An overview of small arms ammunition found at the sites of former battles of the European part of the USSR. Small arms of the second world war shells wwii photo catalog

I I - the period until 1941

In December 1917, the Council of People's Commissars announced the demobilization of military factories, but by this time the production of ammunition in the country had practically ceased. By 1918, all the main stocks of weapons and ammunition left over from the World War were already exhausted. However, by the beginning of 1919, only the Tula Cartridge Plant remained operational. Lugansk cartridge in 1918 was initially captured by the Germans, then was occupied by the White Guard army of Krasnov.

For the newly created plant in Taganrog, the White Guards took from the Lugansk plant 4 machines from each development, 500 poods of gunpowder, non-ferrous metals, as well as part of the finished cartridges.
So ataman Krasnov resumed production at RUSSIAN - BALTIC plant Rus.-Balt. acc. Society of shipbuilding and mechanical plants. (Founded in 1913 in Revel, in 1915 evacuated to Taganrog, in Soviet time Taganrog Combine Plant.) And by November 1918, the productivity of this plant had increased to 300,000 rifle cartridges per day (Kakurin N. Ye. "How the Revolution Fought")

“On January 3 (1919), the Allies saw the already revived and put into operation the Russian-Baltic plant in Taganrog, where they made casings, cast bullets, inserted them into a cupronickel shell, filled the cartridges with gunpowder - in a word, the plant was already in full swing. (Pyotr Nikolaevich Krasnov "The Great Don Host") In the Krasnodar Territory and in the Urals, cartridges with the DZ marking are found.
Most likely, this marking means "Donskoy Zavod" in Taganrog

Simbirsky, under construction, was under the threat of capture. In the spring of 1918. the evacuation of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant to Simbirsk began. In July 1919, about 1,500 workers from Petrograd arrived in Simbirsk to establish the production of cartridges.
In 1919 the plant began to manufacture products, and in 1922 the Ulyanovsk plant was renamed into the “Plant named after Volodarsky”.

In addition, the Soviet government is building a new cartridge factory in Podolsk. Part of the shell plant located in the premises of the former Singer plant was taken under it. Remains of equipment from Petrograd were sent there. In the fall of 1919, the Podolsk plant began to rework foreign cartridges, and in November 1920, the first batch of rifle cartridges was produced.

Since 1924 the production of cartridges is carried out by the State Association "Main Directorate of the USSR Military Industry", which includes Tula, Lugansk, Podolsk, Ulyanovsk factories.

Since 1928, cartridge factories, except for Tula, received numbers: Ulyanovsk - 3, Podolsk - 17, Lugansk - 60. (But Ulyanovsk retained its markings ZV until 1941)
Since 1934, new shops were built to the south of Podolsk. Soon they began to be called the Novopodolsk plant, and since 1940 the Klimovsk plant № 188.
In 1939 cartridge factories were reassigned to the 3rd GU of the People's Commissariat of Armaments. It includes the following factories: Ulyanovsk # 3, Podolsk # 17, Tula # 38, Experienced patr. plant (Maryina grove, Moscow) No. 44, Kuntsevsky (Red equipment) No. 46, Lugansky No. 60 and Klimovsky No. 188.

Marking of Soviet-made cartridges remains mainly with a protruding imprint.

At the top - the number or name of the plant, at the bottom - the year of manufacture.

The patrons of the Tula plant in 1919-20. the quarter is indicated, possibly in 1923-24. only the last digit of the year of manufacture is indicated, and the Lugansk plant in 1920-1927. indicates the period (1,2,3) in which they were made. The Ulyanovsk plant in 1919-30 puts the name of the plant (C, U, ZV) at the bottom.

In 1930, the spherical bottom of the liner was replaced with a flat one with a chamfer. The replacement was caused by problems that arose when firing from the Maxim machine gun. The protruding markings are located along the edge of the case bottom. And only in the 1970s, sleeves began to be marked with an extruded impression on a flat surface closer to the center.

	Marking		Start marking	End of marking
Klimovsky plant
Kuntsevo plant "Red Equipment" Moscow		Produced cartridges for ShKAS and with special bullets T-46, ZB-46 Apparently experienced parties

*Note. The table is not complete, there may be other options

Cases of the Lugansk plant with additional designations + are very rare. Most likely, these are technological designations and cartridges were intended only for test firing.

There is an opinion that in 1928-1936 the Penza plant produced cartridges with markings number 50, but it is more likely that this is an indistinct mark number 60

Perhaps at the end of the thirties, the release of cartridges or casings was carried out at the Moscow "Shot Foundry" No. 58, which then produced tail cartridges for mortar mines.

In 1940-41 in Novosibirsk, plant No. 179 NKB (People's Commissariat of Ammunition) produced rifle cartridges.

The sleeve for the ShKAS machine gun, in contrast to an ordinary rifle sleeve, has, in addition to the plant number and the year of manufacture, an additional stamp - the letter "Ш".
Cartridges with a ShKAS sleeve, having a red primer color, were used for firing only from synchronous aircraft machine guns.

R. Chumak K. Soloviev Cartridges for a super machine gun. Magazine "Kalashnikov" No. 1 2001

Notes:
Finland, which used the Mosin rifle, produced and also purchased in the USA and other countries, cartridges 7.62x54, which are found on the battlefield of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 and the Second World War. Presumably, pre-revolutionary Russian-made cartridges were also used.

	Suomen Ampuma Tarvetehdas OY (SAT), Riihimaki, Finland (1922-26)

In the 1920s and 30s, the United States used Mosin rifles left over from the Russian order for training purposes and sold them for private use, releasing cartridges for this. Deliveries were made to Finland in 1940

	(UMC- Union Metallic Cartridge Co.ToRemington Co.)
	WinchesterRepeating Arms Co., Bridgeport, CT Medium drawing - plantEastAlton Right picture - plantNewHaven

Germany during World War I used a captured Mosin rifle to arm auxiliary and rear units.

	It is possible that, initially, German cartridges were produced without marking, but there will probably be no reliable information about this.
	Deutsche Waffen-u. Munitionsfabriken A.-G., Fruher Lorenz, Karlsruhe, Germany

Spain in the period civil war received a large number of various, mostly outdated, weapons from the USSR. Including the Mosin rifle. The production of cartridges was established. It is possible that in the beginning Soviet-made cartridge cases were used, which were reloaded and new markings were applied to them.

Fabrica Nacional de Toledo. Spain

The British company Kynoch supplied cartridges to Finland and Estonia. According to the data providedGOST from "P.Labbett &F.A.Brown.Foreignrifle-caliberammunition manufactured in Britain.London, 1994., "Kynoch signed contracts for the supply of 7.62x54 cartridges:

1929 Estonia (with tracer bullet)
1932 Estonia (with a heavy bullet weighing 12.12 grams.)
1938 Estonia (with tracer bullet)
1929 Finland (with tracer bullet, armor-piercing bullet)
1939 Finland (with tracer bullet)

The cartridge 7.62x54 was produced in the 20-40s and in other countries for commercial purposes:

	ARS -it is unlikely that thisA. RsAtelierdeConstuctiondeRennes, Rennes, France, since the cartridges of this company areRS, most likely equipped in Estonia with the participation of Finland
	FNC- (Fabrica Nacional de Cartuchos, Santa Fe), Mexico
	FN- (Fabrique Nationale d "Armes de Guerre, Herstal) Belgium,
	Pumitra Voina Anonima, Romania Probably for the remaining captured rifles after World War 1, but there is no exact manufacturer data

It is possible that some of the above-mentioned foreign ammunition could have ended up in Soviet warehouses in small quantities as a result of the annexation of the western territories and the Finnish war, and were most likely used by parts of the "people's militia" in the initial period of the Second World War. Also, nowadays, they are often found during archaeological research of places of war of the Second World War in Soviet positions, casings and cartridges made in the USA and England by order of Russia for 1 world war... The order was not completed in full on time, and already during the Civil War it was supplied to the White Army. After the end of the civil war, the remnants of these ammunition settled in warehouses, probably used by the security units and OSOAVIAKHIM, but turned out to be in demand with the beginning of the Second World War.
Sometimes found on the battlefield casings of a 7.7mm British rifle cartridge (.303 British), which are mistaken for 7.62x54R ammunition. These cartridges were used, in particular, by the armies of the Baltic states and in 1940 were used for the Red Army. Near Leningrad there are such cartridges with the marking V- Riga plant "Vairogs" (VAIROGS, formerly Sellier & Bellot)
.
Later, such cartridges of English and Canadian production came under Lend-Lease.

I I I - period 1942-1945

In 1941, all factories, except for Ulyanovsk, were partially or completely evacuated, and the old numbers of the factories were retained in a new location. For example, the Barnaul plant, transported from Podolsk, produced its first products on November 24, 1941. Some factories were re-created. The numbering of all cartridge productions is given., since there is no exact data on the range of products they produce.

Marking with 1941-42 g.	Plant location	Marking with 1941-42 g.	Plant location
			New Lyalya
	Sverdlovsk		Chelyabinsk
	Novosibirsk

According to B. Davydov, rifle cartridges were produced at factories during the war. 17 ,38 (1943), 44 (1941-42),46 ,60 ,179 (1940-41),188 ,304 (1942),529 ,539 (1942-43),540 ,541 (1942-43), 543 ,544 ,545 ,710 (1942-43),711 (1942).

When restored in 1942-1944, the factories received new designations.

This stigma is probably the product manufactured by the Podolsk plant during the period when its work was resumed.
There may be other designations as well. For example, No. 10 in 1944 (found on TT cartridges), but the location of the production is unknown, perhaps it is the Perm plant or the badly read brand of the Podolsk plant.

Since 1944, it is possible to designate the month of production of the cartridge.
For example, a 1946 training cartridge has such markings.

IV - Post-war period

In the post-war years in the USSR, the factories in Klimovsk-No. 711, Tula-No. 539, Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk)-No. 270, Ulyanovsk-No. 3, Yuryuzani-No. 38, Novosibirsk-No. 188, Barnaul-No. 17 and Frunze remained in ammunition production. -№60.

Rifle cartridge markings from this period of production remain mostly with a protruding imprint. At the top - the plant number, at the bottom - the year of manufacture.

In 1952-1956, the following designations are used to indicate the year of manufacture:

D = 1952, D = 1953, E = 1954, H = 1955, K = 1956.

After the Second World War, a cartridge of 7.62 caliber was also produced in the Warsaw Pact countries, China, Iraq and Egypt, and other countries .. Possible designations

Czechoslovakia	aymbxnzv
Bulgaria
Hungary
Poland
Yugoslavia	P P U
	31 51 61 71 321 671 (usually the code is at the top, but the code 31 can be at the bottom)

This cartridge is still produced at Russian factories in combat and hunting performance.

Modern names and some of the options for commercial markings on Russian cartridges since 1990

Designs, characteristics of various bullets for cartridges of 7.62 caliber are quite well represented in modern literature on weapons and therefore only color designations of bullets are given according to the "Handbook of cartridges ..." 1946.

	Light bullet L model 1908
	Heavy bullet D arr. 1930, the tip is painted yellow for a length of 5 mm From 1953 it was replaced by an LPS bullet painted on the tip until 1978 in a silver color
	Armor-piercing bullet B-30 mod. 1930 the top is painted black for a length of 5 mm
	Armor-piercing incendiary bullet B-32 mod. 1932 the tip is painted black for a length of 5 mm with a red bordering stripe Bullet BS-40 mod. 1940 was painted to a length of 5 mm in black, and the rest of the bullet protruding from the sleeve in red.
	Sighting and incendiary bullet PZ arr. 1935. the tip is colored red for a length of 5 mm
	T-30 tracer bullet mod. 1930 and T-46 mod. 1938 The top is colored green for a length of 5 mm. The T-46 bullet was developed at the Kuntsevsky plant (Red equipment) No. 46 and from here got its number in the name.

Most of the above information is provided by the director of the Museum of History and Local Lore of the Lomonosov District of the Leningrad Region
Vladimir Andreevich Golovatyuk , for many years dealing with the history of small arms, ammunition.
The museum has collected a lot of materials and exhibits on the history of the region, military operations on the territory of the region during the Second World War. Excursions are regularly held for schoolchildren and everyone. T Museum phone 8 812 423 05 66

In addition, here is the information I have on rifle cartridges of an earlier period:
Rifle cartridge for Krnka, Baranov
Produced at the St. Petersburg plant (and some workshops without designations)

Probably L is the name of the St. Petersburg Foundry.

Probably VGO - Vasileostrovsky cartridge case department of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant.

The designation for the third of the year of manufacture appears

Petersburg plant

Unfortunately, I have no information on the designations until 1880, most likely the letter B denotes the Vasileostrovsky cartridge case department of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant, and the upper sign is the name of the brass manufacturer.

Manufactured by Keller & Co., Hirtenberg Austria, probably commissioned by Bulgaria for the Serbo-Bulgarian War.

By the end of the 30s, almost all participants in the coming world war had formed common directions in development. small arms... The range and accuracy of destruction was reduced, which was compensated for by a higher density of fire. As a consequence of this, the beginning of the mass rearmament of units with automatic small arms - submachine guns, machine guns, assault rifles.

Accuracy of shooting began to fade into the background, while the soldiers who were advancing in a chain were taught to shoot on the move. With the advent of the airborne troops, it became necessary to create special lightweight weapons.

Maneuver warfare also affected machine guns: they became much lighter and more mobile. New types of small arms appeared (which was dictated primarily by the need to fight tanks) - rifle grenades, anti-tank guns and RPGs with cumulative grenades.

Small arms of the USSR of World War II

Rifle division of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War represented a very formidable force - about 14.5 thousand people. The main type of small arms were rifles and carbines - 10,420 pieces. The share of submachine guns was insignificant - 1204. There were 166, 392 and 33 units of easel, light and anti-aircraft machine guns, respectively.

The division had its own artillery of 144 guns and 66 mortars. Firepower was supplemented by 16 tanks, 13 armored vehicles and a solid fleet of auxiliary automotive vehicles.

Rifles and carbines

The main small arms of the infantry units of the USSR in the first period of the war were undoubtedly the famous three-line - 7.62 mm rifle S.I. qualities, in particular, with an aiming range of 2 km.

The three-ruler is the ideal weapon for newly recruited soldiers, and the simplicity of the design created tremendous opportunities for its mass production. But like any weapon, the three-line had flaws. A permanently attached bayonet in combination with a long barrel (1670 mm) created inconvenience when moving, especially in wooded areas. Serious criticism was caused by the shutter handle during reloading.

On its basis was created sniper rifle and a series of carbines of the 1938 and 1944 model. Fate measured the three-line for a long century (the last three-line was released in 1965), participation in many wars and an astronomical "circulation" of 37 million copies.

Sniper with Mosin rifle (c optical sight PE sample 1931)

At the end of the 30s, the outstanding Soviet weapons designer F.V. Tokarev developed a 10-round self-loading rifle cal. 7.62 mm SVT-38, which received the name SVT-40 after modernization. It "lost weight" by 600 g and became shorter due to the introduction of thinner wooden parts, additional holes in the casing and a reduction in the length of the bayonet. A little later, a sniper rifle appeared at its base. Automatic firing was provided by the removal of powder gases. Ammunition was placed in a box-shaped, detachable store.

Sighting range of SVT-40 - up to 1 km. SVT-40 fought with honor on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Our opponents also appreciated it. Historical fact: capturing rich trophies at the beginning of the war, among which there were many SVT-40s, the German army ... adopted it, and the Finns created their own rifle, TaRaKo, on the basis of SVT-40.

The AVT-40 automatic rifle became the creative development of the ideas implemented in the SVT-40. It differed from its predecessor in its ability to conduct automatic firing at a rate of up to 25 rounds per minute. The disadvantage of AVT-40 is low accuracy of fire, strong unmasking flame and loud sound at the moment of firing. Subsequently, as the troops received massive amounts of automatic weapons, they were removed from service.

Submachine guns

The Great Patriotic War was the time of the final transition from rifles to automatic weapons. The Red Army began to fight, armed with a small number of PPD-40 - a submachine gun designed by the outstanding Soviet designer Vasily Alekseevich Degtyarev. At that time, the PPD-40 was in no way inferior to its domestic and foreign counterparts.

Designed for a pistol cartridge cal. 7.62 x 25 mm, the PPD-40 had an impressive 71 rounds of ammunition, placed in a drum-type magazine. Weighing about 4 kg, it could fire at a speed of 800 rounds per minute with an effective range of up to 200 meters. However, a few months after the start of the war, it was replaced by the legendary PPSh-40 cal. 7.62 x 25 mm.

The creator of the PPSh-40, designer Georgy Semenovich Shpagin, was faced with the task of developing an extremely easy-to-use, reliable, technologically advanced, cheap-to-manufacture mass weapon.

From its predecessor, the PPD-40, the PPSh inherited a drum magazine for 71 rounds. A little later, a simpler and more reliable sector horn magazine for 35 rounds was developed for it. The mass of the equipped assault rifles (both variants) was, respectively, 5.3 and 4.15 kg. The rate of fire of the PPSh-40 reached 900 rounds per minute with an aiming range of up to 300 meters and with the ability to conduct single fire.

To master the PPSh-40, a few lessons were enough. It was easily disassembled into 5 parts, made by stamping-welded technology, thanks to which during the war years the Soviet defense industry produced about 5.5 million automatic machines.

In the summer of 1942, the young designer Alexei Sudaev presented his brainchild - a 7.62 mm submachine gun. It was strikingly different from its "older brothers" PPD and PPSh-40 in a rational layout, higher manufacturability and ease of manufacturing parts by arc welding.

PPS-42 was 3.5 kg lighter and required three times less manufacturing time. However, despite the quite obvious advantages, it never became a mass weapon, leaving the PPSh-40 to be the leader.

By the beginning of the war, the DP-27 light machine gun (infantry Degtyarev, cal 7.62mm) had been in service with the Red Army for almost 15 years, having the status of the main light machine gun of infantry units. Its automation was powered by the energy of powder gases. The gas regulator reliably protected the mechanism from dirt and high temperatures.

DP-27 could only conduct automatic fire, but even a beginner needed a few days to master the shooting in short bursts of 3-5 rounds. Ammunition of 47 rounds was placed in a disk magazine with a bullet to the center in one row. The store itself was mounted on top of the receiver. The mass of the unloaded machine gun was 8.5 kg. The equipped magazine increased it by almost 3 kg more.

It was a powerful weapon with an aiming range of 1.5 km and a combat rate of fire of up to 150 rounds per minute. In the firing position, the machine gun rested on the bipod. A flame arrester was screwed on the end of the barrel, significantly reducing its unmasking effect. DP-27 was served by the shooter and his assistant. In total, about 800 thousand machine guns were fired.

Small arms of the Wehrmacht of World War II

Basic strategy German army- offensive or blitzkrieg (blitzkrieg - lightning war). The decisive role in it was assigned to large tank formations, carrying out deep breakthroughs in the enemy's defenses in cooperation with artillery and aviation.

Tank units bypassed powerful fortified areas, destroying command centers and rear communications, without which the enemy would quickly lose combat effectiveness. The defeat was completed by motorized units. ground forces.

Small arms of the Wehrmacht infantry division

The staff of the German infantry division of the 1940 model assumed the presence of 12609 rifles and carbines, 312 submachine guns (machine guns), manual and heavy machine guns- respectively 425 and 110 pieces, 90 anti-tank rifles and 3600 pistols.

Small arms of the Wehrmacht as a whole met the high requirements of wartime. It was reliable, trouble-free, simple, easy to manufacture and maintain, which contributed to its serial production.

Rifles, carbines, machine guns

Mauser 98K

The Mauser 98K is an improved version of the Mauser 98 rifle developed in late XIX centuries by brothers Paul and Wilhelm Mauser, founders of the world famous arms company. Equipping the German army with it began in 1935.

Mauser 98K

The weapon was equipped with a clip with five 7.92 mm cartridges. A trained soldier could aim 15 shots within a minute at a distance of up to 1.5 km. The Mauser 98K was very compact. Its main characteristics are: weight, length, barrel length - 4.1 kg x 1250 x 740 mm. Numerous conflicts with its participation, longevity and truly transcendental "circulation" - more than 15 million units testify to the indisputable advantages of the rifle.

The G-41 self-loading ten-shot rifle was the German response to the massive equipping of the Red Army with rifles - SVT-38, 40 and AVS-36. Its sighting range reached 1200 meters. Only single shooting was allowed. Its significant disadvantages - significant weight, low reliability and increased vulnerability from pollution - were subsequently eliminated. Combat "circulation" amounted to several hundred thousand rifle samples.

Automatic MP-40 "Schmeisser"

Perhaps the most famous small arms of the Wehrmacht during World War II was the famous MP-40 submachine gun, a modification of its predecessor, the MP-36, created by Heinrich Volmer. However, by the will of fate, he is better known under the name "Schmeisser", obtained thanks to the stamp on the store - "PATENT SCHMEISSER". The stigma simply meant that in addition to G. Volmer, Hugo Schmeisser also participated in the creation of the MP-40, but only as the creator of the store.

Automatic MP-40 "Schmeisser"

Initially, the MP-40 was intended to arm the command staff of infantry units, but later it was transferred to the disposal of tankers, drivers of armored vehicles, paratroopers and special forces.

However, the MR-40 was absolutely unsuitable for infantry units, since it was an exclusively close-range weapon. In a fierce battle in open terrain, having a weapon with a firing range of 70 to 150 meters meant for a German soldier to be practically unarmed in front of his enemy, armed with Mosin and Tokarev rifles with a firing range of 400 to 800 meters.

Assault rifle StG-44

Assault rifle StG-44 (sturmgewehr) cal. 7.92mm is another legend of the Third Reich. It is undoubtedly an outstanding creation by Hugo Schmeisser and is the inspiration for many post-war assault rifles and assault rifles, including the famous AK-47.

The StG-44 could conduct single and automatic fire. Its weight with a full magazine was 5.22 kg. V sighting range- 800 meters - "Sturmgever" was in no way inferior to its main competitors. There were three versions of the store - for 15, 20 and 30 rounds with a rate of up to 500 rounds per minute. The option of using a rifle with an underbarrel grenade launcher and an infrared sight was considered.

Not without its drawbacks. The assault rifle was a whole kilogram heavier than the Mauser-98K. Her wooden butt could sometimes not withstand hand-to-hand combat and simply broke. The flame escaping from the barrel gave out the location of the shooter, and the long magazine and sighting devices made him raise his head high when lying down.

MG-42 7.92 mm is quite rightly called one of the best machine guns of the Second World War. It was developed at Grossfus by the engineers Werner Gruner and Kurt Horn. Those who have experienced it firepower were very frank. Our soldiers called it "the lawn mower", and our allies called it "Hitler's circular saw."

Depending on the type of shutter, the machine gun fired aimed at a speed of up to 1500 rpm at a distance of up to 1 km. The ammunition supply was carried out using a machine-gun belt for 50 - 250 rounds. The uniqueness of the MG-42 was complemented by a relatively small number of parts - 200 and high manufacturability of their production by stamping and spot welding.

The barrel, red-hot from firing, was replaced with a spare one in a few seconds using a special clamp. In total, about 450 thousand machine guns were fired. The unique technical know-how embodied in the MG-42 was adopted by gunsmiths around the world when creating their machine guns.

We often find shell casings from the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War in the ground. Almost all of them have their own differences. Today we will consider the marking of the cases, which is located on the cartridge capsule, regardless of the brand and caliber of the weapon.

Consider some of the types and markings of the Austro-Hungarian types of cartridges of 1905-1916. For this type of sleeve, the capsule is divided into four parts with dashes, the inscriptions are extruded. The left, respectively, and the right cell is the year of production, the top is the month, and at the bottom is the designation of the plant.

• Figure 1. - G. Roth, Vienna.
• Fig 2. - Bello and Selye, city of Prague.
• Fig 3. - Wöllersdorf plant.
• Fig 4. - Hartenberg factory.
• Fig 5. - the same Hartenberg, but the Kellery Co. plant.

The later Hungarian 1930s-40s have some differences. Fig. 6. - Chapelsky arsenal, year of issue below. Figure 7. - Budapest. Fig. 8. - military plant Veszprem.

Germany, imperialist war.

The German marking of imperialist war shells has two types with a clear division (Fig. 9) using dashes into four equal parts of the primer and with a conditional (Fig. 10). The inscription is embossed, in the second version the letters and numbers of the designation are directed towards the capsule.

In the upper part there is the S 67 mark, in different versions: together, separately, through a dot, without numbers. The lower part is the month of production, on the left is the year, and on the right is the plant. In some cases, the year and the plant are changed in places, or the location of all divisions is reversed.

Fascist Germany.

Cases and their markings in Nazi Germany (Mauser type) have many options, because cartridges were produced in almost all factories in all occupied countries Western Europe: Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Italy.

Consider Figure 11-14, this sleeve is made in Denmark. The capsule is divided into four parts: above - the letter P with numbers, below - the week, on the left side - the year, on the right - the letter S and a star (five-pointed or six-pointed). In Figures 15-17, we see some more types of cartridges produced in Denmark.

In Fig. 18, we see capsules of presumably Czechoslovak and Polish production. The capsule is divided into four parts: at the top - Z, at the bottom - the month of manufacture, on the left and right - the year. There is an option when it says "SMS" at the top, caliber - 7.92 below.

• Fig. 19-23 German shells G. Genshov and Co. in Durlya;
• Figure 24. - RVS, Browning, caliber 7.65, Nuremberg;
• Figs 25 and 26 - DVM, Karlsruhe.

More options for ammunition made in Poland.

• Fig. 27 - Skarzysko-Kamienna;
• Figures 28 and 29 - Pochinsk, Warsaw.

The marks on the Mosin rifle cartridges are not depressed, but convex. Above is usually the letter of the manufacturer's factory, below - the numbers of the year of manufacture.

• Figure 30 - Lugansk plant;
• Fig 31 - a plant from Russia;
• Figure 32 - Tula plant.

Some more capsule options:

• Figure 33 - Tula plant;
• Figure 34 - Russian plant;
• Figure 35 - Moscow;
• Figure 36 - Russian-Belgian;
• Figure 37 - Riga;
• Figure 38 - Leningrad;
• Rice 39, 40, 41, 42 - different factories in Russia.

Universal shooting system of low ballistics for close combat infantry units of the Red Army

The available information about the ampulometre of the Red Army is extremely scarce and is mainly based on a couple of paragraphs from the memoirs of one of the defenders of Leningrad, the description of the design in the ampulomet manual, as well as some conclusions and common speculations of modern search engines and diggers. Meanwhile, in the museum of the capital's Iskra plant named after I.I. For a long time, Kartukov's life was a dead weight of an amazingly high-quality view of the shooting of the front years. Text documents to it are obviously buried in the bowels of the archive of the economy (or scientific and technical documentation) and are still waiting for their researchers. So, when working on the publication, I had to summarize only known data and analyze references and images.
The existing concept of "ampulomet" in relation to the combat system developed in the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War does not reveal all the capabilities and tactical advantages of this weapon. Moreover, all available information refers only, so to speak, to the late period of serial ampulomet. In fact, this "pipe on the machine" was capable of throwing not only ampoules from a can or bottle glass, but also more serious ammunition. And the creators of this simple and unpretentious weapon, the production of which was possible almost on the knee, no doubt deserve much more respect.

Simplest mortar

In the flamethrower system of weapons of the ground forces of the Red Army, the ampulomet took an intermediate position between knapsack or easel flamethrowers, firing a stream of liquid fire mixture at small distances, and field artillery (cannon and rocket), which occasionally used incendiary shells with solid incendiary mixtures of the military type grade 6. As conceived by the developers (and not the customer's requirements), the ampulomet was mainly (as in the document) intended to combat enemy tanks, armored trains, armored vehicles and fortified firing points by firing any ammunition of a suitable caliber at them.

Experienced 125-mm ampulomet during factory testing in 1940.

The opinion that the ampulomet is a purely Leningrad invention is obviously based on the fact that this type of weapon was also produced in besieged Leningrad, and one of its samples is on display at the State Memorial Museum of the Defense and Siege of Leningrad. However, ampoule throwers (as well as infantry flamethrowers) were developed in the pre-war years in Moscow in the experimental design department of plant No. 145 named after SM. Kirov (chief designer of the plant - I.I.Kartukov), which is under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of the aircraft industry of the USSR. Unfortunately, the names of the ampulomet designers are unknown to me.

Transportation of an experienced 125-mm ampulo-gun in the summer when changing a firing position.

It has been documented that with ammunition from ampoules, the 125-mm ampulomet passed field and military tests in 1941 and was adopted by the Red Army. The description of the ampulomet design given on the Internet is borrowed from the manual and only in general outline corresponds to pre-war prototypes: "Ampulomet consists of a barrel with a chamber, a bolt-slide, a firing device, sighting devices and a gun carriage with a fork." In our supplemented version, the barrel of the serial ampulomet was a steel seamless tube made of Mannesmann rolled stock with an internal diameter of 127 mm, or rolled of sheet 2-mm iron, muffled in the breech. The barrel of a standard ampulo-gun freely rested with trunnions on the lugs in the fork of a wheeled (summer) or ski (winter) machine. There were no horizontal or vertical guidance mechanisms.

In an experimental 125-mm ampulomet, a rifle-type bolt in the chamber locked a blank cartridge from a 12-gauge hunting rifle with a folder case and a 15-gram sample of black powder. The firing mechanism was released by pressing the trigger with the thumb of the left hand (forward or downward - were different variants), located near the handles similar to those used on heavy machine guns and welded to the breech of the ampoule gun.

125mm ampulomet in combat position.

In the serial ampulomet, the firing mechanism was simplified due to the manufacture of many parts by stamping, and the trigger lever was moved under the thumb right hand... Moreover, the handles in serial production were replaced by steel pipes bent like ram's horns, constructively combining them with a piston bolt. That is, now, for loading, the shutter was turned with both handles all the way to the left and, resting on the tray, pulled towards itself. The entire breech with handles along the slots in the tray moved off to the extreme rear position, completely removing the spent cartridge case of a 12-gauge cartridge.

The sighting devices of the ampoule gun consisted of a front sight and a folding sight rack. The latter was designed for shooting at four fixed distances (obviously, from 50 to 100 m), indicated by holes. And the vertical slot between them made it possible to shoot at intermediate ranges.
The photographs show that a roughly made wheeled machine welded from steel pipes and an angle profile was used on the experimental version of the ampulomet. It would be more correct to consider it a laboratory bench. At the ampoule thrower machine proposed for armament, all the details were more carefully trimmed and supplied with all the attributes necessary for operation in the troops: handles, openers, slats, brackets, etc. , upholstered with a metal strip along the generatrix and with a metal sleeve as a plain bearing in the axial bore.

In the St. Petersburg, Volgograd and Arkhangelsk museums there are later versions of a factory-made ampulomet on a simplified lightweight wheelless non-folding machine with a support of two pipes, or without a machine at all. Tripods made of steel rods, wooden decks or oak crosspieces as carriages for ampoulomettes were adapted already in wartime.

The manual mentions that the ammunition load carried by the calculation of the ampoule gun was 10 ampoules and 12 knockout cartridges. On the machine of the pre-production version of the ampoule thrower, the developers proposed to install in the transport position two easily removable tin boxes with a capacity of eight ampoules each. One of the soldiers apparently carried two dozen cartridges in a standard hunting bandolier. In a combat position, ammunition boxes were quickly removed and placed in cover.

On the barrel of the pre-production version of the ampulomet, two welded swivels were provided for carrying it on a belt over the shoulder. Serial samples were devoid of any "architectural excesses", and the barrel was carried on the shoulder. Many people note the presence of a metal splitter grille inside the barrel, in its breech. This was not the case on the prototype. Obviously, the grid was needed to prevent the blank cartridge from hitting the glass ampoule with the cardboard and felt wad of a blank cartridge. In addition, it limited the movement of the ampoule to the breech of the barrel to the stop, since the serial 125-mm ampoule gun had a chamber in this place. Factory data and characteristics of the 125-mm ampulomet are somewhat different from those given in the descriptions and manuals for use.

A drawing of a serial 125-mm ampoule gun, proposed for mass production in 1940.

Burst of a 125-mm ampoule filled with a self-igniting liquid KS in the target area.

Warehouse for finished products of the ampulomet production shop at plant No. 455 NKAP in 1942.

Incendiary ampoules

As indicated in the documents, the main ammunition for the ampulomet was the aviation tin ampoules AZh-2 of 125 mm caliber, equipped with a self-igniting type of condensed kerosene of the KS brand. The first tin spherical ampoules entered serial production in 1936. At the end of the 1930s. they were also improved in OKO of the 145th plant (in evacuation this is OKB-NKAL of plant No. 455). In the factory documents, they were called aviation liquid ampoules AZ-2. But still right
It is more appropriate to call the ampoules tin, since the Red Army Air Force planned to gradually replace the glass ampoules AK-1, which have been in service since the early 1930s, with them. like chemical ammunition.

There were constant complaints about the glass ampoules that they were fragile, and having broken ahead of time, they were able to poison both the crew of the aircraft and the ground personnel with their contents. Meanwhile, mutually exclusive requirements were imposed on the glass of ampoules - strength in handling and fragility in use. The first, of course, prevailed, and some of them, with a wall thickness of 10 mm, even when bombing from a height of 1000 m (depending on the density of the soil) gave a very large percentage of unbroken ones. Theoretically, their tin thin-walled counterparts could solve the problem. As tests later showed, the hopes of the aviators for this were also not fully justified.

This feature probably also manifested itself when firing from an ampulo thrower, especially along flat trajectories at a short distance. Note that the recommended target types for the 125mm ampoule gun are also solid-walled targets. In the 1930s, gt. aircraft tin ampoules were made by stamping two hemispheres of thin brass 0.35 mm thick. Apparently, since 1937 (with the beginning of the austerity of non-ferrous metals in the production of ammunition), they began to be converted to tinplate with a thickness of 0.2-0.3 mm.

The configuration of parts for the production of tin ampoules varied greatly. In 1936, at the 145th plant, the Ofitserova-Kokoreva design was proposed for the manufacture of AZ-2 from four spherical segments with two options for rolling the edges of the parts. In 1937, even AZh-2 consisted of a hemisphere with a filler neck and a second hemisphere of four spherical segments in production.

At the beginning of 1941, in connection with the expected transfer of the economy to a special period, technologies for the production of AZh-2 from black tin (thin rolled 0.5 mm pickled iron) were tested. From the middle of 1941, these technologies had to be used to the full. When stamping, black plate was not as plastic as white or brass, and deep drawing of steel made production more difficult, therefore, with the beginning of the war, AF-2 was allowed to be made from 3-4 parts (spherical segments or belts, as well as their various combinations with hemispheres).

Unexploded or non-fired round glass ampoules AU-125 for firing from 125-mm ampoule throwers are perfectly preserved in the ground for decades. Photo of our days.
Bottom: experimental ampoules АЖ-2 with additional fuses. Photo of 1942

Soldering the seams of ferrous tin products in the presence of special fluxes then turned out to be quite an expensive pleasure, and the method of welding thin steel sheets with a continuous seam, Academician E.O. Paton introduced ammunition into production only a year later. Therefore, in 1941, the parts of the AZ-2 hulls began to be connected by rolling the edges and embedding the seam flush with the contour of the sphere. By the way, before the birth of ampoulometres, the filler necks of metal ampoules were soldered from the outside (for use in aviation, this was not so fundamental), but since 1940, the necks began to be fastened inside. This made it possible to avoid the diversity of ammunition for use in aviation and ground forces.

The filling of ampoules AZh-2KS, the so-called "Russian napalm" - condensed kerosene KS - was developed in 1938 by A.P. Ionov in one of the capital research institutes with the assistance of chemists V.V. Zemskova, L.F. She-velkin and A.V. Yasnitskaya. In 1939, he completed the development of a technology for the industrial production of a powdery thickener OP-2. How the incendiary mixture acquired the properties of instantly self-igniting in air remains unknown. I'm not sure that the trivial addition of white phosphorus granules to a thick petroleum-based incendiary mixture here would guarantee their spontaneous combustion. In general, be that as it may, already in the spring of 1941, at the factory and field tests, the 125-mm ampoulo-gun AZh-2KS normally fired without fuses and intermediate ignitors.

According to the original plan, the AZh-2 was designed to infect the terrain from aircraft with persistent toxic substances, as well as to destroy manpower with persistent and unstable toxic substances, and later (when used with liquid fire mixtures) - to ignite and smoke tanks, ships and firing points. Meanwhile, the use of chemical warfare agents in ampoules against the enemy was not ruled out by their use from ampulometry. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the incendiary purpose of the ammunition was supplemented by the smoking of manpower from field forts.

In 1943, for guaranteed operation of AZH-2SOV or AZH-2NOV when bombing from any height and at any carrier speed, the ampoule developers supplemented their designs with fuses made of thermosetting plastic (resistant to the acid base of toxic substances). As conceived by the developers, such modified ammunition affected manpower as fragmentation-chemical.

Ampoule fuses UVUD (universal percussion fuse) belonged to the category of all-blown fuses, i.e. triggered even when the ampoules fell sideways. Structurally, they were similar to those used on aircraft smoke bombs ADSh, but it was no longer possible to shoot with such ampoules from ampoule throwers: from overloads, a non-safety fuse could go off right in the barrel. During the war period, and for incendiary ampoules in the Air Force, they sometimes used cases with fuses or with plugs instead of them.

In 1943-1944. have passed tests of ampoules АЖ-2СОВ or НВ, intended for long-term storage in the equipped state. For this, their hulls were covered with bakelite resin inside. Thus, the resistance of the metal body to mechanical stress increased even more, and fuses were mandatory installed on such ammunition.

Today, at the sites of past battles, "diggers" can come across in a conditioned form only ampoules of AK-1 or AU-125 (AK-2 or AU-260 are extremely rare exotic) made of glass. Thin-walled tin ampoules practically all decayed. You should not try to discharge glass ampoules if you can see that there is liquid inside. White or yellowish turbid - this is a COP, which has by no means lost its properties to self-ignition in air even after 60 years. Transparent or translucent with yellow large crystals of the sediment - this is COB or NOV. In their glass containers combat properties can also persist for a very long time.

Ampulo throwers in battle

On the eve of the war, units of knapsack flamethrowers (flamethrower teams) were organizationally part of the rifle regiments. However, due to the difficulties of using in defense (extremely short range of flame throwing and unmasking signs of the ROKS-2 knapsack flamethrower), they were disbanded. Instead, in November 1941, teams and companies were created, armed with ampoule throwers and rifle mortars for throwing metal and glass ampoules and Molotov cocktails at tanks and other targets. But, according to the official version, the ampoule throwers also had significant drawbacks, and at the end of 1942 they were removed from service.
At the same time, no mention was made of the abandonment of rifle-bottle mortars. Probably, for some reason they did not have the disadvantages of ampulomettes. Moreover, in the remaining units of the rifle regiments of the Red Army, it was proposed to throw bottles with KS at tanks exclusively by hand. The bottle throwers of the flamethrower teams, obviously, were told a terrible military secret: how to use the aiming bar of the Mosin rifle for aimed shooting bottle at a given distance determined by eye. As I understand it, there was simply no time to teach the rest of the illiterate infantrymen this "tricky business". Therefore, they themselves adapted a three-inch sleeve to cut a rifle barrel, and they themselves "after hours" were trained in aimed bottle throwing.

When meeting with a solid barrier, the body of the ampoule AZ-2KS was torn, as a rule, along the soldering seams, the incendiary mixture splashed out and ignited in air with the formation of a thick white
th smoke. The combustion temperature of the mixture reached 800 ° C, which, when it got on clothes and exposed parts of the body, caused the enemy a lot of trouble. No less unpleasant was the meeting of the sticky COP with armored vehicles - from the change in the physicochemical properties of the metal during local heating to such a temperature and ending with an indispensable fire in the engine-transmission compartment of carburetor (and diesel) tanks. It was impossible to clean the burning COP from the armor - it was only required to cut off the air access. However, the presence of a self-igniting additive in the combustion chamber did not exclude spontaneous combustion of the mixture again.

Here are a few excerpts from combat reports from the Great Patriotic War, published on the Internet: “We also used ampoule throwers. From an obliquely installed tube mounted on a sled, a blank cartridge shot pushed out a glass ampoule with a combustible mixture. It flew along a steep trajectory to a distance of 300-350 m. Crashing when falling, the ampoule created a small but stable fire source, striking the enemy's manpower and setting fire to his dugouts. The consolidated ampulometric company under the command of Senior Lieutenant Starkov, which included 17 crews, fired 1,620 ampoules during the first two hours. " “Ampulo-makers have also moved here. Acting under the cover of infantry, they set fire to an enemy tank, two guns and several firing points. "

By the way, intense shooting with black powder cartridges inevitably created a thick layer of carbon deposits on the barrel walls. So after a quarter of an hour of such a cannonade, the ampoule-makers would probably have discovered that the ampoule was rolled into the barrel with more and more difficulty. Theoretically, before this, carbon deposits, on the contrary, would somewhat improve the obturation of the ampoules in the barrel, increasing the firing range of them. However, the usual marks of range on the sight bar, for sure, "floated". Banners and other tools and devices for cleaning ampulomet barrels were probably mentioned in the technical description ...

And here is a completely objective opinion of our contemporaries: “The calculation of the ampulomet was three people. The loading was carried out by two people: the first number of the calculation was inserted from the treasury of the bullet cartridge, the second was inserted into the barrel from the muzzle of the ampoule itself. " "Ampulothrowers were very simple and cheap" flamethrower mortars ", they were armed with special ampulometric platoons. The 1942 infantry combat manual mentions the ampulomet as a standard infantry firearm. In battle, the ampulomet often served as the nucleus of a group of tank destroyers. Its use in defense as a whole justified itself, while attempts to use it in the offensive led to large losses of crews due to the short firing range. True, they were not without success used by assault groups in urban battles - in particular, in Stalingrad. "

There are also memoirs of veterans. The essence of one of them boils down to the fact that at the beginning of December 1941 on the Western Front in one of the battalions of the 30th Army of Major General D.D. Lelyushenko was delivered 20 ampulomettes. The designer of this weapon came here, as well as the commander himself, who decided to personally test the new technology. In response to the comments of the designer on loading the ampoule gun, Leliushenko grumbled that everything hurts cunningly and for a long time, but german tank Will not wait ... At the first shot, the ampoule broke in the barrel of the ampoule gun, and the entire installation burned out. Lelyushenko, already with metal in his voice, demanded a second ampulomet. It all happened again. The general "got angry", switching to profanity, forbade the soldiers to use such an unsafe weapon for calculations and crushed the remaining ampoule guns with a tank.

Use of ARS-203 for filling ampoules of AZh-2 with chemical warfare agents. A bent over fighter pumps out excess liquid, standing near the tripod installs plugs on the AZ-2 filling necks. Photo of 1938

Quite a likely story, although not a very pleasant one in the general context. As if the ampoule throwers did not pass the factory and field tests ... Why could this happen? As a version: the winter of 1941 (all eyewitnesses mentioned this) was very frosty, and the glass ampoule became more fragile. Here, unfortunately, the respected veteran did not specify what material those ampoules were of. The difference in temperatures of thick-walled glass (local heating), which is fired when fired with a flame of high-powered gunpowder, can also affect. Obviously, in severe frost it was necessary to shoot only metal ampoules. But "in the hearts" of the general could easily and ride on ampoules!

Filling station ARS-203. Photo of 1938

Frontline spill fiery cocktail

It is only at first glance that the scheme for using the ampulomet in the troops seems primitively simple. For example, the calculation of the ampulo launcher in the combat position fired off the wearable ammunition and dragged the second ammunition ... What is easier - take it and shoot. Look, Senior Lieutenant Starkov's two-hour unit consumption exceeded one and a half thousand ampoules! But in fact, when organizing the supply of incendiary ampoules to the troops, it was necessary to solve the problem of transporting incendiary ammunition far from safe in handling from factories from the deep rear.

Tests of ampoules in the pre-war period showed that these ammunition, in a fully equipped form, can withstand transportation for no more than 200 km along peacetime roads in compliance with all the rules and with the complete exclusion of "road adventures". In wartime, things became much more complicated. But here, without a doubt, the experience of Soviet aviators came in handy, where ampoules were equipped at airfields. Before the mechanization of the process, the filling of ampoules, taking into account the unscrewing and tightening of the nozzle plug, required 2 man-hours per 100 pieces.

In 1938, for the Air Force of the Red Army at the 145th NKAP plant, a towed aircraft filling station ARS-203, made on a single-axle semitrailer, was developed and later adopted. A year later, the self-propelled ARS-204 entered service, but it was focused on servicing aircraft pouring devices, and we will not consider it. ARSs were mainly intended for filling chemical warfare agents into ammunition and insulated tanks, but for working with a ready-made self-igniting incendiary mixture, they turned out to be simply irreplaceable.

In theory, in the rear of each rifle regiment a small unit was supposed to work to equip ampoules with a mixture of KS. Without a doubt, it possessed the ARS-203 station. But KS was also not transported in barrels from factories, but was prepared on the spot. For this, in the front-line zone, any refined products (gasoline, kerosene, solarium) were used and according to the tables compiled by A.P. Ionov, added different amounts of a thickener to them. As a result, despite the difference in the initial components, a CS was obtained. Then it was obviously pumped into the ARS-203 tank, where the self-ignition component of the fire mixture was added.

However, the option of adding the component directly to the ampoules, and then pouring the KS liquid into them, is not excluded. In this case, the ARS-203, in general, was not so necessary. And an ordinary soldier's aluminum mug could serve as a dispenser. But such an algorithm required that the self-igniting component be inert for some time outdoors (for example, wet white phosphorus).

ARS-203 was specially developed for mechanization of the process of filling the ampoules of AZh-2 to the working volume in the field. On it, from a large reservoir, the liquid was first poured simultaneously into eight measuring tanks, and then eight ampoules were filled at once. Thus, in an hour it was possible to equip 300-350 ampoules, and after two hours of such work, the 700-liter reservoir of the station was emptied, and it was refilled with KS liquid. It was impossible to speed up the process of filling the ampoules: all overflows of liquids took place in a natural way, without pressurizing the container. The filling cycle of eight ampoules was 17-22 s, and 610 liters were pumped into the working capacity of the station using a Garda pump in 7.5-9 minutes.

The PRS station is ready to refuel four ampoules of AZh-2. The pedal is depressed, and the process is on! Refueling incendiary mixtures made it possible to do without a gas mask. Photo of 1942

Obviously, the experience of operating the ARS-203 in the ground forces turned out to be unexpected: the productivity of the station, oriented to the needs of the Air Force, was recognized as excessive, as, indeed, its dimensions, weight and the need for towing by a separate vehicle. The infantry needed something smaller, and in 1942 in the OKB-NKAP of the 455th plant "Kartukovtsy" developed a field filling station PRS. In its design, the measuring tanks were abolished, and the filling level of the opaque ampoules was controlled using the Glass SIG-Extremely simplified version of the ORS nal tube. for use in the field. Working capacity
the tank was 107 liters, and the mass of the entire station did not exceed 95 kg. The PRS was designed in a “civilized” version of the workplace on a folding table and in an extremely simplified version, with the installation of a working capacity “on stumps”. The productivity of the station was limited to 240 ampoules of AZh-2 per hour. Unfortunately, when the field tests of the PRS were completed, the ampoulometry in the Red Army had already been removed from service.

Russian reusable "Faustpatron"?

However, it would not be entirely correct to unconditionally classify the 125-mm ampulomet as an incendiary weapon. After all, no one dares to consider the barrel artillery system or the Katyusha MLRS as flamethrowers, which, if necessary, fired incendiary ammunition. By analogy with the use of aviation ampoules, the designers of the 145th plant suggested expanding the arsenal of ammunition for the ampoule gun through the use of modified Soviet anti-tank bombs PTAB-2.5 of cumulative action, created at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

In the book by E. Pyriev and S. Reznichenko "Bomber armament of Russian aviation in 1912-1945." the PTAB section says that small cumulative aerial bombs in the USSR were developed only in GSKB-47, TsKB-22 and in SKB-35. From December 1942 to April 1943, it was possible to design, test and work out a full program of 1.5-kg PTAB cumulative action. However, at the 145th plant I.I. Kartukov dealt with this problem much earlier, back in 1941. Their 2.5-kg ammunition was called the AFBM-125 aircraft high-explosive armor-piercing mine of 125 mm caliber.

Outwardly, such a PTAB strongly resembled Colonel Gronov's high-explosive bombs of small calibers during the First World War. Since the wings of the cylindrical empennage were spot-welded to the body of the aviation munition, it was not possible to do without a simple replacement of its empennage to use the mine in the infantry. The new mortar-type plumage was installed on the bombs with an additional propellant charge mounted in it in the capsule. The ammunition was fired as before, with a blank 12-gauge rifle cartridge. Thus, as applied to the ampulometric system, the system was obtained in a certain STpemina fBM. 125 without additional NI active-reactive. fuse contact fuse.

For quite a long time, the designers had to work on increasing the reliability of the cocking of the mine contact fuse on the trajectory.

Mine BFM-125 without additional fuse contact fuse.

Meanwhile, the problem is in the above-mentioned episode of 1941 with the commander of the 30th army D.D. Lelyushenko could also have arisen when firing early models of high-explosive armor-piercing mines FBM-125 from ampulometers. This is indirectly indicated by Leliushenko's grumbling: “Everything hurts is cunning and takes a long time, the German tank will not wait,” since the insertion of an ampoule and loading of a cartridge did not require any special tricks in a conventional ampulomet. In the case of using the FBM-125, before firing at the ammunition, it was necessary to unscrew the safety key, opening the fire to the powder pressing of the safety mechanism holding the inertial striker of the contact fuse in the rear position. For this, all such ammunition was supplied with a cardboard cheat sheet with the inscription "Turn out before firing", tied to the key.

The cumulative recess in the front of the mine was hemispherical, and its thin-walled steel lining rather formed a given configuration when filling explosives, rather than played the role of a shock core when cumulating a warhead of an ammunition. The documents indicated that the FBM-125, when fired from standard ampulometers, was designed to disable tanks, armored trains, armored vehicles, vehicles, as well as to destroy fortified firing points (bunkers, bunkers).

Armor plate 80 mm thick, confidently pierced by an FBM-125 mine during field tests.

The nature of the outlet of the same punched armor plate.

Range tests of the ammunition took place in 1941.They resulted in the launch of the mines into pilot production. Military tests of the FBM-125 were successfully completed in 1942. The developers suggested, if necessary, equip such mines with military chemicals irritating effect (chloroacetophenone or adamsite), but it did not come to that. In parallel with the FBM-125, the OKB-NKAP of the 455th plant also developed the BFM-125 armor-piercing fu-extinguishing mine. Unfortunately, its combat properties are not mentioned in the factory certificates.

Cover the infantry with smoke

In 1941, it passed field tests developed at the plant №145 named after. CM. Kirov aviation smoke bomb ADSh. It was intended for setting vertical masking (blinding the enemy) and poisonous smoke (shackling and exhausting the enemy's combat forces) curtains when dropping checkers from an aircraft. On airplanes, ADSh was loaded into ampoule-bomb cassettes, after removing the safety plugs of the fuses. Checkers poured out in one gulp when opening the doors of one of the sections of the cassette. Ampoule-bomb cassettes were also developed at the 145th plant for fighters, attack aircraft, long-range and short-range bombers.

The contact action checker fuse was already made with an all-blowing mechanism, which ensured its operation when the ammunition fell to the ground in any position. The fuse spring prevented the striker from piercing the igniter in case of insufficient overloads (when falling from a height of up to 4 m onto concrete) from being triggered by an accidental fall of the checker.

Probably, it is no coincidence that this ammunition also turned out to be made in a caliber of 125 mm, which, according to the assurances of the developers, made it possible to use the ADSh from standard ampulometers. By the way, when fired from an ampoule gun, the ammunition received an overload much greater than when falling from 4 m, which means that the checker began to smoke already in flight.

Even in the pre-war years, it was scientifically proven that it is much more effective to cover your troops if, in an attack on a firing point, it is it, and not your infantry, that is smoked. Thus, the ampulomet would be a very useful thing when, before the attack, it was required to throw several checkers a couple of hundred meters to the bunker or bunker. Unfortunately, it is not known whether ampoulo throwers were used at the fronts in this version ...

When firing heavy ADSh checkers from a 125-mm ampulo-gun, its sights could only be used with amendments. However, great shooting accuracy was not required in this case: one ADS created an obscure creeping cloud up to 100 m long.
an additional expelling charge was impossible, for shooting at the maximum distance it was required to use a steep trajectory at elevation angles close to 45 °.

Regimental campaigning amateur performance

The plot for this section of the article about the ampulomet was also borrowed by me from the Internet. Its essence consisted in the fact that one day the political officer, having come to the sappers in the battalion, asked who could make a propaganda mortar mine? Pavel Yakovlevich Ivanov volunteered. He found the tools at the site of a destroyed smithy, made the body of the ammunition from a block, adapting a small powder charge to explode it in the air, the fuse from a beak-ford cord, and the stabilizer from cans. However, the wooden mortar mine turned out to be light and sank slowly into the barrel without piercing the primer.

Ivanov reduced its diameter so that the air from the barrel came out more freely, and the primer stopped falling on the firing pin. In general, the craftsman did not sleep for days, but on the third day the mine flew and exploded. Leaflets circled over the enemy trenches. Later, he adapted an ampulomet for shooting wooden mines. And in order not to call back fire on his trenches, he carried it to the no-man's land or to the side. Result: German soldiers once came over to our side in a group, drunk, in broad daylight.

This story is also quite plausible. It is rather difficult to make an agitmina in a metal case from improvised means in the field, but from wood it is quite possible. In addition, such ammunition, according to common sense, should be non-lethal. Otherwise, what kind of agitation is there! But the factory propaganda mines and artillery shells were in metal cases. To a greater extent, so that they fly further and so as not to greatly violate the ballistics. However, before that, the designers of the ampoule thrower did not even think to enrich the arsenal of their brainchild with this kind of ammunition ...

charging, with a piston bolt. Firing mechanisms are similar in both caliber systems.
The Ampulomet easel mortars did not enter service. According to the classification of artillery systems, samples of both calibers can be attributed to hard-type mortars. Theoretically, the forces of recoil when firing high-explosive armor-piercing mines should not have increased in comparison with throwing ampoules. The mass of the FBM was greater than that of the AZh-2KS, but less than that of the ADSh. And the expelling charge is the same. However, despite the fact that the Ampulomet mortars fired at more flat trajectories than the classic mortars and bombers, the former were still much more "mortar" than the Katyusha guards mortars.

conclusions

So, the reason for the removal of ampulometry from the armament of the ground forces of the Red Army at the end of 1942 was officially their unsafe handling and use. But in vain: in front of our army was not only an offensive, but also numerous battles in settlements. It was there that would be fully useful
100-mm heavy anti-tank mortar in the process of loading.

By the way, the safety of using a backpack flamethrower in an offensive battle is also highly questionable. Nevertheless, they were returned to "service" and used until the end of the war. There are front-line memories of a sniper, where he claims that the enemy flamethrower is always visible from afar (a number of unmasking signs), so it is better to aim him at chest level. Then, from short distances, a bullet of a powerful rifle cartridge pierces right through both the body and the tank with the fire mixture. That is, the flamethrower and flamethrower "cannot be restored."
Exactly the same situation could be found in the calculation of the ampulomet when bullets or fragments hit the incendiary ampoules. Glass ampoules in general could be hit against each other by a shock wave from a close burst. And in general, the whole war is a very risky business ... And thanks to the "hussars of generals Lelyushenko" such hasty conclusions about the low quality and combat ineffectiveness of certain types of weapons were born. Recall, for example, the pre-war ordeals of the designers of the Katyusha MLRS, mortar armament, submachine guns, the T-34 tank, etc. Our gunsmith designers in the overwhelming majority were not amateurs in their field of knowledge and no less generals sought to bring victory closer. And they were "dipped" like kittens. The generals are also easy to understand - they needed reliable models of weapons and with "foolproof protection."

And then, the fond memories of the infantrymen about the effectiveness of Molotov cocktails against tanks look somehow illogical against the background of a very cool attitude towards ampulomettes. Both are weapons of the same order. Unless the ampoule was exactly twice as powerful, and it could be thrown 10 times further. Here it is not entirely clear why there were more complaints "in the infantry": to the ampulomet itself or to its ampoules?

External suspended non-dropable container ABK-P-500 for salvo use of small-caliber aerial bombs from high-speed and dive bombers. In the foreground are ampoules of AZh-2KS made of four spherical segments with edges sealed from the inside.

One of the options for a hand-held (non-Iranian) flamethrower developed by the designers of the plant №145 NKAP during the tests in 1942. At such a distance from this "aerosol can", perhaps only tar the hogs.

At the same time, the same "very dangerous" ampoules AZh-2KS in the Soviet assault aviation lasted in service at least until the end of 1944 - the beginning of 1945 (in any case, the assault aviation regiment of M.P. Odintsov used them already in the German territories by tank columns hiding in the forests). And this is on stormtroopers! With unarmored bomb bays! When from the ground all the enemy infantry beat them from anything! The pilots were well aware of what would happen if only one stray bullet hit the cartridge with ampoules, but, nevertheless, they flew. By the way, the timid mention on the Internet that ampoules were used in aviation when firing from such aircraft ampulometrs is absolutely not true.

In the first weeks of the war, the fronts suffered significant losses and accumulated in the troops of the border military districts in the pre-war years. Most of the artillery and ammunition factories were evacuated from the threatened areas to the east.

The supply of weapons and ammunition by military factories in the south of the country has ceased. All this significantly complicated the production of weapons and ammunition and the provision of them to the active army and new military formations. The shortcomings in the work of the Main Artillery Directorate also had a negative effect on the supply of weapons and ammunition to the troops. GAU did not always know exactly the state of security of the front troops, since strict reporting on this service had not been established before the war. An urgent report card for ammunition was introduced at the end., And for armaments - in April

Soon, changes were made to the organization of the Main Artillery Directorate. In July 1941, the Directorate for the supply of ground artillery weapons was formed, and on September 20 of the same year the post of chief of artillery of the Soviet Army was restored with the GAU subordinate to him. The chief of GAU became the first deputy chief of artillery of the Soviet Army. The adopted structure of the GAU did not change throughout the war and fully justified itself. With the introduction of the post of Chief of the Rear Services of the Soviet Army, close cooperation was established between the GAU, the headquarters of the Chief of the Rear Services of the Soviet Army and the Central Directorate of Military Communications.

The heroic labor of the working class, scientists, engineers and technicians at the military enterprises of the central and eastern regions of the country, the firm and skillful leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, local party organizations by the restructuring of the entire national economy on a war footing allowed the Soviet military industry to be released in the second half of 1941 30.2 thousand guns, including 9.9 thousand 76-mm and larger calibers, 42.3 thousand mortars (of which 19.1 thousand 82 mm and larger), 106.2 thousand machine guns , 89.7 thousand machine guns, 1.6 million rifles and carbines and 62.9 million shells, bombs and mines 215. But since these supplies of weapons and ammunition only partially covered the losses of 1941, the situation with the provision of troops to the current army armaments and ammunition continued to be tense. It took a tremendous strain from the military industry, the work of the central rear services, the artillery supply service of the GAU in order to meet the needs of the fronts for weapons, and especially for ammunition.

During the period of the defensive battle near Moscow, due to the current production, which was growing continuously in the eastern regions of the country, they were primarily provided with weapons of the reserve pool of the Supreme Command Headquarters - the 1st shock, 20th and 10th armies, formed in the interior of the country and transferred to the beginning of the counter-offensive near Moscow to the Western Front. Due to the current production of weapons, the needs of the troops and other fronts that participated in the defensive battle and the counteroffensive near Moscow were also satisfied.

Moscow factories carried out a great deal of work on the manufacture of various types of weapons in this difficult period for our country. As a result, the number of weapons in the Western Front by December 1941 for some of its types increased from 50-80 to 370-640 percent. A significant increase in armament was also in the troops of other fronts.

During the counter-offensive near Moscow, a massive repair of out-of-order weapons and military equipment was organized in military repair shops, at enterprises in Moscow and the Moscow region. And yet, the situation with the provision of troops during this period was so difficult that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief JV Stalin personally distributed anti-tank rifles, machine guns, anti-tank 76-mm regimental and divisional guns between the fronts.

With the entry into operation of military factories, especially in the Urals, in the Western and Eastern Siberia, in Kazakhstan, already in the second quarter of 1942, the supply of weapons and ammunition to the troops began to improve markedly. In 1942, the military industry supplied the front with tens of thousands of 76 mm and larger guns, over 100,000 mortars (82-120 mm), many millions of shells and mines.

In 1942, the main and most difficult task was to provide for the troops of the fronts operating in the Stalingrad region, in the great bend of the Don and in the Caucasus.

The consumption of ammunition in the defensive battle of Stalingrad was very high. So, for example, from July 12 to November 18, 1942, the troops of the Don, Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts spent: 7 610 thousand shells and mines, including about 5 million shells and mines by the troops of the Stalingrad Front 216.

Due to the enormous workload of railways with operational traffic, transports with ammunition moved slowly and were unloaded at the stations of the front-line railway section (Elton, Dzhanybek, Kaisatskaya, Krasny Kut). In order to quickly deliver ammunition to the troops, two automobile battalions were assigned to the artillery supply department of the Stalingrad Front, which, in an extremely limited time, were able to transport over 500 wagons of ammunition.

The provision of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the Stalingrad Front was complicated by the continuous bombing by the enemy of the crossings across the Volga. As a result of enemy air raids and shelling, the artillery depots of the front and armies were often forced to change their deployment. Echelons were unloaded only at night. In order to disperse supply railroad trains, ammunition was sent to army warehouses and their departments located near the railway, in small flights, 5-10 cars in each, and then to the troops in small car columns (10-12 vehicles), which usually followed different routes. This method of delivery ensured the safety of ammunition, but at the same time lengthened the delivery time for them to the troops.

The delivery of weapons and ammunition to the troops of other fronts operating in the Volga and Don areas during this period was less complicated and laborious. During the period of the defensive battle at Stalingrad, 5388 wagons of ammunition, 123 thousand rifles and machine guns, 53 thousand machine guns and 8 thousand guns were supplied to all three fronts.

Along with the current supply of troops, the rear services of the center, fronts and armies during the defensive battle at Stalingrad carried out the accumulation of weapons and ammunition. As a result of the work done, by the beginning of the counteroffensive, the troops were mainly provided with ammunition (Table 19).

Table 19

The provision of the troops of the three fronts with ammunition (in ammunition) as of November 19, 1942 218

Ammunition	Front
	Stalingrad	Donskoy	Southwestern
Rifle cartridges	3,0	1,8	3,2
Cartridges for pistols	2,4	2,5	1,3
Anti-tank rifle cartridges	1,2	1,5	1,6
Hand and anti-tank grenades	1,0	1,5	2,9
50mm mines	1,3	1,4	2,4
82 mm mines	1,5	0,7	2,4
120mm mines	1,2	1,3	2,7
Shots:
45 mm cannon	2,9	2,9	4,9
76-mm cannon regimental artillery	2,1	1,4	3,3
76-mm cannon divisional artillery	1,8	2,8	4,0
122 mm howitzer	1,7	0,9	3,3
122 mm cannon	0,4	2,2	—
152 mm howitzer	1,2	7,2	5,7
152-mm howitzer-cannon	1,1	3,5	3,6
203 mm howitzer	—	—	—
37-mm anti-aircraft	2,4	3,2	5,1
76 mm anti-aircraft	—	5,1	4,5
85 mm anti-aircraft	—	3,0	4,2

A great deal of work on providing troops with ammunition during this period was done by the chiefs of the artillery supply services of the fronts: Stalingrad - Colonel A.I. Markov, Donskoy - Colonel N.M. Bocharov, South-West - Colonel S.G. Algasov, as well as a special group of GAU headed by the deputy chief of GAU, Lieutenant General of Artillery K. R. Myshkov, who died on August 10, 1942 during an enemy air raid on Stalingrad.

Simultaneously with the battles that unfolded on the banks of the Volga and in the Don steppes, the battle for the Caucasus began in the vast area from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. The supply of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the Transcaucasian Front (Northern and Black Sea groups) was an even more difficult problem than at Stalingrad. The supply of weapons and ammunition was carried out in a roundabout way, that is, from the Urals and from Siberia through Tashkent, Krasnovodsk, Baku. Some transports went through Astrakhan, Baku or Makhachkala. The long route of transports with ammunition (5170-5370 km) and the need for repeated transshipment of goods from rail to water transport and vice versa, or from rail to road and mountain-pack, greatly increased the time of their delivery to front-line and army warehouses. For example, transport No. 83/0418, sent on September 1, 1942 from the Urals to the Transcaucasian Front, arrived at its destination only on December 1. Transport No. 83/0334 made the route from Eastern Siberia to Transcaucasia, equal to 7027 km. But, despite such huge distances, transports with ammunition regularly went to the Caucasus. For six months of hostilities, the Transcaucasian (North Caucasian) Front received about 2,000 wagons of ammunition 219.

The delivery of ammunition from the front and army depots to the troops defending the mountain passes and passes of the Caucasian ridge was very difficult. The main means of transportation here were army and troop pack companies. In the 20th Guards Rifle Division, which defended the Belorechensk direction, shells from Sukhumi to Sochi were fed by sea, then to the divisional warehouse - by car, and to the regimental points of combat power - by pack transport. For the 394th Infantry Division, ammunition was transported by U-2 aircraft from the Sukhumi airfield. In a similar way, ammunition was delivered for almost all divisions of the 46th Army.

The working people of Transcaucasia rendered great assistance to the front. Up to 30 mechanical factories and workshops in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were involved in the manufacture of cases for hand grenades, mines and medium-caliber shells. From October 1, 1942 to March 1, 1943, they manufactured 1.3 million cases of hand grenades, 1 million mines and 226 thousand shells of shells. The local industry of Transcaucasia produced in 1942 4294 50-mm mortars, 688 82-mm mortars, 46 492 220 machine guns.

The working class of besieged Leningrad labored heroically. The delivery of weapons and ammunition to the besieged city was extremely difficult, so their production on site was often critical. From September until the end of 1941 alone, the city's industry supplied the front with 12,085 submachine guns and signal pistols, 7682 mortars, 2,298 artillery pieces and 41 rocket launchers. In addition, the Leningraders produced 3.2 million shells and mines, over 5 million hand grenades.

Leningrad supplied weapons to other fronts as well. In the difficult days of November 1941, when the enemy was rushing to Moscow, by decision of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, 926 mortars and 431 76-mm regimental guns were sent to Moscow. Disassembled guns were loaded onto planes and sent to the Cherepovets station, where an artillery shop was equipped for their assembly. Then the assembled weapons were loaded onto platforms and transported by rail to Moscow. In the same period, Leningrad sent 39,700 76-mm armor-piercing shells to Moscow by air.

Despite the difficulties of the first period of the war, our industry steadily increased its output from month to month. In 1942, GAU received from military factories 125.6 thousand mortars (82-120 mm), 33.1 thousand 76 mm and larger guns without tank, 127.4 million shells without aviation and mines 221, 2069 thousand rockets 222. This made it possible to fully replenish the combat losses of weapons and ammunition consumption.

Providing the troops of the active army with weapons and ammunition remained difficult in the second period of the war, which was marked by the beginning of a powerful counteroffensive by Soviet troops near Stalingrad. By the beginning of the counteroffensive, the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts had 30,400 guns and mortars, including 16,755 units of 76 mm and over 223, about 6 million shells and mines, 380 million cartridges for small arms and 1.2 million hand grenades. The supply of ammunition from the central bases and warehouses of the GAU for the entire time of the counteroffensive and the elimination of the encircled enemy grouping was carried out continuously. From November 19, 1942 to January 1, 1943, the Stalingrad Front received 1,095 wagons of ammunition, Donskoy (from November 16, 1942 to February 2, 1943) - 1,460 wagons, South-West (from November 19, 1942 to January 1, 1942) - 1090 cars and the Voronezh Front (from December 15, 1942 to January 1, 1943) - 278 cars. In total, 3923 wagons of ammunition were supplied to four fronts for the period November 1942 - January 1943.

The total consumption of ammunition in the Battle of Stalingrad, starting from July 12, 1942, reached 9,539 wagons 224 and was unmatched in the history of previous wars. It amounted to a third of the ammunition consumption of the entire Russian army in the four years of the First World War, and twice the ammunition consumption of both belligerents at Verdun.

A huge amount of weapons and ammunition had to be supplied during the second period of the war to the Transcaucasian and North Caucasian Fronts, which liberated the North Caucasus from the Nazi troops.

Thanks to the effective measures of the Communist Party, the Soviet government, the State Defense Committee, local party and Soviet bodies, the heroic labor of the working class in 1942, the production of weapons and ammunition increased significantly. This made it possible to increase their supplies to the troops. The increase in the number of weapons in the front troops at the beginning of 1943 in comparison with 1942 is shown in Table. 20 225.

Table 20

The hostilities that unfolded in 1943 posed new, even more complex tasks for the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army in the timely accumulation and current supply of the front troops with weapons and ammunition.

The volume of deliveries of weapons and ammunition especially increased during the preparation for the battle of Kursk. Between March and July 1943, over half a million rifles and machine guns, 31.6 thousand light and heavy machine guns, 520 large-caliber machine guns, 21.8 thousand anti-tank rifles, 12 326 guns and mortars were sent to the fronts from the central bases and warehouses of the GAU , or a total of 3100 wagons of weapons 226.

In preparation for the Battle of Kursk, the artillery supply agencies of the center, fronts and armies already had a certain amount of experience in planning to supply the troops of the active army with weapons and ammunition. It was carried out as follows. Every month, the General Staff issued a directive, which indicated which front, in which queue, how much ammunition (in ammunition) and when to send. On the basis of these instructions, time sheets of urgent reports from the fronts and their applications, the GAU planned to send ammunition to the troops of the active army, based on their availability at the bases and warehouses of the NCO, production capabilities within a month, the security and needs of the fronts. When GAU did not have the necessary resources, it, in agreement with General Staff made adjustments to the established volume of ammunition distribution. The plan was considered and signed by the commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army, Colonel-General, then Chief Marshal of Artillery N.N. Voronov, his deputy - Chief of GAU, General ND Yakovlev, and presented to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for approval.

On the basis of this plan, the organizational and planning department of the GAU (headed by General P.P. Volkotrubenko) reported data on the release and dispatch of ammunition to the fronts and gave orders to the Ammunition Supply Directorate. The latter, together with TsUPVOSO, planned the dispatch of transports in terms of five days and informed the fronts of the numbers of transports, places and dates of their dispatch. As a rule, the dispatch of transports with ammunition to the address of the fronts began on the 5th and ended on the 25th of each month. This method of planning and sending ammunition to the fronts from the central bases and warehouses of NPOs remained until the end of the war.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk (on July 1, 1943), the Central and Voronezh fronts had 21,686 guns and mortars (without 50-mm mortars), 518 installations rocket artillery, 3489 tanks and self-propelled guns 227.

The large number of weapons in the troops of the fronts operating on the Kursk Bulge, and the intensity of hostilities in the planned offensive operations demanded an increase in the supply of ammunition to them. During April - June 1943, the Central, Voronezh and Bryansk fronts received over 4.2 million shells and mines, about 300 million small arms ammunition and almost 2 million hand grenades (over 4 thousand cars). By the beginning of the defensive battle, the fronts were provided with: 76-mm rounds - 2.7-4.3 ammunition; 122 mm howitzer rounds - 2.4-3.4; 120 mm mines - 2.4-4; large-caliber ammunition - 3-5 ammunition sets 228. In addition, during the Battle of Kursk, 4,781 wagons (over 119 full-weight trains) of various types of ammunition were supplied from central bases and warehouses to these fronts. The average daily supply of them to the Central Front was 51 cars, to Voronezh - 72 cars and Bryansk - 31 cars 229.

The consumption of ammunition in the Battle of Kursk was especially high. In the period 5-12 July 1943 alone, the troops of the Central Front, repelling the fierce tank attacks of the enemy, used up 1,083 wagons of ammunition (135 wagons per day). The bulk falls on the 13th Army, which in eight days used up 817 wagons of ammunition, or 100 wagons per day. In just 50 days of the Battle of Kursk, three fronts spent about 10,640 wagons of ammunition (not counting rockets), including 733 wagons of ammunition for small arms, 70 wagons of ammunition for anti-tank rifles, 234 wagons of hand grenades, 3369 wagons of mines, 276 wagons shots of anti-aircraft artillery and 5950 carriages of shots of ground artillery 230.

Artillery supply in the Battle of Kursk was led by the chiefs of the artillery supply service of the fronts: Central - Colonel V.I. Shebanin, Voronezh - Colonel T.M. Moskalenko, Bryansk - Colonel M.V. Kuznetsov.

In the third period of the war, the provision of front troops with weapons and ammunition improved significantly. Already by the beginning of this period, the Soviet military industry could uninterruptedly supply them to the troops of the active army and new military formations of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. At the bases and warehouses of the GAU, significant stocks of guns, mortars, and especially small arms were created. In this regard, in 1944 the production of small arms and ground artillery pieces decreased somewhat. If in 1943 the military industry supplied the Soviet Army with 130.3 thousand guns, then in 1944 - 122.5 thousand. The supply of rocket launchers also decreased (from 3330 in 1943 to 2564 in 1944). Due to this, the production of tanks and self-propelled guns continued to grow (29 thousand in 1944 against 24 thousand in 1943).

At the same time, the supply of ammunition to the troops of the active army continued to remain tense, especially with shells of 122 mm caliber and above, due to their high consumption. The total stocks of these ammunition decreased: for 122-mm rounds - by 670 thousand, for 152-mm shells - by 1.2 million, and for 203-mm shells - by 172 thousand 231

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the State Defense Committee, having considered the situation with the production of acutely deficient shells on the eve of decisive offensive operations, set the military industry the task of a radical revision of production programs for 1944 towards a sharp increase in the production of all types of ammunition, and especially scarce ones.

By decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee, the production of ammunition in 1944 was significantly increased compared to 1943: especially 122-mm and 152-mm shells, 76-mm - by 3,064 thousand (9 percent), M-13 - by 385.5 thousand (19 percent) and M-31 shells - by 15.2 thousand (4 percent) 232. This made it possible to provide the troops of the fronts with all types of ammunition in offensive operations of the third period of the war.

On the eve of the Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts had about 50 thousand guns and mortars, 2 million rifles and machine guns, 10 thousand 233 machine guns, 12.2 million shells and mines, 700 million ammunition for small arms and 5 million hand grenades, which amounted to 1-2 front-line ammunition. During the operation, these fronts were supplied with more than 1,300 wagons of all types of ammunition 234. There were no interruptions in their supply. However, due to the beginning of the early spring thaw on military highways and military supply routes, the movement of motor transport became impossible, and the fronts began to experience great difficulties in delivering ammunition to the troops and on firing positions artillery. It was necessary to use tractors, and in some cases to attract soldiers and the local population on impassable sections of roads to carry shells, cartridges, grenades. Transport aircraft were also used to deliver ammunition to the cutting edge.

To provide ammunition for the tank formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front, advancing in the operational depth of the enemy's defense, Po-2 aircraft were used. On February 7 and 8, 1944, from the Fursy airfield, they delivered 4.5 million cartridges, 5.5 thousand hand grenades, 15 thousand 82- and 120-mm mines and 10 thousand 76- and 122 mm shells. Every day, 80-85 aircraft delivered ammunition to tank units, making three to four flights a day. In total, over 400 tons of 235 ammunition were delivered by aircraft to the advancing troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Despite the great difficulties with the supply, the units, units and formations that participated in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation were fully provided with ammunition. Moreover, their consumption in this operation was relatively small. In total, the troops of the two fronts spent only about 5.6 million rounds, including 400 thousand anti-aircraft artillery shells, 2.6 million ground artillery shells and 2.56 million mines.

The provision of troops with ammunition and weapons was led by the chiefs of artillery supply of the fronts: 1st Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery N.Ye. Manzhurin, 2nd Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery P.A.Rozhkov.

A huge amount of weapons and ammunition was required during the preparation and conduct of the Belarusian offensive operation, one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War. To fully equip the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts, which took part in it, in May - July 1944 were supplied: 6370 guns and mortars, over 10 thousand machine guns and 260 thousand rifles and 236 machine guns. By the beginning of the operation, the fronts had 2-2.5 ammunition for small arms, 2.5-5 ammunition for mines, 2.5-4 ammunition for anti-aircraft rounds, 3-4 ammunition for 76-mm shells, 2.5-5 , 3 ammunition load for 122-mm howitzer shells, 3.0-8.3 ammunition load for 152-mm shells.

Such a high supply of ammunition to the front forces has never been seen in any of the previously conducted strategic offensive operations. For the shipment of weapons and ammunition to the fronts of the base, warehouses and arsenals of NGOs worked at maximum load. The personnel of all levels of the rear, the workers of the railway transport did everything in their power to deliver weapons and ammunition to the troops in a timely manner.

However, in the course of the Byelorussian operation, due to the rapid detachment of troops from the bases, as well as due to insufficiently high rates of restoration of railroad communications heavily destroyed by the enemy, the supply of ammunition to the fronts was often complicated. Automobile transport worked with great stress, but could not alone cope with the huge volume of supply in the operational and military rear.

Even the relatively frequent advance of the head departments of front-line and army artillery depots did not solve the problem of timely delivery of ammunition to troops advancing in wooded and swampy terrain, in off-road conditions. The scattering of ammunition stocks along the front line and in depth also had a negative effect. For example, two warehouses of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front on August 1, 1944 were located at six points at a distance of 60 to 650 km from the front line. A similar situation was in a number of armies of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts. The advancing units and formations could not raise all the stocks of ammunition accumulated in them during the preparation of the operation. The military councils of the fronts and armies were forced to allocate a large number of motor vehicles for the collection and delivery of the ammunition remaining in the rear to the troops. For example, the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front allocated 150 vehicles for this purpose, and the head of the rear of the 50th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front - 60 vehicles and a working company of 120 people. On the 2nd Belorussian Front, in the Krichev and Mogilev regions, by the end of July 1944, ammunition stocks were at 85 points, and at the initial positions of the 1st Belorussian Front troops - at 100. The command had to transfer them by airplanes 237. Leaving ammunition at the initial lines, firing positions of artillery and on the way of advancement of units and formations led to the fact that the troops began to experience a shortage of them, although there was a sufficient amount of ammunition on the register in the fronts and armies.

The total consumption of ammunition of all calibers during the Belarusian strategic offensive operation was significant. But if we proceed from the large availability of weapons, then it was generally relatively small. During the operation, 270 million (460 cars) of ammunition for small arms, 2 832 thousand (1700 cars) mines, 478 thousand (115 cars) anti-aircraft artillery rounds, about 3434.6 thousand (3656 cars) ground rounds artillery 238.

The supply of troops with ammunition during the Belarusian offensive operation was led by the chiefs of artillery supply of the fronts: 1st Baltic - Major General of Artillery A.P. Baikov, 3rd Belorussian - Major General of Engineering Service A.S. Volkov, 2nd Belorussky - Engineer-Colonel E. N. Ivanov and 1st Belorussky - Major General of Engineering Service V. I. Shebanin.

The consumption of ammunition in the Lvov-Sandomierz and Brest-Lublin offensive operations was also significant. In July and August, the 1st Ukrainian Front used 4,706 wagons, and the 1st Belorussian Front - 2372 wagons of ammunition. As in the Belorussian operation, the supply of ammunition was fraught with serious difficulties due to the high pace of the offensive of the troops and the large gap between them from the artillery depots of the fronts and armies, poor road conditions and the large volume of supplies, which fell on the shoulders of road transport.

A similar situation developed in the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts, which took part in the Jassy-Kishinev operation. Before the start of the offensive, from two to three ammunition sets were concentrated directly in the troops. But in the course of breaking through the enemy's defenses, they were not completely used up. The troops moved quickly forward and took with them only the ammunition that their road transport could lift. A significant amount of ammunition remained in divisional depots on the right and left banks of the Dniester. Due to the great length of the military routes, their supply stopped two days later, and five to six days after the start of the offensive, the troops began to feel a great need for ammunition, despite their low consumption. After the decisive intervention of the military councils and bodies of the rear of the fronts, all vehicles were mobilized, and soon the situation was corrected. This made it possible to successfully complete the Jassy-Kishinev operation.

During the offensive operations of 1945, there were no particular difficulties in providing the troops with weapons and ammunition. The total stocks of ammunition on January 1, 1945 against 1944 increased: for mines - by 54 percent, for anti-aircraft artillery shots - by 35, for ground artillery shots - by 11 percent 239. Thus, in the final period of the war of the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany not only fully met the needs of the troops of the active army, but also managed to create additional stocks of ammunition at the front and army warehouses 1st and 2nd Far Eastern and Transbaikal fronts.

The beginning of 1945 was marked by two major offensive operations - East Prussian and Vistula-Oder. During their training, the troops were fully provided with weapons and ammunition. It did not present any serious difficulties in their transportation during operations due to the presence of a well-developed network of railways and highways.

The East Prussian operation, which lasted about three months, was distinguished by the highest consumption of ammunition in the entire Great Patriotic War. In the course of its operation, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts used up 15,038 wagons of ammunition (in the Vistula-Oder operation, 5382 wagons).

After the successful completion of the Vistula-Oder offensive operation, our troops reached the line of the r. Oder (Odra) and began to prepare for the storming of the main citadel of Nazism - Berlin. In terms of the level of equipment of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts with military equipment and weapons, the Berlin offensive operation surpasses all offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet rear and the rear of the Armed Forces itself well provided the troops with everything necessary to deliver the last crushing blow to Nazi Germany. In preparation for the operation, over 2 thousand guns and mortars, almost 11 million shells and mines, over 292.3 million cartridges and about 1.5 million hand grenades were sent to the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. By the beginning of the operation, they had over 2 million rifles and machine guns, over 76 thousand machine guns and 48 thousand guns and mortars 240. During the Berlin operation (from April 16 to May 8), 1945, the fronts received 7.2 million (5924 cars) of shells and mines, which (taking into account reserves) fully ensured the consumption and made it possible to create the necessary reserve of them by the end of the operation.

In the final operation of the Great Patriotic War, over 10 million shells and mines, 392 million cartridges and almost 3 million hand grenades were used up - a total of 9,715 wagons of ammunition. In addition, 241,700 (1920 wagons) of missiles were used up 241. Ammunition during preparation and during the operation was transported along the railways of the Union and Western European gauge, and from here to the troops - by front-line and army vehicles. At the junctions of the railways of the Union and the Western European gauge, the transshipment of ammunition in the areas of specially created transshipment bases was widely practiced. It was a rather laborious and difficult job.

In general, the supply of ammunition to the front troops in 1945 significantly exceeded the level of the previous years of the Great Patriotic War. If in the fourth quarter of 1944, 31,736 wagons of ammunition (793 trains) arrived at the fronts, then in four months of 1945 - 44,041 wagons (1101 trains). To this figure it is necessary to add the supply of ammunition to the country's air defense forces, as well as to the marines. Taking into account its total amount of ammunition sent from central bases and warehouses to the troops of the army in the four months of 1945, amounted to 1327 trains 242.

The domestic military industry and the rear services of the Soviet Army successfully coped with the task of supplying the troops of the fronts and new formations with weapons and ammunition in the last war.

The active army used up over 10 million tons of ammunition during the war. As you know, the military industry supplied individual elements of the shots to the artillery bases. In total, about 500 thousand cars of these elements were delivered during the war, which were assembled into ready-made shells and sent to the fronts. This colossal and complex work was carried out at the GAU artillery bases mainly by women, old people and teenagers. They stood at the conveyors for 16-18 hours a day, did not leave the shops for several days, ate and rested right there, at the machines. Their heroic, selfless labor during the war years will never be forgotten by the grateful socialist Fatherland.

Summing up the results of the work of the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army in the years of the last war, it should be emphasized once again that the basis of this type of material support for the Armed Forces was the industry, which during the war years supplied the active army with several million units of small arms, hundreds of thousands of guns and mortars, hundreds of millions shells and mines, tens of billions of rounds. Along with the steady growth in the mass production of weapons and ammunition, a number of qualitatively new models of ground and anti-aircraft artillery were created, new models of small arms were developed, as well as subcaliber and cumulative projectiles. All these weapons were successfully used by Soviet troops in the operations of the Great Patriotic War.

As for the import of weapons, it was very insignificant and, in fact, did not have great influence to equip the Soviet troops. In addition, imported weapons were inferior to Soviet weapons in terms of their tactical and technical data. Several anti-aircraft artillery systems obtained by import in the third period of the war were only partially used in the air defense forces, and the 40-mm anti-aircraft guns remained at the GAU bases until the end of the war.

The good quality of weapons and ammunition supplied by the domestic military industry of the Soviet Army during the war years was largely ensured by a wide network of military representatives (military acceptance) of GAU. Of no small importance in the timely supply of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the active army was the fact that it was based on strictly planned production and supply. Establishing, since 1942, a system of accounting and reporting of weapons and ammunition in the troops, armies and in the fronts, as well as planning their delivery to the fronts, the artillery supply service has continuously improved and improved the organizational forms, methods and methods of work to support the troops of the active army. The rigid centralization of leadership from top to bottom, close and continuous interaction of the artillery supply service of the center, fronts and armies, formations and units with other rear services, and especially with the rear headquarters and the military communications service, the intense work of all modes of transport made it possible to provide the troops of the fronts and new formations of the Headquarters The Supreme High Command of Armaments and Ammunition. In the Main Artillery Directorate, which worked under the direct supervision of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, a harmonious system of systematic and purposeful supply of troops with weapons and ammunition was formed, corresponding to the nature of the war, its scope and methods of warfare. This system fully and completely justified itself throughout the war. Uninterrupted supply of the army with weapons and ammunition was achieved thanks to the enormous organizational and creative activity of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, the Soviet government, the Supreme Command Headquarters, the efficient work of the USSR State Planning Committee, workers of the defense people's commissariats and all links in the rear of the Soviet Army, the selfless and heroic labor of the working class ...