Our son of a bitch. 'Our son of a bitch' Of course a son of a bitch but ours
One of the biggest paradoxes of the "Schellenberg version" lies in the fact that from the very beginning it had a powerful potential for instant exposure as a fake of British intelligence. And in a timely manner, our researchers should pay close attention to this paradox, this version would not have been around the world for almost half a century, and even in the status of almost a priori reliable. But, unfortunately, this did not happen. And it could not have happened, because the best aces of Soviet intelligence were arrested by Khrushchev on false charges. But it was they, these aces of not only the domestic, but also the world intelligence community, who were not only a living embodiment of the traditions of the Soviet special services, but were also living carriers of knowledge of pre-war, military and post-war intelligence affairs and the nuances of most of the most complex vicissitudes of the deadly struggle with the strongest special services the world. And if people like Pavel Sudoplatov, Naum Eitingon and many of their colleagues would have remained in their high posts in intelligence, I dare to assure you that there would have been no stone unturned from the "Schellenberg version" already in 1956. But, alas ...
And the incredible power of the "Schellenberg version" exposure potential consists of three main "charges":
First, after a fifth of a century, the "version" tightly fits with the content not only of the charges brought against the military in 1937, but also with the "version of Krivitsky" - the same characters, the same "technology" of presentation, the same the same "version", the same political and geopolitical conclusions from it, etc. This does not happen in reality and, more precisely, it has the right to exist only in one case - if they used some that were impeccable from any, most picky point of view. and the same archival documents. But this is not even in sight.
Human memory, albeit the head of intelligence of a large state, but surviving a fatal defeat, collapse and national catastrophe, captivity, interrogation, humiliation, poverty, illness, persecution and imprisonment, is physically unable to provide such an accuracy of "docking". All the more so dubious, from the point of view of impeccability and reliability in the opinion of British intelligence officers from 1948, as Schellenberg's memory. Even if we assume a hypothetical version that Schellenberg actually sat down to write his memoirs immediately after the war, still a whole decade separated his memory from the "Tukhachevsky case". It was oversaturated with an astronomical number of events, problems and tasks that the ex-chief spy of Nazi intelligence faced, as its head, during the total war of Germany against the whole world.
When intelligence officers do write their own memoirs, they - and this is an almost ubiquitous "iron rule" - "refresh" their memory by referring to the archives of their special services. Take a look at any memoirs - there are a lot of them now published - at least of our intelligence officers, and in any of them you will see both direct links to the archives, including with the indication of even the numbers of archival files, and the argumentation clearly verified by the archives. This is an unwritten rule for all memoirists, especially those from the special services. Schellenberg was in captivity, then served a sentence, and who, in that case, "refreshed" his memory? Moreover, documents from the archives of the Reich, when all the intelligence services of the member countries of the anti-Hitler coalition were chasing these archives. As mentioned above, Schellenberg personally did not write anything in terms of memoirs and became a "memoirist" more than four years after his death by the "grace" of the same British intelligence.
Secondly, to an even greater extent, the power of the potential for exposure determines the characteristic manifestation of the "handwriting" of British intelligence in the conduct of global intrigues of influence - the massive use of extremely effective and effective both in propaganda terms and in terms of preventing any attempts to verify the reception: after all, Schellenberg's “memoirs” are the “memoirs” of the deceased, the characters and sources are also the dead. Such main characters of Schellenberg's "version", such as himself, his chief Heydrich, Hitler, Benesh, Skoblin, Stalin, Yezhov, military conspirators, and even often emerging in a roundabout way as allegedly one of the sources of confirmation of the "version" former assistant of Heydrich Hermann Behrens and others were dead by the time the "memoirs" came out. And often referred to as an allegedly important source of SS Alfred Naujoks, escaping from captivity, for a long time completely disappeared from sight, although he allegedly published some kind of book himself (although at the end of his life Naujoks returned to Germany and became a successful businessman, died 4 April 1960).
And there is no one to ask, and the paper for them will endure forever. All the more so with regard to the Nazis: well, would it ever occur to anyone to intercede for these monsters, and indeed to stir up this matter ?! Greatly conceived, isn't it! Even in the form of corpses, the Nazis still carry out the faithful and necessary service of "good old" England!
Indeed, J. Stalin and W. Churchill were right when they uttered practically at the same time in 1943:
W. Churchill - “The Truth About War Is So Precious That It Should Be Protected By Bodyguards From Lies”;
I. Stalin - "The truth is guarded by battalions of lies."
And the truth about the Permanent World War against Russia - even more so.
But the "valiant" British intelligence officers themselves left in front of everyone the most accurate "directions" on how to calmly walk between the Scylla of Nazism condemned by mankind and Charybdis of the danger of involuntary intercession. And the essence of these "directions" is that "according to Schellenberg" it turns out that, although with the help of compromising evidence, it was not even the Gestapo that "surrendered" the military to reprisals, but the General Directorate of Security of the NSDAP (hereinafter GUB NSDAP). But why should it have to get involved in such matters - after all, this is the competence of only and only military intelligence, and even then with the sanction of the General Staff!
Work against the high military command, and even more so its compromise before the higher authorities of the opposite state, in no country in the world and at any time has not been carried out and is not carried out without preliminary and careful coordination with the leadership of the General Staff and the military intelligence of their country. After all, they have their own, professional interests in this area, which in this area are priority in relation to everyone else. Remember at least our operations during the Great Patriotic War... For example, the strategic radio games "Monastyr" and "Berezina" (perfectly described in the memoirs of P. A. Sudoplatov) - they were coordinated with the General Staff of our armed forces, with the exception, of course, of purely operational intelligence issues. Or, more closely to the topic of our investigation, Operation Trust (or Syndicate), according to which Tukhachevsky's involvement in the anti-Soviet underground was legendary in the 1920s, which many usually refer to as the source of the resulting compromising evidence in relation to the marshal. Indeed, in this operation, the involvement of him and a number of other persons from among the military was directly coordinated with the command of the Red Army and the General Staff.
The main one, "according to Schellenberg", the role of the NSDAP GUB in this operation is all the more surprising, given that in practice, between the secret services of the Third Reich - in the person of the Abwehr (military intelligence and counterintelligence) and the NSDAP GUB (first of all, the VI Directorate - foreign intelligence) - the "Declaration of 10 principles" was in effect, according to which both sides pledged not to interfere in each other's affairs, which were outlined by this declaration as follows: the military sphere is entirely behind the Abwehr, the political sphere is behind the GUB NSDAP. Moreover, at the very moment when, according to the "Schellenberg version", the head of the NSDAP GUB Heydrich had the idea of compromising the Soviet military leaders, this very declaration had just been signed and the ink had not yet dried on it. Below we will dwell on this in more detail.
In addition, it should be borne in mind that the beginning of the story itself with the declaration was laid by the oral agreements between Canaris and Heydrich in 1935.
Naturally, Canaris and Heydrich were not going to honestly and scrupulously follow the meaning, spirit and letter of this declaration in everything - this, in principle, does not happen in the communities of special services by definition. However, it was simply impossible to carry out such a grandiose operation with gigantic military-political consequences, bypassing the all-powerful Abwehr in the 30s, headed by Canaris, who enjoyed Hitler's full confidence, and the General Staff, which was then headed by General Beck himself.
Meanwhile, in this whole story in the "Schellenberg version" Canaris and the General Staff are presented as almost innocent lambs. Like, the Gestapo swooped in, stole some documents (including from Canaris, and at the same time in the military department), set a fire to cover their tracks, and they were like that. And then they stamped the forgeries and sold them to Stalin for as much as three million rubles in gold. Nonsense, and what a nonsense! Just think - what kind of security was there in the Ministry of War, including in the Abwehr itself, in order to get in there so calmly, steal documents and even start a fire so that no one would find any traces ?! What's the point in this tale? None. Just for the entourage. Or with these three million rubles in gold, because none of those who made up this tale even thought that 3 million rubles in gold is 300 thousand gold pieces, because from the end of the 19th century until the collapse of the NEP in the USSR, no other gold coins were minted in Russia. And in this case, if according to the tsar's chervonets - and this is 7.74 grams of gold - then 2322 kilograms of gold, if according to the Soviet - 8.6 grams of gold - and even 2580 kilograms. Someone should have realized that there are no such wallets in the world where one could cram up to 2.5 thousand kg of gold and dangle with such a wallet across the border! Not to mention the fact that to transport such a wallet, a powerful team of at least 10 heavyweight weightlifters, or even more, was needed, because no emissary of Stalin, no matter how you order him, could ever lift such a wallet in his life.
But it would be okay if only that, otherwise someone from the compilers of the "Schellenberg version" came up with the idea that these three million rubles in gold, that is, by definition, metal money, the emissary of Stalin gave out, it turns out, with high denomination paper bills, numbers which were rewritten, which is why the German agents in the USSR subsequently collapsed, since they were paid precisely from this money. A real fool came up with this, because, firstly, or three million rubles in gold, or just three million rubles - there is simply no third. Secondly, what kind of strongman-emissary Stalin was - a super-world record holder in weight lifting. Thirdly, and where did the Gestapo find such a press knife, under which they let three million rubles in gold with numbers, which has never happened in banking since the creation of the world.
Fourth, what a fool one had to be to write that agents were paid in large denomination money, which is not done by any intelligence agency in the world when issuing cash to agents, not to mention giving agents money from those resources that a priori exposed by enemy counterintelligence. This, at least, means that the one who stuck this passage into the "Schellenberg version" never worked in real intelligence in his life, especially with agents. That, as we will see a little later, was in fact.
Meanwhile, in fact, everything was much simpler and more natural, because everything rests on the figure of Heydrich. The head of the RSHA, Reinhard Heydrich, was killed at the brutal insistence of British intelligence. But the point is that when it came to the implementation of Operation Anthropoid - the assassination of Heydrich in Czechoslovakia in 1942 - the militants of the illegal residency of the Czechoslovak military intelligence came out against. They rightly believed that the murder of such a high-ranking Nazi would lead to extremely negative consequences for the civilian population of Czechoslovakia. That is why they turned both to their leaders and through them to the leadership of British intelligence with a request to cancel Operation Anthropoid. However, London in the most rude and harsh form replied that they must carry out this operation without fail. Militants of the illegal residency of the Czechoslovak military intelligence carried out this order, staged an attempt on Heydrich's life, but in reality he died not from wounds, but from banal sepsis. It is clear that the Nazis took revenge on the civilian population of Czechoslovakia for Heydrich in the most brutal way. But the world-famous tragedy of the Czech village of Lidice burned down together with its population is on the conscience of not only the Nazis, but also personally of the then head of British intelligence Stuart Menzies.
However, in the name of what or who, with such an unprecedentedly tough demand for the unconditional destruction of even a high-ranking Nazi, Heydrich, illegal, as the British rumor claimed of those years, the son of King Edward VII (died 1910) - Stuart Menzies - deliberately did not only innocent people, but after all, citizens who did not have any relation to this matter, albeit a union, but nevertheless a foreign state? Surprisingly enough, back in 1942, the answer to this question, moreover, from the mouth of Stuart Menzies himself, managed to get an outstanding Soviet intelligence officer Kim Philby, who later himself almost headed MI6. Now it is no longer a secret to anyone that Menzies maintained personal contact with Admiral Canaris and even during World War II periodically met with him in Switzerland and Sweden (by the way, behind Canaris's liaison in Switzerland - the wife of the deceased Polish military attaché Galina Szymanski - Apparently, the Soviet intelligence also kept an eye on it). After one of such meetings, Menzies gave the order to prepare the assassination of Heydrich by the hands of militants of the Czechoslovak military intelligence, whose headquarters, led by F. intelligence to London).
Formally, the order to liquidate Heydrich was linked to the fact that he personally developed and carried out through Hitler's approval a plan for the “final” solution of the “Jewish question” in occupied Europe, discussed at the Wannsee Conference at the end of January 1942. Kim Philby was among those whom this the order concerned in the first place, and therefore he proposed at the same time to eliminate Canaris himself (a thought quite appropriate during such a war). However, in response, I heard the harsh words of S. Menzies: "I do not want any action taken against the admiral." As a result, Menzies actually admitted that there was an unspoken connection between him and Canaris and, moreover, that the question of the destruction of Heydrich in the Czech Republic arose clearly on the initiative of Canaris himself, and he, Stuart Menzies, the head of British intelligence, guaranteed him the satisfaction of his unusual request. Of course, one should not rush to conclude from this that Canaris was a trivial MI6 agent - not the case and the wrong rank, and the British themselves are sophisticated professionals enough not to demand a cooperation agreement from the admiral.
Based on what has been written both in foreign and in our literature, we can confidently characterize Canaris' status in the pairing with Menzies as “informing proactively in the order of consulting an proactive agent of proactive influence”, of course, pro-Western, more precisely, in the format of pro-Western anti-Nazism. It turned out a little long, but it completely coincides with all the published data on this score.
... This, incidentally, is by no means uncommon in the invisible world of intelligence communities, especially when working with representatives of the elite of the ruling circles of a particular country. As a matter of fact, the agents of influence, which, as a rule, are also superbly informed, are extremely dangerous, because they work mainly without written formalization of relations with foreign intelligence (there are, of course, exceptions, but only those that confirm the rule), and if this is an "initiative agency of influence", then the degree of its danger increases many times over. It is extremely difficult to deal with it, because the line between sympathy and the provision of targeted influence by order in the legislation of almost all countries of the world is so fragile and unstable that it is never possible to bring anyone to court ...
The reason that prompted Canaris to turn to Menzies with a request (or a hint) for such a service was that the admiral's old enemy - at that moment the head of the RSHA Reinhard Heydrich literally "hung" on his "tail", quite justifiably, almost from the very first days of Canaris's tenure as head of the Abwehr, suspecting him of links with British intelligence. Despite the fact that the inveterate Nazi Reinhard Heydrich has long hated Canaris (this story has been described many times in the literature and there is no point in repeating it), he was an excellent counterintelligence agent, especially in terms of political investigation and counter-espionage. By the way, Heydrich quickly enough collected a voluminous dossier on the "cunning Greek", which concentrated numerous data indicating that Canaris was almost initially, that is, from January 1935, when he was appointed head of the Abwehr , was in operational contact with British intelligence.
A priori, it is believed that S. Menzies and V. Canaris were nodding acquaintances since the First World War. In 1934, contact with Canaris was established (often they write that they were "restored") by the British naval intelligence agent in Spain, Juan March, and the famous arms dealer, who was closely associated with the ICU Basil Zakharov, since the time of the First World War. Contact with Canaris was kept in the field of interpersonal contacts, provided that each of the parties knew perfectly well what the counterpart was. Obviously, this is why MI6 regarded Canaris as "Dormant agent".
Moreover, Heydrich's materials convincingly testified that Canaris, both himself personally and through a network of specially substituted SIS officers and agents of the Abwehr, transmits the most important information to the British. The "cunning Greek", knowing perfectly not only the rules of the Nazi "politeness", but also the laws of the secret services of the Third Reich, no less quickly compiled a voluminous dossier on Heydrich. It convicted the head of the RSHA - this "driving belt of the conscience of the Nazi party" - of non-Aryan origin: his great-grandfather, Chaim Aron Heydrich, as can be seen by his name, was a Jew, which in turn meant not only the automatic departure of Heydrich from the Nazi party and of all posts in the SS and SD, but also his inevitable placement in a concentration camp (and most likely, it would not have come to that - they did not like to take out garbage in the SS and SD, and therefore they would slap him right in the basement on Prince Albrecht -strasse, where the Gestapo was located). By the beginning of the 40s, mutual enmity reached an unprecedented scale - Heydrich, like a real hound, followed the trail of Canaris, and when he went to Prague, the "cunning Greek" realized that this was the end. Heydrich went to Prague precisely because he was right there looking for absolutely irrefutable proof of Canaris's connection with British intelligence.
Because it was in the Czech Republic that a very high-ranking officer of the Abwehr was and actively acted through the channels of the Czechoslovak military intelligence by that time, who long before the war, with the direct instructions of Canaris, voluntarily went to recruit as an agent of the Czechoslovak military intelligence. And this intelligence has long been controlled by MI6. From the very first days of his cooperation and until the failure, he supplied both the Czechoslovakians and the British with valuable information on a very wide range of issues. In principle, this story itself is hardly news. But no one ever paid attention to the fact that it was through this agent that the transfer of reliable and fully verifiable information about the conspiracy of the Soviet military to the Czechoslovak military intelligence was carried out, which, of course, reported this to its president, Beneš, and he, after making sure that that this is true - to Stalin. In the office work of the Czechoslovak military intelligence, this agent was listed under the pseudonym A-54 and it is under him that he often appears in various historical studies about the Second World War.
In reality, his real name is Paul Tummel (sometimes they write Tummel), by the beginning of cooperation with the Czechoslovak military intelligence, a major, by the time of the failure - Colonel of the Abwehr.
... Paul Thummel, a member of the NSDAP since 1928. Since 1933, an employee of the Abwehr headquarters in Berlin. In 1934 he was transferred to the Abwehr department in Dresden, which dealt with Czechoslovakia and under the pseudonym "Doctor Holm" headed the particularly aggressive intelligence networks of the Abwehr known as NETZ-1 and NETZ-2. On February 10, 1936, under the pseudonym "Karl", he voluntarily exposed himself to the Czechoslovak military intelligence and, in fact, from the very first meeting with its head (Colonel F. Moravets), started recruiting. From the very first personal contact and right up to failure, he transmitted extremely reliable and important information about all the military and military-political plans of Hitler and his entourage that became known to him. Information automatically became the property of not only the Czechoslovak government, but also the British government. The fact is that from the very first days of his cooperation with the Czechoslovak military intelligence, the fact of cooperation became known to the British intelligence, whose regional resident in Prague, Major Gibson, was familiarized with Tyummel's materials. Until the beginning of the implementation of the Munich deal, that is, until October 1, 1938, the A-54 was actually a key agent, on the information of which it was mostly based military security Czechoslovakia (the announcement of the May 1938 general mobilization in Czechoslovakia was carried out on the basis of precisely his data). Since 1939, the A-54 actually also became an agent of British intelligence under the pseudonyms "Fanta", "Rene", "Eva", etc., although the operational leadership was still carried out through the illegal channels of the Czechoslovak military intelligence. Outstanding agents of the Soviet foreign intelligence Anthony Blunt and Kim Philby. Until his failure in 1942, Paul Thummel was a key MI6 agent in Central and Southeast Europe. The failure occurred as a result of a purposeful search by the Gestapo, which introduced its agents into the Czech Resistance movement.
As soon as the surname A-54 - Paul Tummel - surfaced, there was a kind of commotion in the RSHA. The fact is that Tummel has long been a personal friend of Reichsfuehrer S S Heinrich Himmler, and, in particular, he was sent to work in the Abwehr department in Dresden at his behest. Given this circumstance, Reinhard Heydrich personally headed the counterintelligence development of Paul Tummel on charges of espionage, and it was because of this that he went to Prague.
Of course, personal closeness with Himmler, even for an uninitiated into the secrets of the specifics of intelligence activities, is an extremely alarming moment. However, it is just as extremely quickly neutralized by the fact that from the first to the last day of work for Czechoslovak, and then also for British intelligence. Paul Thummel has always supplied unprecedentedly reliable, secret, and therefore the most valuable information. An agent specially set up for disinformation purposes sooner or later, but necessarily begins to transmit disinformation - for this, he is set up. And this has never been noted in the A-54 for the entire period of cooperation. It was because of him, Paul Tummel, who was Canaris's top secret channel for transmitting reliable intelligence information to Great Britain, that the admiral asked Stuart Menzies to urgently organize the assassination of R. Heydrich. After all, if the head of the RSHA had grabbed Tyummel, he would have gutted him, and Canaris would have hung on the same iron hook by the rib in the basement of the Gestapo back in 1942 ...
Neither the Czechs nor the British have ever had a sufficient minimum of information to make at least some assumptions about the real reasons that prompted Paul Tummel to cooperate with them. It is only known that he was not interested in money as such, he took them only for operating expenses. According to a number of indirect data, there are quite enough reasons to believe that Tyummel was a personal, especially trusted representative of Canaris and it was on his instructions that he substituted himself for the Czechs. This conclusion is supported by the "handwriting" of the work of Canaris himself: firstly, the absolute absence of a material basis for the cooperation of the A-54 with the intelligence services of the anti-Hitler coalition - Canaris was indeed extremely scrupulous in these matters in his work for the West.
Secondly, the exceptional reliability of the most classified information supplied by the A-54 throughout the entire period of its cooperation with both the Czechs and the British, and without a single suspicion of disinformation, which is also extremely characteristic of the "handwriting" of Canaris' work in the West.
Thirdly, the sophisticated cunning of the admiral himself in choosing a candidate for such a role - Canaris's direct calculation is obvious that in case of failure he will be able to “wash his hands”, blaming everything on Himmler, as a friend and patron of Tyummel, because the head of the Abwehr himself hated and RSHA, and SS, and SD, although he was extremely careful with them. In general, it is quite common practice for the world of intelligence services to expose each other, especially in front of the top leadership of their state, especially with the help of iconic figures or events.
Fourthly, Canaris's exact calculation that Western intelligence services, especially in a war, will not delve into the reasons for Tummel's cooperation with them - the self-implied rejection of the Nazi regime will be quite enough. Canaris was a professional of a very high class and he calculated his moves very accurately.
And, finally, fifth: despite the fact that the RSHA was literally "hot on the trail", Paul Tyummel managed to escape from the clutches of the Gestapo for quite a long time. This should primarily be explained not so much by his personal professionalism, although he is evident, but by the direct patronage of Canaris - after all, the admiral also had military counterintelligence in the hands of the admiral, which not only very often crossed the path of the Gestapo, but also very skillfully exposed the Gestapo to criticism of him. bosses. Not to mention the very fact of Canaris's unique request to Menzies to organize the assassination of Heydrich ...
Paul Tummel, aka A-54, was one of two key figures in the two-channel system of circulation of the most secret information and correspondence secret consultations created by the "cunning Greek", clearly oriented towards the top leadership of British intelligence - specifically personally to Stuart Menzies, who almost simultaneously with the appointment of the admiral to the post of head of the Abwehr became the first deputy head of the SIS, and a little later chief of British intelligence.
The fact is that simultaneously with Tummel, even a little earlier, Canaris introduced his other agent into Menzies's field of vision - Robert von Treek, together with his wife Violetta von Schroeder (a German of Chilean origin). The track was brought into Menzies' field of vision openly - he became his neighbor on a country estate in the town of Luckington (Wilshire), which is west of London. In carrying out this operation, Canaris was well aware of the fact that there was a rather bulky dossier in British intelligence on von Treek - on that, in fact, the whole calculation of the admiral was based. For the main task of Robert von Treek was to reach, including with the help of the same Menzies, the highest circles of the British elite, and so that they initially knew and understood who they were dealing with. Menzies, it should be noted, instantly established what kind of neighbor he had, and was quite loyal to this fact, and so much so that he systematically teased Treek, shouting at his sight the words from the Nazi anthem - "Deutschland, Deutschland, Hubert Alles." Naturally, she knew perfectly well who von Treek was, and Menzies's inner circle.
Alan Brown, a connoisseur of the history of the British secret services, mentioned in the first chapter, directly pointed out that Treek was sent to England “to establish contacts with the British branch of the Blue International, a small, closely related group of political and commercial aristocracy, in whose hands was real power in Europe ".
... The British branch of the Blue International, or more precisely, based on the data of the former high-ranking British intelligence officer John Coleman, the British branch of the European Black Nobility is the most powerful branch of the already mentioned Committee of 300. Its representatives were almost without exception members of one of the most powerful Masonic lodges in the world - the British Hermetic Order of Golden Down. In turn, representatives of this Order since the end of the 19th century have been persistently developing the basic ideological prerequisites for the future of Nazism, systematically transferring them to German soil through the channels of the so-called. theosophy and specially inspired in the German-speaking area of Europe Ariosophy. According to the most authoritative British researchers of the occult roots of Nazism (for example, Nicholas Goodrick-Clark, Ph.D. from Oxford University), "the German occult revival (namely, it is the direct forerunner of Nazism. - AM) owes much to the popularity of Theosophy in Anglo-Saxon countries", for it is " here she (Germany - AM) had access to the international movement of secret societies. "
In its visible part, the backbone of the then composition of the "Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn" was personified by members of the "Cleveland Group" led by the notorious Nancy Astor. The "Clevelands" were distinguished by the fact that they adhered not only to a pro-German, but to a pro-Nazi orientation. It was naturally based on a pragmatic view of Nazism as a "tool" designed to "strangle Russia", which was what the British ruling elite was interested in.
One significant stroke from the activities of the "Clevelands" is curious - as soon as the real threat of the embodiment of the "double-triple" conspiracy into the military-geopolitical alliance Berlin - Rome - Moscow - Tokyo, horrifying in its consequences for the British elite, was liquidated, the "Cleveland group" was immediately 1937 - put the same Neville Chamberlain at the head of the British government. The latter, firstly, did not have even the minimum intellect necessary for such a high post, as a result of which even his older half-brother, Austin, a former British Foreign Secretary, when appointed to the post of Prime Minister, his brother "congratulated" him with the following telegram: "Neville, you must remember that you don't understand anything about foreign policy!" Secondly, according to the chairman of the British Royal College of Physicians, Baron Charles McMoran Wilson (aka Lord Moran), N. Chamberlain was simply a madman.
And this crazy British Prime Minister, on the basis of the instructions of the "Cleveland Group" through the Munich deal, led the British state ship into the abyss of yet another world massacre, dragging along, due to the vastness of the British Empire and the enormous importance of Great Britain as a great power, practically the whole world ...
Robert von Treek fulfilled his task brilliantly - he even became a regular participant in the famous "Beaufort hunt", which took place under the direction of the equestrian of Buckingham Palace, the Duke of Beaufort, to hunt for the British high nobility. It is about these who have collected the cream of the highest British elite, the so-called. hunting amusements of the Duke of Beaufort, the already mentioned Alan Brown, with the finest knowledge of the essence of the matter, wrote that all this "Beaufort's hunt was as much a political conspiracy as sport." The essence of the relationship between Robert von Treek and Menzies was both the maintenance of direct personal contact with him, and, as the same Brown noted, "a discussion on such issues that will be of interest to both of us," - this is how the representative of Canaris told his counterpart hunting. That is, for Menzies, but especially for the most powerful forces of the British Empire behind him, on the one hand, and on the other, for Canaris. Moreover, and it is very important to emphasize once again that by the time when von Treek, as it were, revealed his true face to Menzies, as well as the essence and goals of his mission in England, Menzies already knew perfectly well who was in front of him. He had reliable information about him, and that Canaris actually went over to the opposition to Nazism (into the opposition of a purely pro-Western wing, that is, he fully shared the geopolitical Russophobia of the West, but did not accept the cruelties of Nazism), and even that the admiral began to prepare the ground for the creation of a broad overseas anti-Hitler network.
The two-channel system of covert communication with the leadership of British intelligence created by Canaris at that time - in this form it existed until the beginning of World War II, at the very first volleys of which von Treek fled England in an unknown direction - was, as they say, a kind of tribute to the leading Nazi fashion ... In the 30s of the XX century, each more or less prominent figure of the Third Reich considered it a matter of honor to have their own channel of illegal communication with representatives of various circles of the ruling elite of Great Britain - Hitler, Goering, Himmler, Rosenberg, Ribbentrop, Heydrich and others had their own channels of access to the British nobility in the leading circles of the treacherous Albion.
... Hitler, for example, did not even have a channel, but a “multicore hot-line cable” with London. This is the ex-Kaiser of Germany Wilhelm II, his sons, especially Friedrich Wilhelm, and other crowned relatives of the former monarch. A special role was played by the above-mentioned Philip of Hesse, who was listed in the Nazi hierarchy at number 53 (that is, belonged to the top leadership of the Third Reich), and in the family tree of the British monarchy - the same great-grandson of the famous British Queen Victoria, like the fleeting King Edward VIII (later Duke of Windsor). Duke Karl-Edward of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha also performed important functions in this respect. This is the eccentric English aristocrat Unity Mitford, madly in love with Hitler, one of the five daughters of the famous British diplomat, peer of England, Lord Redesdale (the closest friend of Hitler Houston's "spiritual guru" Stuart Chamberlain, whose name and works were revered in the Reich on Fuhrer and his "Mein Kampf"). The Mitford sisters were a unique find for almost all the main intelligence services in the world: the eldest, Diana, was the wife of the leader of the British fascists Oswald Mosley (for his sake she left the prominent British businessman Guinness - the very one who founded the famous Book of Records), the middle ones, respectively, Deborah, Jessica and Nancy is also, respectively, a duchess, a communist (it is unlikely that this unique fact was overlooked in Soviet intelligence - after all, after all, but the sister of Hitler's mistress herself), a short story writer. Through Unity, Hitler calmly reached out to N. Chamberlain, W. Churchill, Lord Rothermere, Anthony Eden and others, not to mention the royal court.
This is Haushofer's father and son, Karl and Albrecht, who maintained very close ties with the Duke of Hamilton, who in turn was very close to King George VI, as well as to Churchill. Not to mention the Haushofer occult ties with Great Britain - both had a very close connection with the "Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn" (Karl Haushofer was apparently a member of this Order).
Goering, as a rule, acted through his close friend and well-known at that time Swedish industrialist Birger Dolerus, who had direct access to the British nobility.
Alfred Rosenberg preferred to act through the aforementioned Baron William de Ropp, who maintained close contact with one of the leaders of British intelligence, F.I.Winterbotham.
The famous and influential aristocrat Prince Max Hohenlohe played a colossal role for the entire Nazi elite as a channel of unofficial communication - who among the leaders of Nazism did not use this communication channel with London.
Even R. Heydrich had his own personal channel - British intelligence officer Evan Butler, who worked in pre-war Berlin under the “roof” of a journalist.
Naturally, it would be quite surprising if Canaris, well aware of this particular "fashion", did not do the same. The only difference was that Canaris really acted like a high-class professional - he created his system, clearly orienting himself not just to the highest level, but precisely to the highest level of the backstage of the British Empire. At the same time, this system functioned to transmit information, and to receive advice, without creating at the same time a threat to the failure of the admiral himself, if, of course, not Heydrich, "sitting on the tail" of Canaris. Through the A-54 channel, he launched information, including the probe type, and through the von Treek channel he received a reaction and adequately coordinated his actions both within the Reich and beyond. From a purely professional point of view, Canaris should be given his due - in the creation of such a system, a colossal justified calculation is obvious. The admiral was well aware that in the 1930s British intelligence itself did not need such an agent as Paul Tummel, at least as badly as he had since the beginning of the war. In addition, in the 30s, the reliable information transmitted by the A-54 could not only lead to failure, but also simply lead to Canaris himself, if he acted straightforwardly on British intelligence (by the way, from the moment the A-54 began to act on the British, Heydrich really tightly "sat on the tail" of Canaris).
Canaris was well aware of the real capabilities of the Reich's intelligence services and its allies, especially Italian intelligence, whose head, M. Roatta, a close friend of Canaris, more than once "regaled" the admiral with information from the same "German danger" daddy that was in the Foreign Office , - unfortunately, not only Soviet intelligence looked into it.
But the Czechs really needed the A-54. It has long been known that Czechoslovakia will be Hitler's first victim. In addition, Canaris took into account that, firstly, Benes himself, to whom, as the head of state, the Czechoslovak military intelligence closed itself, was a long-time agent of the influence of British intelligence, who, one way or another, but has a certain authority with his masters in London, as a result, he was constantly and "herded" by the best British intelligence officers in Central Europe - Lockhart, Nicholsen, Gibson and others.
Secondly, that Benes is also an experienced Mason with colossal connections in this world - both in the first and in the second cases, this created guarantees of a quick and serious perception of the transmitted information.
Thirdly, that the Czechoslovak military intelligence is under the full control of the British, whose regional resident Major Gibson is a close friend of the head of the first, František Moravia. The calculation of Canaris was that over time all these circumstances would lead to unconditional trust of British intelligence in the A-54 and the information it supplied in case of war.
Fourth, when creating the A-54 channel, the admiral, among other things, very clearly focused on the head of the Czechoslovak military counterintelligence, Major Bortik, as a guarantee against failure at the very first stage of the operation. Something, but Canaris knew the intelligence capabilities of his own Abwehr in Czechoslovakia brilliantly, that's why the first signal from Paul Tummel about his readiness to cooperate with the Czechs came to Bartik, and F. Moravets joined later.
And finally, fifthly, Canaris also took into account the fact that in May 1935 the USSR and Czechoslovakia signed the many times mentioned Mutual Assistance Treaty, the secret annex to which was the agreement on cooperation between the Soviet and Czechoslovak military intelligence. It is no coincidence that the organization of the A-54 channel began precisely on February 10, 1936 - that is, in fact, a month before the entry into force of this treaty ...
I want to make a reservation that in the part concerning the interaction of Canaris and Menzies in the "Tukhachevsky case", one should not understand everything literally - the British are not the professionals to work so recklessly with such a high-ranking "agent of influence". In addition, the level of this contact is such that, being excellent professionals, both parties perfectly understood even the most muffled hints emanating from each other. But how he, Canaris, took part in the "Tukhachevsky case" - this, of course, is extremely interesting.
After the collapsed in the spring of 1936, in fact, a joint provocation of the Abwehr and British intelligence both against Soviet intelligence and especially against the Soviet leadership as part of attempts to expose the "double conspiracy" A-54 information about the Soviet part of the conspiracy to the Czechs, knowing at the same time that it will go immediately to three addresses: Beneš - as the head of state, the regional resident of the SIS in Prague - Major Gibson, and through him will get to Menzies (he supervised the German direction personally), and within the framework of the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement on cooperation between the military intelligence services of both countries - also to Moscow. At the same time, it was clearly not excluded that Benes himself would do the same. It is characteristic that the "leakage" of information began at an extremely "symptomatic time": on the one hand, British intelligence with might and main inflamed an agiotage on a pan-European scale around Kandelaki's "secret mission" and the supposedly imminent rapprochement between the USSR and Germany, on the other hand, Canaris timed the beginning of " plum "to the moment when there was a strong surge of pro-Soviet sentiments in the Wehrmacht.
Subsequently, recalling in his memoirs about the Second World War about the meeting in 1944 in Marrakesh (Morocco) with the ex-President of Czechoslovakia Eduard Beneš, W. Churchill wrote (with a direct reference to the story of Beneš himself): “In the fall of 1936, Beneš from a high-ranking military source in Germany was told that if he wants to take advantage of Hitler's offer (it was about the fact that the Fuhrer expressed his readiness to respect the integrity of Czechoslovakia in exchange for guarantees that it would remain neutral in the event of a German-French war; this is an explanation of W. Churchill himself, in fact, it was a very clumsy attempt by Adolf at least somehow- then to neutralize the previously repeatedly mentioned treaties between the USSR, Czechoslovakia and France. - AM), then he must hurry, because soon there will be events that will make his possible assistance to Germany insignificant. "
This "high-ranking military source in Germany" is the very agent of the Czechoslovak military intelligence A-54, aka Paul Tummel, major of the Abwehr and head of the Dresden department of the Abwehr.
... One detail is interesting here - the style of presenting information, or rather, even the pro-British spirit of the style of presenting such important information. This style is also found in Soviet intelligence information, and each time those messages were also behind Anglo-German "consultations." So, even in the first chapter of this section, the GRU intelligence report to Stalin of July 4, 1933 was fully quoted, and there is the same style: "In the opinion of German circles, one should expect a quick change in the political situation in Russia."
It does not happen in the world of intelligence services that the same "style" of information presentation is in the agent networks of completely different intelligence services of completely different states ...
As Prime Minister of Great Britain during the war years, Winston Churchill not only knew very well about the existence of the A-54, but also read his information more than once - Tummel, in particular, reported to London detailed plans for various operations: "Sea Lion" - against England, "Barbarossa" is against the USSR, "Marita" is against Greece and much more. Therefore, citing Benes' words in his memoirs, he was perfectly aware of what kind of "high-ranking military source in Germany" he was writing about.
However, just like the one who was too clever in his time with encrypting the source of information about the Benes conspiracy, Churchill could not and did not want to give either the name or even the pseudonym of this agent. In England, his memoirs were published back in 1951, and many military secrets were not yet subject to disclosure. On the other hand, on the initiative of Churchill himself, a "cold war" with all its propaganda maneuvers began in the world, and Churchill understood such things better than anyone else of his predecessors or successors. In our country, despite the fact that these Churchill's memoirs were published back in 1955, that is, even before Khrushchev's famous speech at the XX Congress of the CPSU, there was no one to pay attention to this fact - "by the grace" of the 1st secretary The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the outstanding aces of Soviet intelligence were "packaged" some in prisons, some on a beggarly pension, and some were even exiled to the “bear corners” of the immense homeland ...
Meanwhile, they just perfectly knew about the A-54 according to reports from both Kim Philby and Anthony Blunt, and the A-54 itself went out to Soviet intelligence several times. And if they were at their posts, then without any doubt they would instantly identify this "high-ranking military source in Germany" with the A-54 and with their exhaustive analysis could save the same bald man from the frenziedly stupid fight with the "dead lion" from which he came out, as the same Churchill emphasized, defeated. But alas. And then time, unfortunately, did its job - blurred the sharpness of the corners, and only now, finally, there was an opportunity to say what and how it was.
And here's another thing I would like to say about Canaris in connection with the "Tukhachevsky case." Immediately after the war, in conditions openly provoked by the West " cold war”, There was one small, but nevertheless very remarkable event. A certain British publicist Vernoy Hinchley, who specialized in essays on the "intrigues of the" red spies, "suddenly came up with a version that Admiral Canaris, in collusion with Krivitsky, fabricated and organized the delivery of false documents to Stalin on Tukhachevsky. As it should be in the oldest stronghold of democracy and freedom of speech, this very Vernon Hinchley was so given a hand that since then from the British side there have been no more such "pearls" about Canaris's involvement, and even in the "spark" with Krivitsky. At the same time, versions are not born from scratch, especially since Hinchley was an ordinary sensible journalist who earned money with a brisk pen. Consequently, the truth about Canaris's involvement has leaked somewhere - otherwise the same Hinchley would not have been gagged.
You can imagine the commotion in British intelligence that Hinchley's version caused - after all, if it fell into the hands of professionals, then even then the whole tangle of incredible intrigues of the SIS with Canaris with the participation of A-54 and von Treek would have been unwound to the end. But since the sins of the British intelligence will be enough for tens of generations to come, they decided very simply - from now on in any publication about Canaris, in the part concerning the alleged nature of the origin of forged documents on Tukhachevsky, the main leitmotif is one: all this is the work of Nazi Heydrich, who organized the whole this operation, including the raid on the headquarters of the Abwehr, since Canaris categorically refused to provide archival documents on cooperation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army. In domestic studies, this fiction is "flavored" out of nowhere with Yezhov's memorandum addressed to Stalin, which allegedly confirms the fact of a fire in the German military department on the night of March 2, 1937.
The first to pull this "report" of Yezhov into the world was the late professor, Colonel-General of History Dmitry Volkogonov. True, he nevertheless refrained from putting the date of his signature for Yezhov.
... In the book “Triumph and Tragedy. I. V. Stalin. Political portrait "by D. A. Volkogonov on p. 534 of the 1st volume of the said work, the following document is given:" In addition to our report on the fire in the German War Ministry, I am sending detailed material about the fire that took place and a copy of the report of the head of the commission on sabotage under the Gestapo ... "
For reasons only known to him, the now deceased Volkogonov refrained from putting the date of his signature for Yezhov. Nevertheless, for the Gestapo, he nevertheless put down the "date" of the fire - after the word "fire" in the text of the report, Volkogonov's own note was printed as follows: "... In fact, it was so. At the end of 1936, a grandiose skirmish took place between the high command of the army and the NSDAP security service: in the building where the Abwehr was located on Tirpitzufer Strasse, 74–76, eavesdropping microphones were found installed by the security service directly subordinate to Himmler. And not just in the premises of the Abwehr, but in the very department of military counterintelligence that oversaw the connections and behavior of the senior officers of the Wehrmacht. This particular detail caused the grandiose scale of the clash and its severity, because the generals were hurt: one thing Canaris will know something, but you can always agree with him, but a completely different matter when the SD finds out about the same.
Meanwhile, it was no accident that the SD installed a wiretap there. In addition to the quite ordinary, routine practice of counterintelligence surveillance of the military, in addition to the extremely characteristic hostility and competition between the secret services of the Third Reich, the fact of interception was based on a specific reason for the current moment. The fact is that at the beginning of the autumn of 1936 there was a noticeable surge in the activation of previously frozen official contacts between the Soviet and German military, including the highest, which caused hysteria in Hitler, who, in a fit of anger, shouted at his generals that they "They get drunk and hang out with the communist generals."
The reason for the hysteria was that for the autumn 1936 maneuvers of the Wehrmacht, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht, Colonel-General Baron Werner von Fritsch, invited the commander of the 1st rank Jerome Petrovich Uborevich. Moreover, at the urgent request of Uborevich himself, in January 1936, at a meeting with the assistant to the German military attaché in Warsaw, Major Kinzel, he made such a request.
... Eberhard Kinzel, at the time of the German attack on the USSR - Colonel, head of the special service of the General Staff for monitoring intelligence activities in the Russian direction. The most significant of his pre-war biography is the fact that it was he who presented a detailed report on the fortified regions of the USSR on the western borders, the combat schedule of the Soviet troops, the mobilization measures of the USSR, the industrial reserves of the Soviet Union and possible strategic plans of Moscow. It was Kinzel's report that served as the basis for a more thorough revision of the "Barbarossa Plan" ...
Moreover, Uborevich substantiated his request with a desire to discuss with the German generals a number of important political and military issues. The military - it is understandable, and even then not entirely, because according to all existing rules, in any case, the solution of such issues was the prerogative of the People's Commissar of Defense himself. As for political issues, nothing is clear at all, since political issues are not at the level of the commander of a military district.
However, if we consider that Uborevich acted as emissary of Tukhachevsky, then everything falls into place, all the more if we remember that, according to Molotov, from the second half of 1936, the “Bonaparte candidate” began to rush the coup. In this case, everything really falls into place and not only in our investigation.
The fact is that for these autumn maneuvers of the Wehrmacht in 1936, many significant figures in the framework of the "double-triple" conspiracy gathered, which could not fail to attract the attention of both Canaris, and especially British intelligence. And Canaris, by the way, it was at the same time that he began to "drain" information about the conspiracy through the A-54.
... First, and indeed, why on earth is the commander of one of the most important military districts in the western part of the USSR begs to meet with the generals of the state, where the extremely unfriendly USSR Nazi regime has been dominating for three years, and even in order to discuss some important political and military issues ?! Is this his level - to climb with such initiatives ?!
Secondly, it should be noted that Uborevich at that moment went on an official business trip to Czechoslovakia, in connection with which his route to Prague through Warsaw is already quite strange, and if we also take into account that natural meetings for such an already strange case could If there is only a meeting with official Polish military representatives, the very fact of a meeting and conversation with the assistant military attaché of Germany in Poland, who is much lower in rank and rank, arouses suspicion intermingled with bewilderment.
Third, why did the conversation take place with the assistant military attaché? And not with the attaché himself? Indeed, in the latter case, there would be at least some semblance of parity strictly observed in the military-diplomatic sphere ?! And what kind of almost absolute confidence is this that this Kinzel will certainly bring his insistent request to the attention of the relevant military authorities in Germany ?!
As a result, it turns out that the assumption that Kintsel was a kind of "hotline" for emergency cases in order to transmit urgent information and communication looks clearly not groundless. The piquancy of this assumption also lies in the fact that this "hotline", if, of course, our assumption is really reliable - I write this way, since it is not yet possible to check everything thoroughly - apparently, was under the control of the GRU agents operating in the embassy Nazi Germany in Poland: Ilse Stoebe, Rudolf Gernstadt and Gerhard Kegel (the latter from the beginning of 1935 was already an employee of the embassy).
As mentioned above, Uborevich got to Germany in the fall of 1936 for military maneuvers in Bad Kissingen, but in this case it turns out that he was asking for it unofficially, but he was invited - officially. And given that the head of the Department of Foreign Relations of the People's Commissariat of Defense - Gekker - "thundered" in one case with Tukhachevsky and Uborevich, it turns out that it was a pre-calculated operation: in response to an unofficial request, the Germans officially invite candidacy….
It was because of this visit of Uborevich at the September 1936 congress of the Nazi party in Nuremberg that Hitler threw a tantrum with extremely harsh anti-Soviet statements that shocked German generals and officers, especially those who left the Reichswehr. Already on October 10, 1936, British intelligence - Colonel Christie, later the head of the German department of MI6 - received a detailed report from their agent "Phil", which described this shock of the generals and the surge of open sympathy for the Red Army in the Wehrmacht.
That is why, wishing to please the authorities, the SD installed eavesdropping devices in the very department of the military counterintelligence of the Abwehr, where all information about the mood and behavior of the higher officers flocked. From the point of view of the logic of counterintelligence confrontation with the generals, the move is correct. The scandal itself in connection with the exposure of the fact of eavesdropping in the Abwehr ended with the fact that, on the direct orders of Hitler, the SD went to sign the above-mentioned "Declaration of 10 Commandments" with the Abwehr on December 21, 1936. And so that after only two months - on the night of March 2, 1937 - as allegedly asserted by the "Schellenberg version" and that with the help of Yezhov's "memorandum" who had come from nowhere, but for the Gestapo, the late Volkogonov also confirmed in his work "Triumph and Tragedy, "- SD, even if under the patronage of Hitler himself, would risk another operation to secretly infiltrate the premises of the military department, and even with a fire ?! Absolutely out of the question!
Hitler had to endure obstinate generals for another year, until the British, including through the ex-King Edward VIII, opened his eyes to their true face. Only after that he could finally get rid of them, defaming Blomberg, Fritsch and expelling them from all their posts.
As mentioned above, the Soviet intelligence had an excellent agent in the Gestapo - "Breitenbach", aka Willie Lehmann. "Breitenbach" was just one of the leading employees in the very same department of counterintelligence support of the entire German military-industrial complex, including the military department, which was part of the Gestapo (then the 4th department of the RSHA) and which, by definition, was supposed to investigate this case with a fire , if, of course, it would take place. However, in none of the essays - neither official nor journalistic, - in one of the books dedicated to V. Lehmann's outstanding contribution to the struggle against Nazism, there is not even a shadow, not even a dull hint of this story with a raid and fire. And Willie Lehman always provided such unique information about various Gestapo operations, such unique information on other issues, and besides, Dice himself was such a highly qualified professional that even if this story could have done without his direct participation, it does not matter how exclusively a high-class professional, he himself would have paid attention to such an event, he would have gotten out and surely handed over to our intelligence the necessary documents, especially since he was related to this commission on sabotage. By the way, he could have done this through other channels - due to the nature of his official functions, Breitenbach was quite naturally in constant business contact with the Abwehr, especially with his counterintelligence officers. V. Lehman was respected by them both as a former front-line soldier (he fought side by side with some of the Abwehr) and as a high-class professional. And so that with such initial data from Breitenbach there would not be a single signal about the story of the fire? ..
If we take into account a number of important details to all of the above about this "story", then there will not even be a hint of any shadow of doubts about the true nature of the origin of this pseudo-fact about pseudo-raid and pseudo-fire. Moreover, it will become finally clear why, when creating the "Schellenberg version", the British, having pointed out the alleged fact of the Gestapo raid on the premises of the Abwehr, nevertheless realized that it was undesirable to indicate the exact date of this rather loud, if it actually happened, event.
First, in fact, the "Schellenberg version" does not operate with a specific date - it appears only in publications that supplement and explain it. In all these additional clarifications, it has been shifted to March 1-2, 1937.
Secondly, let us again turn to the tried and tested method of the simplest comparative analysis of the two main versions of Schellenberg's memoirs - English and German.
Translated from English: "And then one day Heydrich sent two special teams to break into the secret archives of the General Staff and the Abwehr, the military intelligence service headed by Admiral Canaris."
Translated from German: "Since there was no written evidence of such secret communications for conspiracy purposes, on the orders of Hitler (and not Heydrich), raids were made on the Wehrmacht archives and on the intelligence office."
As you can see, there is no exact date of the raid in either version, but there is a direct contradiction: in the English version, the raid was allegedly carried out by order of Heydrich, in the German version, allegedly directly by order of Hitler, and it is also emphasized in parentheses that “ not Heydrich. " Before us is a cheap trick of obfuscation, covering up traces of falsification.
Not to mention the fact that “secret archives” cannot be “hacked” - they can only be penetrated and stolen, and safes, cabinets, doors leading to secret vaults, etc., can or cannot be hacked, but not the archives themselves.
If, with all the circumstances analyzed, a certain clarity has finally come, then with regard to the role of the aforementioned "report" Yezhov, first used as a proof by Volkogonov, then everything is far from clear. Usually very scrupulously indicating the sources of the information he cites on the pages of his books - for example, in the same first volume of Triumph and Tragedy, there are 514 references to sources for six main chapters (fluctuations from 74 to 99 per chapter, on average 85–86) - including for archival documents, Volkogonov for some reason did not do the same with respect to Yezhov's "memo", which he completely cited. It is also strange that, fully citing this very short document, the general did not even indicate the date of Yezhov's signature, which is more than categorically important in this particular story.
Just a year later - in 1991 - the situation around the origin of Yezhov's "report" turned out to be even more obscured. The first volume of "Triumph and Tragedy" was signed for publication on February 23, 1990, and a year later, the journalistic novel "Conspiracy against the Marshals" by Eremey Parnov, which was re-singing "Schellenberg's version", was published in full swing. In the preface from the editorial board, it is directly stated that "the novel uses numerous documents, sometimes unknown to the general public." In this very novel, the same "report" of Yezhov is quoted, and also without reference, which for this genre of creativity is quite admissible on legal grounds. But what is surprising is that Volkogonov's mention of the date of the alleged fire after the alleged raid allegedly on the night of March 2, 1937 disappeared from the text of the "memo" without a trace. Naturally, there is no date for Yezhov's signature either. Why did Yezhov, reporting in writing about such a serious event in Germany, fail to indicate the exact date and date of his signature? For such tricks, Stalin could easily "lather the withers", because he always demanded special accuracy in everything, especially from intelligence.
Why, on the other hand, did D. A. Volkogonov try so hard for the Gestapo that he indicated the date of the pseudo-fire - after all, it would have been easier to do this by writing it directly into the text of Yezhov's report? So was Yezhov's report really? Indeed, by definition, at that specific historical moment, the source of this archival document for Volkogonov could only be the Special Folder of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (now the Special Archive under the President of the Russian Federation), that is, everything had to go through the channels of the KGB of the USSR. But the KGB of the USSR did not issue any documents at that time. What is the end result? That even in the archive of the highest importance concentrated special secrets of the state for the 20th century, even then it was possible to forge and produce false archival documents of special storage ?! If you remember that in those days the ideology in the Central Committee was in charge of none other than Alexander Nikolayevich Yakovlev, then ...
Well, that is, perhaps, all that I would like to tell about the history of the appearance not so much of "Schellenberg's memoirs", but about the version of the "Tukhachevsky case" contained in them and what is behind it. Now there should no longer be a shadow of doubt about the involvement of British intelligence in the emergence of this masterpiece of falsification, as well as the involvement of British intelligence in overthrowing the "Tukhachevsky conspiracy."
In conclusion, I would like to draw your attention to the incredible zeal and persistence with which British intelligence for more than seventy years has been concerned about keeping secret its involvement in the failure of the "Tukhachevsky conspiracy", including in cooperation with Canaris. After all, they understand in British intelligence that Canaris is a son of a bitch, but he is her, British intelligence, a son of a bitch ...
Western support for the Uzbek regime demonstrates a dangerous trend - reliance on tyrants and despots
Let's call this the foreign policy tradition of "reliance on the children of bitches." Franklin Roosevelt is said to have been asked how to deal with the many atrocities of his ally, Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza. The President replied, "He may be a son of a bitch, but this is our son of a bitch."
Today, 60 years later, this phrase is perfect for defining the policy of the United States, and therefore Britain, towards the Tashkent tyrant Islam Karimov, who has ruled the Central Asian Republic of Uzbekistan since the collapse of the USSR in 1991.
The fact that Karimov's son of a bitch is an indisputable fact. Like many of his despotic predecessors, he borrows the most brutal methods of suppressing dissent from the dark times of the Middle Ages. As a result, a cauldron of boiling water appeared in his arsenal of torture: in 2002, Karimov cooked two of his critics alive. The number of political prisoners in Uzbekistan is 6,000, independent economic activity is suppressed, freedom of religion is severely limited, there is no free press, and the Internet is censored. On December 26, when the whole world admired the Ukrainian "orange revolution", Karimov held elections, the outcome of which was clear in advance - after all opposition parties he forbade.
But what is the meaning of "some human rights violations" when it comes to a friend. And Karimov is undoubtedly our friend. Soon after 9/11, he allowed the United States to establish a military base in Khanabad, thus making a useful contribution to the preparations for the war against Afghanistan. Since then, he has happily played the role of a reliable guarantor of oil and gas supplies from Central Asia - so longed for by the United States, which seeks to reduce oil dependence on the Gulf countries. In addition, he readily agreed to provide his services for the action, which bears the bashful name of "transfer": persons suspected of involvement in terrorism are taken for interrogation to countries where torture is less sensitive than Britain or the United States.
It is because of this (Craig Murray), former ambassador Great Britain in Tashkent, fell out of favor with the authorities: this brave man claimed that England "sells its soul to the devil", using information obtained in such a disgusting way.
Brushing aside the doubts voiced by Murray, London and Washington continue to feel grateful to Karimov. High-ranking officials of the Bush administration rushed to Tashkent to thank the dictator for the services rendered. Donald Rumsfeld - apparently not enough for being photographed with Saddam Hussein in 1983 - praised Karimov for his "excellent cooperation" and former Bush finance minister Paul O "Neil" Neill) expressed admiration for the "powerful intellect" of the autocrat and his "passionate desire" to improve the lives of ordinary Uzbeks.
However, this egregious example of "reliance on children of bitches" would have passed almost unnoticed, if not for the events of recent days. After all, you can only make friends with disgusting subjects when others do not look too closely at your friend - and this week the whole world saw the Karimov regime in action. When his opponents took to the streets last Friday, the dictator ordered troops to shoot the demonstrators. Uzbek official sources say 169 dead; human rights organizations estimate the number of victims at 500-750 people: most of them were unarmed people.
Mass demonstrations in Lebanon, Georgia and Ukraine were hailed by the Americans as a manifestation of the "will of the people." However, they reacted differently to the bold popular performance in Uzbekistan. Washington called on both sides for "restraint", thereby placing peaceful demonstrators on a par with those who shot them. True, Washington's tone has changed slightly over the past two days. Now the State Department is demanding that Tashkent "carry out real reforms" and address "human rights problems." One cannot, at least, exclude the possibility that Washington will soon decide that Karimov has become too odious a figure and should be replaced by another, more "digestible" - but no less reliable - leader. In other words, to have the same "our", but not such a son of a bitch.
"Reliance on children of bitches" has always caused some inconvenience, even in the days of Roosevelt; it, of course, does not fit well with America's self-perception as a kind of "ray of light in the dark kingdom." But today this contradiction - some would call it hypocrisy - is greater than ever. After all, this is happening in the Bush era, and the main tenet of the Bush doctrine is the spread of democracy and the "irrepressible flame of freedom" everywhere, right up to the farthest corners of the planet. Such rhetoric is difficult to reconcile with practice - for example, funding a dictator who cooks his enemies alive.
Maybe Bush should break with the traditions of the past and wage his fight for democracy with pure, democratic methods? But this option scares him. If you allow free elections to be held in countries that are now considered reliable allies of the United States - for example, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco - who can vouch for the consequences? Washington fears that, albeit dubious, but friends will be replaced by irreconcilable enemies: radical Islamists who, most likely, will emerge victorious from any democratic competition in many countries of the Arab world.
The question is, of course, a difficult one. Nevertheless, many arguments can be made in favor of America, and Britain as well, not only talking about democracy, but also behaving like democrats - and not only of an idealistic, but also of a pragmatic nature.
First, despots are unreliable allies: they too often turn from friends to enemies. Let us recall two people who once played the role of "our sons of bitches" for America. In the 1980s, the United States supported Saddam in the war with Iran and Osama bin Laden in the fight against the USSR. It was the United States that supplied them with the weapons that they ultimately turned against America itself.
Second, pragmatic "deals with the devil" are inherently ineffective. The fact is that by oppressing their own peoples, tyrannical regimes do not suppress, but provoke terrorism. Moreover, such deals, made in the name of democracy, tarnish the very purpose they are intended to serve. That is why liberal reformers in the Middle East today find it so difficult to convince the Arab peoples of their righteousness, who suspect that the word "democracy" actually means the American occupation, cheap oil sales and torture in Abu Ghraib.
Third, if democracy, as the Bush doctrine asserts, is truly a panacea for all ills, then why not let it work its magic? In other words, the government (whatever its political coloring), which really represents the people, cannot but bring its country the freedom and stability that Washington so dreams of. Perhaps the Western leaders should be reassured by at least the following fact: in the Middle East, even the democrats themselves do not call for an immediate revolution - they understand that under the conditions of authoritarian regimes, the only space for public activity in their countries, besides the state, is the mosque. That is why, if free elections are held tomorrow in the same Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood Islamist group will certainly win.
But if the West tied the huge financial and military assistance it provides to these regimes, say, to the implementation of a three-year program of gradual liberalization - the abolition of emergency laws, the lifting of bans on the normal financing of political parties - then the public space will soon expand, and this new "territory "It will not be despots or mullahs who will occupy, but completely different forces. Various parties and movements will be able to begin preparations for future elections, in which they now have a real chance of success.
From the point of view of the spread of democracy, such a policy is undoubtedly more logical and consistent than the current contradictory course of "relying on tyrants". And it may well prove its effectiveness - even in such a gloomy place as Uzbekistan.
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This is a son of a bitch, but this is our son of a bitch
Review of the Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza (senior), who belongs, as some American memoirists point out, to the 32nd President of the United States (1933-1945), Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945).
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| President of Nicaragua |
San Marcos
Panama Canal Zone
Anastasio Somoza Garcia(Spanish. Anastasio Somoza García ; February 1 - September 29) - Nicaraguan military and statesman, the actual head of Nicaragua from 1936 to 1956.
As the head of the National Guard, he was the organizer of the assassination attempt on the revolutionary Augusto Sandino, who led the fight against the American occupation forces in 1927-1933.
On September 21, 1956, the poet Rigoberto Lopez Perez attempted to assassinate Somoza, wounding him in the chest with a pistol shot. Lopez was shot dead by guards on the spot, and Somoza died 8 days later in an American hospital in Panama, after which his son Luis Somoza Debayle became the head of Nicaragua.
Somoza Mode
Under Somoza, a tough authoritarian regime was established in Nicaragua. The Guard became the arbiter of destinies in Nicaragua [ style]. She controlled the trade in arms, alcoholic beverages, drugs, medicines in the country. Organized prostitution, gambling houses, radio and television, tax collection and rural justice were also under her jurisdiction. Anastasio Somoza himself was already considered one of the richest people throughout Mesoamerica. He was an extreme anti-communist (in particular, surrealism was banned in any form as "communist art"), patronized fascist and Nazi organizations, showed open sympathy for Hitler until the outbreak of World War II. Nevertheless, on December 8, 1941, he declared war on Germany.
"Our son of a bitch"
Despite authoritarianism, the anti-communist Somoza enjoyed political support from the United States. Franklin Roosevelt is credited with the phrase allegedly said by him in 1939: "Somoza may be a son of a bitch, but this is our son of a bitch." As historian David Schmitz points out, a study of the archives of the Franklin Roosevelt Presidential Library has found no evidence to support this statement. This phrase first appeared in the November 15, 1948 issue of Time magazine; On March 17, 1960, she was mentioned on CBS's Trujillo: A Portrait of a Dictator as referring to Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. Thus, the authorship and the object of this statement remain dubious.
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Excerpt from Somoza Garcia, Anastasio
Prince Andrey glanced at Timokhin, who was looking at his commander with fear and bewilderment. Contrary to his former restrained silence, Prince Andrew now seemed agitated. He, apparently, could not refrain from expressing those thoughts that suddenly came to him.- The battle will be won by the one who is determined to win it. Why did we lose the battle at Austerlitz? Our loss was almost equal to that of the French, but we told ourselves very early that we had lost the battle - and lost. And we said this because we had no reason to fight there: we wanted to leave the battlefield as soon as possible. "If you lose - so run!" - we ran. If we hadn't said this until evening, God knows what would have happened. We won't say that tomorrow. You say: our position, the left flank is weak, the right flank is stretched, - he continued, - all this is nonsense, nothing of this. And what do we have to do tomorrow? One hundred million of the most varied accidents, which will be resolved instantly by the fact that they or ours ran or run, that they kill that one, they kill another; and what is being done now is all fun. The fact is that those with whom you traveled around the position not only do not contribute to the general course of affairs, but interfere with it. They are busy only with their own little interests.
- At such a moment? - Pierre said reproachfully.
“At such a moment,” repeated Prince Andrey, “for them this is only such a moment in which you can dig under the enemy and get an extra cross or ribbon. For me tomorrow is this: the 100,000-strong Russian and 100,000-strong French troops have come together to fight, and the fact is that these two hundred thousand are fighting, and whoever will fight angrily and feel less sorry for himself will win. And if you want, I'll tell you that no matter what, no matter what is confused up there, we will win the battle tomorrow. Tomorrow, whatever it is, we will win the battle!
“Here, your Excellency, it’s true, true,” said Timokhin. - Why feel sorry for yourself now! The soldiers in my battalion, believe me, did not drink vodka: not such a day, they say. - All were silent.
The officers got up. Prince Andrew went out with them behind the shed, giving the last orders to the adjutant. When the officers left, Pierre went up to Prince Andrew and was just about to start a conversation, when the hooves of three horses began to clatter along the road not far from the shed, and looking in this direction, Prince Andrew recognized Wolzogen and Clausewitz, accompanied by the Cossack. They drove close, continuing to talk, and Pierre and Andrei involuntarily heard the following phrases:
- Der Krieg muss im Raum verlegt werden. Der Ansicht kann ich nicht genug Preis geben, [War must be transferred to space. This view I cannot praise enough (in German)] - said one.
“O ja,” said another voice, “da der Zweck ist nur den Feind zu schwachen, so kann man gewiss nicht den Verlust der Privatpersonen in Achtung nehmen. [Oh yes, since the goal is to weaken the enemy, private losses cannot be taken into account (DE)]
- O ja, [Oh yes (German)] - confirmed the first voice.
- Yes, im Raum verlegen, [transfer to space (German)] - repeated Prince Andrew, snorting viciously, when they drove by. - Im Raum then [In space (German)] I have a father, and a son, and a sister in the Bald Mountains. It doesn't matter to him. This is what I told you - these gentlemen Germans will not win the battle tomorrow, but will only shit how much their strength will be, because in his German head there are only arguments that are not worth a damn, and in his heart there is nothing that only and you need for tomorrow - what is in Timokhin. They gave all of Europe to him and came to teach us - glorious teachers! His voice shrieked again.
"So you think tomorrow's battle will be won?" - said Pierre.
“Yes, yes,” said Prince Andrei absentmindedly. “One thing I would do if I had power,” he began again, “I would not take prisoners. What are prisoners? This is chivalry. The French have destroyed my house and are going to destroy Moscow, and they have insulted and insulted me every second. They are my enemies, they are all criminals, according to my ideas. And Timokhin and the whole army think the same. We must execute them. If they are my enemies, they cannot be friends, no matter how they talk in Tilsit.
- Yes, yes, - said Pierre, looking at Prince Andrey with shining eyes, - I absolutely, completely agree with you!
The question that had worried Pierre from Mozhaiskaya Mountain all that day now seemed to him completely clear and completely resolved. He now understood the whole meaning and all the significance of this war and the forthcoming battle. Everything that he saw that day, all the significant, stern expressions that he caught a glimpse of, lit up for him with a new light. He understood that latente, as they say in physics, the warmth of patriotism, which was in all those people whom he saw, and which explained to him why all these people calmly and as if frivolously prepared for death.
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