The composition of the group and plans of the German command. Defeat of Army Group "Center Offensive of Army Group Center 1941

During the titanic struggle between Hitler and Stalin, the Soviet side had one predominant task - the destruction of Army Group Center, a powerful group equipped with the best forces and means, which was aimed like a dagger at the very heart of the Soviet Union.

In December 1941, Army Group Center approached Moscow and was ready to seize the capital of the Soviet state. Not a year passed before the Red Army won the final victory. But then she herself was close to destruction.

Scorched earth
Army Group Center

Scorched earth. Army Group Center

As the name suggests, Army Group Center operated in the central sector of the front, formed by three powerful army groups that Hitler brought down on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

Army Group North advanced on Leningrad, Group Center marched on Moscow through Minsk and Smolensk, and Army Group South attacked Odessa and invaded Crimea.

For the offensive on June 22, Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal von Bock had four powerful formations: the 4th Army under the command of von Kluge; 9th under the command of General Strauss; 2nd Panzer Group under the command of General Guderian; and the 3rd under the command of General Goth. Air support was led by the 2nd Air Fleet under the command of Field Marshal Kesselring.

John Erickson, Professor of Defense Studies, University of Edinburgh: "Army Group Center was the most powerful force in the Soviet-German war. It was commanded by Field Marshal von Bock, who, before the war with the Soviet Union, expressed doubts about the Barbarossa plan. He was a realist and had excellent intuition. . As a commander at the strategic level, he was of considerable value. "

Stephen Walsh, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst: "Field Marshal Fyodor von Bock commanded Army Group B during the successful offensive in France in the summer of 1942. He was now given a major role in the execution of the Barbarossa plan to command Army Group Center. He was a capable military leader, raised in traditions of the German military school. He was distinguished by caution and thoughtful command. He knew how to unite subordinates. As part of his armies, the tank group of General Guderian, who became one of the most famous military leaders of the Second World War, operated. "

Army Group Center outnumbered the other two groups. It consisted of 50 divisions. Group South - 39, and Group North - only 29. She could deploy 910 aircraft, Group South - 684, and 434 Army Group North. The two tank groups of von Bock's compound accounted for the lion's share of the tanks prepared for the invasion. Von Bock had 1,700 cars. 1000 at von Runstedt in the south and 650 at Rieter von Leeb in the north. Army Group Center was supported by 3,000 artillery pieces.

John Erickson: "Well, Army Group Center was top-tier. Not surprisingly, it was considered a key player. And it played a key role until 1944."

In 1941, the success of Army Groups Center was critical to the success of the campaign as a whole. If she had achieved the set goal, and the goal was almost achieved, then in 1941 the war in the east could have been won by Hitler. Army Group Center was aimed at the very heart of the Soviet state. The Red Army had to put up incredibly stubborn resistance in order not to receive a mortal wound.

John Erickson: "The Russians tried to ward off this aimed strike. And it was impossible to avoid confrontation. Army Group Center always found itself in front of Soviet troops. It should be said that the basis of the Soviet-German war is constant attempts to destroy Army Group Center. Soviet units tried to act through the flanks on north and south, but their target was Army Group Center. "

Stephen Walsh: "For the High Command, in the person of General Halder, Army Group Center was of the most strategic importance. It had to deliver a decisive blow to the Soviet Union and ensure victory as a whole. Thus, Army Group Center became a priority in all respects. It had to ensure the implementation of the strategic goals - to deliver a decisive blow to Moscow.Evaluating the transport system, the railway network, the importance of Moscow in general, political, economic, Halder believed that the Red Army would be forced to defend Moscow, responding to the strategic initiatives of Army Group Center. There it will lose the battle, the Center group will occupy Moscow will not allow the Russians to organize full-fledged actions of the remaining forces. They will no longer have a chance to defeat the Germans. "

At the start of the campaign, it seemed that Army Group Center would fulfill its strategic mission. Barbarossa's plan fell on the unexpected Soviet armies on Sunday 22 June 1941. In the first days of the campaign, the tank groups of Gotha and Guderian completed a large-scale encirclement of the Soviet units that had lost their leadership near Bialystok. They rushed further to Minsk.

The Soviet command was paralyzed. Chaos reigned in most sectors of the front. In the course of the front-line battles, only one place was seriously resisted. The garrison of the Brest Fortress fought for 8 more days after the front went further to the East towards the next target. Only after using the forces of a whole division and "pieces" with bombs weighing 1800 kg, the citadel was captured by the Germans. 7 thousand defenders of the fortress were captured, the harsh conditions of which few survived.

The German chronicle demonstrates the surrender of the garrison of the Brest Fortress to the Army Group Center.

John Erickson: "The Soviet leadership and command were confident that there would be a period of time between the declaration of war and the start of hostilities. That stubborn battles would be fought on the border, and that after the first strike the Red Army would go on the offensive and be able to defeat the enemy. No declaration of war and There was no ultimatum. The attack was tactically sudden. It's true. "

Stephen Walsh: "When discussing the hostilities in June 1941 and the state of the Red Army opposing the German troops, Army Group Center in particular, we must not forget about the purges staged by Stalin in the army from 1936 to 1938. Stalin beheaded the officer corps of the Red Army. Two-thirds officers were destroyed or sent to the camps.The same third that remained was generally no longer capable of showing initiative, even if this initiative was encouraged.The Red Army was not weak, but thanks to many, many circumstances, it could not respond equally degree.

The Red Army was large, but the weapons were generally outdated. First of all, this applies to tanks and aircraft. As for the means of communication, the situation was simply depressing. There was simply no equipment necessary for combat operations. It was otherwise difficult to fight the German troops. This immediately affected the course of operations. So, the leadership, positions taken, equipment, tanks, aircraft and communications. For all these parameters, the Soviet troops opposing the Army Group Center could not be compared with the enemy. "

After the success near Minsk, units of the Center group rushed to Smolensk, where a huge party of prisoners of war was captured on the approaches to the city. Despite all the losses suffered by the enemy, the Germans were forced to state that the resistance had increased.

The Germans had to face another unpleasant surprise. The first Soviet T-34 tanks appeared in the battles near Vyazma. They ironed out the positions of the 7th Infantry Division, went out to the artillery battery and simply transferred the guns. The morale of the German infantrymen suffered greatly.

So the tank terror began.

In 1941, not a single anti-tank gun could handle the T-34. Then, the German infantry was armed with 37-mm and 50-mm anti-tank guns. They couldn't do anything with the T-34. A minimum 75 mm gun was required. But it still needed to be designed and built.

Meanwhile, only an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun could penetrate the T-34's armor and it immediately fell into completely different conditions.

By the end of July, the total losses of Army Group Center totaled 74 thousand troops. Reinforcements numbered only 23 thousand. For a one month campaign that will last 4 years, these are huge numbers.

The rapid advance of June and July slowed down in August and September. There were no signs of weakening Russian resistance.

John Erickson: "At the beginning of July 1941, it became clear that the Barbarossa plan in its original form failed. The Soviet armies could not be destroyed. Yes, they suffered defeat, suffered heavy losses, but they could not be completely destroyed."

Despite the obvious successes, Army Group Center was unable to immediately capture Moscow. And Hitler also decided to make changes to the overall strategic plan - he transferred Guderian's Panzer Group to the south to help the German troops fighting there, instead of concentrating forces for a decisive strike on Moscow. The consequences of this decision were very grave. But then Hitler did not think about it.

In the German chronicle, Guderian's tanks are bursting deep into Soviet territory. They will contribute to spectacular victories when, teamed up with von Kleist's Panzer Group in the south, they carry out a massive encirclement of Soviet troops, capturing a huge number of enemy soldiers. You see a meeting between Guderian's group, whose cars are marked with the letter G and Kleist with the letter K.

Stephen Walsh: “Guderian was the most capable German theorist of tank warfare in the 1930s. In 1939 he was active in Poland. In 1940 he established himself as one of the best German combat commanders. He commanded the 19th Panzer Corps. In May 1940, the corps crossed the Meuse at Sedan, but at the same time he had an unusually hot-tempered and difficult character, which made it difficult for him to deal with other commanders. "

Guderian was one of the creators of the blitzkrieg strategy, so he was not deceived by the huge number of prisoners captured near Kiev. He knew that the essence of a blitzkrieg was a concentrated strike on one target. This goal could only be Moscow. He was not afraid to convey his views to the Fuhrer. And an angry answer followed. Thus the first seeds of enmity were sown, which led to Guderian's ouster in December 1941.

John Erickson: "There was a problem - the goal was not defined. For example, there was the question of Leningrad. In addition, Hitler still could not decide which goal would be the most impressive. The answer was, of course, the south, Ukraine and maybe even further. I think that was happening. some controversy over the re-purpose of the Barbarossa plan. "

Stephen Walsh: "There was disagreement over the strategic goal of the Barbarossa plan. First of all between Adolf Hitler and the Chief of General Staff, General Franz Halder. Hitler, Halder and the High Command generally believed that this war for living space, a war of annihilation, was be won as soon as possible. But they could not find agreement on the main goal of the offensive. Halder believed that it should be Moscow. Hitler was now interested in the agricultural and industrial resources of the South. At the same time he constantly thought about Leningrad. Halder and the High Command insisted on the fact that it should be Moscow. "

John Erickson: "In many respects, judging by the directives of Barbarossa, the commanders of the tank groups, the same Guderian, did not improvise, but they interpreted the plans in a certain direction. Later, the new commander of the army group Center felt that for this they should be removed."

Despite the growing losses in manpower and equipment, the fierce resistance of the Red Army, Army Group Center moved deep into Soviet territory. But the target still eluded them.

As a result, in October everything was ready for the decisive attack on Moscow - Operation Typhoon.

In November, the Chief of the General Staff called a meeting with the chiefs of staff of all three groups, as well as all the armies fighting on the Eastern Front. It took place in Orsha. The commanders had to decide whether the German troops should take up defenses along the entire front and go on a large-scale offensive in the spring, or all three army groups should continue the offensive in the winter.

With regard to Army Group Center, the prospects were as follows: on the one hand, the ability to capture the Kremlin, on the other, to what extent the troops were able to deliver the final blow, given their weakened state.

After the meeting, a detailed discussion of the issue began with the field commanders. Field Marshal von Kluge regularly traveled to the front line to his soldiers. He could get a real idea of \u200b\u200btheir capabilities and mood. Opinions were generally divided. But the decision was made to make one last attempt, to deliver a final decisive blow to Moscow.

There have been quite a few large-scale battles that can claim to be considered turning points in World War II. Operation Typhoon is one of the first on the list. Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group returned from a southerly direction. Now Army Group Center has mustered its maximum strength for the last assault on Moscow. And this attempt almost succeeded, despite all the opposing factors.

The offensive began in the terrible mud of a rainy fall. The muddy road, which was replaced by the coldest winter in the last 100 years. Despite all the obstacles and stubborn resistance of the Red Army, Army Group Center continued to crawl towards the Stalinist capital.

By early December, German troops reached the outskirts of Moscow. They were only 25 kilometers from the Kremlin. Through binoculars, they saw the stars on its towers. 25 km or 2 thousand 500 - no difference. The Wehrmacht reached the farthest point of its advance. Soldiers and equipment were on the brink. Huge losses in battles broke the morale of the troops. The unprecedented frost also caused the deaths of thousands of soldiers along the entire front. It was all over. The defensive ring around Moscow was too tough for the weakened units of Army Group Center. Operation Typhoon failed.

John Erickson: "The importance of Operation Typhoon can hardly be overestimated. It became the pinnacle of the Barbarossa plan. The decision was made to attack Moscow. It became a turning point for actions on the Eastern Front. The problem was that the assault on Moscow began too late. The weather conditions were extremely difficult. The supplies were clearly insufficient. Operation Typhoon is indicative of the strategic circumstances of the Soviet-German war at the first stage. But I do not think that it is a turning point of the whole war, nevertheless. "

Stephen Walsh: “The failure of Operation Typhoon must be properly assessed. Simply put, it turned out to be a strategic failure for Nazi Germany. It affected the Barbarossa plan as a whole. The destruction of the Red Army did not take place. In many ways, the failure of Operation Typhoon affected the strategic position of Great Britain. completely and completely changed.In October 1941, the Soviet Union was on the brink of defeat.Thanks to the defeat of the Germans, Britain could find itself in the same situation as in June 1940 after the fall of France.The Battle of Britain postponed defeat, but there was no prospect of victory either. near Moscow, the situation completely changed. In December 1941, just a few days after the failure of the Typhoon, the United States entered the war on the side of the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Now the war will be completely different. "

On December 5, 1941, a powerful counterattack by the Soviet armies under the command of General Zhukov broke through the German defenses. A long retreat began. Hitler reacted as follows - fell into a rage and personally led the Army Group Center on December 19. And then he issued an order not to retreat. Everyone must fight to the last.

Surprisingly, Army Group Center found the strength to contain the Soviet offensive practically in the positions that the Germans occupied in October. Some believe that Hitler saved Army Group Center with his order not to surrender. The debate continues to this day.

John Erickson: "If the order Not to retreat had not been given, it is quite possible that Army Group Center would have been shattered. For the first time, the Wehrmacht was defeated. In addition, the situation in which the Soviet offensive took place, it cut the defense to pieces. Without an order to fight to the death, many parts of Army Group Center would be cut off and destroyed. "

Stephen Walsh: "Hitler's order to the German troops" Not to retreat and to resist stubbornly "by itself could not keep Army Group Center. What he actually did was to maintain the faith of the ordinary German soldier in the ability of Adolf Hitler. its commanders gradually disappeared. The real reason for the preservation of the Army Group Center, and other formations, mainly lie in the mistakes of the Soviet command, primarily Stalin's ambitions. "

Now it was Stalin's turn to make a fundamental mistake. Stalin ordered an offensive to be launched, which on January 7 crashed against the German defenses. This time there was no repeat of the December successes.

Stephen Walsh: “Contrary to the recommendations of the Soviet commander, General Zhukov, on December 20, 1941, Stalin expanded the objectives of the offensive - to encircle and destroy Army Group Center. Zhukov and his colleagues believed that the goal of the offensive could only be the withdrawal of Army Group Center. They understood that the troops for now lack of equipment, mobility and experience to carry out larger tasks. "

As a result, Army Group Center retreated to its original positions. Her position has become more advantageous. The Red Army failed to capture a single strategically important facility.

This was his point of view in the winter of 1939/40. Hitler can by no means be considered a far-sighted statesman. For him, politics was never a means to an end, but was primarily a dream, and he, a dreamer, ignored time, space and the limitations of German power. He forgot that Germany itself was just a tiny patch on a huge globe. Probably shortly after the campaign in Poland, his dreams were completely engulfed in the East. Perhaps he even mentally saw a new "Germanization" of the vast eastern territories, as it was in past centuries. But endless steppes, bad roads or almost complete impassability, huge swamps and woodlands and with all this a staunch, brave Russian soldier - he could not imagine this. During the First World War, he served as a private only in the West and was not familiar with the conditions of the East.

After lightning victories in Poland, Norway, France and the Balkans, Hitler was convinced that he could defeat the Red Army as easily as his former opponents. He remained deaf to the many warnings. In the spring of 1941, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who spent most of the First World War on the Eastern Front, asked Hitler if he knew what it meant to invade Russia. The commander-in-chief of the German ground forces, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch and his chief of staff, General Halder, discouraged Hitler from war with Russia. General Kestring, who had lived in Russia for many years and knew the country and Stalin himself well, also addressed him with the same warnings. But all this did not bring any results. Hitler insisted on his own.

It seems to me that Hitler seriously conceived an attack on Russia in the summer of 1940. He wanted, firstly, to strike at the Russians before they could attack Germany, and, secondly, to conquer living space for the increasing population of Germany. Then only the highest political and other leaders knew about the intention. In some respects, Hitler's plan depended on making peace with England, which he still dreamed of. He knew that the successful implementation of his intentions would depend on the security of the Western Front. A war on two fronts meant the defeat of Germany. But when all hopes for the implementation of an important condition failed, when it became abundantly clear that England would never conclude peace with Hitler's Germany, the Fuehrer still did not abandon the campaign to the East. With a firm hand, he took the wheel and led Germany onto the cliffs of complete defeat.

Despite the conclusion of the German-Soviet treaty, a chill of mistrust remained between the countries. However, relations between Russia and the West, especially between Russia and England, were even worse. During the Russo-Finnish campaign, England almost declared war on the Soviets, and now Hitler decided on what England refrained from. With this fateful decision, Germany lost the war.

Preparing for war in 1940-1941

In 1940, shortly after the end of the campaign in the West, the headquarters of Army Group B under the command of Field Marshal von Bock was transferred to Poznan. Some time later, the headquarters of the 4th Army of Field Marshal von Kluge was transferred to Warsaw. Prior to that, there were only a few divisions along our eastern border, including one cavalry. They were stationed in major cities as in peacetime, and normal security measures were taken along the border. The Red Army, located on the other side of the demarcation line that divided Poland, behaved as quietly as our army. It was clear that neither the one nor the other side was thinking about war. But as soon as all actions in France ceased, the German divisions began to gradually but steadily move to the East.

Until January 1941, neither Field Marshal von Kluge, nor his headquarters received any instructions about preparations for war with Russia.Then, from the headquarters of the Army Group, we received an order with very careful wording, which hinted at the possibility of a campaign in the East and there were many vague phrases and general provisions.

The top commanders got acquainted with the plan of Operation Barbarossa (the symbol of the invasion of Russia) later. In the spring of 1941, more and more divisions were transferred to the East. To hide this from the Russians, they deployed far from the border. Headquarters of new large formations were created in the East, headquarters exercises and tactical games were held. There was no longer any doubt about Hitler's decision to attack Russia, and the headquarters of all units and formations intensified their preparations for war.

A very strange atmosphere was created during these months. First of all, we had a clear idea of \u200b\u200bwhat a new war would entail. During the First World War, many of us fought in Russia as junior officers, and therefore we knew what awaited us. Among the officers, there was some kind of uneasiness, uncertainty. But the duty of service required meticulous painstaking work. All maps and books concerning Russia soon disappeared from bookstores. I remember that there was always a pile of such books on the desk of Field Marshal Kluge in Warsaw. The Napoleonic campaign of 1812 became the subject of special study. Kluge read with great attention the reports of General de Caulaincourt about this campaign. They revealed the difficulties of waging war and even life in Russia. The battle sites of Napoleon's Great Army were drawn on our maps. We knew that we would soon follow in the footsteps of Napoleon.

We also studied the Russian-Polish war of 1920. As chief of staff of the 4th Army, I read a series of lectures on this topic for the officers of our headquarters, illustrating the course of events with detailed diagrams and maps. The Pripyat swamps played an important role in this war. A huge area of \u200b\u200bswamps and forests, stretching from Brest to the Dnieper and almost equal in area to the whole of Bavaria. was not completely impassable as before. During the First World War, we made our way through this territory and soon were going to go through it again.

Our preparations for Operation Barbarossa were partially interrupted in the spring by the so-called Balkan incident. Remembering Gallipoli, Hitler was afraid that the British would try again to sabotage this corner of Europe. He took into account the likelihood of an enemy landing in Greece, which could give the British the opportunity to advance through Bulgaria to the north and strike at the rear of Field Marshal von Rundstedt's Army Group South advancing to the East. To avoid this and ensure the safety of Romanian oil, he sought to strengthen the political and military ties that tied the Balkan states with Germany.

As for Romania, General Antonescu fully approved of Hitler's plans. A German military mission was sent to Bucharest to reorganize the Romanian army. Antonescu was anxious to bring back Bessarabia, occupied by the Russians in 1940, he hoped to annex part of Ukraine to Romania. With all this in mind, Antonescu signed a pact of alliance with Germany.

The attitude of the Bulgarians was more restrained, since they did not want to provoke the anger of either England or Germany. As a bait, Hitler offered Bulgaria to Thessaloniki and the territories it had lost in Thrace. After lengthy negotiations, the Bulgarians finally agreed to allow German troops to pass through their country in order to strike at British troops in Greece. In Albania, the Greco-Italian war came to a standstill with the advantage, perhaps, for the Greek side. Yugoslavia caused Hitler a lot of unpleasant troubles. Back in 1939, Prince Paul, the regent of Yugoslavia, was received in Berlin with great honors. Hitler expected Prince Paul to maintain neutrality. But unexpectedly, probably not without the intervention of London or Moscow, a revolutionary situation arose in Yugoslavia. The government of Prince Paul was overthrown, and the country ceased to be our potential ally. This situation immediately threatened the communications of the German armies in Romania and Bulgaria. Hitler acted without delay. German troops invaded Yugoslavia, and its brave army was soon defeated. This was largely facilitated by the ethnic enmity between Serbs and Croats.

It is not my task to examine in detail the short Balkan campaign. Its significance is that it delayed to some extent our invasion of Russia. Since this campaign did not last long and ended successfully, the divisions used in the Balkans returned to their original areas again. As for several tank divisions that made a long march through the mountains of Greece, their tank fleet needed lengthy repairs and replenishment.

The start of Operation Barbarossa was tentatively scheduled for 15 May. This was the earliest date, as we had to wait for the roads to dry out after the spring thaw. Mechanized units would be stuck in April, when rivers and streams swell and the vast expanses of western Russia are covered with spring waters. The Balkan campaign delayed the start of the war with Russia by five to five and a half weeks.

But even if there was no Balkan campaign, the start of the war with Russia would obviously have to be postponed, since in 1941 the thaw came late and the Bug River in the sector of the 4th Army entered its banks only at the beginning of June. D-Day was finally set for June 22, which almost coincided with the start of Napoleon's campaign in 1812. ...

In connection with the Balkan campaign and late spring, we lost many invaluable weeks. There were only a few months left for the effective use of our motorized troops. From June to the end of September, Russian conditions are exceptionally favorable for waging a moderate war. Thus, we had four months at our disposal. In October, the autumn thaw begins and traffic becomes extremely difficult, as whole cars get stuck in the mud. The frost period - from November to February - favors military action, but only if the equipment, weapons and vehicles are adapted to wage war in cold weather, and the troops are dressed and trained for warfare in the same way as the Russian army. Despite careful study of Russian conditions, we were amazed at the severity of the two periods of thaw in spring and autumn. In this case, the experience gained during the First World War not only did not bring us any benefit, but even misled us. Then we fought with the tsarist army mainly in Poland, and not in the depths of Russia, where the climate is much more severe.

Finally, about the morale of our troops. There is no doubt that our commanders and troops were worried about the prospect of a new campaign. Everyone got the impression that we are going to a mysterious and eerie country, a country without end and edge. However, this did not prevent us from preparing for war in the most thorough way. Everything that could be done before the start of the campaign was done.

Russia and Russians

Evaluation of enemy forces should be approached very carefully. It is better to overestimate them than to underestimate them. We must assume that in fact the enemy may be much stronger than we imagined. Failure to properly assess the opponent can lead to unpleasant surprises. A resident of the East differs in many ways from a resident of the West. He bears hardship better, and this obedience gives an equally equanimous attitude towards life and death.

His lifestyle is very simple, even primitive compared to our standards. Inhabitants of the East attach little importance to what they eat and what they wear. It's amazing how long they can exist on what would mean starvation to a European. Russian is close to nature. Heat and cold have almost no effect on him. In winter, he protects himself from severe cold with everything that only comes to hand. He is a master of invention. It does not need complex structures and equipment to keep warm. Strong and healthy Russian women work the same way as men.

Close contact with nature allows Russians to move freely at night in fog, through forests and swamps. They are not afraid of darkness, endless forests and cold. They are not unusual in winter when the temperature drops to minus 45 o FROM.

The Siberian, who can be partially or even completely considered an Asian, is even more hardy, even stronger and has a much greater resistance than his European compatriot. We already experienced this for ourselves during the First World War, when we had to face the Siberian army corps. For a Westerner, accustomed to small territories, the distances in the East seem endless. A US citizen is used to thinking in terms of vast steppes and prairies, and therefore he will not share this feeling, which is close to horror. The horror is further enhanced by the melancholic, monotonous nature of the Russian landscape, which is depressing, especially in the gloomy autumn and the painfully long winter.

The psychological influence of this country on the average German soldier was very strong. He felt insignificant, lost in these vast expanses. The natives of East Germany found it much easier to acclimatize to this strange new world, since East Germany is geographically the link between Russia and the West. Soldiers from other German states, like their fathers in the First World War, also learned to adapt to local conditions. Russia was a true test for our troops. It was a tough school. A person who survived after meeting a Russian soldier and the Russian climate knows what war is. After that, he has no need to learn to fight.

All the wars waged by Russia were cruel and bloody. During the Seven Years War, Frederick the Great learned to respect the fighting qualities of the Russian soldier. Napoleon considered the battle of Borodino the bloodiest of all his battles. Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 was as brutal as the Russo-Japanese war at the beginning of the 20th century. In these two wars, the losses were enormous. During the First World War, we became closely acquainted with the Russian tsarist army. I will cite a little-known but significant fact: our losses on the Eastern Front were much greater than the losses we suffered on the Western Front from 1914 to 1918. The Russian generals were then qualitatively inferior to the German ones, and the tactics of huge armies in the offensive were inflexible. On the other hand, in defense, the Russian army was distinguished by remarkable resilience. Russian skillfully and very quickly built fortifications and equipped defensive positions. Their soldiers showed great skill in fighting at night and in the forest. The Russian soldier prefers hand-to-hand combat. His physical needs are small, but his ability to endure hardship without flinching is truly surprising.

Such is the Russian soldier whom we recognized and respected a quarter of a century ago. Since then, the Bolsheviks have systematically re-educated the youth of their country, and it would be logical to assume that the Red Army has become a tougher nut to crack than the tsarist army.

The Russians have scrutinized past campaigns, and we expected their top commanders to learn from past experiences. But the middle and junior command staff, according to our observers, were poorly trained and had no combat experience.

It was very difficult for us to get a clear idea of \u200b\u200bthe equipment of the Red Army. The Russians took careful and effective security measures. Hitler refused to believe that Soviet industrial production could be equal to German production. We had little information about Russian tanks. We had no idea how many tanks a month Russian industry was capable of producing.

It was difficult to get even maps, since the Russians kept them under great secret. The cards we had were often wrong and misleading.

We also did not have accurate data on the combat power of the Russian army. Those of us who fought in Russia during the First World War believed that it was great, and those who did not know a new enemy tended to underestimate it.

We did not know how the civilian population of Russia would react to us. In 1914-1918. the Russian population treated us softly and loyally. However, no one could tell how much it has changed over the years.

Strategic intent

In 1941, the German army was still mainly composed of purely infantry divisions, which moved on foot and used horses in the wagon train. Only a small part of the army consisted of tank and motorized divisions. Therefore, we faced a problem: how to cover huge distances in the short time that remained at our disposal? The length of the front was also enormous - from the Carpathians to the Baltic coast near Memel. The configuration of the border completely excluded the possibility of immediate coverage or encirclement of the enemy. Only frontal strikes had to be made.

In June 1941, according to our data, the Russians had 160 rifle and 30 cavalry divisions and 35 motorized and tank brigades. Some of these forces were stationed along the Far Eastern border. The total number of human resources to be mobilized was 12 million. We assumed that the Russians had more tanks than ours, but that their tanks were qualitatively inferior to ours, although other types of equipment for the Russian troops were considered good. Neither the aircraft nor the Russian navy posed a great threat to us. We did not know much about the organization of the Red Army either.

Our main strategic problem, as I said, was to defeat the enemy in a huge theater of operations within the limited time at our disposal. We had only a few months to crush the huge Russian armies west of the Dnieper and the Western Dvina. If they can move away intact beyond these water barriers, we will face the same problem that faced Napoleon in 1812. In this case, it will be difficult to say when the war in the East will end.

Hitler approached the war from a purely economic standpoint. He wanted to take possession of the grain-rich Ukraine, the industrial Donetsk basin, and then the Caucasian oil.

Brauchitsch and Halder viewed the war from a completely different perspective. They wanted to first destroy the Red Army, and then fight for the achievement of economic goals. However, both Hitler's plan and the plan of his closest military advisers required the concentration of the main forces of German troops north of the Pripyat swamps. It was planned to deploy two army groups there, and the army group operating on the right flank was supposed to be stronger. Their task was to strike the enemy with tank formations on both flanks, surround him west of the upper reaches of the Dnieper and the Western Dvina, and prevent his retreat to the east. At the same time, other formations of Army Group North were to seize Leningrad and unite with the Finns, destroying all Russian troops in the Baltic Sea region. Only after that was the planned offensive of German troops on Moscow from the west and north.

South of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group South was to deliver a frontal strike and advance eastward.

Further planning was useless, since the course of the campaign depends on the successes achieved at the beginning of hostilities. So, the differences between Hitler and the high command regarding the plans for the war remained unresolved even after our troops crossed the Russian border.

Later, in the summer, these disagreements caused great friction and led to the most dire consequences.

Before proceeding to a detailed examination of the plan of the grouping of forces and our operational plans, it seems that it would be interesting to cite here the opinions of some of our senior officers expressed at that time.

Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who commanded Army Group South and, after Field Marshal von Manstein, our most talented commander during the Second World War, in May 1941 said the following about the approaching war:

“The war with Russia is a senseless undertaking, which, in my opinion, cannot have a happy ending. But if, for political reasons, war is inevitable, we must agree that it cannot be won in just one summer campaign. Just look at these huge spaces. We cannot defeat the enemy and occupy the entire western part of Russia from the Baltic to the Black Sea in just a few months. We must prepare for a long war and gradually achieve our goals. First of all, the strong Army Group North must capture Leningrad. This will give us the opportunity to unite with the Finns, destroy the red Baltic Fleet and increase our influence in the Scandinavian countries. Army Groups "South" and "Center" must advance only to the line Odessa - Kiev - Orsha - Lake Ilmen. If then it turns out that this year we still have time, we will attack Moscow: from the northwest - by Army Group North and from the east - by Army Group Center. All further Operations can be postponed until 1942, when we can develop new plans based on the real situation. "

My immediate superior in the 4th Army was Field Marshal von Kluge, who later commanded 4th Panzer Army in its advance on Moscow. He expressed his opinion in the following terms:

“Moscow is the head and heart of the Soviet system. It is not only the capital, but also an important center for the production of various types of weapons. In addition, Moscow is the most important railway junction, which diverge in all directions, including Siberia. The Russians will be forced to send large forces to defend the capital. Therefore, I believe that we must throw all our forces on Moscow, advancing through Minsk, Orsha and Smolensk. If we capture Moscow before the onset of cold weather, we can assume that we have achieved a lot in one year. Then it will be necessary to think about plans for 1942 ”.

Critical remarks made after 1945 by military leaders in other countries are also of some interest. One theory is that we should have focused on the capture of the Black and Baltic Sea basins by air and navy forces. Here the ground forces were to play a secondary role. Such actions would lead to the isolation of Russia. However, this plan was impracticable because our Air Force and Navy were too weak. Further, it was considered necessary to quickly defeat Russia. Taking into account the peculiarities of the geographical position of Germany, then a prolonged war should have been fatal for her. Only the great maritime powers can afford to wage a protracted war, since they are impregnable and cannot be subjected to economic strangulation.

My personal point of view on this issue was as follows.

In 1941, we had to capture the districts of Moscow and Leningrad and hold the enemy's capital, its largest railway junction and two major cities. This could be achieved by deploying the bulk of our forces in the areas of operation of Army Groups North and Center. The main task of Army Group South during the 1941 campaign would be only to advance eastward south of the Pripyat Marshes and to cover the right flank of Army Group Center. Therefore, there could be no question of an attempt to capture the southern part of Russia this year.

Each of these plans had advantages and disadvantages. Planning for military operations has been difficult even in the best of times, and of course it is far from easier now that political and economic factors influence military decisions.

The commanding staff of Army Group "Center"

My theme is the Battle of Moscow, and therefore I will limit myself to sketching in general terms the portraits of the people who were charged with the capture of the Russian capital. Although the operations of Army Group Center were closely related to those of Army Groups North and South, here we will only touch on Army Group Center, commanded by Field Marshal von Bock.

Bock is one of the most outstanding military talents. Like Rundstedt and Manstein, he led large-scale operations brilliantly. During the First World War, for some time he was on the Western Front the chief of the operations department of the army headquarters, commanded by the German crown prince. Bock is a tall, slender man, a typical old school Prussian. Agile and caustic, he expressed his thoughts clearly and clearly. Bock looked younger than his age - he could have been given no more than forty. However, his health was not in order (he suffered from stomach ailments).

Field Marshal von Kluge is an energetic officer of the traditional warehouse. He was more of a talented tactician than an outstanding strategist. The field marshal did not smoke and hardly touched alcoholic beverages. No matter how alarming the situation was, he always went to bed early and got up early. Like Rommel, von Kluge felt happy being among the troops, on the front lines. Sometimes he personally took over the leadership of the combat operations of individual units and formations, which made the work of his headquarters difficult. True, he always made sure that his chief of staff knew the orders he gave on the spot. The Field Marshal had a passion for aviation and was proud of his wing patch, which he had earned in the First World War. Jokingly, he often compared himself to Napoleonic Marshal Ney. Like Ney, he did not know the feeling of fear. Without a shadow of hesitation, he flew and drove under enemy fire. When visiting his troops, he always took with him a tent, a stove, food and water, as well as an armored car, a car with a radio station and one or two messengers - motorcyclists. Thus, he did not depend on his headquarters and spent the night where the night caught him. Von Kluge was injured several times, and was repeatedly involved in car and aircraft accidents. He was a tireless and determined person.

Colonel General Guderian commanded the 2nd Panzer Group, which operated in close cooperation with von Kluge's 4th Army. Even before the war, he became one of the creators of the German armored forces and was considered a born tank commander. All the tanks and vehicles of his group had the letter "G" - the first letter of his last name. As one of the commanders of the German armored forces in the Polish campaign and in France, he acquired a flattering reputation. It was not easy to deal with him, since at times the general was incredibly stubborn - apparently, this trait is often found among prominent personalities. A brilliant commander, the general was very popular among the personnel of the armored forces.

Colonel General Strauss was in command of the 9th Army, which operated north of von Kluge's 4th Army. He was a calm, careful and experienced commander. Colonel-General Goth's 3rd Panzer Group interacted with his army. Goth was also an outstanding tanker and a level-headed, pedantic person.

The commander of the 4th tank group, Colonel-General Hepner, will be discussed later. His troops managed to get closest to Moscow. He, too, was considered an energetic military leader.

Needless to say, in the course of the war, various disagreements arose between individual generals. This, however, did not interfere with the coordinated work of their headquarters. To the best of our strength and abilities, we have always helped each other without fail.

Grouping of German troops in June 1941

Army Group South. Under the command of Field Marshal von Rundstedt were four field armies and one panzer group under General von Kleist. The German-Romanian 11th Army was stationed in the Iasi region, the Hungarian army in the Carpathian Mountains, the 17th Army of General von Stülpnagel north of the Carpathian Mountains, and the 6th Army of General von Reichenau, between the 17th Army and Lublin. Panzer group Kleist was stationed in Galicia west of Tomaszuv.

The task of Army Group South: to advance in an eastern direction south of the Pripyat swamps, concentrating its main efforts on the left flank and aiming to capture Kiev.

Army Group Center. The composition and deployment of Field Marshal von Bock's Army Group will be discussed in detail below. It was located north of the Pripyat bogs and was supposed to advance on Moscow.

Army Group North. Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb had under his command General Bush's 16th Army and General Kühler's 18th Army, as well as General Hoepner's 4th Panzer Group. This army group was located between Suwalki and Memel. She was supposed to advance on Leningrad and then turn south.

Air Force. Each army group was supported by one air fleet. The 4th Air Fleet, under the command of Colonel-General Lehr, supported Army Group South; Field Marshal Kesselring's 2nd Air Fleet, the strongest of the three air fleets, supported Army Group Center, and 1st Air Fleet, under the command of Colonel General Koller, supported Army Group North.

Numerical composition. On June 21, 1941, the German high command had at its disposal about 135 divisions. Most of them, namely 80 infantry, 15 motorized, 17 tank divisions and one cavalry division, were on or en route to the Eastern Front. In addition to these troops, there were several more security divisions intended for garrison service in the territory that we were supposed to occupy.

Army Group South consisted of 25 infantry, 4 motorized, 5 tank and 4 mountain rifle divisions. All these divisions were German. Army Group South also included a Hungarian corps, a Slovak division, and later an Italian corps. The Romanian army of Marshal Antonescu was under the operational control of Field Marshal Rundstedt. In front of the front of Army Group South were superior Russian forces under the command of Marshal Budyonny.

Army Group Center, the strongest of the three army groups, had 30 infantry, 15 tank or motorized divisions, and one cavalry division. In front of the front of this group of armies were the Russian troops of Marshal Timoshchenko, which in their numbers had only a slight superiority over the Germans.

Army Group North consisted of 21 infantry and used armored or motorized divisions. In terms of the number of personnel, it was significantly inferior to the Russian troops commanded by Marshal Voroshilov.

Our three air fleets numbered about 1200 aircraft.

Group of forces of Army Group "Center"

A few days before June 21, the army commanders and formation commanders took their places at the command posts. Army Group Center, which consisted of the 4th and 9th field armies, the 2nd and 3rd tank groups (a group — a formation larger than a corps, but a smaller army), was to advance east with the task of capturing the Soviet capital. In the future, we will consider the actions of this army group, especially the 4th army and two tank groups.

Hour "H" was set for 3 hours 30 minutes on June 22. By this time, the commander of Army Group Center had moved with his headquarters to Warsaw. Kluge's headquarters left the former Polish capital and was located west of Brest. The headquarters of Guderian and Gotha were near the demarcation line.

Assessing the deployment of our troops, Kluge remarked: “Our battle formations are not deep. We do not have such powerful reserves as during the war in the West. The further we move eastward, the wider our front will be and the thinner the line of our advancing troops. Therefore, it is very important that our troops operate compactly and not disperse, even if there are gaps between us and neighboring armies. "

It was an accurate assessment of the situation. The territory of European Russia had such a shape that we had to advance along a corridor, at first squeezed from both sides by the Black and Baltic Seas, and then constantly expanding as we moved east. Our operational plan was as follows. Two tank groups were located on the flanks of two field armies: Guderian's group on the right flank of the 4th Army, in the Brest region, and Gotha's group on the left flank of the 9th Army, west of Suwalki. These tank groups were supposed to break through the enemy's defenses and advance at maximum speed to Minsk, where these giant pincers were supposed to close, thus surrounding as many Russian troops as possible. The infantry corps of the 4th and 9th armies were to carry out more or less limited roundabout movements in order to destroy individual units and formations of the Red Army directly on or near the border. The right flank, which was already reliably covered by the Pripyat swamps, had to be covered by small forces. This was our main battle plan.

The tension in the German troops was constantly growing. As we assumed, by the evening of June 21, the Russians should have understood what was happening, but on the other bank of the Bug, in front of the front of the 4th Army and 2nd Panzer Group, that is, between Brest and Lomzha, everything was quiet. The Russian border guard behaved as usual. Shortly after midnight, when all the artillery of the infantry divisions of the first and second echelons was ready to open fire, the Moscow-Berlin international train proceeded unhindered through Brest. It was a fateful moment.

Three hours later, German warplanes took to the air, and soon only their sidelights were visible in the far east. Field Marshal von Kluge and his headquarters were located at the location of the 31st Infantry Division north of Brest. By 3 hours 30 minutes - it was hour "H" - it began to grow light, the sky became somehow surprisingly yellow. It was still quiet around. At 0330, all our artillery opened fire. And then something happened that seemed like a miracle: the Russian artillery did not answer. Only occasionally did any of the coastal guns open fire. A few hours later, the divisions of the first echelon were on the other side. Tanks were crossed, pontoon bridges were built, and all this was almost without resistance from the enemy. There was no doubt that the 4th Army and 2nd Panzer Group had caught the Russians by surprise.

The breakthrough was successful. Our tanks almost immediately broke through the strip of Russian border fortifications and rushed east over the flat terrain. Only in the Brest Fortress, where the GPU school was located, did the Russians put up fanatical resistance for several days.

In order to pass to a description of the Moscow battle as soon as possible, I will dwell very briefly on the hostilities of the next month.

Bialystok-Slonim boiler

As I said, at the front of Army Group Center, the Russians were taken by surprise. When hostilities began, our radio operators overheard the Russians talking on the radio: “They are shooting at us! What to do?" The senior manager to whom the question was addressed replied, “You're out of your mind! Also, why don't you code the conversation? "

But Army Group South immediately ran into stubborn resistance, and heavy battles unfolded there.

And everything went according to plan. The two panzer groups advanced with a swift rush to the far east, and then turned towards each other. At the same time, part of the forces of Guderian's Panzer Group continued to move forward, although in the rear there was a fierce battle with the surrounded Russian troops. Guderian strove to reach Minsk as soon as possible, since it was important not to allow the enemy to withdraw to the east, beyond the Berezina, Dnieper and Western Dvina.

The infantry had to withstand the rapid pace of the offensive. Crossings of 40 kilometers a day were no exception, and on the most terrible roads. Before my eyes I still have a vivid picture of the first weeks of the war: unbearable heat, huge clouds of yellow dust raised by columns of retreating Russian troops and German infantry trying to catch up with them. Sometimes it rained unexpectedly, turning dust on the roads into liquid mud. But as soon as the sun appeared, the dirt turned to dust again.

By July 2, the first battle was won, 150 thousand prisoners were taken, about 1200 tanks and 600 guns were captured and destroyed. Our first impression was that the Russian soldier was a staunch fighter. However, Russian tanks were not perfect, and as for aviation, we hardly saw it at that time.

The behavior of the Russian troops, even in the first battles, was in striking contrast to the behavior of the Poles and Western allies in defeat. Even surrounded by the Russians, they continued stubborn battles. The vast territory of the country with forests and swamps helped them. There were not enough German troops to create everywhere the same tight ring around the Russian troops as in the Bialystok-Slonim region. Our motorized troops fought along or near roads. And where there were no roads, the Russians in most cases remained out of reach. That is why the Russians often left the encirclement. Whole columns of their troops at night moved through the forests to the east. They always tried to break through to the east, so the most combat-ready troops, usually tank troops, were usually sent to the eastern part of the encirclement ring. And yet our circle of Russians was rarely successful.

The high pace of our offensive can be judged at least by the fact that the headquarters of the 4th Army had to change their place of residence twice within four days in order to be close to the combat area. On June 24, our headquarters moved to Kamenets-Podolsky, and on June 26 - to Pruzhany.

Battle for Minsk and the breakthrough of the "Stalin line"

Before the Battle of Minsk and the breakthrough of the “Stalin Line”, Army Group Center underwent a thorough reorganization.

As in the old days, when large masses of cavalry, building on the achieved success, advanced far ahead, it was now decided to unite the panzer groups of Hoth and Guderian and send them as far east as possible. To manage this tank formation, a headquarters was created, which received the name "4th Tank Army". Field Marshal von Kluge was appointed commander. He took with him the entire staff of the headquarters of the 4th field army, which from June 2 became known as the 2nd army. Colonel General Weichs, whose headquarters was in Pruzhany, became the commander of the 2nd Army. We went to Minsk and, having arrived there on July 3, began to perform new functions.

The fierce Minsk battle was in full swing. The liquidation of the surrounded large enemy grouping was entrusted to the infantry, and we rushed to the Dnieper and the Western Dvina. It was during this advance, between 2 and 11 July, that the terrain first caused our tanks serious trouble. It was not easy to cross the Berezina with its swampy shores, since almost all the bridges were blown up. In this swampy area, the Russians put up stubborn resistance, and here we first began to run into numerous mines. All this delayed the advance of the tanks and allowed the infantry, after the Battle of Minsk, to catch up with the tank formations again.

Goth and Guderian did not stay in one place for long. Despite the difficulties listed above, Guderian quickly reached the Dnieper near Mogilev and Orsha. Somewhat to the north, the Goth just as quickly reached the Western Dvina near Vitebsk and Polotsk. And so the tanks approached the so-called "Stalin's line" - the main defensive zone of the Russians.

However, this line was not equally fortified along its entire length. In addition, the Russians did not have enough troops to defend it, despite the reinforcements sent in from the east. Guderian and Goth soon crossed the Dnieper and the Western Dvina. The way into the interior of Russia was open.

On July 8, the headquarters of the 4th Panzer Army moved to Borisov (on the Berezina). Here we found traces of Napoleon's army. Several kilometers north of Borisov, Napoleon's Grand Army was forced to cross the frozen river in the winter of 1812 and suffered terrible losses. When there is little water in the river, the pillars of the bridges, once built by French sappers, are still visible.

Smolensk battle

After the 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper, and the 3rd - the Western Dvina, the resistance of the Russians increased. The Soviet command transferred strong reinforcements from the east and tried to re-capture the "Stalin line". I will not describe these fighting in detail here. Suffice it to say that the Russian tactics now consisted, as a rule, of striking at the flanks of our tank columns. These hostilities continued from 12 to 30 July, and even in August sporadic battles broke out here.

The most significant of these was the battle in the Smolensk region, where a large group of Russian troops was surrounded. While the bulk of the two tank groups, repelling the Russian attacks on the flanks, continued to move east, small forces were allocated to strengthen the eastern side of the Smolensk boiler. After a grueling march, two field armies finally caught up with the tank formations again. They held the three sides of the cauldron, while our tanks blocked the exit from it near Yartsevo. Again this operation was unsuccessful. At night, Russian troops escaped from the encirclement and went east. Tank troops were not suitable for such an operation, especially in the swampy terrain adjacent to the Dnieper

On July 13, Field Marshal Kluge's headquarters moved from Borisov to Tolochin. There we were visited by the Japanese ambassador to Berlin, General Oshima. We were ordered to take all precautions so that he did not get into trouble. However, he insisted that he be shown the Dnieper near Orsha, where the ambassador came under heavy enemy artillery fire. But Oshima survived, and as proud as Petrushka, returning to our headquarters, showed Field Marshal von Kluge his samurai saber.

On July 10, the 29th Motorized Division captured Smolensk, the most important of the Russian cities so far in our hands. On July 24, we moved forward. Now our headquarters was housed in tents in the forest southwest of Smolensk, just a few kilometers from the front line. Not far from us there was an old road along which Napoleon went to Moscow.

In late July and early August, we lost a few precious weeks as our high command pondered the best strategy for us to pursue. I have already said above that Hitler was striving to achieve economic goals: he wanted to seize Ukraine, the Donetsk Basin and, finally, the Caucasus. These areas were in the offensive zone of Army Group South. Hitler's secondary goal was the capture of Leningrad, which at that phase of the campaign seemed to be about to fall and which in all likelihood would have fallen if Hitler had not repeated Dunkirk's mistake He ordered Field Marshal von Leeb to stop the German tanks in front of Leningrad

Least of all, Hitler was interested in Moscow. According to his original plan, Army Group Center was supposed to stop on the line of the river. Desna and further north, transfer most of their forces to Army Group South and this year cease any offensive actions in the direction of Moscow. Therefore, the 4th Panzer Army was disbanded, and the headquarters of Field Marshal von Kluge was transferred to the reserve. The two tank groups were now subordinate directly to the commander of Army Group Center. It was proposed to subordinate Guderian's Panzer Group and the new field army to Kluge. It was assumed that this formation would advance in the southeastern direction in the offensive zone of Army Group South with the aim of crushing the large enemy forces concentrated there.

The commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Field Marshal Brauchitsch, and his chief of staff, General Halder, did not approve of this plan. Brauchitsch insisted that Army Group Center move directly to Moscow, in the capture of which he saw the main goal of the entire campaign. Field Marshal von Bock and the headquarters of Army Group Center shared this view. Field Marshal von Kluge preferred to act in accordance with Hitler's strategic plan. These disagreements provoked sharp clashes. That is why the final decision was delayed for several weeks.

Meanwhile, heavy fighting broke out between the Dnieper and the Desna, between the Western Dvina and the upper reaches of the Dnieper. Gradually, our troops were entrenched on a fairly solid line of defense that runs along the river. Desna to the east of Roslavl and Yelnya and west of Dorogobuzh. This line, which was a continuation of the line defended by the 9th Army located slightly to the north, was held by the troops of the old 4th Army. The 4th Army was restored, and Field Marshal von Kluge again became its commander. Now we were responsible for keeping the defenses along the Desna.

During the second half of August and throughout September, the 4th Army fought on the Desna line, and the 9th Army defended itself on the right bank of the Dnieper north of Dorogobuzh. To the south of us, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group fought with 2nd Army, while Gotha's 3rd Panzer Group operated in conjunction with 9th Army. Lacking sufficient tank support, we were forced to go over to positional defense along the Desna, which required a large number of troops. The Russians launched fierce counterattacks and more and more often broke through our thin line of defense. In a critical situation, only tank units saved us. During these battles, we became convinced that in modern warfare, the support of tanks is necessary for infantry not only in the offensive, but also in defense.

When I say that our line of defense was thin, I am by no means exaggerating. The divisions defended the zone along the front for about 30 kilometers. In addition, in the course of hostilities, especially in the Yelnya area, the divisions suffered heavy losses and were now incomplete. As for tactical reserves, they simply did not exist.

The disagreements between Hitler and his top military advisers concerned not only strategy, but tactics as well. In hostilities designed to encircle large enemy forces, we captured many prisoners and large trophies. And yet the results were not as significant as it might seem at first glance. First, large tank forces were required to encircle large enemy formations; secondly, such encirclement of the enemy rarely ended successfully, since large groups of Russians often escaped from the cauldrons and went east. Therefore, Hitler insisted on encircling small groups of the enemy, believing that this tactic would be more successful.

In September, the question of the future strategy was finally decided. The option proposed by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch was accepted. So, we are going to Moscow. The question now was whether we would manage to capture the still distant capital with our weak forces before the harsh Russian winter sets in. We had to pay dearly for the fruitless disputes that took several weeks in August and all of September.

Finally, the order was received. Army Group Center was supposed to attack Moscow. The start of the operation was scheduled for October 2. So, the die is cast, the great battle is about to begin. The battle for Vyazma was to become an overture to it.

Battle for Vyazma

While there was a debate among the German high command about what to do, the Russians built a new defensive line along the upper reaches of the Dnieper and Desna, that is, just in front of the front of Army Group Center. This line was the outer ring of the defensive system that covered Moscow.

Our task is to break through this line of defense, carry out a double encirclement of the enemy, and enter Moscow before the onset of winter.

Our troops were deployed as follows. Located in the area of \u200b\u200bBryansk and to the south of it, the 2nd Army, together with the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian attached to it, was to strike in the direction of Orel and, having captured it, advance north. On the left was Kluge's 4th Army with the Hepner Panzer Group attached to it. The left flank of the 4th Army ran along the upper reaches of the Dnieper east of Smolensk. This army, reinforced with tanks, was to deliver the main blow to Moscow. To the north of the upper reaches of the Dnieper was Strauss's 9th Army, with the Panzer Group Hoth attached to it. As in previous battles east of the Bug, the tank groups of Gepner and Hoth were concentrated on the outer flanks of the field armies. These tank formations were to move first to the east, and then turn towards each other in order to encircle Vyazma. The field armies had to repeat their old tactics, which had always been successful before. This tactic, as mentioned above, consisted of encircling small enemy groups inside a huge encirclement ring created by tank formations. As soon as the bells close, the tank groups, regardless of the battle with the surrounded enemy, which will undoubtedly flare up in the cauldron in the Vyazma region, will have to continue to move at maximum speed to Moscow.

The offensive began in the early morning of October 2. The armies of Kluge and Strauss, reinforced by tank groups, attacked the enemy with truly remarkable precision. The troops acted exactly according to the plans developed by the General Staff. In this battle, conducted as a training exercise, and taking place between October 2 and 13, Army Group Center captured 650 thousand prisoners, 5 thousand guns and 1200 tanks. Truly astronomical figures!

The Russians suffered the same losses in the sectors of Army Groups North and South. It is not surprising that Hitler, the high command and the troops believed that the material and human resources of the Red Army were running out. As the prisoners informed us, this attack, undertaken at such a late time of the year, was a complete surprise for the Russians. It seemed that Moscow was about to fall. Everyone in Army Group Center became very optimistic. From Field Marshal von Bock to the soldier, everyone hoped that soon we would be marching through the streets of the Russian capital. Hitler even created a special engineer team to destroy the Kremlin. And yet, one can only regret that the Minister of Propaganda found it appropriate to make a pompous statement that the war in the East, they say, was won, and the Red Army was virtually destroyed.

To clearly understand the dimensions of the impending catastrophe, it is necessary to outline what the mental state of our commanders and troops was at that moment. Starting from June 22, the German army marched forward from victory to victory and, despite the bad roads and bad weather, covered a huge distance from the Bug to the outskirts of Moscow. Since most of the army moved on foot with a horse-drawn wagon train, one march of our troops can be considered a feat. And all this was done in a matter of three and a half months, of which we were inactive for several weeks while the high command discussed issues of higher strategy. On October 12, when the battle for Vyazma was basically over (only scattered pockets of Russian resistance remained), we could look with pride at our past and with confidence into the future.

In mid-October, all German armies launched an offensive against Moscow. Our headquarters, located in Roslavl, when the battle for Vyazma began, was redeployed to Spas-Demensk on October 6, and to Yukhnov on October 10. A few days later, the entire Army Group Center began to move east. Between us and the Russian capital was the so-called "Moscow defensive position". We had no reason to believe that this nut would be difficult to crack. If we succeed in taking these positions, the way to Moscow, we thought, would be open.

Change of mood

When we came close to Moscow, the mood of our commanders and troops suddenly changed dramatically. With surprise and disappointment, we discovered in October and early November that the defeated Russians did not cease to exist as a military force at all. Over the past weeks, enemy resistance has intensified, and the tension of the fighting has increased every day. Marshal Zhukov now took command of the Russian troops covering Moscow. For several weeks, his troops created a defense in depth, which passed through the forest adjacent to the river. Nara, from Serpukhov in the south to Naro-Fominsk and further north. Carefully camouflaged strongholds, wire fences and large minefields now filled the vast forest that covered the western approaches to the capital.

From the remnants of armies battered in heavy battles, as well as fresh units and formations, the Russian command formed new strong armies. Moscow workers were drafted into the army. New army corps were arriving from Siberia. Most of the foreign embassies and missions, as well as part of the Russian government, were evacuated from Moscow to the east. But Stalin with his small headquarters remained in the capital, which he firmly decided not to surrender. All this was a complete surprise to us. We did not believe that the situation could change so much after our decisive victories, when the capital, it seemed, was almost in our hands. The troops now recalled with indignation the pompous October statements of our propaganda ministry.

Sarcastic remarks began to be heard at the military leaders who were sitting in Berlin. The troops believed that it was time for the political leaders to visit the front and see with their own eyes what was going on there. The soldiers were overworked, and the units, especially the infantry, were not fully manned. In most infantry companies, the number of personnel reached only 60-70 people. The troops suffered heavy losses in horse composition, and now it became difficult to transfer the guns. In armored divisions, the number of combat-ready tanks was much less than the standard number. Believing that the war with Russia was essentially over, Hitler ordered the industrial production of war materials to be reduced. At the front, in combat units, scanty replenishment was now received. Winter was about to start, but we never heard of winter uniforms.

The overstretched communication lines barely ensured the delivery of the necessary supplies to our troops. It was necessary to redo the tracks of the Russian railways, which were wider than the tracks of railways in Western Europe. Deep in our rear, in vast forested and swampy areas, the first partisan detachments began to operate. We did not have sufficient forces and means to fight them. They attacked convoys and supply trains, forcing our troops at the front to suffer great hardships.

The memory of Napoleon's Great Army haunted us like a ghost. The book of memoirs of Napoleonic General Caulaincourt, which always lay on the desk of Field Marshal von Kluge, became his bible. More and more coincidences with the events of 1812 became. But these elusive omens paled in comparison with the period of mud or, as it is called in Russia, the muddy road, which now pursued us like a plague.

We, of course, knew that a thaw awaited us - we had to read about it in books. But the reality surpassed the saddest fears. The thaw began in mid-October, during the battles in the Vyazma area, and steadily intensified until mid-November. It is impossible to tell a person who has never encountered it himself what Russian mudslide is. There are only a few highways in this part of the world. The entire territory of the country is covered with impassable sticky mud. An infantryman slides on roads soaked with water. To haul implements, you need to harness many horses. All wheeled vehicles sink deep into sticky mud. Even tractors are very difficult to move. Many heavy guns got stuck on the roads and were therefore not used in the Moscow battle. Tanks and other tracked vehicles were often sucked in by mud. Now it is not difficult to imagine what strain our already exhausted, exhausted troops were subjected to.

And suddenly a new, no less unpleasant surprise fell upon us. During the battle for Vyazma, the first Russian T-34 tanks appeared. In 1941, these tanks were the most powerful of all tanks that existed at that time. Only tanks and artillery could fight them. 37-mm and 50-lsh anti-tank guns, which were then in service with our infantry, were helpless against the T-34 tanks. These guns could only hit old Russian tanks. Thus, the infantry divisions were faced with a serious problem. As a result of the appearance of this new tank from the Russians, the infantrymen were completely defenseless. At least a 75mm gun was required, but it still had to be created. In the Vereya area, T-34 tanks, as if nothing had happened, passed through the battle formations of the 7th Infantry Division, reached artillery positions and literally crushed the guns that were there. It is clear what impact this fact had on the morale of the infantry. The so-called "fear of tanks" began.

We already knew about the order given by Marshal Timoshenko to cheer up his troops after many defeats. This order listed the weaknesses of the German troops. Tymoshenko explained that the main strength of the Germans lies in their technical skill and weapons. One on one German soldier is weaker than a Russian, wrote the Marshal, he gets nervous and becomes timid when he has to fight at night, in a forest or on a swampy area. In these types of combat, the Russian soldier is much stronger than the German one. All this, of course, is not entirely accurate. If that were so, we would not be standing at the gates of Moscow. Yet Tymoshenko's order contained a grain of truth. The civilized European is in many respects inferior to the more robust man of the East, hardened by close communion with nature.

Our aviation performed excellently. However, now the number of combat-ready aircraft has decreased, and there were not enough landing sites near the front line, especially during a thaw. The number of accidents during aircraft landing and takeoff increased sharply. And Russian aviation has hardly appeared in the air so far.

On October 26, Field Marshal von Kluge moved his headquarters from Yukhnov to the Maloyaroslavets area, closer to his troops. Later, during a major Russian counter-offensive, his headquarters was nearly captured. By the way, in 1812 Napoleon passed through Maloyaroslavets.

By the end of October, the weakened section of our front ran along the Oka from Aleksin and to the north, then along the river. Nara to Naro-Fominsk, then turned north-west and crossed the highway going to Moscow through Ruza and Volokolamsk. This front line, at least temporarily, represented the border of the greatest advance of the German forces, since our offensive ability was depleted. Our troops were weakened and weary. The Russian armies took up an in-depth defense in the forests surrounding Moscow. Part of our artillery got stuck in the mud somewhere between Vyazma and p. Hapa. But Moscow was not far away. At night it was seen how the shells of Russian anti-aircraft artillery exploded over the capital. What was going to happen?

Meeting in Orsha

In November, the chief of the general staff called for a meeting in Orsha the chiefs of staff of the three army groups, as well as all the armies that participated in the battles on the Eastern Front. The fatal question was on the agenda: should the German armies dig in along the then existing front line and wait until favorable weather came in spring, or should they continue their offensive in winter.

A representative of Army Group South (commanded by Field Marshal Rundstedt) opposed further offensive operations and insisted on going over to the defensive. Army Group North was so weakened that there was nothing to think about conducting offensive operations in its sector. Representatives of the Center Army Group spoke in favor of making a last attempt to seize Moscow. As soon as the Russian capital was in our hands, they said, separate armored divisions should be sent east of the city in order to cut off the main railways connecting Moscow with Siberia.

Opinions were divided. Of course, the prospect of entering the Kremlin could not but attract us, but many doubted the ability of our weakened troops to deliver a decisive blow.

last try

After this meeting, the issue of an offensive on Moscow was discussed in detail with the commanders of units and formations. Field Marshal von Kluge repeatedly visited his units on the front lines and asked for the opinion of non-commissioned officers.

As for our manpower and military equipment, we were still receiving minor replenishments of personnel and weapons. But since October, the divisions rested a little in their positions held close to Moscow. Only the right flank of the army was subjected to continuous enemy attacks in the Serpukhov area and along the Podolsk-Maloyaroslavets road. There were few of our troops on this flank, and they could hardly repulse enemy attacks. For hours, the army commanders discussed the situation. And now the final decision was made - to make one last attempt to deliver a decisive blow to Moscow. The high command considered it possible to begin the operation only after freezing.

Troop disposition

The attack on Moscow was planned to be carried out by the troops of the 4th Army of von Kluge, which in this connection was strengthened.

Our right flank, from the Oka to Nara, was covered by weak forces. South of the Oka, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, attached to the 2nd Army, was to advance to Tula and further to the northeast. The main forces of the 4th Army were concentrated along the river. Nara, between the Podolsk - Maloyaroslavets road and the Moscow-Smolensk highway. To the north of this highway and the river. Moscow, more precisely, between Ruza and Volokolamsk, concentrated the 4th Panzer Group of General Gepner attached to the 4th Kluge Army.

The experience of past hostilities has shown that close cooperation between tank and infantry formations gives a good result, and therefore several infantry corps were subordinated to Gepner's tank group.

The plan of the operation was as follows: the reinforced 4th Panzer Group was to strike in a northern direction, to the left of the Moscow-Smolensk highway, then turn east and attack Moscow from the west and north-west. At this time, the 4th Army, crossing the river. Nara, had to pin down significant enemy forces in this sector of the front with her offensive actions.

Last offensive

By mid-November, the muddy period was over, and the first frost heralded the onset of winter. Now combat vehicles and vehicles of all kinds could move on roads and flat terrain. Far in our rear, tractors were pulling heavy guns out of the frozen mud, which were transferred one after another to the front line. However, it often happened that, pulling tools out of the hardened mud, they were literally torn to pieces.

In the first days, the offensive of the 4th Panzer Group developed successfully. With heavy fighting, the enemy slowly retreated to the east. To the north, the 3rd Panzer Group of Colonel-General Reinhardt was advancing. Both of these tank groups were subordinate to the commander of the 4th Army, Field Marshal von Kluge. Thus, in his subordination were 11 army corps, or 35 divisions, of which nine were tank. True, these were incomplete formations: there were not enough people and weapons.

Around November 20, the weather suddenly turned bad, and after a night we experienced all the horrors of the Russian winter. The thermometer suddenly dropped to -30 o C. A sharp cold snap was accompanied by heavy snowfall. A few days later, we were bitterly convinced that the Russian winter had begun. As difficulties increased, the pace of the offensive of both tank groups slowed down, but they continued to push their way to Moscow. Throwing their last reserves into battle, they captured Klin and reached the Moscow-Volga canal. In this area, their northern flank was suddenly attacked by fresh Russian units.

In the last days of November, our forward units, advancing on Moscow, reached Ozeretskoye, and reconnaissance units of tank units even penetrated into the western outskirts of Moscow. This exhausted the offensive power of both of our tank groups.

Such was the situation on the evening of November 28, when Colonel-General Hepner asked Field Marshal von Kluge to give the order to advance to the troops of the 4th Army, located along the river. Nara. This offensive, Gepner believed, would ease the pressure exerted by the enemy on both tank groups, and force the Russian command to transfer part of its forces from their sector to the area of \u200b\u200boperations of the 4th Army. After discussing this request in detail with me as his chief of staff, on November 29, the field marshal gave the order to go over to the offensive. The offensive began the next morning. The main blow was struck at Naro-Fominsk. The Panzer Corps supported the southern wing of the advancing army. A few days after the start of the offensive, the infantry in several places broke through the enemy's defense in depth in the forest along the river. Nara. However, by December 2, it became clear that the troops at our disposal were clearly not enough to fulfill the task assigned to them. Only the reconnaissance battalion of the 258th Infantry Division managed to find a gap in the Russian defenses. He moved forward throughout the night and almost reached the southwestern outskirts of Moscow. However, early in the morning of December 3, it was attacked by Russian tanks and detachments of Moscow workers.

The field marshal decided to suspend the offensive, the prospects of which, in the current situation, became hopeless and which could only lead to unnecessary losses. Troops of the 4th Army, located south of the highway, were ordered to withdraw to their former positions located beyond the river. Nara. The retreat was successful. The enemy pursued our troops with great caution.

In that situation, Field Marshal von Kluge's decision must be considered correct. A few days later, Marshal Zhukov threw the Russian troops into a powerful counteroffensive. Started on December 6, it was directed against two tank groups located northeast of Moscow. This was a turning point in our Eastern campaign — hopes of pulling Russia out of the war in 1941 were dashed at the very last minute.

Now it was important for Germany's political leaders to understand that the days of the blitzkrieg were over. We were opposed by an army that was far superior in its combat qualities to any other army we had ever encountered on the battlefield. But it should be said that the German army also demonstrated high moral resilience in overcoming all the disasters and dangers that befell it.

It was clear to every soldier of the German army that our life or death depended on the outcome of the battle for Moscow. If the Russians defeat us here, we will have no more hope. In 1812 Napoleon managed to return to France with the pitiful remnants of his defeated Great Army. In 1941, the Germans had to either withstand or be destroyed. At that time, Russian propaganda boiled down to the scattering of leaflets from airplanes with a boring, crudely executed image of snow-covered Russian steppes strewn with the corpses of German soldiers. This propaganda did not make the proper impression on our troops. Four battalions of French volunteers serving in the 4th Army were less resilient. At Borodin, Field Marshal von Kluge addressed them with a speech, recalling how in the days of Napoleon the French and Germans fought here side by side against a common enemy. The next day, the French boldly went into battle, but, unfortunately, could not withstand either a powerful enemy attack, or severe frost and blizzard. They have never had to endure such tests before. The French legion was defeated, suffering heavy losses from enemy fire and frost. A few days later he was withdrawn to the rear and sent to the West.

Position of armies

Before proceeding to consider further hostilities, it is necessary to talk about the German and Russian troops that participated in the battle near Moscow in 1941, as well as about the conditions in which the Moscow battle took place.

On our front, limited visibility was only established for a few hours daily. Until 9 o'clock in the morning, the surroundings were usually shrouded in thick fog. The sun gradually broke through, and only at 11 o'clock in the afternoon it was possible to see something. Twilight fell at 15 o'clock, and an hour later it became dark again. In the Maloyaroslavets area we had an airfield, where transport planes from Smolensk, Orsha and Warsaw occasionally arrived. They delivered reinforcements, but they were completely insufficient to compensate for the daily losses. The soldiers arriving by air were dressed in long trousers and boots with laces. Often they did not have greatcoats and blankets. Transport divisions awaited replenishment at the airfields and immediately transferred them to the front, where they were urgently needed. Often they found themselves at the front that very night. Thus, people who only two days ago lived in the cozy barracks of Warsaw, after 48 hours, ended up on the Moscow front, which had already begun to disintegrate.

At the end of the summer, when Field Marshal von Brauchitsch realized that the war in the East would continue in winter, he urged Hitler to prepare the necessary winter equipment for our troops in time. Hitler refused to heed sound advice, as he was firmly convinced that the Russians could be defeated before the onset of cold weather. Now, even at Hitler's headquarters, they suddenly realized that the war in Russia was in fact just beginning and that, no matter how awful it was, they would have to fight almost without winter clothes. Hitler began to give categorical orders to urgently send warm clothes to the Eastern Front. In Germany, fur and other warm things were collected everywhere. But it's too late! It took not days or even weeks to deliver the collected clothes to the troops, but whole months. Thus, the soldiers were destined to spend their first winter in Russia in heavy battles, having only summer uniforms, greatcoats and blankets. Everything that was available in the occupied regions of Russia - felt boots, fur hats and woolen uniforms - were requisitioned, but turned out to be a drop in the ocean and almost did not alleviate the situation of the huge mass of our soldiers.

With the supply of troops, things were not very good. Only a few railways approached our area of \u200b\u200bhostilities, and they were often cut by partisans. In the steam boilers of steam locomotives, not adapted to the conditions of the Russian climate, water froze. Each steam locomotive could only carry half of the usual number of wagons. Many of them, covered with snow and ice, stood idle for days in dead ends of railway stations. Our huge need for artillery shells was met with difficulty. At the same time, in order to cheer up the soldiers, whole trains with red wine were delivered from France and Germany to the Eastern Front. You, of course, can imagine what a disgusting feeling arose among soldiers and officers when, instead of shells, without which the troops literally suffocated, they were brought wine. However, wine often got to the front in an unusable form: during transportation it froze, the bottles burst, and only pieces of red ice remained from it.

Our defensive positions were almost devoid of cover. This affected the tactics of both sides, who fought stubborn battles for the capture of settlements, where it was possible to find at least some shelter from the terrible cold. In the end, however, such tactics led to the fact that both sides subjected these villages to shelling and set fire to wooden houses and houses with thatched roofs, depriving the enemy of basic amenities. There was nothing to bury in the ground and try - the earth hardened like iron.

The harsh climate also affected weapons. The grease on the weapon thickened so that it was often impossible to open the bolt, and we did not have glycerin or special oils that could be used in low temperatures. We had to maintain low fire under the tanks at night so that the engines did not freeze and fail. Tanks often slid over frozen ground and rolled down a slope.

Perhaps this brief description helped the reader to get an idea of \u200b\u200bthe conditions in which the German army had to fight in the winter of 1941/42.

The Russians were in better conditions. Most importantly, the intense cold was not a novelty for them - they got used to it. In addition, Moscow was immediately behind them. Consequently, the supply lines were short. The personnel of most of the Russian units were provided with fur coats, quilted jackets, felt boots and fur hats with earflaps. The Russians had gloves, mittens and warm underwear. Steam locomotives, designed taking into account their operation in Siberia, at low temperatures, ply along the railways of the Russians. Russian trucks and tanks, like ours, were uncomfortable, but not to the same extent, they were better adapted to Russian conditions than ours. Until now, we have seen little of Russian aircraft, although at that time the front line passed only a few minutes of flight from the Moscow airfields. These were the conditions when, on December 6, Marshal Zhukov launched a powerful counteroffensive on the Moscow front, fatal for us.

Russian counteroffensive

Fierce hostilities on the outskirts of Moscow, which almost led to the collapse of most of the German front, chronologically, in order to better understand the events that took place, can be combined into separate series of battles. It would take an entire book to write them down in detail. But to understand the battle for Moscow as a whole, they must be viewed in general terms. Strictly speaking, the Battle of Moscow lasted until mid-April 1942.

The Russian counteroffensive began with the overwhelming Russian attack north of Moscow. They crossed the Moscow-Volga canal from the east towards Klin and attacked the left flank of General Reinhardt's tank group in the area south of the Volga lakes. At the same time, they attacked the 4th Panzer Group, located to the south. A particularly strong blow was struck from the Moscow region in the western direction along the Moscow-Smolensk highway at the junction of the 4th Panzer Group and the 4th Army. In those wretched conditions, the German tank forces could not withstand the strongest pressure from the Russians and were forced to slowly retreat, continuing to fight stubbornly in deep snow and hoping to restore the united front further to the west. During the retreat, we left behind a lot of heavy weapons. The roads, which are rare in these places, covered with a thick layer of snow, were often impassable for our guns and tanks. In battles with the enemy, we suffered heavy losses, but the losses from frost were even greater. Especially often soldiers froze their feet, as uncomfortable, tight-fitting shoes made it impossible to wear more than one pair of socks. In the end, even Hitler was forced to agree to the withdrawal of two tank groups. In mid-December, the Russian offensive expanded southward. New attacks were launched against the 4th Army between Serpukhov and Tuchkovo. Here the enemy managed to achieve only local successes so far, and the 4th Army was able to hold the common front line.

A great threat loomed over the southern sector of the 4th Army's front. Here, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army (formerly 2nd Panzer Group), battered in previous battles, was attacked by superior enemy forces. The Russians launched a strong offensive in the Tula area, which the 2nd Panzer Army was unable to delay. One group of Russian troops continued to advance westward, while the other turned northwest in the direction of Kaluga. Russian troops stationed in the Tarusa-Aleksin area also launched an offensive. Here again one of their groups rushed to the west, while the other turned northwest in the direction of Maloyaroslavets and Medyn.

The intentions of the Russians were clear. They planned a wide double encirclement of the 4th Army by striking in the north and south. Their ultimate goal was to encircle and destroy this army in its positions west of Moscow. The German command had almost no hope of avoiding the encirclement and defeat of the huge southern group. The Russians were slowly widening the gap between 2nd Panzer and 4th Field Armies. Field Marshal von Kluge had no reserves to deal with the danger looming over his southern flank. Moreover, the 4th Army was connected to the rear by only one road. It passed through Yukhnov, Medyn, Maloyaroslavets and Podolsk. All other roads in the army's area disappeared under a thick snow cover. If the Russians, advancing from the south, managed to capture our only vital artery, the 4th Army would be finished.

"The 4th Army will fight!"

The situation was such that the command of Army Group Center had to think about organizing a systematic withdrawal of the entire reinforced 4th Army in the western direction. The need for this logically followed from the fact that the 2nd Panzer Army, located to the south, was forced to retreat beyond the Oka in the Belev area. A line was drawn on the map, passing roughly from Belev through Yukhnov to the river. Ugra, to Gzhatsk and further north. The troops of the 4th Army were supposed to retreat to this line. The order was given to conduct a reconnaissance of the front line of defense. One motorized division has already entered the Yukhnov area. Field Marshal von Kluge with his headquarters deliberately remained in Maloyaroslavets, although now the city was in serious danger. In mid-December, he summoned his corps commanders and their chiefs of staff to a meeting to discuss in detail the plan for the withdrawal of the 4th Army formations that were defended south of the Moscow-Smolensk highway. Everything seemed perfectly clear.

Suddenly the Chief of Staff of Army Group Center, General von Greifenberg, a close friend of mine, called. He wished to speak with the Chief of Staff of the 4th Army. I went to the phone. Greifenberg said: “Better stay where you are now. A new order from Hitler has just been received. The 4th Army must not retreat a single step. "

The reader will understand what impression this order made on us. By all accounts, it could only mean the defeat of the 4th Army. And yet I had to obey him. Units and formations that were already withdrawing to the west were returned. The 4th Army was preparing for its final battles. Now only a miracle could save her.

However, that was not all. At the most critical moment, some commanders were radically replaced by others.

Change of command

The commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock, had long suffered from stomach ailments. Von Bock's physical condition deteriorated sharply in connection with the defeat of his army group near Moscow, and now he had to at least temporarily transfer command of the army group to another person. In his place was appointed Field Marshal von Kluge, a man of iron will. After leaving the 4th Army on December 18, he took command of Army Group Center, whose headquarters were located in the forest west of Smolensk.

Thus, at the time of difficult trials, the 4th Army was left without a commander. Kluge believed that he would be able to lead his old army by telephone and radio from Smolensk. Therefore, he sent me, as his former chief of staff, orders and instructions, for the implementation of which I was personally responsible. This situation continued until December 26, when the new commander, General of the Mountain Rifle Forces Kübler, arrived at the headquarters of the 4th Army. For some time the army commander was General of the Panzer Troops Stumme.

It is not difficult to imagine how this change of commanders had a detrimental effect on the military operations of the army.

Even more significant changes took place in Berlin. The commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, had long been out of favor with Hitler. For several years he had suffered from heart disease and could not stand the defeat of our troops near Moscow. Brauchitsch resigned, and Hitler became the sovereign commander-in-chief of the ground forces. His only adviser, albeit without any rights, was the chief of the general staff, General Halder, who remained at his post after this purge.

Hitler believed that he alone could save his army from the catastrophe that was inevitably impending near Moscow. And frankly, he really did it.

His fanatical order, which obliged the troops to stand firm in every position and in the most adverse conditions, was undoubtedly correct. Hitler instinctively realized that any retreat through snow and ice in a few days would lead to the collapse of the entire front, and then the German army would have suffered the same fate as Napoleon's Great Army. The division was not allowed to retreat more than 5-10 kilometers in one night. More could not have been demanded from the troops and horse-drawn transport in those incredibly difficult conditions. Since all the roads were covered with snow, they had to retreat in open areas. After several nights of such a retreat, the soldiers were so exhausted that, stopping, they simply lay down on the snow and froze. In the rear there were no pre-prepared positions where the troops could retreat, and no defensive line to hold.

Thus, over the course of many weeks, the battlefield was slowly pushed westward. Stubbornly defending ourselves, our armies gradually withdrew. The Russians broke through our defenses several times, but we always found the strength to restore the front line again. In most cases, the number of company personnel was reduced to 40 people. We suffered heavy losses in military equipment. Until the end of December, they saw the main danger in the threat hanging over the left flank of the army.

But then happiness smiled at Hitler. Although the enemy was much stronger than us, the pace of his advance began to slow down. Undoubtedly, the Russians were disappointed that they had not yet achieved the disintegration of the German front west of Moscow. They were amazed at the resilience of the heavily battered German divisions fighting in the harsh climate.

The Russian command ruthlessly sent its troops forward. In Maloyaroslavets, a few days before Christmas, we intercepted radio reports, which are interesting to quote here. The Russian regiment commander reported on the radio: “Now it is impossible to continue the offensive. It is necessary to stay for twelve hours at the achieved line. " The senior commander's reply was: “Attack the enemy immediately. If you don't, blame yourself. "

Something like a miracle happened on the southern flank of the 4th Army. It was not clear to us why the Russians, despite their advantage in this sector of the front, did not cut the Yukhyov - Maloyaroslavets road and deprived the 4th Army of its only supply route. At night, Belov's cavalry corps, which had caused us so much trouble in the second half of December, advanced in our deep rear towards Yukhnov. This corps reached the vital communication for us, but fortunately did not cut it. He continued to move westward and hid somewhere in the huge bogs of the Mother of God.

At the end of December 1941, the headquarters of the 4th Army was still in Maloyaroslavets. On Christmas Eve, fighting went on all night near our headquarters. Between us and the Russians was only the 19th Panzer Division, called from the front, in which there were only 50 tanks.

During these weeks, the aviation could not provide us with such effective support as before. Back in November, the most combat-ready units of Kesselring's 2nd Air Fleet were transferred to North Africa, where the troops of Field Marshal Rommel were defeated.

On December 25, the headquarters of the 4th Army at the very last moment moved to Yukhnov. By December 22, the 4th and 3rd Panzer Groups were withdrawn from the 4th Army. Now the 4th Army could rely only on its own forces.

Comparative data on the forces and means of the German and Russian troops as of the end of December are very instructive. The 4th Army, which held the defenses between Kaluga and Tuchkovo, consisted of 13 infantry and one tank division. However, these formations had such a shortage of personnel that many divisions were, in fact, combat groups consisting of subunits of various branches of the armed forces. The following Russian formations were concentrated in front of the front of the 4th Army: 24 rifle divisions, three tank and two landing brigades. The bulk of these forces operated on the southern flank of the 4th Army. South of Kaluga, six more rifle divisions, one tank brigade and four cavalry divisions were advancing in the western direction. In the Tula region, three rifle, one motorized, two tank divisions and two tank brigades were concentrated.

These numbers speak for themselves. True, not all Russian divisions were staffed according to wartime states. Some of them were certainly very weak. They varied greatly both in organization and in combat capability. The Russians were inexhaustible in various inventions. For example, cavalry divisions were often accompanied by sleigh infantry. The sleds were tied with ropes to the saddles of the cavalrymen. It was strange to see long columns of horsemen moving through the snow on a clear moonlit night, each of whom was followed by an infantryman on a sled.

Our losses in weapons and military equipment were as great as the losses in people, and perhaps even exceeded them. An example of this is the state of the 4th Army's artillery at the beginning of January 1942. In this case, we mean artillery of army subordination. Before our retreat, it included 48 heavy howitzers, 36 mortars, 48 \u200b\u200b100-mm and nine 150-mm cannons, 84 assault guns and 252 heavy and light tractors. Now we have five heavy howitzers, eight mortars, 17 l00-mm and two 150-mm cannons, 12 assault guns and 22 tractors.

Fights in early 1942

Despite the huge advantage in forces, the Russians were unable to achieve the disintegration of the German front west of Moscow by the end of 1941. But this in no way meant that the acute crisis was over. During the first three months of 1942, a serious danger repeatedly hung over the 4th Army.

In January, the thermometer dropped to 42 degrees Celsius. This lasted only a few days, then the temperature rose. Here I cannot describe in detail the battles that took place then, although in the aggregate they represent part of the huge Moscow battle. Those were terrible months. Later, Hitler ordered the casting of the "Eastern Medal", which was awarded to everyone who took part in heavy battles on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1941/42. This medal was considered then and is now considered a sign of high distinction.

On December 26, a staunch soldier, General of the Mountain Rifle Forces, Kübler, became the commander of the 4th Army. After a few weeks, he came to the conclusion that he was incapable of commanding an army in such a difficult environment. In the second half of January, he was replaced by General Heinrici, who had long commanded the 4th Army.

Conclusion

The campaign in Russia, and especially its turning point - the Battle of Moscow, dealt the first powerful blow to Germany, both politically and militarily. In the West, that is, in our rear, there could be no more talk of the much-needed peace with England. As for North Africa, here too we have failed. A tense situation has developed in the Mediterranean region. German troops were stationed in Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, Greece and the Balkans.

Even with a glance at the map of the world, it was not difficult to understand that the small area in Central Europe occupied by Germany clearly could not deploy forces capable of capturing and holding the entire European continent. Because of Hitler's policies, the German people and their armed forces, step by step, came to an impasse.

It is appropriate to recall the last years of the reign of Alexander the Great, when his small army moved deep into Asia until the situation forced the king to abandon his intentions. Or the Swedish king Charles XII, who in 1709 reached Poltava, where his small army was defeated by the Russians. By the way, Army Group South in the summer of 1941 passed through Poltava.

But the closest parallel can be drawn with the Emperor Napoleon. A child of the French Revolution, he believed he could conquer all of Europe. And here, in Russia, in the fire of blazing Moscow, Nemesis overtook him. We will return to this parallel a little later. People often ask: could the Germans have won this war if they had managed to capture Moscow? This is a purely academic question, and no one can answer it with certainty. I personally believe that even if we captured Moscow, the war would still be far from a successful end. Russia is so vast, and the Russian government was so determined that the war, taking on new forms, would continue across the vast expanses of the country. The least evil we could expect is the Guerrilla War, which is widespread throughout European Russia. We should not forget about the huge areas in Asia, which are also Russian territory.

One thing is absolutely indisputable: the German military leaders and German troops have achieved the seemingly almost impossible. The war in the East was the last test of our soldiers. In two world wars, they demonstrated their iron will, bravely enduring the harsh Russian conditions.

1812 and 1941

Before concluding, I would like to draw a parallel between Napoleon's campaign of 1812 and the campaign of 1941, although historically this is difficult to do because the reasons and circumstances of these wars are completely different. And yet, in my opinion, it would be interesting to compare them.

Napoleon was not French, but Italian from Corsica, which became part of France. Hitler was not a pure German, but an Austrian. Napoleon used the striking force created by the French Revolution and relied on the might of France. Hitler used the power of Germany. Napoleon, the child of the revolution, fought many wars and conquered all the countries of Europe one after another. Hitler followed in his footsteps. England was Napoleon's main target and he was ready to launch an invasion from Boulogne. Operation Sea Lion of 1940 was no more than a political threat. The French fleet was defeated by the English, and Napoleon's dream of conquering England became impracticable, so the emperor decided to harm the island kingdom by creating a system of continental blockade. Most European countries were forced to implement this event of Napoleon, and only Russia hesitated. This was one of the main reasons that made Napoleon declare war on Russia. Hitler launched a war with Russia, intending to conquer living space for Germany, destroy Bolshevism and become the master of Europe.

Both Napoleon and Hitler believed that their wars in Russia would end as quickly and successfully as many others they had fought before. Both of them misunderstood the internal strength and size of Russia. Both of them were not sufficiently prepared for the war and did not take into account the difficulties of supplying their armies in this vast country. Many marshals and generals of Napoleon did not approve of his war plan in 1812. The same was the case with Hitler's plan for war in 1941.

In 1812, Napoleon invaded Russia with an army of more than 600 thousand people (among them there were more than 200 thousand Germans, Flemings, Poles, Swiss, Spaniards and Portuguese), 1400 cannons and 180 thousand horses. Napoleon led an army of all Europe against Russia. Hitler tried to do the same. Although he did not succeed in doing this fully, his soldiers included Romanians, Hungarians, Italians, Slovaks, Finns, a Spanish division and a legion of French volunteers. On June 21, 1812, Napoleon issued a grandiose order to his troops. Before the start of the 1941 campaign, Hitler also issued a similar order. On the evening of June 22, 1812, the emperor watched the crossing of the river by his soldiers. Neman near Kovno. Hitler's armies crossed the Bug on the same day, exactly 129 years later. Napoleon began hostilities on June 24. In both cases, the war in the East began too late.

Both in 1812 and 1941 the war was delayed by an unexpected pause. The French emperor lost several precious weeks due to negotiations with the Russian tsar. Napoleon resumed his offensive against Moscow at a relatively late time of the year, like Hitler, on October 2, 1941. In 1812, the Russians retreated with stubborn, bloody battles, luring Napoleon into the depths of Russia and dragging out the war until winter. In 1812, the French emperor captured Moscow, but the war did not end there. On the contrary, from the point of view of the Russians, the war was just beginning. Hitler was unable to take Moscow, and only after that did the enemy begin to wage war for real. When Napoleon was forced to leave the flaming Moscow, he suffered his first major defeat. A similar situation developed in 1941. In both cases, at this stage, the Russians launched a powerful counteroffensive, and partisans played an important role in both wars.

In 1812 Napoleon believed that by retreating through the snow and ice, he could save his army. However, it turned out the other way around - the retreat led to the defeat of his Great Army. In December 1941, Hitler ordered not to retreat in any way. With gigantic efforts, the front was held, and the crisis was eventually overcome. You can find other historical parallels, but, as we noted above, they should be treated with great caution.

1812 and 1941 proved that using such an old-fashioned vehicle as a horse, it is impossible to conquer the vast expanses of Russia in a short time. Neither Napoleon's fairly strong cavalry, nor Hitler's motorized formations were large enough to capture and control vast Russian territory.

Before starting the war, Napoleon made one last attempt to convince the king to accept his demands. In Vilna, the Count of Narbonne was sent to Tsar Alexander I. The king told the ambassador the following: “I am not blinded by dreams; I know to what extent the Emperor Napoleon is a great commander, but, as you can see, I have space and time on my side. In all this hostile land for you, there is no such remote corner, wherever I retreat, there is no point that I would not defend before agreeing to conclude a shameful peace. I will not start a war, but I will not lay down my weapons while at least one enemy soldier remains in Russia. "

Stalin's determination in 1941 was not inferior to that of the tsar in 1812. The big difference between the two wars is that the emperor personally led his army to Moscow and back, which Hitler did not.

At the Russian military council in 1812, the question of whether or not to leave Moscow was discussed. Prince Kutuzov then said: “With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not lost. My first duty is to preserve the army and get closer to those troops that are coming to us for reinforcements. By the very concession of Moscow, we will prepare the enemy for destruction. As long as the army exists and is able to resist the enemy, until then there will be hope of happily completing the war, but after the destruction of the army, both Moscow and Russia are lost. I order you to retreat. "

We can definitely assume that if the Germans took Moscow, the Soviets would have acted in the same way.

It is interesting to recall that on October 21, 1812, Marshal Mortier received an order from Napoleon to blow up the Kremlin before the French retreat from Moscow. Hitler intended to do the same if he succeeded in capturing Moscow.

The great difficulties in supplying the troops in 1812 and 1941 were already indicated above. In 1941, the main problem was supplying the troops with ammunition and fuel. In 1812 it was very difficult to provide horses with fodder. 180 thousand of Napoleon's horses could not exist on that meager feed, to which the Cossack horses were accustomed. The cavalry of the French emperor suffered heavy losses in battles, and the death rate of horses increased steadily at large crossings.

After the battle at Borodino, the famous cavalryman Murat said, reproaching his generals, that the cavalry attacks were not energetic enough. To this the cavalry general Nansuti replied: “The horses are to blame for everything - they are not patriotic enough.

Our soldiers fight brilliantly if they do not even have bread, but horses without hay do not move. "

There is a famous painting depicting Napoleon, immersed in thoughts, on horseback. On the sandy Russian road, he drives east ahead of the columns of his guards. Under the picture are the words: "They grumbled - and yet they followed him!" This is the best description not only of 1812, but also of 1941, for there is no doubt that the German troops also did everything they were capable of.

I was Hitler's adjutant Belov Nikolaus von

The defeat of Army Group "Center"

The defeat of Army Group "Center"

The situation in the East was different at that time. On June 22 - the very day the campaign against Russia began three years ago - the Red Army launched a major offensive against Army Group Center, undertaking its largest and most successful operation in this war (276). At first, it seemed that the Russians wanted to launch an offensive on a smaller scale. But when the first breakthroughs of the German defensive line were made and significant gaps formed in it, a large tank offensive began in the area between Gomel and Vitebsk, and further ones followed. The Russians prepared each of their attacks with air raids and heavy artillery fire, massively throwing tanks into battle. The commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Bush, tried to induce Hitler to withdraw from this, as the Fuehrer put it, "a firm place." But he ordered to hold each position.

Now Hitler was forced to fight off three offensive wedges of the enemy at once: in France, Italy and Russia. He gave a categorical order: to defend every square meter of land to the end. But everywhere it became obvious: the enemy's forces were superior to ours, and in some areas - by much. But the Fuhrer did not want to reckon with these facts yet and perceived the reports sent to him by the troops as greatly exaggerated. In Army Group Center, he replaced Bush with Model, and a few days later Colonel General Lindem, Commander of Army Group North, by Colonel General Frissner. But this change of faces did not affect the course of events in any way. Army Group Center has already lost 25 divisions, approximately 350,000 men. A gap of about 300 km arose in the front line, through which the Russians advanced to the German border.

On July 9, Hitler flew to his Headquarters in East Prussia. Heitel, Doenitz, Himmler, Jodl and Korten accompanied him. Model, Frissner and Colonel-General Cavalier von Greim, the air commander of Army Group Center, arrived from the Eastern Front. The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Zeitzler, was absent. From the beginning of the Russian offensive, he had various, sometimes sharp, disagreements with Hitler, since he could not follow the views of the Fuhrer on the command of the ground forces and, moreover, was at the limit of his strength. Since then, Hitler never saw him again.

The conversation in East Prussia was primarily about the rapid transfer of new formations to the Eastern Front. Model and Frissner looked at the further course of events with some optimism. Their proposals and demands could be fulfilled in the coming weeks, however, on the preliminary condition that the Russians did not decide to quickly break through. Gross Admiral Doenitz demanded that the ports on the Baltic Sea, important for new submarines, be held. In the afternoon, Hitler flew to Salzburg. I got the impression that he still evaluates the course of events on the Eastern Front positively.

In these last weeks at Obersalzberg, I experienced an event that deeply moved me. During one routine discussion of the situation, for some reason I had to leave the hall and into a nearby small room. There I suddenly heard Hitler say about me that I was the only one who openly and without fear expresses his opinion to him. The accidentally heard words of the Fuehrer, which sounded right now, when the enemy was making his way to the Reich in three places, strengthened my intention to continue to behave in the same way. I did not return to the meeting because I was annoyed that others did not do the same.

Chapter 4 “Group biography, mailed out, showing age, spelling of group members' names and birthplaces, released in the hopes of improving the meager prospects of success; the complete absence of friendships in the music business; and with group members,

1988. Defeat of the Gdlyan / Ivanov group. Party conference ahead. Suddenly, it turns out that you can choose delegates. This is the first election so far within the party. At the conference itself, Academician Abalkin, the future chief of the State Commission on Reform, is subjected to harsh criticism.

Chapter 27. The defeat of Denikin's armies However, on July 9, Stalin was sent to the Western Front, where a dangerous situation also developed. Back in April 1919, Polish troops began to seize lands inhabited by Ukrainians and Belarusians. During its offensive, Poland captured

Winzer Bruno Soldier of the Three Armies

A. Operations of Army Group South (later Army Groups A and B) before reaching the Volga Each battle has its own background, and it is often more interesting and instructive than the battle itself. It is still considered the beginning of the "Battle of Stalingrad" on November 19, 1942. Neither name nor date

I. Situation on the front of Army Group South at the beginning of the summer campaign of 1942 (end of June) On the 800 km front occupied by Army Group South, there were: 11th Army In Crimea Witersheim Group (14th Panzer Corps) North Taganrog 17th Army East of Stalino Italian

III. The Situation at the Front of Army Group B In mid-September 1942 it became clear that the two armies that took part in the operation had failed to take Stalingrad into the flares. The 4th Panzer Army did not capture the Volga heights in the Krasnoarmeysk area, its front was bent to

IV. Situation on the Front of Army Group A By mid-September, when 4th Panzer Army and 6th Army captured central Stalingrad, it became clear that none of the far-reaching goals of Army Group A had been achieved and could no longer be to be achieved.

VIII. Force grouping on the front of Army Group B before the Russian counteroffensive Apparently, mainly for political reasons, the German and allied armies, located on both sides of Stalingrad and on the middle reaches of the Don, were originally

II. Tasks and plans of Army Group Don and Army Group Gotha The task that Army Group Don put before the Army Group of Gotha was to “advance east of the river. Don to the north, to break through to the 6th army. " 6th Army, the command of Army Group Don ordered:

Position of Army Group G When Balck took command on September 21, the troops of Army Group G were positioned as follows: 1st Army of General von Knobelsdorff - in the Metz area, Chateau-Salen; 5th Panzer Army of General Hasso von Manteuffel covered the Northern Vosges

Soldier of three armies Who did not rule over the territory of modern Croatia! In the 1st century BC, it fell under the rule of Rome and later became part of the Roman provinces of Pannonia and Dalmatia. In the III-V centuries, Visigoths, Huns and Ostrogoths constantly invaded here, in the VI

Position of Army Group G When Balck assumed command on September 21, the forces of Army Group G were positioned as follows: - General von Knobelsdorff's 1st Army - in the Metz-Chateau-Salen area; - General Hasso von Manteuffel's 5th Panzer Army covered the Northern

Army Group Don Sends Major In the morning of December 18, the commandant of the airfield in the Nursery contacted us. - An officer of the reconnaissance department of Army Group Don, Major of the General Staff Eisman, has just arrived. He asks to send a car for him.

Center and Right Center Created primarily by Yuri Luzhkov and his political allies, the Fatherland party initially declared itself a social democratic party, that is, the party of the center left. In 1999, in opposition to it, the Unity party was created,

“In the central sector of the eastern front, our brave divisions are waging fierce defensive battles in the areas of Bobruisk, Mogilev and Orsha against large forces of the advancing Soviets. West and south-west of Vitebsk, our troops withdrew to new positions. To the east of Polotsk, numerous attacks by the infantry and tanks of the Bolsheviks were repulsed.

At the beginning of the summer of 1944, Army Group Center occupied the front line running from Polotsk in the north, through Vitebsk in the east, east of Orsha and Mogilev to Rogachev on the Dnieper, and from there turning and stretching westward to the area north of Kovel, where the junction with Army Group Northern Ukraine (this name was given to the former Army Group South since March 30, 1944).

Spring-summer 1944

The command post of Army Group Center at the beginning of June 1944 was located in Minsk. The commander, as before, remained Field Marshal Bush, the chief of staff - Lieutenant General Krebs.

The headquarters of the 3rd Panzer Army, Colonel-General Reinhardt, was located in Beshenkovichi. He was in charge of the front line on the northern flank of the army group 220 kilometers wide. On the far left were the 252nd Infantry Division and Corps Group D of the 9th Army Corps, commanded by General of Artillery Wutman. (Corps Group "D" was formed on November 3, 1943 after the merger of the 56th and 262nd Infantry Divisions). Near Vitebsk, they were bordered by the 53rd Army Corps of General Gollwitzer, which included the 246th Infantry, 4th and 6th Airfield and 206th Infantry Divisions. The army's right flank was held by Artillery General Pfeifer's 6th Army Corps. It consisted of the 197th, 299th and 256th Infantry Divisions. The 95th Infantry and 201st Security Divisions were in reserve.

The 4th Army of Colonel General Heinrici, who was sick in those days and was replaced by General of the Infantry von Tippelskirch, placed its headquarters in Godevichi near Orsha in the center of the army group strip. From left to right in its lane were: 27th Army Corps of General Völkers' Infantry (78th Assault, 25th Motorized Infantry, 260th Infantry Division). Next to it was the 39th Panzer Corps of General of Artillery Martinek (110th, 337th, 12th, 31st Infantry Divisions). Lieutenant General Müller's 12th Army Corps consisted of the 18th Motorized Infantry, 267th and 57th Infantry Divisions. The width of the army's strip was 200 kilometers. The 4th Army in the rear had the 14th Infantry (Motorized) Division, the 60th Motorized Infantry Division and the 286th Security Division.

The adjacent 300-kilometer strip was occupied by General Jordan's 9th Army. Its headquarters were located in Bobruisk. The army consisted of: 35th Army Corps of General Wiese (134th, 296th, 6th, 383rd and 45th Infantry Divisions), 41st Panzer Corps of General of Artillery Weidling (36th Motorized Infantry, 35th and 129th Infantry Divisions) and General Herlein's 55th Army Corps (292nd and 102nd Infantry Divisions). The army's reserves were: the 20th tank and 707th security divisions. They were located in the northern part of the strip near Bobruisk, the largest city in the area.

Colonel-General Weiss's 2nd Army, whose headquarters was located in Petrikov, defended the longest front line, 300 kilometers wide, passing through forests and swamps. The army consisted of: 23rd Army Corps, General of the Sapper Troops Timann (203rd Security and 7th Infantry Divisions), 20th Army Corps of Artillery General Freigerr von Roman (3rd Cavalry Brigade and Corps Group "E") , 8th Army Corps of Infantry General Höne (Hungarian 12th Reserve Division, 211st Infantry Division and 5th Jaeger Division). The 3rd Cavalry Brigade was formed in March 1944 from the Center Cavalry Regiment, the 177th Assault Gun Division, the 105th Light Artillery Battalion and the 2nd Cossack Battalion. Corps Group E was created on November 2, 1943 as a result of the amalgamation of the 86th, 137th and 251st Infantry Divisions.

To protect the vast roadless area of \u200b\u200bPripyat, the 1st Cavalry Corps of General Hartenek's Cavalry with the 4th Cavalry Brigade was used. On May 29, the brigade consisted of the cavalry regiments "North" and "South", now - the 5th and 41st cavalry regiments, the 4th cavalry artillery battalion, the 70th tank reconnaissance battalion of the 387th communications battalion.

On June 1, 1944, there were only 442,053 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers in Army Group Center, of whom only 214,164 could be considered trench soldiers. These include another 44,440 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of individual units of the reserve of the Supreme Command, who served as artillerymen, tank destroyers, signalmen, orderlies and car drivers throughout the army group zone.

In those days, the command of the army group reported to the main command of the ground forces that none of the formations on the front was capable of repelling a major enemy offensive. Were suitable for limited offensive actions: 6th, 12th, 18th, 25th, 35th, 102nd, 129th, 134th, 197th, 246th, 256th , 260th, 267th, 296th, 337th, 383rd infantry and motorized infantry divisions, as well as corps group "D".

Fully suitable for defense were: 5th, 14th, 45th, 95th, 206th, 252nd, 292nd, 299th infantry divisions, 4th and 6th airfield divisions ...

Conditionally suitable for conducting defense were: 57th, 60th, 707th infantry and motorized infantry divisions.

The 6th Air Fleet of Colonel-General Ritter von Greim, whose headquarters was located in Priluki, at the beginning of June 1944 had the 1st Aviation Division of Major General Fuchs (based in Bobruisk) and the 4th Aviation Division of Major General Royce (based in Orsha). The 1st Aviation Division included the 1st Squadron of the 1st Assault Squadron and the 1st Squadron of the 51st Fighter Squadron. Both were based in Bobruisk.

The 4th Aviation Division included the 3rd Squadron of the 1st Assault Squadron (in Polotsk), the 3rd Squadron of the 51st Fighter Squadron and the 1st Squadron of the 100th Night Fighter Squadron (both based in Orsha).

At that time, there was not a single bomber formation in the air fleet, since the bomber squadrons envisaged for operations in the central sector of the eastern front were being reorganized. The 4th Aviation Corps of Lieutenant General Meister in Brest was in charge of him. In May, the following formations were to be formed (which were not combat-ready at the beginning of the Russian offensive):

3rd Bomber Squadron (Baranovichi),
4th Bomber Squadron (Bialystok),
27th Bomber Squadron (Baranovichi),
53rd Bomber Squadron (Radom),
55th Bomber Squadron (Lublin),
2nd night assault group (Terespol),
long-range reconnaissance squadron 2/100 (Pinsk),
4th group of close reconnaissance (Biala Podlaska).

The 2nd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Corps of General Anti-Aircraft Artillery Odebrecht, whose command was in Bobruisk, was responsible for anti-aircraft defense in the entire zone of Army Group Center. In June 1944, the corps included the 12th anti-aircraft artillery division of Lieutenant General Prelberg with headquarters in Bobruisk. Parts of the division were located in the bands of the 2nd and 9th armies. Major General Wolf's 18th anti-aircraft artillery division with headquarters in Orsha was in charge of the 4th Army's zone, and the 3rd Tank Army's zone was covered by Major General Sachs's 10th anti-aircraft artillery brigade with headquarters in Vitebsk (17 batteries in total).

Such was the situation in the zone of Army Group Center, over which hell broke loose on June 22, 1944, and which ceased to exist a few weeks later.

The end of Army Group Center was outlined in February 1944, when the Soviet command developed a plan to encircle and destroy German troops in this sector. The last meetings of the command of the four fronts of the Red Army, which included 23 fully equipped armies, were held on May 22 and 23 in Moscow.

10,000 guns of the Red Army at dawn on June 22, 1944 brought down devastating fire on the positions of the German artillery on the ledge of the front near Vitebsk and began a major battle that led to the death of Army Group Center.

Only 30 minutes passed, and the artillery fire struck again. From the east, the roar of the engines of hundreds of heavy and medium tanks approached and the footsteps of thousands of Red Army men were heard.

The 3rd Panzer Army was the first target of the 1st Baltic Front, which was advancing in five armies from the north and south to the front ledge near Vitebsk. The most left flank was defended by the Silesian 252nd Infantry Division of Lieutenant General Melzer. Its front was immediately broken through by the Soviet 12th Guards Corps 8 kilometers wide. Army Group North was cut off from Army Group South.

During the Soviet offensive south of Vitebsk, the Hessian-Palatinate 299th Infantry Division of Major General von Junck was defeated. Until noon, three major breakthroughs were made here, which could no longer be eliminated by the counterattacks of battle groups of the Hessian, Thuringian and Rhineland soldiers of the 95th Infantry Division of Major General Michaelis and the Saxons and Lower Bavarians of the 256th Infantry Division of Lieutenant General Wüstenhagen.

A report from the 252nd Infantry Division that day said:

Tank attacks, which always took place in conjunction with infantry attacks, did not stop all day. Where the enemy, thanks to his unheard-of superiority, the support of tanks and aircraft, wedged into our positions, he was repelled during counterattacks. Even when individual strongholds had long been abandoned, they were captured again in the course of a counterattack. In the afternoon, they still hoped that, in general, they would be able to hold their positions. The main line of defense in some places turned out to be crowded, but not yet broken through. Separate enemy tanks broke through. Most often they were knocked out at the line of artillery firing positions or destroyed with faust cartridges. Small local reserves were all used up on the first day and quickly disappeared. After a particularly fierce fighting on the evening of June 22, an infantry position north of Sirotino was lost. But even before that, they had to leave the village of Ratkova due to a lack of ammunition. The cutoff position was taken in a planned manner.

In the dark, the units were being put in order everywhere. Some command posts were moved back as they were under heavy fire. The commander of the 252nd artillery regiment was forced to move his command post to Lovsha. During the night, it became clear that the front remained intact, but too rare, with the exception of some places where there were gaps. But the enemy has not yet discovered and used them. There was no communication with the left flank of the division. Therefore, the impression arose that this area had been attacked. This unit was separated from the division by the Obol River.

The division commander tried by all means to find out the situation from his right neighbor and in the sector of the 461st Grenadier Regiment. Information was received from the right neighbor about the situation in the corps lane. There, too, the enemy was conducting strong attacks. But the situation was difficult only on the left flank of Corps Group "D", where in some places the battle was still going on. The dispatched officer reconnaissance patrols and liaison groups brought a little clarity to the situation in the areas with which communication was lost. On the left flank of the division, in the sector of the 461st Grenadier Regiment, continuous enemy attacks continued all day on June 22. The positions on the regiment's sector changed hands several times. The regiment suffered heavy losses during the day. There were no more reserves. With a blow along the Obol River, the enemy really cut off the regiment from the rest of the division. At dawn on June 23, the enemy again launched attacks with a non-decreasing force. Due to heavy losses, the battles with varying success on the main battlefield moved to the positions of the artillery batteries, which in some places had to engage in close combat in the first half of the day. Now the enemy has already cut, and in places broke through the main line of defense. Since it was no longer possible to restore the position in the central sector with the help of reserves, on the left flank of the division, in the sector of the 461st Grenadier Regiment, on June 23 at 4.00 the first units of the arriving 24th Infantry Division began to be deployed on the heights near Grebentsy south of Star Lesochka. This was the infantry of the 24th Infantry Division, which was sent into battle behind the right flank of the 205th Infantry Division to defend the southern flank of the 16th Army (Army Group North).

The 24th Infantry Division received the task of holding the Isthmus near Oboli to stop the enemy who had broken through to the north-west of Vitebsk. The 32nd Grenadier Regiment, the 24th Fusilier Battalion and the 472nd Grenadier Regiment launched a counterattack on both sides of the Cheremka-Grebentsy road. The counterattack was soon stopped and did not bring the intended success.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht announced in its official report on 23 June:
"On the central sector of the front, the Bolsheviks launched the offensive we were expecting ..."

And the sentence below:
"Fierce battles are still going on on both sides of Vitebsk."
These battles continued at night.

Field Marshal Busch, who had never thought of a major Red Army offensive, hastily returned to his command post from Germany, where he was on leave. But the situation could no longer be changed. On the left flank of the 3rd Army, it had already developed into a crisis. The command of the army group already on the evening of the first day of the battle admitted:

"A major offensive north-west of Vitebsk meant ... complete surprise, since until now we did not assume that the enemy could concentrate such large forces in front of us."

The mistake in assessing the enemy could not be corrected, since already on June 23 new enemy strikes followed, as a result of which the 6th Army Corps was defeated. The divisions lost contact with each other and with small battle groups retreated hastily to the west through forests and lakes. The commander of the 53rd Army Corps, directly from the headquarters of the Fuhrer, received an order to advance to Vitebsk and defend the city as a "fortress".

But even before the command of the Army Group had time to intervene, on June 23, the battle spread to the front of the 4th Army.

There, the offensive of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front began, which immediately attacked the German 26th Army Corps with all its might. The Württemberg 78th Assault Division of Lieutenant General Troutai, and the Württemberg 25th Motorized Infantry Division of Lieutenant General Shurman, who were located there, were pushed back along the road to Orsha. Only with the help of army reserves - the 14th infantry (motorized) division of Lieutenant General Flörke, at least on the first day, was it possible to prevent a breakthrough.

The next day, another bad news was received: the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts by thirteen armies (among which was the 1st Army of the Polish Army) began an offensive in the zone of the German 9th Army between Mogilev and Bobruisk.

The right-flank division of the 4th Army - the Bavarian 57th Infantry Division of Major General Troowitz - spent the day like this:

At 4.00 a powerful artillery bombardment began in the sector of the division's right regiment. The entire front of the 9th Army south of the area was also under fire.

Under the cover of artillery preparation, large Russian forces managed to temporarily capture the village of Vyazma, 33 kilometers north of Rogachev. The commander of the 164th Grenadier Regiment managed to quickly gather forces, defeat the Russians and regain lost positions.

The battle proceeded very hard south of Vyazma in the area of \u200b\u200bthe 1st battalion of the 164th grenadier regiment, the 1st and 2nd companies of which were on the western bank of the Drug. The friend flows from the north-west and turns sharply to the south under Vyazma. Its channel is very wide, the western bank is steep and high. In summer, the river flows along a narrow channel a hundred meters from the steep western bank. Willows and reeds completely cover this coastal strip. Every night, numerous reconnaissance groups and patrols made their way along it to intercept enemy patrols and scouts. The enemy's preparations for crossing or building a bridge were not established.

On the morning of June 25, the commander of the 1st company met in a trench on the front line in order to receive reports from his patrols at 3.00 am. He was just listening to the report of the senior right-flank patrol from the right flank of his strongpoint, which was also the right flank of the division and army, when the Russians opened artillery fire at 4:00. He immediately gave the order to take up defensive positions and fifteen minutes later was seriously wounded in his right arm.

The adjacent, left-flank in the 9th Army, Lieutenant General Philip's 134th Infantry Division, in which soldiers from Franconia, Saxony, Silesia and the Sudetenland served, found itself in the hellish flames of a battle of destruction.

It was 2.30 am on June 24, when suddenly hundreds of guns of the Soviet 3rd Army hit the main line of defense of the 134th Infantry Division. Shells continuously rained down on the trenches, strong points, firing points, dugouts, gats and artillery firing positions. As dawn broke on the horizon, stormtrooper regiments began to dive into forward positions. There is not a single square meter of land left that has not been plowed. At these moments, the grenadiers in the trenches could not raise their heads. The artillerymen did not have time to reach their guns. Communication lines were broken in the first minutes. The hellish rumble stood for 45 minutes. After that, the Russians moved their fire to our rear. There he came to the locations of the rear services. At the same time, the quartermaster service was damaged and the 134th detachment of the field gendarmerie was almost completely destroyed. Not a single wagon carriage survived, not a single truck started. The earth was on fire.

Then, on a narrow front, the 120th Guards, 186th, 250th, 269th, 289th, 323rd and 348th Infantry Divisions went on the attack. In the second echelon, heavy tanks moved across the Friend over the bridges built by Soviet sappers. The guns of the 134th artillery regiment, which had survived in the fiery whirlwind, opened fire. The grenadiers on the front line clung to their carbines and machine guns, preparing to sell their lives dearly. Several assault guns from the 244th Battalion drove eastward. Close combat began.

The offensive had to be repelled practically along the entire front. Although the first lines of enemy riflemen were repelled before the line of defense, the attackers of the second wave were already able to break into the position. There was no communication between regiments, battalions and companies in the morning. A wave of Russian riflemen, and then tanks, seeped into all the gaps.

The 446th Grenadier Regiment could no longer hold the defenses south of Retka. His 3rd battalion withdrew to the area of \u200b\u200bthe Zalitvinje forest, when communication with neighbors had long been lost. The 1st Battalion held firmly in the ruins of Ozerani. The 2nd and 3rd companies were cut off. Part of the 4th company, commanded by Feldwebel Enč and Gauč, was held in the Ozerani cemetery. Thanks to this, it was possible, at least, to cover the battalion's retreat. The battle groups of the two sergeant-major, Lieutenant Dolch and Sergeant-Major Mittag, held the defense all day. Only in the evening did Feldwebel Jench give the order to break through. His battle group saved most of the 446th Grenadier Regiment. Later, Feldwebel Jench received the Knight's Cross for this battle.

The 445th Grenadier Regiment, which defended itself south of Ozeran, could not hold the defense for a long time. The losses were great. All company commanders were killed or wounded. Lieutenant Neubauer (Adjutant of the 1st Battalion), who died a few days later, and Lieutenant Zahn, an officer for the 2nd Battalion, were wounded. Colonel Kushinski was exhausted from his injury. When in the evening the regiment was subjected to a massive air raid, the main line of defense was broken. The 445th Grenadier Regiment ceased to exist as a military unit.

Thus, on June 24, 1944, battles were fought along the entire front of Army Group Center, with the exception of the strip south of the Pripyat Marshes, which was covered by the 2nd Army.

Everywhere the Soviet ground forces and aviation were so superior that in some areas the desperate resistance of small combat groups continued for several hours, while the Russian offensive could not be delayed.

The 3rd Panzer Army near Vitebsk was surrounded on the third day of the battle. The concentric offensive of the Soviet 39th and 43rd armies at 16.10 on 24 June led to the encirclement of Vitebsk. To the north of the city, a gap 30 kilometers wide was made in the German defense, and to the south - 20 kilometers. The garrison of Vitebsk was left to its own devices.

The remnants of the tank army, if they still existed, made their way to Vitebsk. During these hours, the 4th and 6th airfield divisions of Lieutenants General Pistorius and Peschel, as well as the 299th Infantry Division, had long been defeated. Major General Müller-Bullow's Rhineland-Saar-Palatinate 246th Infantry Division fought surrounded, while the East Prussian 206th Infantry Division of Lieutenant General Hitter and the main forces of the West Prussian 197th Infantry Division of Major General Hane to Vitebsk, the 256th Infantry Division was pushed back to the south.

The commandant of the "fortress" of Vitebsk, General of the Infantry Golwitzer, was forced to report the next day: "The situation is extremely difficult." Since a large force of Russians has already broken into Vitebsk. Three hours later - at 18.30 on June 25 - the command of the army group received a radiogram from Vitebsk: “The general situation forces us to concentrate all our forces and break through in the southwestern direction. The attack will start tomorrow at 5.00.

The breakthrough was finally allowed, however, with the order of the 206th Infantry Division to hold Vitebsk "to the last man."

But before this order could be executed, the general situation changed dramatically once again. General of the infantry Gollwitzer ordered a breakthrough in the southwest direction. Among those who broke through were soldiers of the 206th Infantry Division.

The commander of the 301st regiment withdrew the main force (1,200 men) south of a marshland of approximately 5 square kilometers. At the same time, the 2nd shock group (about 600 people with the division headquarters) walked along the forest road and made its way from the east to the marshy area. The wounded were transported on a large tractor and carts.

Our attack was stopped by heavy fire from enemy infantry, mortars and tanks. After overcoming the above-mentioned swampy area, everyone was very tired. The units returned to the forest (June 26 morning).

Russian aviation conducted reconnaissance and directed artillery and mortar fire at the edge of the forest occupied by us. After rifle and machine-gun shots were heard in the rear of our strike group, at 16.00 the last attempt was made to break through this line. The detachment, divided into platoons, rose from the forest with shouts of "Hurray!" But after 200 meters, the attackers lay down under enemy infantry fire. The enemy combed the forest and took the main forces of the division prisoner before dark.

The remnants of the battle groups that had broken through were communicated by radio with the headquarters of the army group on June 26 and 27, but from June 27 all radio communications with them ceased. The battle of Vitebsk is over.

Only 200 soldiers of the 53rd Army Corps managed to break through to the German positions, 180 of them were wounded!

10,000 servicemen of all ranks never returned. They were taken prisoner by the Red Army, who stormed the destroyed Vitebsk in those days. Between Dvina near Vitebsk and Lake Sara, 20 kilometers south-west of the city, 20,000 German soldiers were killed.

The situation of the 3rd Panzer Army that day was desperate, although it did not cease to exist.

The army was headquartered in Lepel. Its divisions, or their remnants, defended a 70-kilometer front between Ulla in the north and Devino in the southeast. Fortunately, the neighboring Army Group North closed the gap with vigorous actions by the 24th and 290th Infantry Divisions, and then the 81st Infantry Division. The Saxon 24th Infantry Division established contact with the remnants of the almost defeated 252nd Infantry Division, which managed to withdraw from June 26 to the area of \u200b\u200bthe lakes north of Lepel. Corps Group D of Lieutenant General Pamberg with part of the 197th Infantry Division and the 3rd Assault Sapper Battalion was able to break through east of Lepel to the guard positions of Lieutenant General Jacobi's 201st Security Division.

From here began a 30-kilometer gap, behind which, near the Vitebsk-Orsha highway, were the remnants of combat groups of the 197th, 299th and 256th infantry divisions. The Saxon 14th Infantry (Motorized) Division established contact with them and prevented the final defeat of the 6th Army Corps, whose commander died on the front lines in those days.

On June 26, the remaining armies of Army Group Center also fought the last battles in their history.

On that day, the 4th Army no longer occupied either the left or the right flank. Located in its center, in Mogilev, the 39th Panzer Corps was already dispersed. The Pomeranian 12th Infantry Division of Lieutenant General Bamler received strict orders to defend Mogilev. The rest of the divisions received an order from the corps commander: "All troops to break through to the west!" Hitler, who was at the far "headquarters of the Fuehrer" in Rastenburg (East Prussia), ordered to report to him on an hourly basis on the situation in the army group and in the armies and gave "orders of the Fuehrer" direct instructions to the division commanders. So, the 78th assault division received an order to defend Orsha.

In accordance with the order of the Fuehrer, General Trout and his headquarters went to Orsha. He knew that this order was a death sentence for him and his division. But she was in the "Tiger" position, and one could hope that events stronger than this order would occur. And so it happened.

Already early in the morning, fierce fighting broke out at the Tiger position and on the highway. The enemy's breakthrough between Nuts and the Lake was eliminated. More unpleasant was the breakthrough in the strip of the left neighbor north of Devino at the northern end of Lake Kuzmin, with which nothing could be done. A shaft of enemy tanks was already rolling along the highway. In full view of the defenders, they fought their way to the west. The front of the left neighbor began to fall apart. The situation on the left flank of the division, at the 480th Grenadier Regiment, would have become unbearable if it had not been possible to close the gap at Lake Kuzmino.

At this critical moment, the divisional commander ordered the northern battle group to force its way along the highway in the direction of Orsha. There she had to take up the defensive position. The ring around Orsha began to close. The situation became more and more unclear. How to proceed further? The soldiers of the 78th knew only one thing, that during the withdrawal they managed to prevent an attempt to break through the enemy.

On June 26, Orsha was blocked from three sides. Only the road to the southeast remained open for the division. On the evening of June 26, Orsha fell into Russian hands before units of the 78th assault division entered the city. The 4th Army managed to ferry only half of its troops across the Dnieper.

Now the army was pushed back from the road. We went on foot. Behind the back there was a spacious wooded-swampy area, crossed by numerous rivers. It stretched all the way to Minsk. But there were still 200 kilometers to go. “Old men” from 78th were familiar with this area. They knew the sandy roads in which the wheels of cars were stuck, the swampy swampy places near the banks of the rivers and about the enormous tension that had to be endured then in order to keep up with the enemy. Now the enemy was pressing. He was already on the flanks, and soon he will be in the rear. Added to this were the active actions of the partisans in the area. But for the 4th Army, there was no other road to the new line of defense of the German troops that was being created in the deep rear, except for the one that led through Mogilev, Berezino, Minsk. It became a torn road for retreat, and the 78th assault division was to retreat to the north as part of the 27th Army Corps.

But even here orders came too late, so the other two Württemberg divisions of the 17th Army Corps (25th Motorized Infantry and 260th Infantry) could not free themselves from Russian coverage.

The main forces of the 260th Infantry Division were resting in the forest east of Kamenka on the morning of 28 June. After gathering at 14.00, the units continued their march. The 1st Battalion of the 460th Grenadier Regiment (Major Vinkon) marched in the forward detachment. But soon from the direction of Brashchino, fire was opened on the battalion. It became clear that the Soviet troops now approached the route of movement from the south. The 1st Battalion of the 460th Grenadier Regiment, supported by five assault guns and three self-propelled gun carriages, went into the attack on the move and captured Brashchino. The enemy was desperately defending himself, nevertheless he was able to be thrown back two kilometers. Once again, 50 prisoners were captured.

Then we moved on. Small Russian battle groups tried again and again to upset the marching columns or stop them. One of these attacks was repelled by fire from a 75-mm anti-tank gun. When the advance detachment approached Ramshino, it was stopped by heavy fire.

Colonel Dr. Bracher hurried forward. He built his regiment to attack. 1st Battalion - on the right, 2nd - on the left, in this order the grenadiers went into battle. The regiment commander rode at the head of the attackers on his amphibians. The 2nd Battalion of Captain Kempke attacked Ramshino from the front. His soldiers were forced to lie down on the eastern outskirts. But the 1st battalion was more fortunate. He went on the attack, bypassing and by midnight went to the stream near Akhimkovichi. At the same time, the combat groups of the 199th Grenadier Regiment provided an offensive from the north, in one place they reached the highway southeast of Krugloye and held it for some time.

The division, which, despite all the efforts of the radio operators, was never able to contact the army and therefore did not know the general situation, on June 29 made its way to the Drug River. Again, the 1st battalion of the 460th grenadier regiment (Major Vinkon) marched ahead through Olshanki to Zhupeni, and from there to Drugo. The battalion seized the Likhnichi - Teterin road and took up a defensive front to the west. The 2nd Battalion that followed him turned north, and the remnants of the 470th Grenadier Regiment provided defense from the south. But far along the river there was not a single bridge. They were destroyed by Soviet troops or units of the 110th Infantry Division, who wanted to ensure their withdrawal this way. Soldiers of the 653rd Sapper Battalion came to the conclusion that it was necessary to build an auxiliary bridge as soon as possible. The work was hampered not only by the lack of equipment for the construction of bridges, but also by the indiscipline of suitable intermixed units, each of which wanted to get to the other side first. Although the divisional command put traffic control officers everywhere, among whom were Major Ostermeier, adviser to the military court Jansen, Lieutenant Rüppel and others, they had to restore order by force.

At the same time, it is worth remembering two more parts, which in the past days have endured inhuman trials and which are not mentioned in any message. These were the soldiers of the 260th communications battalion, who were constantly trying to establish radio communications with the higher command or with neighboring divisions, pulled communication lines under fire and created the opportunity for the division to control its forces to some extent. At the same time, Chief Lieutenant Dambakh distinguished himself especially.

We must not forget about the orderlies. There was no rest for them, neither day nor night. Major of the medical service, Dr. Hengstmann, immediately ordered the organization of a dressing station and a collection point for the wounded on the steep western bank of the Druga, so that from here, at least with the remaining carts, it would be possible to organize the evacuation of the wounded to a safe place. Providing them has become one of the biggest challenges of the day.

Russian artillery and mortars at times interfered with the construction of the bridge. But the sappers did not stop. Troops began crossing the river in the afternoon. Russian attack aircraft tried to stop the crossing. They inflicted casualties and sowed panic. A complete confusion began, order was only brought about by the cruel orders of brave officers. The division headquarters was hit by a bomb and Colonel Fricker was wounded.

So far, the 1st battalion of the 460th, which had already crossed the bridges and by boats, at 18.00 received an order to seize the crossroads six kilometers northwest of Teterin and keep it open for further division's withdrawal. But by this time the Russians had become so strong that it was already impossible to carry out this order. It was now clear that the division was surrounded a second time.

On June 27, the commander of Army Group Center arrived at the Fuehrer's headquarters. Here the field marshal demanded to withdraw the army group beyond the Dnieper and leave the "fortresses" of Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk. (He did not know that on that day the battles for Mogilev were already over, after Major General von Erdmannsdorff's small battle group managed to stop the advancing Russian troops for only a few hours. Since June 26, only Soviet flags have been flying over Mogilev.) Here on in the south, the same thing began that had happened on the northern sector of the front: an inglorious retreat or an even more shameful flight of German battle groups in a western direction. On June 27, the organized front of Army Group Center no longer existed!

The commander of the 4th Army that day ordered a general retreat without the permission of the command of the army group or even the headquarters of the Führer. General of the infantry von Tippelskirch moved his command post to Berezina. His troops, those with whom he could still communicate by radio, he gave the order to withdraw to Borisov, and then to Berezina. But many battle groups were unable to get out of here. Among them was the headquarters of the 39th Panzer Corps, which went missing somewhere in the forests and swamps near Mogilev. The 12th Army Corps did not leave the encirclement either. Its remains surrendered somewhere in the forests and swamps between Mogilev and Berezina.

On the same days, the history of the 9th Army ended. Its right flank - the 35th Army Corps, which was commanded on June 22 by Lieutenant General Freigerr von Lütwitz, was defeated on the first day of the battle. His 134th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Philippe and 296th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Kulmer were dissected near Rogachev and south of it.

Russian tanks simply crossed the Drut, a tributary of the Dnieper. (There, a few days before that, the sappers of the Red Army had built bridges below the surface of the water. The German artillery could not interfere with the construction, since it did not have ammunition.) The infantry of the 35th Army Corps, bypassed by powerful tank battalions, was able to offer serious resistance only in multiple locations. Then the mechanized units of the enemy made a clear road for themselves to the west.

On June 24, 1944, at 4.50, as expected, after an unusually strong forty-five-minute artillery preparation along the entire front, the enemy launched an offensive. The attack was supported by a large number of assault aircraft: up to 100 aircraft were constantly above the division's defensive zone, causing especially heavy damage to anti-tank and field artillery in positions. The plan of effective engagement of the reconnoitered and probable areas of enemy concentration was fulfilled. The communication lines were soon broken, and the command of the division found itself without wire means of communication with its regiments, neighboring divisions and the management of the 41st Panzer Corps. The enemy, who had burst into our trenches during the artillery preparation in many areas, with the support of tanks on the left flank of the division, managed to penetrate deeply into our defenses in two places. These breakthroughs, despite the use of all reserves, the division failed to eliminate.

It is essential to state that during the artillery preparation, no fire was fired on separate swamps and in hollows. Along them, even during the cannonade, the advance detachments of the attackers were running from the depths. Enemy divisions were advancing on a front with a width of 1 to 2 kilometers. Using such tactics, the enemy partially bypassed the trenches from the rear, partially, not paying attention to anything, broke through into the depths of the defense. Since our heavy infantry weapons and artillery themselves at that time were under heavy enemy artillery fire, and some of the resistance nodes were destroyed and defeated, their return fire did not bring the desired results.

On the right flank, the Russians also advanced with the support of tanks, broke through in the northwest direction and soon approached the artillery firing positions from three sides. By noon, she had already reached the second line of defense. The enemy was constantly pulling new forces of infantry and tanks from the depths to the areas of breakthroughs.

ORDER ON THE BODY FOR BREAKTHROUGH IN THE NORTHERN DIRECTION TO THE 4th ARMY:

1. The environment, especially the lack of ammunition and food, compels swift action.

2. 35th Army Corps to break through with divisions located in the northern encirclement ring east of the Berezina. The breakthrough area is on both sides of the Podrechye. The direction of the main blow is Kozulichi, Uzechi, then the section of the Olza River. The point is that, concentrating all forces under the leadership of decisive commanders, at night, suddenly break through the enemy front of encirclement and with one dash, swiftly break through to the final goal and win freedom of action.

3. Tasks:

a) the 296th Infantry Division from the area of \u200b\u200bconcentration to the south of Bereshchevka to break through the ring of enemy protection and, having built a battle formation with a ledge to the right, continue the attack in the north-western direction to Novye Wieliczka, and then to Podrechye. The direction of the further offensive is Kozyulichi, Kostrichi, Bazevichi on Olza.
b) the 134th Infantry Division from the general concentration area southwest of Staraya Zhareevschina to break through in the direction through Yasny Les to Dumanovschina, then through Mordevichi, Lubonichi to Zapolya on Olza.
c) the 20th Panzer Division and the 36th Infantry Division from the concentration area southeast of Titovka to break through the area east of Titovka, west of Domanovschina to Merkevichi, and then along the route of the 134th Infantry Division (in front of it). This plan takes effect only if she fails to pass through Bobruisk.
d) 6th, 45th Infantry Divisions and units of the 383rd Infantry Division follow the 134th Infantry Division. The divisions provide rear cover and then provide rear guards.

4. Organization of the battle:

a) the beginning of the attack: suddenly at 20.30.
b) take with you only vehicles carrying weapons, field kitchens and a small number of vehicles with food. Leave all other cars and horse-drawn carts. They are subject to mandatory destruction. Send the drivers to the front as infantrymen.

Communication: radio only.

6. Corps headquarters is advancing behind the left flank of the 296th Infantry Division.

Signed: von Lutzow.

The army command in Bobruisk was stunned by the catastrophic situation that developed on the very first day, and immediately ordered Lieutenant General von Kessel, who was in the reserve of the 20th Panzer Division to the east of the city, to launch a counterattack. But while the German tank companies lined up, the order came: "Set aside!" Now heavy fighting was going on along the entire line of defense of the army. The defense of the 41st Panzer Corps located in its center was broken through, and its divisions were retreating. In this sector, the Don Guards Tank Corps attacked directly on Bobruisk.

Therefore, now the 20th Panzer Division had to urgently turn 180 degrees in order to deliver a counterattack southward. But before she reached the battlefield, Russian tanks were already far to the northwest. Another 24 hours passed, and the first tanks with a red star on their armor reached the outskirts of Bobruisk. Since at the same time the Soviet 9th Panzer Corps was striking in the direction of Bobruisk from the northeast, on June 27 the main forces of the 9th Army were surrounded between the Dnieper and Bobruisk.

The directorate of the 41st Panzer Corps, whose command was taken over by Lieutenant General Hofmeister shortly before the start of the Soviet offensive, was the only one with a working radio station that day, on the night of June 28 transmitted the last radio message to the army headquarters. It said, among other things, that there was no contact with the 35th Army Corps, that its defeated divisions were retreating to Bobruisk, and the battle groups were scattered around the district.

Chaos reigned in Bobruisk that day. Infantrymen, artillerymen, nurses, sappers, transport vehicles, signalmen, generals and thousands of wounded spontaneously retreated to the city, which had already been brutally bombed by Soviet attack aircraft. Major General Haman, appointed commandant of the "fortress", could hardly restore order in these defeated troops.

Only energetic officers rallied the remnants of their units and again created battle groups, which here and there and somehow on the outskirts of the city prepared for defense. The army command tried to surrender Bobruisk, but Hitler forbade ... When he finally gave his permission in the afternoon of June 28, it was already too late.

The various battle groups that had gathered last night, on the morning of June 29, attempted here and there to break through from the encircled Bobruisk in the northern and western directions.

On that day, about 30,000 soldiers of the 9th Army were still in the Bobruisk area, of which about 14,000 in the following days, weeks and even months were able to reach the main forces of the German troops. 74,000 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of this army were killed or taken prisoner.

The 55th Army Corps, which was on the right flank of the army, was not directly attacked by the Russians in those days, but was cut off from other formations of the army. The 292nd and 102nd Infantry Divisions were transferred to the 2nd Army and retreated to the Pripyat swamps, teeming with partisans. By the same maneuver, the 2nd Army itself was forced to withdraw its left flank, which was under Petrikov, to the Pripyat region, in order to prevent the enemy from bypassing it.

Command of Army Group Center, commanded by Field Marshal Bush, who flew by plane to report to the Fuehrer's headquarters, was transferred to Lida on 28 June. At 20.30 on the same day, Field Marshal Model arrived here by mail plane. When he entered the headquarters work room, he said briefly: "I am your new commander!" To the timid question of the Chief of Staff of the Army Group, Lieutenant General Krebs, who was already the Chief of Staff of Model when he was in command of the 9th Army: "What did you bring with you?" The model replied: "Myself!" However, the new commander, who became a field marshal on March 1, 1944, in fact brought with him several formations, which he, being the commander of Army Group Northern Ukraine (and now he commanded two army groups at once), ordered to be transferred to the central sector of the eastern front ...

First, it was about a formation consisting of motorized battle groups under the command of Lieutenant General von Sauken, who was previously the commander of the 3rd Panzer Corps. Sauken had orders from Lieutenant General Decker's 5th Panzer Division, the 505th Tigers Battalion, units of a training sapper battalion and police companies to first create a defense front on the Berezina. There, in the Zembin area, the 5th Panzer Division was even able to offer vigorous resistance to the breakthrough Russian tank formations, so that the enemy halted his advance. The battle group took up positions near Borisov.

From left to right, without forming a continuous front, from Minsk to Borisov were located units of the 31st Tank Regiment and the 14th Motorized Infantry Regiment of the Silesian 5th Panzer Division. To the right, in the Zembin area, the 5th Tank Reconnaissance Battalion fought, while the 13th Motorized Infantry Regiment and the 89th Sapper Battalion of the same division took up positions northeast of this area in order to intercept Russian tanks striving towards Borisov.

On the very right flank were the police units of the SS Gruppenfuehrer von Gottberg, whose tenure as Gebiitskommissar Weisrutenia (Belarus) had expired these days.

Before the new commander of Army Group Center on June 29, the situation on the map appeared as follows: 3rd Tank Army: the enemy entered the line of the Minsk-Polotsk railway near the village of Vetrina. The remnants of the army were thrown back through Lepel to the lakes Olshytsya and Ushacha. In the Brod and Kalnits areas, the enemy crossed the Berezina.

4th Army: The enemy tries to encircle the army before it retreats to the Berezina. Von Sauken's battle group is holding a bridgehead near Borisov.
9th Army: the enemy turned from Osipovichi to the southwest in the direction of the Slutsk - Minsk road.
2nd Army: systematically withdraws the left flank to the Pripyat area.

Based on this, Field Marshal Model gave the following brief orders: 3rd Panzer Army: stop and restore the front!
4th Army: systematically withdraw the divisions from the flanks beyond the Berezina. Reconnect with the 9th Army. Leave Borisov.
9th Army: Send 12th Panzer Division southeast to hold Minsk as a "fortress". Evacuate the wounded.
2nd Army: hold the line Slutsk, Baranovichi. Close the gap at the junction with the 9th Army. For reinforcement, the 4th Panzer and 28th Jaeger Divisions will be transferred to the army.

On the same day, the main command of the ground forces informed the command of the army group that, from 30 June, some formations would be transferred to the central sector of the eastern front. Among them are the Franconian-Thuringian 4th Panzer Division of Major General Betzel and the Silesian 28th Jaeger Division of Lieutenant General Heistermann von Zilberg. Both will immediately be delivered to the Baranovichi area. The North German 170th Infantry Division of Major General Hass will arrive from Lake Peipsi from the strip of Army Group North to Minsk. In addition, the main command of the ground forces sent seven combat march battalions and three anti-tank battalions of the high command reserve to Minsk. Thanks to this, on June 30, for the first time, the situation "calmed down", about which the combat log of Army Group Center reported:

"For the first time after nine days of the constantly lasting battle in Belarus, this day brought a temporary detente."

In the east, there were still dozens of German battle groups cut off from the main forces. They tried to get through to their own. Many Russian troops identified, destroyed, once again scattered. Only a few of them managed to reach the German lines of defense.

Large units were no longer active here. Only the radio stations of the army group constantly heard radio communications confirming the existence of such groups. An example is the radio message from the headquarters of the 27th Army Corps from 19.30 on 5 July:

"Make your way to the west on your own!"

This was the last message from this corps, the last message from the small battle groups scattered through the forests and swamps east of the Berezina.

The commander of the army group ordered the former chief of artillery of the 9th Army, Lieutenant General Linding, to stand with the battle group near Osipovichi and ensure the reception of the penetrating battle groups. There, between Bobruisk and Maryina Gorki, regiments, battalions and divisions of Lieutenant General Freigerr von Bodenhausen's Pomeranian 12th Panzer Division managed to meet many of these small battle groups and transport them to safety.

The last day of June 1944 was characterized by the emerging consolidation of the Army Group's front. Although the 3rd Panzer Army south of Polotsk finally lost contact with the neighboring Army Group North, the remnants of the 252nd, 212nd Infantry Divisions and Corps Group D managed to hold the Polotsk-Molodechno railway for some time. The gap on the right was somehow closed by the police units of the Wehrmacht commander in Ostland (Baltic).

The 170th Infantry Division was still en route between Vilnius and Molodechno.

But near Minsk in the zone of the 4th Army, the situation developed dramatically. The battle group of Lieutenant General von Sauken was forced to leave the bridgehead near Borisov and hastily transfer the 5th Panzer Division to the left flank in the direction of Molodechno in order to prevent enemy coverage. The 12th Panzer Division withdrew to Minsk.

The hole continued to gape in the strip that had previously been completely defeated by the 9th Army. There, between Minsk and Slutsk, except for the guards of the SS Gruppenfuehrer von Gottberg, there was no one.

The 2nd Army of Colonel-General Weiss, whose troops on the left flank had left Slutsk, had now to close the gap that had formed. Therefore, in the first days of July, from the Slutsk, Slonim line, the army launched a counterattack in the northern direction. It was attended by the 102nd Infantry Division of Major General von Berken, withdrawn from the front south of Slutsk and turned northwest in the direction of Baranovichi. To the north, units of the Hungarian cavalry corps moved in the same direction. The 4th Panzer Division of Major General Betzel, located east of Baranovichi, at that time attacked the southern flank of Soviet tank formations that crossed the Minsk-Baranovichi railway. The 28th Jaeger Division of Lieutenant General Heistermann von Zilberg north of Baranovichi created a bridgehead to wait here for the approach from Slonim of the 218th Infantry Division of Lieutenant General Lang and the 506th Tiger Battalion.

At this time, Field Marshal Model decided to abandon the battle for Minsk. On July 2, he ordered to immediately leave the Belarusian capital. Before the arrival of the Russians from Minsk, 45 trains were dispatched.

But near Minsk the fighting was still going on. In the dense forests and swamps east of the city, 28 divisions and 350,000 of their soldiers continued to bleed. The forces of Army Group Center were exhausted.

Although Field Marshal Model west of Minsk again managed to create a defensive line, on which the 4th, 5th and 12th Panzer, 28th Jaeger, 50th and 170th Infantry Divisions were located, around which the remnants of the defeated units were gathered, but On July 8, Baranovichi fell, on July 9 - Lida, on July 13 - Vilnius, on July 16 - Grodno, and on July 28 - Brest.

Army Group Center again stood where it had set out on June 22, 1941 against the Soviet Union.

Behind there were thousands of cemeteries buried on them by servicemen of all ranks. Behind there were echelons with thousands of prisoners traveling further east into the unknown ...

The history of Army Group Center, the most powerful formation of German ground forces, which crossed the Soviet-German border three years ago, ended there. But her troops were not finished. Its remnants were once again able to stop on the Vistula and on the border of East Prussia and take positions. There, with their new commander (from 16 August 1944) - Colonel General Reinhardt - they defended Germany and on 25 January 1945 they were renamed into Army Group North. Since that time, the name Army Group Center was given to the former Army Group A, which was retreating from Southern Poland to the Czech Republic and Moravia, where it was forced to surrender on May 8, 1945.

The Headquarters appointed the start of the offensive for 23 June. By that time, the concentration of troops was completely finished. On the eve of the offensive, the military councils of the fronts appealed to the troops with an appeal to inflict a crushing blow on the enemy and liberate Soviet Byelorussia. Party and Komsomol meetings were held in the divisions. In front of their comrades, the Communists gave their word to be an example in battle, to entice soldiers to exploits, to help young soldiers to cope with their missions in the operation with honor. On the 1st Belorussian Front, before the attack, battle banners were carried along the front trenches.

On the morning of June 22, the 1st Baltic, 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts successfully conducted reconnaissance in force. In the course of it, in a number of sectors, the forward battalions wedged into the enemy's defenses from 1.5 to 6 km and forced the German command to bring divisional and partly corps reserves into battle. The battalions met stubborn opposition at Orsha.

On the night of June 23, long-range aviation and front-line bombers made about 1,000 sorties, and struck enemy defense and artillery centers in the areas of breakthrough of the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts. From the morning of June 23, artillery preparation was carried out on the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts. In the southern sector of the breakthrough of the 3rd Belorussian Front, before the start of the attack, an aviation strike was struck by 160 Pe-2 bombers. Then the troops of these fronts in the Polotsk, Vitebsk sector went over to the offensive. They broke through the defenses of the 3rd German Panzer Army and swiftly pursued its troops in the southwestern direction. Although inclement weather did not allow widespread use of aviation, the Soviet troops successfully advanced, while simultaneously expanding the breakthrough along the front. The enemy put up the greatest resistance in the Polotsk direction, where the flanks of his 3rd Panzer and 16th armies closed up.

On the 1st Baltic Front, the troops of the 6th Guards Army under the command of General I.M. Chistyakov and the 43rd Army of General A.P. Beloborodov broke through the enemy defenses. By the end of the first day of the operation, the breakthrough reached 30 km along the front and 16 km in depth.

On the 3rd Belorussian Front, the troops of the 39th Army, commanded by General I.I.Lyudnikov, and the 5th Army under the command of General N.I. Krylov, by the end of the first day of the operation, advanced 10-13 km forward, expanding the breakthrough to 50 km along the front. At the same time, the 5th Army in the Bogushevsky direction crossed the Luchesa River and seized a bridgehead on its southern bank, which created conditions for the subsequent introduction of mobile troops into the battle.

On the Orsha direction on the first day of the operation, it was not possible to break through the enemy's defenses. Only in a secondary direction, the right-flank formations of the 11th Guards Army of General KN Galitsky were able to wedge into the enemy's defenses from 2 to 8 km. The actions of the rest of its formations, as well as the troops of the 31st Army of General V.V. Glagolev, were not successful that day. In this regard, the head of the political department of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General S. B. Kazbintsev, left for this sector of the front. Together with the officers of the political departments of the armies, he organized work to mobilize the efforts of the soldiers to increase the pace of the offensive.

On June 23, the 2nd Belorussian Front went on the offensive. The 49th Army under the command of General I. T. Grishin, striking at a front 12 km away, had advanced 5 - 8 km by the end of the day.

On June 23, reconnaissance in force was carried out on the 1st Belorussian Front, which confirmed that the enemy was occupying the previous positions. This made it possible with complete confidence to carry out artillery preparation according to the planned plan the next morning. On the night of June 24, before the attack of the main forces, long-range aviation was reoriented here, striking the enemy in the offensive zones of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts. On the same night, front-line and long-range bombers, having made 550 sorties, inflicted powerful strikes on enemy defense centers and airfields.

On the second day of the operation, the main forces were already advancing on all four fronts. Events developed rapidly. In none of the main directions did the Nazis succeed in stopping the Soviet troops, evading attacks, or in an orderly retreat into the depths of the defense. As a result, the troops of the fronts in most sectors managed to break through the main strip and reach the second defensive strip. As acknowledged by the German command itself, from the hurricane of artillery fire, especially along the first line of trenches, its troops suffered heavy losses in personnel and equipment, which significantly reduced their combat effectiveness.

The 1st Baltic Front wedged into the enemy's defenses in the Polotsk direction, at the junction of Army Groups North and Center. On June 25, troops of the 43rd Army crossed the Western Dvina and by the end of the day reached the Gnezdilovichi area, where they established direct contact with the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

Thus, on the third day of the operation in the Vitebsk region, five Nazi infantry divisions were surrounded. The enemy stubbornly tried to break out to the west, but could not, being subjected to powerful attacks by the troops of the 43rd and 39th armies, supported by aviation. On June 26, Vitebsk was released. Having lost hope of a breakthrough, the Nazis laid down their arms on June 27 near Vitebsk. They lost here 20 thousand people killed, more than 10 thousand prisoners, many weapons and military equipment. The first significant breach arose in the enemy's defenses.

In the afternoon of June 24, in the zone of the 5th Army, the mechanized cavalry group of General NS Oslikovsky entered the breakthrough. She freed Senno and cut the Orsha-Lepel railway. The success achieved here created favorable preconditions for entering the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of Marshal of Armored Forces P.A.Rotmistrov into the breakthrough. On the morning of June 26, its formations began to develop an offensive in the direction of Tolochin, Borisov. The entry of the tank army and its actions were supported from the air by four air corps and two air divisions of the 1st Air Army, commanded by General T. T. Khryukin. The gap between the 3rd tank and 4th armies of the enemy increased, which greatly facilitated the coverage of the fascist grouping near Orsha from the north.

The offensive of the 11th Guards and 31st armies in the Orsha direction began to develop more dynamically. Using the success achieved on the first day of the operation in the secondary sector, the commander of the 11th Guards Army regrouped all four divisions from the second echelons of the corps by the morning of June 24. As a result, the army's troops advanced up to 14 km during the day of hostilities.

The German command was still trying to hold the Minsk highway and strengthen the flank of the 4th army of General K. Tippelskirch in the Orsha area, transferring there two divisions from their reserve. But it was already late: on the morning of June 26, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps entered the battle in the zone of the 11th Guards Army. He began to bypass Orsha from the northwest. Under strong blows by Soviet troops, the enemy's 4th army wavered. The troops of the 11th Guards and 31st armies liberated Orsha on June 27. At the same time, the 2nd Belorussian Front, with the forces of the 49th Army and the 50th Army of General IV Boldin, crossed the Dnieper, defeated the fascist grouping in the Mogilev direction and liberated Mogilev on June 28.

Now the task of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts was to thwart the attempts of the fascist German command with the support of aviation and partisans to orderly withdraw its forces to the Berezina and to hold this important line covering Minsk. The enemy transferred a fresh tank division and other units here from Kovel, which somewhat slowed down the 5th Guards Tank Army's offensive on the approaches to the Berezina. But the enemy's resistance was soon broken, and the Soviet tankers continued to move forward with the task of encircling and defeating the Nazis near Minsk.

In fierce battles, the Soviet troops displayed high level of organization and great persistence in achieving the objectives of the operation. Thus, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky and the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, General I. Kh. Bagramyan, reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief: “Following your order, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front broke through a heavily fortified, deeply echeloned enemy defensive zone between the cities of Polotsk and Vitebsk at the front up to 36 km. And, developing the offensive in the direction of Beshenkovichi, Kamen, Lepel, the troops of the 6th Guards and 43rd armies swiftly, on the move, forced a serious water barrier on the river. Zapadnaya Dvina, 200-250 m wide at a front up to 75 km, and thus deprived the enemy of the opportunity to create a defensive front on the line prepared for this purpose. Western Dvina".

During the offensive, Soviet soldiers displayed high combat skill and mass heroism. In the Orsha region, a Komsomol member Yuri Smirnov, a private of the 77th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 26th Guards Rifle Division of the 3rd Belorussian Front, performed a heroic feat. On June 24, during a breakthrough of the enemy's defenses, he volunteered to participate in a tank assault, which received the task of cutting the Moscow-Minsk highway behind enemy lines. Near the village of Shalashino, Smirnov was wounded and fell from a tank. Unconscious, the Nazis seized him. The hero was interrogated with the use of the most cruel tortures, but, faithful to the military oath, he refused to answer the executioners. Then the fascist monsters crucified Smirnov. The hero's award list says that “Private Yuri Vasilyevich Smirnov of the Guard endured all these tortures and died a martyr’s death, without giving the enemy military secrets. With his perseverance and courage, Smirnov contributed to the success of the battle, thereby accomplishing one of the highest feats of soldier's valor ”. For this feat, Yu. V. Smirnov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The news of the atrocity of the Nazis and the courage of the Soviet soldier quickly spread among the soldiers of the advancing fronts. At the rallies, the fighters vowed to mercilessly avenge the enemy for the death of a comrade in arms.

At dawn on June 24, the main forces of the 1st Belorussian Front went on the offensive. The enemy offered fierce resistance. At 12 o'clock in the afternoon, with the improvement of the weather, it became possible to deliver the first massive attack by aviation, in which, along with attack aircraft, 224 bombers participated. By 13 o'clock the troops of the 65th Army under the command of General PI Batov advanced up to 5 - 6 km. To build on the success and cut off the Nazis' escape routes from Bobruisk, the army commander brought in the 1st Guards Tank Corps into battle. Thanks to this, the 65th Army, as well as the 28th Army under the command of General A.A. Luchinsky, on the very first day of the offensive, advanced up to 10 km and increased the breakthrough to 30 km along the front, and the 1st Guards Tank Corps fought up to 20 km.

The offensive developed slowly in the zone of the front's right strike grouping in the Rogachev-Bobruisk direction, where the 3rd and 48th armies operated. On the main axis, the troops of the 3rd Army met stubborn opposition from the enemy and could not advance at a significant distance. To the north of the direction of the main attack, enemy resistance turned out to be weaker, and the units operating here, despite the wooded and swampy terrain, advanced more significantly. Therefore, the army command decided to regroup its forces to the north and, using the indicated success, to develop the offensive in a new direction.

In the 28th Army's offensive zone in the direction of Glusk, in the second half of the next day, the mechanized cavalry group of General I.A.Pliev was introduced into the breakthrough, with which two aviation corps interacted. The offensive of the 3rd Army also resumed. But it developed slowly. Then, at the direction of the front command, the commander of the 3rd Army, General A.V. Gorbatov, on the morning of 25 June brought the 9th Panzer Corps into battle. Having made a skillful maneuver through the wooded and swampy terrain, the tankmen, supported by two air divisions, began to rapidly advance deep into the enemy's defenses.

By the end of the third day of the offensive, the 65th Army reached the approaches to Bobruisk, and the 28th Army liberated Glusk. The troops of the German 9th Army, commanded by General N. Forman, were bypassed from the northwest and southwest. On June 27, the 9th and 1st Guards Tank Corps closed a ring around the enemy's Bobruisk grouping. The encirclement was 6 divisions - 40 thousand soldiers and officers and a large number of weapons and military equipment. These divisions tried to break through in order to create a defense along with the 4th Army on the Berezina and on the approaches to Minsk. Aerial reconnaissance revealed that the Nazis were pulling tanks, vehicles and artillery onto the Zhlobin-Bobruisk road with the intention of making a breakthrough to the north. The Soviet command thwarted this enemy's plan. For the rapid destruction of the encircled enemy troops, representatives of the Headquarters Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and Chief Marshal of Aviation A.A.Novikov, together with the front command, decided to involve all the forces of the 16th Air Army, commanded by General S.I.Rudenko. At 1915 hours on June 27, the first groups of bombers and attack aircraft began to strike at the head of the enemy column, and the following ones - at tanks and vehicles that had stopped on the road. A massive raid of 526 aircraft, which lasted an hour and a half, inflicted huge losses on the Nazis and finally demoralized them. Having thrown all the tanks and assault guns, about 5 thousand guns and 1 thousand vehicles, they tried to break through to Bobruisk, but came under flank fire from the 105th rifle corps of the 65th army. By this time, the troops of the 48th Army approached and by strikes from several directions by 13:00 on June 28, they basically destroyed the encircled enemy grouping. However, the battles for the final elimination of the fascist troops in Bobruisk continued from June 27 to June 29. Only a small enemy group of about 5 thousand people managed to break out of the encirclement, but it was destroyed northwest of Bobruisk.

On June 29, troops of the 48th Army under the command of General P.L. Romanenko with the assistance of the 65th Army and active air support, having completed the defeat of the encircled group, liberated Bobruisk. During the fighting in the Bobruisk direction, the enemy lost about 74 thousand soldiers and officers killed and captured and a large amount of weapons and military equipment. The defeat of the Nazis at Bobruisk created another big gap in their defense. Soviet troops, deeply engulfing the German 4th Army from the south, reached the lines that were beneficial for throwing on Minsk and developing an offensive on Baranovichi.

The Dnieper military flotilla under the command of Captain 1st Rank V.V. Grigoriev provided substantial assistance to the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front. Its ships, moving up the Berezina, supported the infantry and tanks of the 48th Army with their fire. They transported from the left bank of the river to the right bank 66 thousand soldiers and officers, a lot of weapons, military equipment. The flotilla violated the enemy's crossings, successfully landed assault forces in its rear.

The Soviet offensive in Belarus between June 23 and 28 put Army Group Center on the brink of disaster. Its defenses were broken through in all directions of the 520-kilometer front. The group suffered heavy losses. Soviet troops advanced 80 - 150 km westward, liberated many hundreds of settlements, surrounded and destroyed 13 enemy divisions, and thus were able to launch an offensive in the direction of Minsk, Baranovichi.

For skillful leadership of the troops in the defeat of the Vitebsk and Bobruisk enemy groupings on June 26, 1944, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front I.D.Chernyakhovsky was awarded the military rank of General of the Army, and on June 29, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front K.K.Rokossovsky was awarded the rank Marshal of the Soviet Union.

The advance of the Soviet troops was facilitated by the partisans' strikes against the enemy's reserves and his front-line communications. On some sections of the railways, they interrupted traffic for several days. The actions of the partisans on the rear routes of the fascist German troops partially paralyzed the activities of the supply bodies and transportation, which further undermined the morale of the enemy soldiers and officers. The Nazis were seized by panic. This is what an officer of the 36th Infantry Division, an eyewitness to these events, painted: “The Russians succeeded in encircling the 9th Army in the Bobruisk region. An order was received to break through, which at first we succeeded ... But the Russians created several environments, and we got from one environment into another ... As a result, a general confusion was created. Often, German colonels and lieutenant colonels tore off their shoulder straps, threw their caps and remained to wait for the Russians. There was a general panic ... It was a catastrophe that I have never experienced. At the headquarters of the division, everyone was at a loss, there was no communication with the headquarters of the corps. No one knew the real situation, there were no maps ... The soldiers now lost all confidence in the officers. Fear of the partisans drove them to such a disorder that it became impossible to maintain the morale of the troops. "

In the course of hostilities from 23 to 28 June, the Hitlerite command sought to improve the position of its troops in Belarus at the expense of reserves and maneuvering forces from other sectors of the eastern front. But as a result of the decisive actions of the Soviet troops, these measures turned out to be belated and insufficient and could not effectively influence the course of events in Belarus.

By the end of June 28, the 1st Baltic Front was conducting hostilities on the approaches to Polotsk and on the Zaozerye-Lepel line, while the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front approached the Berezina River. Fierce battles with enemy tanks continued in the Borisov area. The left wing of the front curved sharply to the east. It constituted the northern section of a kind of bag, in which the 4th Army and part of the forces of the 9th enemy army found themselves, who escaped encirclement near Bobruisk. From the east, the enemy was driven back by the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, which were located 160 - 170 km from Minsk. The formations of the 1st Belorussian Front reached the Svisloch, Osipovichi line, finally breaking open the enemy's defenses on the Berezina and enveloping it from the south. The forward units of the front were located 85 - 90 km from the capital of Belarus. Extremely favorable conditions were created for encircling the main forces of Army Group Center east of Minsk.

The actions of the Soviet troops and partisans thwarted the attempts of the Hitlerite command to withdraw their units in an organized manner beyond the Berezina. During the retreat, the 4th German army was forced to use mainly one dirt road Mogilev - Berezino - Minsk. The Nazis could not break away from the pursuing Soviet troops. Under continuous attacks on the ground and from the air, the fascist armies suffered heavy losses. Hitler was indignant. On June 28, he removed Field Marshal E. Bush from his post as commander of Army Group Center. In his place came Field Marshal V. Model.

On June 28, the headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command ordered the advancing troops to encircle the enemy in the Minsk region with converging strikes. The task of closing the ring was assigned to the 3rd and 1st Belorussian fronts. They had to advance swiftly towards Molodechno and Baranovichi in order to create a mobile outer front of encirclement, to prevent the enemy from pulling up reserves to the encircled grouping. At the same time, with part of their forces, they had to create a strong internal front of the encirclement. The 2nd Belorussian Front was given the task of attacking Minsk from the east, maneuvering its troops around the Nazis' defense through areas liberated by their neighbors.

The new tasks set by the Headquarters were also carried out successfully. On July 1, the 5th Guards Tank Army, breaking the resistance of the fascist troops, liberated Borisov. On July 2, units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps made an almost 60-kilometer rush through the partisan area near Smolevichi and attacked the enemy near Minsk. In a night battle, the enemy was defeated, and the tankers broke into the city from the northeast on the morning of July 3. Units of the 5th Guards Tank Army entered the northern outskirts of Minsk, followed by the advance detachments of the 11th Guards and 31st armies. At 13 o'clock the 1st Guards Tank Corps entered the city from the south; after him formations of the 3rd Army of the 1st Belorussian Front approached Minsk from the southeast. By the end of the day, the long-suffering capital of Belarus was liberated. The troops of the 1st Baltic Front, continuing the offensive according to the previously developed plan, liberated Polotsk on 4 July. This completed the tasks of the first stage of the Belarusian operation.

The Nazis, retreating, almost completely destroyed Minsk. Having visited the city, Marshal AM Vasilevsky reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on July 6: “Yesterday I was in Minsk, the impression is heavy, the city is three-quarters destroyed. Of the large buildings, the House of Government, the new building of the Central Committee, the radio plant, the DKA, the equipment of the power plant and the railway junction (the station was blown up) were preserved ”.

While the fighting was going on in the Minsk area, the troops of the mechanized cavalry group of General NS Oslikovsky on the right wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front advanced 120 km. With the active assistance of the partisans, they liberated the city of Vileika and cut the Minsk-Vilnius railway.

On the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, the mechanized cavalry group of General I.A.Pliev cut the Minsk-Baranovichi railway, captured Stolbtsy and Gorodeya.

East of Minsk, Soviet troops completed the encirclement of 105 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The German divisions caught up in the ring tried to break through to the west and southwest, but in the course of heavy fighting, which lasted from July 5 to 11, they were captured or destroyed; the enemy lost over 70 thousand people killed and about 35 thousand prisoners, while Soviet troops captured 12 generals - corps and division commanders. A large number of weapons, equipment and military equipment were captured.

Aviation played an important role in eliminating the encircled groupings. Providing powerful support to the advancing troops and firmly maintaining air supremacy, the Soviet pilots inflicted heavy damage on the enemy. Only southeast of Minsk, they destroyed 5 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, a lot of military equipment and weapons. Four air armies and long-range aviation from 23 June to 4 July to support the combat operations of the fronts made more than 55 thousand sorties.

Purposeful and active party political work was one of the decisive conditions for the success of the Soviet troops in the operation. The offensive provided rich material convincingly showing the growing power of the Soviet Army and the progressive weakening of the Wehrmacht. The beginning of the operation coincided with the next anniversary of the treacherous attack by Hitlerite Germany on the Soviet Union. On June 22, central and front-line newspapers published a message from the Soviet Information Bureau about the military and political results of the three years of the war. Commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations have launched a great deal of work to bring the content of this document to all personnel. Special publications of political departments were dedicated to the outstanding victories of the Soviet troops. For example, the leaflet of the political department of the 1st Belorussian Front “Three Boilers in Six Days” described how Soviet troops surrounded and destroyed large enemy groups in the regions of Vitebsk, Mogilev and Bobruisk in such a short time. Such materials inspired Soviet soldiers to new feats of arms. In the course of offensive battles, political agencies and party organizations showed special concern for the growth of the ranks of the party at the expense of the soldiers who distinguished themselves in battle. Thus, in July 1944, on the 1st Belorussian Front, 24,354 people were admitted to the party, of which 9,957 were members of the CPSU (b); on the 3rd Belorussian Front at the same time, 13,554 people joined the party ranks, including 5,618 people became members of the CPSU (b). The admission of such a significant number of soldiers to the party made it possible not only to maintain the party nucleus in the troops operating in decisive directions, but also to ensure a high level of party political work. At the same time, the large replenishment of the party ranks demanded that the political agencies strengthen the education of young communists.

The high efficiency of party political work in units and formations is largely due to the fact that it took into account the peculiarities of their combat operations. During the Byelorussian operation from the end of July, military operations were already taking place on the territory of Poland. Under these conditions, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations made great efforts to mobilize soldiers to further improve organization and discipline.

The political work carried out by Soviet political agencies among the enemy troops was also distinguished by significant efficiency. Using various forms of moral influence on the German soldiers, the political agencies explained to them the senselessness of further resistance. During this period, almost all political directorates of the fronts had formed and trained operational groups of special propaganda (5 - 7 people), including antifascists from among the prisoners. Various and in some cases specific were the forms and means of propaganda among the encircled troops of Army Group Center, located outside large settlements, in wooded and swampy areas. New in this work during the operation was the delivery to the enemy troops of orders to end resistance, given by German generals who accepted the terms of the ultimatums of the Soviet command. In particular, after the encirclement of the enemy grouping east of Minsk, the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front sent an appeal to the encircled troops. Realizing the hopelessness of the situation, the acting commander of the 4th German Army, General W. Muller, was forced to give the order to surrender. This order, together with an appeal from the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the form of a leaflet in 2 million copies, was scattered by the front's aviation over the encircled troops. Its content was widely promoted with the help of loudspeakers. In addition, 20 prisoners voluntarily agreed to hand over the order to the commanders of German divisions and regiments. As a result, on July 9, about 2 thousand people from the 267th division, together with the commanders, arrived at the assembly point indicated in the order. This experience was successfully used in other sectors of the front. So, in the period from July 3 to July 15, 1944, 558 prisoners were released to their units, 344 of them returned and brought with them 6085 German soldiers and officers.

As a result of the defeat of the Nazi troops in Belarus, Soviet troops were able to rapidly advance towards the western border of the USSR. Stabilizing the situation on the eastern front became the most important task of the German command. Here he did not have the forces capable of restoring the front and closing the gap that had formed. The remnants of Army Group Center, which escaped defeat, could only cover the main directions. Hitler's headquarters had to help Army Group Center to urgently transfer additional reserves to create a new front.