciated by the General Assembly, which in 2002 expressed the conviction that "today there is more than ever the need for education on the specified issues."

Issues of restricting imports of materials and sensitive technologies should be solved not only by the limited number of importing countries. It is preferable that decisions on such issues are taken as part of the coordination of the positions of all interested countries, including especially the exporting states of peaceful nuclear power products.

This position is founded, firstly, on the conciliation of international law, the main regulator of international relations. Secondly, for the successful functioning as a whole, a sustainable balance of interests is required for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. On the one hand, the interests of free access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear power, on the other - the interests of non-reflection with peaceful nuclear programs.

In the preamble of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons of 1968 (paragraph 6), the principle of accessibility to all states of the benefits of peaceful application of nuclear technologies was enshrined. Article IV of the Treaty directly provides for the right of all its participants to develop studies of production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, which reflects the freedom of state in possession, construction, use, etc. Nuclear installations for electricity and other non-military needs.

A sufficient basis for the greatest access of non-nuclear states to the global achievements of scientific and technical thought in the nuclear field should be the adoption of maximum commitments in the field of international control.

However, it is necessary to further improve the Institute for International Control, the expansion of its scope. The existing practice of implementing the norms of this institute requires the settlement of many issues.

Thus, for example, there was a need for scientific study in order to create new international legal norms of such aspects, as the responsibility of employees of international organizations and other persons on which the obligation to implement international control measures is imposed. Determining the legal nature of such responsibility, its presence and adequacy is just an example of issues requiring scientific consideration.

In order to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime in all its aspects, incl. For the successful functioning of international control requires the improvement of the internal legislation of states.

The efforts of states in the field of national normation must be focused in the following areas:

1) Recognition of crimes and the establishment of criminal liability for acts, the consequence of which will be the spread of nuclear weapons. Even a superficial analysis of the sources of criminal legislation in individual foreign countries shows, despite the presence of many countries of crimes related to nuclear dissemination in the criminal law, not all possible acts are criminalized. There is no uniformity in fixing the elements of the composition of crimes.

The question arises. Is it not advisable to develop and adopt internationally an Convention, where would the acts that need to be considered criminal and establish a punishment? It is thought to be appropriate for a number of reasons, among which: the agreement will establish the legal obligation of states to introduce criminal prosecution for specific crimes, the list of which will be formulated; They will find permission issues of legal cooperation to combat these offenses, including legal assistance issues, etc.

Recognition of crimes of mentioned acts will allow the possibilities of national law enforcement agencies, which will become an additional obstacle to nuclear distribution.

2) Formation of a reliable export control system. Effective regulation of legislation in the field of export of materials and technologies sensitive to distribution will eliminate any transboundary moving Export items that can contribute to the creation of nuclear weapons.

In this regard, it seems at least two aspects. First. International law should establish legal obligations to establish national export control systems. The second, deeply worked at the international model of such systems will help States to form effective export control mechanisms.

3) Regulation measures to ensure nuclear safety, the content of which today is interpreted more widely. Along with the task of neutralizing the danger from nuclear materials (preventing a spontaneous chain reaction, protection against radiation infection, etc.), it is necessary to reliably protect such materials from unlawful capture, use, etc., i.e. From their illegal turnover.

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Arises more general question: What will be with the global market of nuclear materials when establishing a actual fixed carial price for knowing through the supply from international centers? How to ensure that such a carpenter will really be the lowest and thereby creating an incentive to fail the importers from his own Yatz? How to exclude the possibility of becoming the concept of "guaranteed supplies of knowledge" into the chamber of chamber in the hands of recipient countries aimed at obtaining all large discounts and privileges in nuclear cooperation under Art. IV NPT? After all, any country will be theoretically able to qualify for such preferential supplies and new projects of houses (and possibly additionally for the supply of finished fuels), stating that otherwise it will create its own fuel cycle.

The creation of multilateral IATC centers also entails many difficulties of an economic, technical and legal nature. Will the right to receive know or nuclear fuel in one state or another, depend on the share of its investment in the MCO or the right to imports will depend only on the refusal of its own Yatz, and the price and amount of services are determined by the world market mechanism? In other words, if any state does not wish to invest in the MCOs abroad, will it be eligible for guaranteed deliveries only for the refusal of his own Yatz? What are the economic relations between the MCO and the national export companies, especially if the same state will be the participant of the first and also to have the second?

Does this mean that the guaranteed supplies of future MCOs will push out national firms for uranium enrichment exclusively to the market of states of Yatz? Due to what will be compensated for damages to enterprises as part of MCOs caused by guaranteed supplies of Nou at low prices? What members of the ICC will undertake obligations to export on their territory, processing and storing SNF importers?

It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the monopolization from the MCO of the key elements of Yatz (enrichment of uranium and recycling of the SNF) can negatively affect the market of the remaining units of Yatz - the production of uranium concentrate, uranium hexafluoride and fuel assemblies for reactors. This is especially true for fuel assemblies, since the delivery of certified fresh assemblies, as well as the export and processing of irradiated assemblies, as a rule, technologically and commercially linked to the supply of reactors themselves.

Finally, the success of the initiative of the gradual internationalization of the fuel cycle proposed by the management of the IAEA and implied the plans of the expansion of the ITCO will largely be determined by the progress in the issue of termination of the production of splitting materials for military purposes.

It is hardly possible to count on the consent of all countries that do not have YATC, forever tie their nuclear power from the MCO, if countries with technologies for the production of splitting materials, including five nuclear powers - members of the NPT and four countries "Outsider", have not reached the prohibition of production Slistened materials for military purposes, and their processing plants and recycling enterprises will remain outside the control of the IAEA.

This issue can be solved in principle by negotiation under the contract for the prohibition of the production of splitting materials for military purposes (DzPRM). But these negotiations are known for several years already in a blind dead end of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva because of the military-strategic, technical and political discrepancies of the participants in the process. The listed questions require objective, thorough and competent study. It should take into account the experience of research of the 70s and 1980s of the last century.

An analysis of the existing practical projects aimed at solving the problem of non-proliferation of IATC technologies is also necessary. In this regard, the construction of interest russian company Atomstroyexport of the nuclear power plant in Iran. In accordance with the Intergovernmental Agreement, Russia has committed itself to supply fresh fuel and take it to the entire period of operation of the station built in Bustor, up to the end of its operating period.

The use of such practice in all countries raising the development of nuclear energy will answer the tasks of ensuring the safety of Yatz. Additional attractiveness of this practice for recipient countries attaches the fact that they are getting rid of the problems of circulation of SNF. Thereby, serious barriers are removed for national nuclear energy development programs. On the other hand, the same Iranian experience demonstrates that such bilateral agreements themselves do not exclude the interest of states in their own Yatz.