Removal of Khrushchev from the post of leader. The years of the reign of N.S. Khrushchev and biography. Khrushchev retired

By 1964, ten years of reign Nikita Khrushchev led to an amazing result - there are practically no forces left in the country on which the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee could rely.

He frightened the conservative representatives of the "Stalinist guard" by debunking the personality cult of Stalin, and moderate party liberals by disregarding their comrades-in-arms and replacing the collegial leadership style with an authoritarian one.

The creative intelligentsia, who at first greeted Khrushchev, recoiled from him, having listened to “valuable instructions” and direct insults. The Russian Orthodox Church, accustomed in the post-war period to the relative freedom granted to it by the state, has come under pressure that it has not seen since the 1920s.

Diplomats were tired of resolving the consequences of Khrushchev's abrupt steps in the international arena, the military was outraged by the ill-conceived massive redundancies in the army.

The reform of the management system of industry and agriculture led to chaos and a deep economic crisis, aggravated by the Khrushchev campaign: the widespread planting of corn, persecution of collective farmers' private plots, etc.

Just a year after the triumphant flight of Gagarin and the proclamation of the task of building communism in 20 years, Khrushchev in the international arena plunged the country into the Cuban missile crisis, and internally suppressed with the help of army units the protest of those dissatisfied with the decline in the living standards of workers in Novocherkassk.

Food prices continued to rise, store shelves emptied, and bread shortages began in some regions. The country is under the threat of a new famine.

Khrushchev remained popular only in jokes: “On Red Square, during the May Day demonstration, a pioneer with flowers rises to the Mausoleum in front of Khrushchev, who asks:

- Nikita Sergeevich, is it true that you launched not only a satellite, but also agriculture?

- Who told you that? - Khrushchev frowned.

"Tell your dad that I can plant more than just corn!"

Intrigue versus schemer

Nikita Sergeevich was an experienced master of court intrigue. He skillfully got rid of his comrades-in-arms in the post-Stalin triumvirate, Malenkov and Beria, in 1957 he managed to resist during an attempt to overthrow himself by the "anti-party group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov, who joined them." Then Khrushchev's intervention in the conflict saved defense Minister Georgy Zhukov, whose word turned out to be decisive.

Less than six months later, Khrushchev dismissed his savior, fearing the growing influence of the military.

Khrushchev tried to strengthen his power by promoting his own protégés to key posts. However, Khrushchev's management style quickly alienated even those who owed him much.

In 1963, a colleague of Khrushchev, Second Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Frol Kozlov, left his post for health reasons, and his responsibilities were divided between chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Leonid Brezhnev and transferred from Kiev to work secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikolai Podgorny.

From about this moment Leonid Brezhnev began to conduct secret negotiations with members of the Central Committee of the CPSU, learning their moods. Usually such conversations were held in Zavidovo, where Brezhnev loved to hunt.

In addition to Brezhnev, active participants in the conspiracy were kGB Chairman Vladimir Semichastny, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander Shelepin, already mentioned Podgorny. The further, the more the circle of participants in the conspiracy expanded. He was joined by a member of the Politburo and the future main ideologist of the country Mikhail Suslov, defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky, 1st Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Alexey Kosygin other.

Among the conspirators were several different factions who viewed Brezhnev's leadership as temporary, accepted as a compromise. Of course, this also suited Brezhnev, who turned out to be much more far-sighted than his comrades-in-arms.

"You are up to something against me ..."

In the summer of 1964, the conspirators decided to speed up the implementation of their plans. At the July plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Khrushchev dismisses Brezhnev from the post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, replacing him Anastas Mikoyan... At the same time, Khrushchev, who was returned to his previous position - the curator from the Central Committee of the CPSU on the military-industrial complex, Khrushchev rather dismissively informs about his lack of skills to find the position from which he was removed.

In August - September 1964, at meetings of the top Soviet leadership, Khrushchev, dissatisfied with the situation in the country, hints at the upcoming large-scale rotation in the highest echelons of power.

This forces us to cast aside the doubts of the last hesitant - the final decision to remove Khrushchev has already been made in the near future.

It turns out to be impossible to conceal a conspiracy of this magnitude - at the end of September 1964, through the son of Sergei Khrushchev, evidence of the existence of a group preparing a coup was transmitted.

Oddly enough, Khrushchev does not take active counter actions. The most that the Soviet leader does is threaten the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU: “You, friends, are up to something against me. Look, if something happens I will scatter like puppies. " In response, the members of the Presidium vying with each other begin to assure Khrushchev of their loyalty, that he is quite satisfied.

In early October, Khrushchev went on vacation to Pitsunda, where he was preparing for the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on agriculture, scheduled for November.

As one of the participants in the conspiracy recalled, dmitry Polyansky, member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central CommitteeOn October 11, Khrushchev called him and said that he knew about intrigues against him, promised to return to the capital in three or four days and show everyone "Kuzka's mother."

Brezhnev at that moment was on a working trip abroad, Podgorny - in Moldova. However, after Polyansky's call, both urgently returned to Moscow.

Leader in isolation

It is difficult to say whether Khrushchev planned anything or his threats were empty. Perhaps, knowing about the conspiracy in principle, he did not fully realize its scale.

Be that as it may, the conspirators decided to act without delay.

On October 12, a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee was held in the Kremlin. A decision was made: in connection with the emerging ambiguities of a fundamental nature, hold the next meeting on October 13 with the participation of Comrade Khrushchev. Instruct com. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov and Podgorny contact him by phone. " The participants in the meeting also decided to summon the members of the Central Committee and the Central Committee of the CPSU to a plenary meeting, the time of which to be determined in the presence of Khrushchev.

At this point, both the KGB and the military were effectively controlled by the conspirators. At the state dacha in Pitsunda, Khrushchev was isolated, his negotiations were controlled by the KGB, and the ships of the Black Sea Fleet could be seen at sea, arriving “to guard the First Secretary in connection with the complication of the situation in Turkey.

By order minister of Defense of the USSR Rodion Malinovsky, the troops of most of the districts were put on alert. Fears were caused only by the Kiev military district, which was commanded by Pyotr Koshevoy, the closest military man to Khrushchev, who was even considered as a candidate for the post of Minister of Defense of the USSR.

In order to avoid excesses, the conspirators deprived Khrushchev of the opportunity to contact Koshev, and also took measures to exclude the possibility of turning the First Secretary's plane to Kiev instead of Moscow.

"The last word"

Together with Khrushchev in Pitsunda was Anastas Mikoyan... On the evening of October 12, the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was invited to come to Moscow to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee to resolve urgent issues, explaining that everyone had already arrived and were only waiting for him.

Khrushchev was too experienced a politician not to understand what was happening. Moreover, Mikoyan told Nikita Sergeevich what awaits him in Moscow, practically in plain text.

However, Khrushchev did not take any measures - with a minimum number of guards, he flew to Moscow.

The reasons for Khrushchev's passivity are still being argued about. Some believe that he hoped, as in 1957, to tip the scales in his favor at the last moment, having achieved a majority not at the Presidium, but at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Others believe that 70-year-old Khrushchev, entangled in his own political mistakes, saw his removal as the best way out of the situation, removing all responsibility from him.

On October 13 at 15:30 a new meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee began in the Kremlin. Khrushchev, who arrived in Moscow for the last time in his career, took the chair. The first to take the floor was Brezhnev, who explained to Khrushchev what kind of questions arose in the Presidium of the Central Committee. So that Khrushchev understood that he was isolated, Brezhnev emphasized that the questions were posed by the secretaries of the regional committees.

Khrushchev did not surrender without a fight. While acknowledging the mistakes, he nevertheless expressed his readiness to correct them by continuing to work.

However, after the speech of the First Secretary, numerous critical speeches began, which lasted until the evening and continued on the morning of October 14. The further the "enumeration of sins" went, the more obvious it became that there could be only one "sentence" - resignation. Only Mikoyan was ready to "give one more chance" to Khrushchev, but his position did not find support.

When everything became obvious to everyone, Khrushchev was once again given his word, this time really the last. “I'm not asking for mercy - the issue has been resolved. I told Mikoyan: I will not fight ... - said Khrushchev. - I am glad: at last the party has grown and can control any person. Gathered and smeared th ... m, but I can not object. "

Two lines in the newspaper

It remained to decide who would be the successor. Brezhnev proposed to nominate Nikolai Podgorny for the post of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, but he refused in favor of Leonid Ilyich himself, as, in fact, was planned in advance.

The decision, made by a narrow circle of leaders, was to be approved by an extraordinary plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which began on the same day, at six in the evening, in the Catherine Hall of the Kremlin.

Mikhail Suslov spoke on behalf of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee with an ideological justification for Khrushchev's resignation. Having announced the accusations of violating the norms of party leadership, gross political and economic mistakes, Suslov suggested that a decision be made to remove Khrushchev from office.

The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee unanimously adopted a resolution "On Comrade Khrushchev", according to which he was dismissed from his posts "in connection with his advanced age and deteriorating health."

Khrushchev combined the posts of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. The combination of these posts was recognized as inexpedient, having approved Leonid Brezhnev as the party successor, and Alexei Kosygin as the "state" one.

There was no defeat of Khrushchev in the press. Two days later, the newspapers published a short report about the extraordinary plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, where it was decided to replace Khrushchev with Brezhnev. Instead of anathema, Nikita Sergeevich was prepared for oblivion - for the next 20 years, the official USSR media wrote almost nothing about the former leader of the Soviet Union.

"Sunrise" flies to a different era

The 1964 "Palace coup" became the most bloodless in the history of the Fatherland. The 18-year era of Leonid Brezhnev's rule began, which would later be called the best period in the country's history in the 20th century.

The reign of Nikita Khrushchev was marked by loud cosmic victories. His resignation was also indirectly related to space. On October 12, 1964, the Voskhod-1 manned spacecraft was launched from the Baikonur cosmodrome with the first-ever crew of three - Vladimir Komarov, Konstantin Feoktistov and Boris Egorov... The cosmonauts flew away even under Nikita Khrushchev, and reported on the successful implementation of the flight program to Leonid Brezhnev ...

The very fact of such a transfer of power from one political leader to another was unprecedented in Soviet history. For the first time, power in the country passed from one hand to another not after the death of the previous leader, but formally legitimate, from the point of view of Soviet political norms, through: as a result of decisions of the Presidium and the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The classic law of big politics worked, the essence of which is that in a situation of loss of confidence in the leader, a state of opposition arises, a challenge, leading as a result to various manifestations of hostility, and then to its change. Demidov A.I., Fedoseev A.A. Fundamentals of Political Science. M., 1995, p. 92

Objectively, different forces united in the struggle against N.S. Khrushchev. Apparently, at that time the interests of at least three political groups, dissatisfied with the actions of Khrushchev, coincided. He was irritated by the Stalinists, who did not forgive him the open and harsh criticism of I.V. Stalin, the party apparatus, tired of the endless series of innovations in the management of the party and the country, and supporters of more radical, thoughtful and profound reforms in society, who see the fluctuations and limitations of Khrushchev's social transformations.

And yet, the main force that carried out the displacement of N.S. Khrushchev from all party and state posts, the party nomenclature became. "Palace coup" - this is how Academician G.А. Arbatov. The first secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, S.P. Pavlov. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. Materials for the biography. M., 1989.S. 72

The mechanism of organizing a conspiracy against N.S. Khrushchev was difficult enough. According to the testimony of a former member of the Politburo of the Central Committee G.I. Voronov, the resignation was being prepared for about a year. The historian R. Medvedev cites curious evidence that the question of removing Khrushchev was discussed in more detail by a group of members of the Presidium and the Central Committee in September, when they spent their holidays in the south. Invited by the first secretary of the Stavropol regional committee F.D. Kulakov for hunting in the area of \u200b\u200bLake Manych, these members of the Central Committee were less engaged in shooting or fishing than in political discussions. In the same place. P.42

Many believed and still believe that the conspiracy against N.S. Khrushchev was planned and carried out by the second secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L.I.Brezhnev. However, this is not quite true. Leonid Ilyich just happened to be in the right place at the right time. It was in the right place, because the post of the second secretary of the Central Committee allowed him to take the post of the First. Hosking D. History of the Soviet Union. M., 1996. P.72 Academician G.A. Arbatov, assuming that in a group, collective conspiracy, Brezhnev could have been one of three or four main organizers, he still assigns an active role to the first secretary of the Kharkov regional party committee N.V. Podgorny. According to R. Medvedev, an important figure in the conspiracy against Khrushchev could be N. G. Ignatov, who served as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, who developed hostile relations with Khrushchev. M.A. knew about the conspiracy and took an active part in it. Suslov, head of the ideological department of the CPSU Central Committee. Burlatsky F.M. Leaders and Counselors. M., 1990. С39

Almost all memoirists of the Kremlin coup agree that the soul of the conspiracy was A. N. Shelepin, who served as chairman of the Committee for Party and State Control, former Secretary of the Central Committee and a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. Alexander Nikolaevich himself, in his memoirs, denies his active role in preparing the dismissal of N.S. Khrushchev. Shelepin AN: "History is a harsh teacher" // Trud. 1991.14, 15 March. An extremely ambitious, strong-willed man, trained in the art of apparatus intrigue from his youth, he, when he was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, began to put together his own team. A.N. Shelepin himself contributed to the promotion and advancement of former Komsomol workers to the higher echelons of the party nomenclature. By the time of the coup, he had a real "shadow government". So, after leaving the post of Chairman of the KGB for the post of Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Committee for Party and State Control, Shelepin achieved the appointment of V.E. Sevenfold to its place. It was he and his department who were obliged to neutralize Khrushchev's personal protection. The head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR was also a former Komsomol worker, Shelepin's man, V. Tikunov. Zenkevich N. Secrets of the Outgoing Century. M., 1999. P.136 N. Mironov, the head of the department of administrative bodies of the CPSU Central Committee, who oversaw the army, the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the court and the prosecutor's office, belonged to the same Komsomol group. The informed persons claimed that the Minister of Defense of the USSR R.Ya. Malinovsky and Chief of the General Staff S.S. Turquoise. On the eve of the main events, those close to NS were sent on business trips abroad. Khrushchev, the editor of the Pravda newspaper P. Satyukov and the chairman of the State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting of the USSR M. Kharlamov. The latter was immediately replaced by an employee of the Central Committee N.N. Mesyatsev, former editor of “Komsomolskaya Pravda” D. Goryunov was appointed the head of TASS.

Thus, the group that prepared and carried out the displacement of N.S. Khrushchev, was quite numerous and had its supporters among high-ranking party workers, government officials, and the military. The serious plans of the "conspirators" were evidenced by the serious personnel transfers they carried out on the eve of the October 1964 events.

Did Nikita Sergeevich himself know about the upcoming events? If so, why did you not do anything to prevent your resignation? This question is most fully answered by the son of Khrushchev - Sergey. Khrushchev S.N. Nikita Khrushchev: crises and missiles. M., 1994.T.2. P.93 According to him, information about the conspiracy began to arrive long before the fateful day. The first to learn about him in the summer of 1964 was the daughter of Nikita Sergeevich - Rada, information about the conspiracy came to the Central Committee to the first assistant N.S. Khrushcheva G.T. Shuisky, who prudently hid it, was the last to learn about the upcoming events himself. The details of the upcoming conspiracy were told to him by the former head of security N.G. Ignatova V.I. Galyukov. He told Khrushchev's son about many suspicious details and facts. Everything indicated that a conspiracy was being prepared against the head of state. “If you put all these little things together, you get a suspicious picture. Obscurity, hints, one-on-one conversations with the secretaries of the regional committees, unexpected friendship with Shelepin and Semichastny, frequent calls to Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kirilenko ... ”- noted Galyukov. Sergei told his father about his meeting with Galyukov, a little later his information was documented in the presence of A.I. Mikoyan. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. Materials for the biography. M., 1989. S. 75 Khrushchev Jr. was surprised by the carelessness with which Nikita Sergeevich reacted to the information received. Moreover, attempts to verify its authenticity were extremely awkward: “we talked to Podgorny, he made fun of us,” “we talked with Vorobyov (secretary of the Krasnodar Regional Committee - IP), he completely denied everything”. According to S.N. Khrushchev, the main reason for such carelessness was that Nikita Sergeevich did not believe in the possibility of such a conspiracy, uniting such different people against him. “He behaved like all other charismatic leaders who deeply believed in their star,” concludes F.M. Burlatsky. Burlatsky F.M. Leaders and Counselors. M., 1990.S. 67

After a detailed acquaintance with the testimonies of contemporaries and direct participants in the October events of 1964, the question involuntarily arises: “What is the role of A.I. Mikoyan in these events? " It was to him that N.S. Khrushchev instructed to “sort out” the information of Galyukov, his opinion became decisive in assessing the information received. In our opinion, the point of view of F.M. Burlatsky on this issue: Mikoyan used Galyukov's message for his own purposes, just as Shelepin and Semichastny used the gullibility of the Khrushchev family. He not only did not pass on the minutes of the conversation to Nikita Sergeevich, but, probably, reported it in the most general terms. After the displacement of Khrushchev A.I. Mikoyan continued to hold a high post and left only because of old age, with honor and preservation of benefits for himself and his family.

On October 12, a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU began its work, at which the question of the resignation of N.S. Khrushchev. It took place behind closed doors. 22 people took part in its work. In addition to members and candidates for members of the Presidium, the Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Defense of the USSR R.Ya. Malinovsky, several regional committee secretaries. All members of the Central Committee present at the meeting spoke mainly of Khrushchev's mistakes. The meeting was carefully prepared: all members of the Central Committee, except A.I. Mikoyan, opposed N.S. Khrushchev united front.

Let's dwell on some of these performances. M.A. Suslov, for example, spoke of a gross violation of the norms of collegial leadership; that Khrushchev attributed all the good things to himself, and blamed the local authorities for everything bad; and spoke about his belittling of the role of the party and the Presidium of the Central Committee. D.S. Polyansky recalled outrageous cases of ostentation, such as the well-known "Ryazan affair" - a swindle by the secretary of the regional party committee Larionov who later shot himself to death. A.N. Kosygin accused Khrushchev of inciting some members of the Presidium against others, that he substituted his notes for the decisions of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, did not invite members of the Defense Council to inspect new military equipment; Kosygin was indignant at Khrushchev's incorrect treatment of some leaders of the communist parties in other countries. The most poignant were N.V. Podgorny, P.E. Shelesta, G.I. Voronova. The latter behaved very rudely, was not shy in expressions. According to a relative A.I. Mikoyan A. Arzumanyan, it was he who told NS Khrushchev: “You have no friends here!” This remark even provoked a rebuke from Grishin. "You are wrong," he objected, "we are all friends of Nikita Sergeevich." Burlatsky F.M. Leaders and Counselors. M., 1990. P.59 Particular activity in the criticism of NS. Khrushchev was shown by A.N. Shelepin and P.E. Shelest. In his memoirs A.N. Shelepin speaks extremely sparingly of his speech at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee. However, a comparative analysis of historical sources shows that the emphasis in his speech was not so much on criticism of mistakes in the domestic policy of N.S. Khrushchev, how many were in the nature of personal accusations against the First Secretary of the Central Committee and members of his family. The debate ended with a report by Leonid Brezhnev, who expressed full agreement with all the speakers and concluded that a personality cult of N.S. Khrushchev. The last word was taken by N.S. Khrushchev. In his short speech, he said: “You smeared me today g ... and I agree with that. What kind of cult am I? I am not going to speak at the Plenum of the Central Committee. Leaving the stage, I repeat that I am not going to fight you and will not throw mud at you, because we are like-minded people. I am now worried, but also happy: the period has come when the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee began to control the activities of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and speak in full voice. Today's meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee is a victory for the party. " Shelepin AN: "History is a harsh teacher" // Trud. 1991.14, 15 March.

The conspirators could celebrate victory. It was obvious - including for Khrushchev -

that the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which in June 1957 supported him and rejected the decision of the Presidium, this time will not be on his side. Nevertheless, among the 330 members and candidates for members of the Central Committee, Khrushchev could have more than a dozen supporters, and the discussion at the Plenum could also not be very smooth, and the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee tried to avoid this. They also tried to avoid unnecessary publicity: after the first day of the meeting, Shelepin's ally N.N. Months late in the evening appeared at the Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting and demanded from the watchman to let him in the building, trumping Brezhnev's order to appoint him to the post of chairman of the Committee. With the help of bodyguards - KGB officers, he removed the watchman from his path and asked the duty officer only one question: "Where are the buttons here that turn off all radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union and abroad?" He stayed in the office all night, guarding those same buttons.

So, Khrushchev was dismissed and dismissed. He was just tired, so he left without a fight. He still couldn't win. In 1964, this was not possible. “He was not supported by either the apparatus, or the army, or the KGB — the real participants in the performance; neither the people, he was given a place in the auditorium, fenced off from the stage by a deep orchestra pit, ”wrote S.N. Khrushchev in his book about his father. Khrushchev S.N. Nikita Khrushchev: crises and missiles. M., 1994.T.2. P. 129

Time N.S. Khrushchev has passed.

Image copyright Getty Image caption Khrushchev was often deservedly criticized and ridiculed. But they were not afraid of him.

In 1964 I went "first time to first grade". The teacher immediately ordered to tell the parents that they should buy special paper and not wrap our primers in newspapers, because they might contain portraits of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev.

Photos of the leader and huge, two or three pages, speeches that few people read, did appear in the press almost every other day. He was an amateur to talk.

After a month and a half, Khrushchev ceased to be "dear Nikita Sergeevich", "faithful Leninist" and "outstanding figure of our time."

"Sorry for Nick," sighed the mother.

"He was a fool, the only thing that did good was threw Stalin out of the mausoleum," cut off the father.

Exactly half a century has passed since then.

Black and white ruler

The change in power is not a typical phenomenon for a totalitarian system. Of the seven leaders of the Soviet Union, only Khrushchev and Gorbachev did not leave for medical reasons.

The monument to Nikita Sergeevich at the Novodevichy cemetery by sculptor Ernst Neizvestny symbolically sculpted half of white and half of black marble.

Khrushchev did not surpass America in meat and milk. But under him, people began to live in separate apartments, follow the fashion, have massive vacations in the Crimea, buy household appliances, and some - and cars.

Practically everything that was done to them brought the USSR downright irreparable harm. It is impossible to find such that this insignificance would have contrived not to destroy Alexander Bushkov, writer

By the end of his reign, white bread disappeared from the shops. But for the first time, the Soviet state spent hard currency on grain purchases instead of letting its citizens starve to death.

Participation in the repressions of the 1930s and 40s, the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, the massacre in Novocherkassk, the "Rokotov and Faibyshenko case" and the post-Stalinist "thaw", the liberation of the GULAG prisoners, the rehabilitation of repressed peoples, passports for collective farmers and, more or less, decent pensions for citizens.

The Berlin and Caribbean crises, the famous "Khrushchev shoe" and the official rejection of the doctrine of the inevitability of wars, the only real reduction in military spending in all Soviet history, unprecedented openness to the world, a youth festival in 1957, the first foreign students and tourists, tours and records of foreign stars ...

Quite a little time will pass, and Manezh and corn will be forgotten. And people will live in his houses for a long time. The people freed by him ... Mikhail Romm, film director

The corn epic and a breakthrough into space. Harassment of Pasternak and the publication of "One Day in Ivan Denisovich".

Spreading of the creative intelligentsia, obscene language in the Manege, loud propaganda, self-cult and poetry evenings in the Polytechnic Museum, songs by Okudzhava, films by Chukhrai, Khutsiev, Klimov, Ryazanov, Gaidai.

All this is Khrushchev and his time.

Why was he removed?

Khrushchev believed that freedom is better than non-freedom, and he became enraged when people did not use freedom in the way he wanted. He then took steps towards emancipation and democratization, tried to introduce a change in the nomenklatura and "break up" the siloviki, then menacingly growled: "Keep in mind, we have not forgotten how to plant!"

We are doing well, comrades! Nikita Khrushchev

According to the estimates of people who knew Khrushchev intimately, he was perhaps the last person in the leadership of the USSR, convinced of the vitality of the ideals of communism and the possibility of building it.

He explained all the difficulties and failures with the imperfection of administrative structures and the negligence of the executors, whom he constantly strained and shaken up: he replaced the ministries with economic councils, divided the regional party committees into industrial and rural ones, was going to expel the Academy of Agricultural Sciences to the provinces - there is nothing to increase yields and milk yield on the capital's asphalt!

According to historians, Khrushchev signed his own verdict, intending to limit his tenure in party positions to three four-year terms, despite the fact that he did not even think to extend this to himself and the members of the Central Committee Presidium.

"If Nikita Sergeevich would have retired, we would have erected a golden monument to him," one of the participants in the coup, the secretary of the Central Committee Alexander Shelepin, later said to Khrushchev's son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei.

Khrushchev tirelessly searched for a magic link, grabbing at which, as it seemed to him, he could pull out the whole chain: virgin soil, corn, "big chemistry", popular squads, the idea of \u200b\u200bbuilding communism by 1980.

This is how we lived - we didn’t grieve, we often talked, or simply chatted, we were engaged in idle talk. From the poem of the anonymous author "Where did Nikita miscalculated?"

Subsequently, it will be called "voluntarism" and "subjectivism".

In Soviet times, a long "transport anecdote" arose. The train went and went, and stopped: the canvas in front was taken apart. Lenin shot the locomotive brigade, Stalin ordered to push the train with his hands, Brezhnev - to close the curtains tightly and sway rhythmically, saying "knock knock," Gorbachev - open the windows, let in fresh air, lean out and shout to the whole world: "We have no rails!" ...

For Nikita Sergeevich, folklore took the image of a dreamer-enthusiast who proposed to build an airship out of improvised means and fly away on it to a bright future.

Khrushchev was irritated by the constant boast and unrealizable promises. A dramatic gap has emerged between expectations and reality.

Film director Mikhail Romm explained Khrushchev's unpredictable decisions, verbosity and antics by getting rid of the years of oppressive fear he had experienced under Stalin.

"At some point, all the brakes refused, everything was decisive. He had such freedom, such an absence of any constraints, that, obviously, this state became dangerous - dangerous for all mankind, probably, he was painfully free Khrushchev, "wrote Romm.

Politicians are the same everywhere: they promise to build a bridge where there is no river Nikita Khrushchev

The conservatives were dissatisfied with democratization, the liberal intelligentsia and youth were dissatisfied with its inconsistency, the nomenclature was dissatisfied with burdensome bureaucratic innovations and arguments about social self-government and the impending withering away of the state, the military — with the reduction of the army, workers — with food difficulties, and collective farmers — with the destruction of personal subsidiary plots.

Ordinary people rebelled in Novocherkassk. At a meeting with the Second Secretary of the Central Committee, Frol Kozlov, students of the Higher Party School openly demanded that the principle of personnel turnover be applied from Khrushchev. Among the paratrooper officers, the KGB recorded conversations about the need to scatter letters of protest from planes during exercises.

The country is tired of the leader.

Secret kitchen

The events of October 13-14, 1964 formally fit into the framework of the CPSU Charter, but in fact had all the signs of a palace coup.

Khrushchev is a tough, eloquent, polemical representative of the system that raised him and in which he fully believes John F. Kennedy

The classic definition from the dictionary of Vladimir Dahl: "a conspiracy is the secret consent of many to act against the government; sedition, preparation for rebellion" implies secrecy and a minimum of traces.

It is not yet clear who played the key role: the "old" members of the leadership (Brezhnev, Podgorny, Suslov) or the "youth" (Shelepin, Semichastny, Polyansky).

Former Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR Gennady Voronov in his memoirs stated that "all this was being prepared for about a year," and "the threads were leading to Zavidovo, where Brezhnev usually hunted."

“In the list of Central Committee members, Brezhnev put“ pluses ”(who are ready to support him in the fight against Khrushchev) and“ minuses ”against each surname. Each was individually processed,” he wrote.

"Due to their secondary position in the party hierarchy, Shelepin and Semichastny did not have the opportunity to lead the opposition," says Doctor of Historical Sciences Andrei Artizov.

The former head of the Archives Administration under the President of Russia, Rudolf Pikhoya, on the contrary, believes that "Shelepin was the real coordinator and central figure of the action to remove Khrushchev," another thing is that the "young" lost in the first hours of the conspiracy.

Khrushchev, he is a shoemaker in questions of theory, he is an opponent of Marxism-Leninism, he is an enemy of the communist revolution, hidden and cunning, very veiled [...] No, he is not a fool. It reflected the mood of the vast majority Vyacheslav Molotov

In support of this position, the historian refers to the fact that Brezhnev and Podgorny on the eve of the decisive events were in Berlin and Chisinau, where the 15th anniversary of the GDR and the 40th anniversary of the Moldavian SSR were celebrated, and flew to Moscow only on October 11 and 12 at the call of the chairman KGB of Vladimir Semichastny.

According to the former first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU Nikolai Yegorychev, Semichastny allegedly actually threatened Brezhnev: "If you do not come, the plenum will take place without you. Draw conclusions from this."

It is known that for several months the key figures of the komplet discussed their plans with more or less frankness with the members of the Central Committee, primarily the first secretaries of large regional committees.

Anyone could tell Khrushchev, and everything was over. But the organizers took the risk, realizing that the opinion of the elite cannot be ignored, at least with its leading representatives the issue must be "ventilated."

It is known that the party boss of Ukraine Pyotr Shelest and the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR Nikolai Ignatov played an important role in the probing.

Shelest was the only one who left at least some written traces. His workbook for the summer and early fall of 1964 contains a number of entries of the same type: date - surname - "we talked about the case."

Father returned to Stalin all the time, he seemed to have been poisoned by Stalin, tried to erase him from himself, and Sergei Khrushchev could not

“Brezhnev and Podgorny had conversations with the secretaries of the Central Committees of the Union republics and other major organizations, up to the city committees. There was a conversation with [Defense Minister] Malinovsky, [Deputy Prime Minister] Kosygin. They also spoke with me. I agreed,” he modestly described his the role of Shelepin.

It is not known when exactly the dull grunt turned into a decision to act.

At meetings of the leadership in July-September, Khrushchev disparaged Brezhnev, Kosygin and Polyansky and hinted at major personnel changes in the near future.

According to Shelepin, "the last impetus" was the intention of Khrushchev to arrange another cardinal reorganization of the agricultural sector.

A number of researchers see a different reason: at the end of September, Ignatov's bodyguard Vasily Galyukov met with Khrushchev's son Sergei and told him about the conspiracy.

Khrushchev's further behavior is difficult to explain: on September 29, he went on vacation to Pitsunda and only instructed his closest colleague Anastas Mikoyan to talk to Galyukov.

On October 3, Mikoyan flew to the Caucasus and confirmed the information. However, even after that Nikita Sergeevich continued to swim and sunbathe, read materials for the plenum of the Central Committee on agriculture and received Japanese parliamentarians.

He, you will not refuse, possessed crushing pressure and peasant uncompromising stubbornness. His fight against Stalin is proof of this. The already dead and debunked leader of all peoples desperately resisted. However, Khrushchev threw Stalin out of the Mausoleum, uprooted his monuments throughout the country, erased his name from geographical maps, and was not afraid of the millions of murmurs of fans. Try to deny this person character! Vladimir Tendryakov, writer

On October 11, Khrushchev did the worst that could have been done under the circumstances: he called Polyansky, who remained "on the farm" in Moscow, said that he knew about intrigues against him, would soon return and show everyone Kuzka's mother. On the same day, Semichastny summoned Brezhnev and Podgorny to the capital, and on October 13 told Khrushchev that his comrades were expecting him at an emergency plenum of the Central Committee.

Khrushchev was outraged that someone was calling a plenum in his absence. Seven-chastny replied that the plane was already in the air.

Subsequently, the ex-head of the KGB said that Shelest had conveyed to him Brezhnev's request to arrange a plane crash for Khrushchev, but it should be borne in mind that he was subsequently offended by Brezhnev, so this statement must, as they say, be divided by two.

Conversation not to the point

The meeting of the Central Committee Presidium opened at about half past three and continued the next day. No transcripts were kept, there is only a working record made by the head of the General Department of the Central Committee, Vladimir Malin.

The presidential archives, where materials from the Politburo Special Folder were transferred in 1991, contains a 70-page document attributed to Polyansky. It contains a thorough analysis of Khrushchev's entire domestic and foreign policy, presented as a chain of continuous mistakes.

The Plenum was not a conspiracy, all statutory norms were observed. The members of the Central Committee for the first time in the Soviet history of the party boldly, in accordance with their convictions, went to the removal of the leader Nikolai Mesyatsev, a large party apparatus, a member of the Shelepin's group

However, at the meeting "Polyansky's report" was not read out, and Brezhnev and Suslov, judging by their speeches, were not familiar with him.

Since the report entered the General Department of the Central Committee only on October 21, some researchers believe that it was generally compiled retroactively.

True, Semichastny argued that the document had been prepared ahead of time and was secretly typed at home by "two old KGB typists." His words are indirectly confirmed by the fact that the copy stored in the President's Archives is well-designed and beautifully designed, but on an antediluvian typewriter with an apostrophe instead of a solid sign.

Judging by Malin's notes, the representatives of the "old guard", who immediately took the discussion into their own hands, tried to avoid a critical assessment of the situation in the country, reducing everything to the characteristics of the leader's character and work style.

The tone was set by the chairman Brezhnev, proposing to speak "about the situation in the Central Committee due to the non-party treatment of NS Khrushchev with his colleagues."

Khrushchev immediately asked for the floor, said that "I had not noticed before, and did not expect such a negative reaction," admitted that he "allowed irritability" and expressed a desire to work further, "as far as he could."

When he addressed those present: "like-minded friends", Voronov interrupted: "You have no friends here!" Mikoyan corrected: "We are all friends of Nikita Sergeevich here."

The next morning in the metro I was struck by the sight of people: yesterday they were calm, but now they became frightened and depressed. On the faces of all - the stamp of uncertainty and concern, as under Stalin. Who are they afraid of? After all, not Brezhnev and Kosygin, whom no one knows. It was clear: people who yesterday had little fear of the talkative fat man with his whims and clownery were frightened today by a gloomy anonymous force that easily disposed of him, a force from which they did not expect anything good Mikhail Voslensky, historian

The main speaker, Suslov, spoke mainly about the insults of the nomenklatura: "The situation in the Presidium is abnormal, it is almost impossible to express a different opinion, you treat the workers insultingly, everything positive is attributed to Khrushchev, shortcomings are attributed to the regional committees."

The rest spoke in the same spirit: "reorganization - we just sit on it", "you forbid to travel to the regions", "the role of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee is belittled", "they fell ill with megalomania", "became rude."

Only Shelepin mentioned the situation in the economy and the Cuban missile crisis.

Polyansky was the first to say the words: "You must resign from all posts." The members of the Presidium, one after another, began to call for "granting the request," although Khrushchev had not asked for anything yet.

Mikoyan proposed "to give Nikita Sergeevich the opportunity to correct his mistakes," but did not argue with the majority further: "I said what I thought, I agree with the proposals."

Khrushchev gave in: "I can't fight you. I'm not asking for your mercy - the issue has been resolved. Now you have to deal with it."

Brezhnev proposed Podgorny for the post of head of the party, he refused in favor of Brezhnev.

In fact, members of the Central Committee were already sitting in the Kremlin's Catherine Hall, waiting for the end of the Presidium meeting.

After Suslov's speech, shouts were heard from the audience: "Do not open the debate!" They voted unanimously, and concluded the historic event with exclamations: "Long live our mighty Leninist party!"

The change of power was announced to Soviet citizens only on the evening of October 16. The leaders of the socialist countries were personally informed by Brezhnev by telephone. The world learned about the incident from the "special-purpose journalist" Victor Louis, a Soviet citizen who lived in Moscow, but worked exclusively with the Western press.

When I die, my deeds will be put on the scales. Evil one bowl, good one on the other, and, I hope, good will outweigh Nikita Khrushchev

There were no "closed letters" for the communists. The directive to the Soviet ambassadors spoke of the continuity of the course and emphasized that "Comrade Khrushchev continues to remain a member of the CPSU."

The former leader was given a pension of 500 rubles a month and was actually isolated in a state dacha near Moscow, where he lived until his death on September 11, 1971.

Khrushchev worked in the garden and dictated about 300 hours of memories to a tape recorder.

At a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee on October 14, 1964, he told his former comrades-in-arms that the ability to remove a leader without blood was the main achievement of his life: “I’m glad - at last the party has grown and can control any person. Gathered together and smeared g ... m, but I cannot argue ".

The post-war political was stable. Until 1991, anything changed very rarely. The people soon got used to the emerging state of affairs, its best representatives happily carried portraits of the new leaders in Red Square during the May and November demonstrations, and those that are also good, but worse, did the same thing at the same time in other cities, regional centers, villages. and villages. The overthrown or deceased party and state leaders (except for Lenin) were forgotten almost instantly, even jokes about them were stopped. Outstanding theoretical works were no longer studied in schools, technical schools and institutes - their place was taken by the books of the new secretaries general, with approximately the same content. A certain exception was the politician who overthrew Stalin's authority in order to take his place in the minds and souls.

Unique case

He really became an exception from all party leaders, not only before, but also after himself. Khrushchev's bloodless and quiet resignation, without a solemn funeral and revelations, passed almost instantly and looked like a well-prepared conspiracy. In a sense, she was like that, but by the standards of the CPSU Charter, all moral and ethical standards were observed. Everything happened quite democratically, albeit with a fully justified admixture of centralism. An extraordinary plenum met, discussed the behavior of a comrade, condemned some of his shortcomings and came to the conclusion that it was necessary to replace him in a leading position. As they wrote then in the protocols, "they listened and decided." Of course, in Soviet realities, this case became unique, like the Khrushchev era itself with all the miracles and crimes that occurred in it. All previous and subsequent general secretaries were solemnly taken to the Kremlin necropolis - their final resting place - on gun carriages, except for Gorbachev, of course. First, because Mikhail Sergeyevich is still alive, and secondly, he left his post not because of a conspiracy, but in connection with the abolition of his post as such. And thirdly, he and Nikita Sergeevich were somehow similar. Another unique case, but not about it now.

First try

Khrushchev's resignation, which occurred in October 1964, happened in a sense on the second attempt. Almost seven years before this fateful event for the country, three members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, later called an "anti-party group", namely Kaganovich, Molotov and Malenkov, initiated the process of removing the first secretary from power. Considering that in fact there were four of them (in order to get out of the situation, another conspirator, Shepilov, was declared simply "joined"), then everything also happened in accordance with the party charter. I had to take non-standard measures. Members of the Central Committee were urgently transported to Moscow for the plenum from all over the country by military aircraft, using high-speed MiG interceptors (training "twin" UTI) and bombers. Defense Minister GK Zhukov provided invaluable assistance (without her, Khrushchev's resignation would have taken place back in 1957). The "Stalinist guards" were neutralized: they were expelled first from the Presidium, then from the Central Committee, and in 1962 they were completely expelled from the CPSU. They could have shot, but nothing happened.

Prerequisites

The dismissal of Khrushchev in 1964 was crowned with success not only because the action was well prepared, but also because it suited almost everyone. The claims made at the October Plenum, with all their party lobbying bias, cannot be called unfair. A catastrophic failure was felt in almost all strategically important areas of politics and economics. The welfare of the broad working masses was deteriorating, bold experiments in the defense sphere led to the half-life of the army and navy, the collective farms languished, becoming "vice versa millionaires", the prestige in the international arena fell. The reasons for Khrushchev's resignation were numerous, and she herself became inevitable. The people perceived the change of power with quiet glee, the downsized officers rubbed their hands gloatingly, art workers who received laureate badges in Stalin's times welcomed the manifestation of party democracy. Tired of sowing corn, collective farmers of all climatic zones did not expect miracles from the new secretary general, but vaguely hoped for the best. In general, after the resignation of Khrushchev, there was no popular unrest.

Achievements of Nikita Sergeevich

For the sake of justice, one cannot fail to mention the bright deeds that the removed first secretary managed to accomplish during the years of his reign.

First, a number of events were held in the country, marking a departure from the darkly authoritarian practices of the Stalinist era. They were generally called a return to Lenin's principles of leadership, but in reality they consisted of the demolition of almost all the numerous monuments (except for the one in Gori), permission to print some literature exposing tyranny, and the separation of the party line from the personal qualities of the character of the deceased in 1953. the leader.

Secondly, the collective farmers were finally given passports, formally ranking them in the category of full citizens of the USSR. This by no means meant freedom to choose a place of residence, but some loopholes still appeared.

Thirdly, in a matter of a decade, a breakthrough was made in housing construction. Millions of square meters were rented out annually, but despite such large-scale achievements, there were still not enough apartments. The cities began to "swell" from the former collective farmers who came to them (see the previous point). The dwelling was cramped and uncomfortable, but the “Khrushchevs” seemed to their then inhabitants to be skyscrapers symbolizing new, modern trends.

Fourth, space and space again. The first and best were all Soviet missiles. The flights of Gagarin, Titov, Tereshkova, and before them the dogs Belka, Strelka and Zvezdochka - all this aroused great enthusiasm. In addition, these achievements were directly related to defense capability. they were proud of the country in which they lived, although there were not as many reasons for this as they wanted.

There were other bright pages during the Khrushchev period, but they were not so significant. Millions of political prisoners were freed, but after leaving the camps, they soon became convinced that now it is better to keep their tongues shut. It's safer this way.

Thaw

Today this phenomenon evokes only positive associations. It seems to our contemporaries that in those years the country rose from a long winter sleep, like a mighty bear. Brooks murmured, whispering words of truth about the horrors of Stalinism and the gulag camps, the sonorous voices of poets sounded at the Pushkin monument, the dudes proudly shook their lush hairstyles and started dancing rock and roll. Approximately the same picture is depicted by modern films shot on the theme of the fifties and sixties. Alas, this was not the case. Even the rehabilitated and released political prisoners remained deprived. Housing space was not enough for "normal", that is, citizens who were not in prison.

And there was one more circumstance, important for its psychological nature. Even those who suffered from Stalin's cruelty often remained his admirers. They could not come to terms with the rudeness shown when overthrowing their idol. There was a pun about the cult, which, of course, was, but also about the personality, which also took place. The hint was a low estimate of the overthrower and his own guilt in the repression.

The Stalinists made up a significant part of those who were dissatisfied with Khrushchev's policy, and they perceived his removal from power as a just retribution.

Discontent of the people

In the early sixties, the economic situation began to deteriorate. There were many reasons for this. Crop failures persecuted the collective farms, which lost many millions of workers who worked at city construction sites and factories. The measures taken in the form of raising taxes on trees and livestock led to very disastrous consequences: mass logging and "letting go" of the livestock.

Believers have experienced unprecedented and most monstrous persecutions after the years of the “red terror”. Khrushchev's activities in this direction can be described as barbaric. Repeatedly forcible closings of churches and monasteries led to bloodshed.

The "polytechnic" reform of the school was carried out extremely unsuccessfully and illiterately. It was canceled only in 1966, and the consequences were lasting.

In addition, in 1957, the state stopped paying on bonds that had been forcibly imposed on workers for more than three decades. Today it would be called a default.

There were many reasons for dissatisfaction, including the growth of norms in production, accompanied by a decrease in prices coupled with an increase in food prices. And the patience of the people could not stand it: unrest began, the most famous of which were the Novocherkassk events. The workers were shot in the squares, the survivors were caught, tried and sentenced to the same extreme measure. A natural question arose among people: why did Khrushchev condemn and why is he better?

The next victim is the Armed Forces of the USSR

In the second half of the fifties, the Soviet Army underwent a massive, destructive and devastating attack. No, it was not NATO troops or the Americans with their hydrogen bombs that carried it out. The USSR lost 1.3 million troops in a completely peaceful environment. Having gone through the war, having become professionals and who know nothing else but how to serve the Motherland, the soldiers ended up on the street - they were reduced. The characterization of Khrushchev, given by them, could become the subject of linguistic research, but the censorship would not allow publishing such a treatise. As for the fleet, there is a special conversation here. All large-tonnage ships that ensure the stability of naval formations, especially battleships, were simply cut into scrap metal. The strategically important bases in China and Finland were mediocre and useless, the troops left Austria. It is unlikely that external aggression would have done as much harm as Khrushchev's "defense" activities. Opponents of such an opinion may object, they say, overseas strategists were afraid of our missiles. Alas, they began to develop them even under Stalin.

By the way, the First did not spare his savior from the "anti-party clique" either. Zhukov was released from his ministerial post, removed from the Presidium of the Central Committee and sent to Odessa to command the district.

"Concentrated in my hands ..."

Yes, this very phrase from Lenin's political testament is quite applicable to the fighter against the Stalinist cult. In 1958, Nikita Khrushchev became chairman of the Council of Ministers, and he no longer had enough party power. Leadership methods, positioned as "Leninist", virtually did not allow the possibility of expressing opinions that did not coincide with the general line. And its source was the mouth of the first secretary. For all his authoritarianism, JV Stalin often listened to objections, especially if they came from people who know their business. Even in the most tragic years, the "tyrant" could change his decision if he was proven wrong. Khrushchev was always the first to express his position and perceived every objection as a personal insult. Moreover, in keeping with the best communist traditions, he considered himself a man who knew everything from technology to art. Everyone knows the case in the Manezh, when avant-garde artists fell victim to the attacks of the "party leader" who fell into a rage. Trials were held in the country on the cases of disgraced writers, sculptors were reproached with the spent bronze, which "is not enough for rockets." By the way, about them. About what Khrushchev was a specialist in the field of rocketry, eloquently speaks of his proposal to VA Sudets, the creator of the Dvina air defense system (S-75), to shove a complex for himself ... Well, in general, further away. It was in 1963 in Kubinka, at the training ground.

Khrushchev diplomat

Everyone knows how NS Khrushchev knocked his boot on the podium, even today's schoolchildren know at least something, but they heard about it. No less popular is the phrase about Kuzka's mother, which the Soviet leader was going to show to the entire capitalist world, which caused difficulties for translators. These two quotes are the most famous, although the direct and open Nikita Sergeevich had a lot of them. But the main thing is not words, but deeds. For all the menacing statements, the USSR won few real strategic victories. The adventurous sending of missiles to Cuba was discovered, and a conflict began, which almost became the cause of the death of all mankind. The intervention in Hungary caused outrage even among the allies of the USSR. Supporting the "progressive" regimes in Africa, Latin America and Asia cost the poor Soviet budget extremely expensive and aimed not at achieving any goals useful for the country, but causing the greatest harm to Western countries. Khrushchev himself was most often the initiator of these undertakings. A politician differs from a statesman in that he thinks only of momentary interests. This is exactly how Crimea was presented to Ukraine, although at that time no one could have assumed that this decision would entail international consequences.

Coup mechanism

So what was Khrushchev like? A table in two columns, on the right of which would indicate his useful deeds, and on the left - harmful ones, would distinguish two features of his character. So on the tombstone, created by the irony of fate by Ernst Neizvestny, who was abused by him, black and white are combined. But this is all lyrics, but in fact Khrushchev's displacement occurred primarily because of his dissatisfaction with the party nomenclature. No one asked the people, nor the army, nor the rank-and-file members of the CPSU, everything was decided behind the scenes and, of course, in an atmosphere of secrecy.

The head of state was quietly relaxing in Sochi, arrogantly disregarding the warnings he had received about the conspiracy. When he was summoned to Moscow, he still hoped in vain to rectify the situation. There was no support, however. The State Security Committee, headed by A. N. Shelepin, sided with the conspirators, the army showed complete neutrality (the generals and marshals, obviously, did not forget the reforms and reductions). And there was no one else to count on. The resignation of Khrushchev passed in an ordinary clerical manner and without tragic events.

58-year-old Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, a member of the Presidium, led and carried out this "palace coup." Undoubtedly, this was a bold act: in case of failure, the consequences for the participants in the conspiracy could be the most dire. Brezhnev and Khrushchev were friends, but in a special way, in a party way. Equally warm were Nikita Sergeevich's relationship with Lavrenty Pavlovich. Yes, and a personal pensioner of Union significance treated Stalin very respectfully at one time. In the fall of 1964, the Khrushchev era ended.

Reaction

At first, the West was very wary of the change of the main Kremlin inhabitant. Politicians, prime ministers and presidents already dreamed of the ghost of "Uncle Joe" in a paramilitary jacket with his constant pipe. The resignation of Khrushchev could mean the re-stabilization of both the internal and the USSR. This, however, did not happen. Leonid Ilyich turned out to be quite a friendly leader, a supporter of the peaceful coexistence of the two systems, which, generally speaking, was perceived by orthodox communists as degeneration. At one time, the attitude towards Stalin greatly worsened relations with the Chinese comrades. However, even their most critical characterization of Khrushchev as a revisionist did not lead to an armed conflict, while under Brezhnev it nevertheless arose (on the Damansky Peninsula). The Czechoslovak events demonstrated a certain continuity in defending the achievements of socialism and evoked associations with Hungary in 1956, although not completely identical. Even later, in 1979, the war in Afghanistan confirmed the worst fears about the nature of world communism.

The reasons for Khrushchev's resignation consisted mainly not in the desire to change the vector of development, but in the desire of the party elite to preserve and expand their preferences.

The disgraced secretary himself spent the remaining time in sad thoughts, dictating to the tape recorder memoirs, in which he tried to justify his actions, and sometimes even repenting of them. For him, the removal from office ended relatively well.

At the October (1964) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, N.S. Khrushchev was dismissed for voluntarism and "for health reasons." Voluntarism was understood as the replacement of thoughtful collective decisions with the setting of tasks for which Khrushchev alone advocated, which were carried out exclusively by the method of administrative pressure and were often deliberately doomed to failure.

Occupying two posts - the first secretary of the Central Committee and the chairman of the government - Khrushchev tried to place people who were loyal to himself in key posts in the state. But his spontaneous, often ill-considered actions in domestic and foreign policy irritated both the apparatus and ordinary citizens. People were tired of the constant innovations that often canceled or replaced the decisions they just made. New initiatives in the reorganization of management, the structure of ministries and departments, agriculture, etc. were also perceived with fear. The slight increase in prices due to the denomination of the ruble caused a deep murmur among the people. The collective farmers could not rejoice at the cutting back of their household plots. His actions in foreign policy were perceived ambiguously, diplomats believed that Khrushchev's behavior could complicate the international situation of the Soviet Union. The top military leadership condemned the first secretary of the Central Committee for a sharp reduction in the army. The creative intelligentsia considered Khrushchev's measures in the democratization of cultural life to be completely insufficient, while in scientific circles they recalled the country's leader's threat to disperse the Academy of Sciences if it did not accept Lysenko's supporters. Dissatisfaction with Khrushchev also grew in the regions, whose leaders wanted a more predictable supreme leader in the country. Finally, people did not like the fact that the cult of one person began to appear to replace the cult of another - who was once subordinate to the first. The film "Dear Nikita Sergeevich" appeared on the screens of the country.

FROM ALL POSTS

In the spring and summer of 1964, secret negotiations between members of the Soviet leadership began with the aim of eliminating Khrushchev. At the head of the team that advocated the removal of the leader were L.I. Brezhnev, M.A. Suslov, A.N. Shelepin, N.V. Podgorny, V.E. Seven-chastny and others. With the departure of Khrushchev to rest in Pitsunda, secret consultations intensified. From the south, Khrushchev was summoned by telephone to a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, ostensibly to discuss agrarian issues. On October 12-13, 1964, the Presidium of the Central Committee demanded the resignation of Khrushchev. Suslov made a report against the first secretary. Khrushchev signed a declaration of resignation from all posts, which was approved on October 14. Khrushchev was removed from all posts and his political career ended with the title of "a pensioner of union significance." He moved to a dacha in the village of Petrovo-Dalnee near Moscow, where he sometimes worked at the site and dictated his memoirs to a tape recorder. Khrushchev died seven years after his resignation on September 11, 1971.

L.I. was elected as the first secretary of the party Central Committee. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers - A.N. Kosygin. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR remained until the end of 1965 A.I. Mikoyan, but then he was replaced by N.V. Podgorny. Brezhnev's coming to power meant the end of Khrushchev's innovations.

UNPREDICTABLE - DANGEROUS

USSR under Khrushchev: some personal impressions of the former British ambassador to Moscow, Sir F. Roberts, presented in a conversation with members of the UK-USSR Association in May 1986 (F. Roberts's words reflect, of course, the point of view of a Western diplomat who viewed the USSR as enemy during the Cold War).

“Khrushchev was a very sociable person, he loved to arrange receptions, attend them, he was always ready to devote time to us, Western ambassadors. During a big reception at the Kremlin, I was told that he had just made an offensive speech about Great Britain, and I intended to be very cold with him. But he came right up to me and told me not to be angry with him, that it was in his character to flare up so much, and continued to demonstrate our friendly relations in public ...

The Soviet people never really trusted Khrushchev. He returned many millions from Stalin's concentration camps, eliminated to a large extent the threat of arbitrary arrest and improved the living conditions of the Soviet people. He oversaw the great achievements of the Soviet Union in space exploration, starting with the satellite and Gagarin's flight, which, at least temporarily, allowed the Russians to outflank the Americans and gave him hope that the Soviet Union could catch up with the United States in other areas. He also turned the Soviet Union into a world power that played a major role in the third world. Unlike Stalin, he enjoyed visiting countries such as India, Indonesia and Egypt, as well as the United States and Western European countries. Without pretending, like Stalin, to theoretical superiority over Lenin, he realized the consequences of the emergence of nuclear power and abandoned the old dogma about the inevitability of war with capitalist countries in favor of "peaceful coexistence."

Unfortunately, this conviction did not prevent him from embarking on such provocative and risky ventures as the attempt to change the status of Berlin, as well as the Caribbean crisis ... His agricultural policy, which was based on the production of grain and the development of virgin lands in Kazakhstan, also was not crowned with success. As a result of all this, Khrushchev's associates got rid of such an unpredictable and therefore dangerous leader in 1964 ...

[Khrushchev] lacked Stalin's toughness and elementary discretion. All his efforts aimed at improving the life of the Soviet people did not win their universal respect. He had to back down too often after risky ventures, and usually, skillful management was not enough to calm his colleagues ... "

WHO REPLACED?

“Unlike Stalin or Khrushchev, Brezhnev did not have vivid personal characteristics. It is difficult to call him a major political figure. He was a man of the apparatus and essentially a servant of the apparatus.

... In everyday life, he was a kind person, in my opinion. Politically - it is unlikely ... He lacked education, culture, intelligence in general. In Turgenev's times he would have been a good landowner with a large hospitable house ... "

Journalist, employee of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1963-1972. A.E. Bovin about L.I. Brezhnev

“Of course, now the question may arise: if it was clear that decisions were being made that did not meet the interests of the country, then why did the Politburo and the Central Committee not take other decisions that would actually meet the interests of the state and the people?

It should be borne in mind that there was a certain decision-making mechanism. I can cite facts to support this thesis. Not only me, but also some other members of the Politburo rightly pointed out that heavy industry and gigantic construction projects absorb colossal funds, and the industries producing consumer goods - food, clothing, footwear, etc., as well as services - are located in corral.

Isn't it time to make adjustments to our plans? - we asked.

Brezhnev was against it. The plans remained unchanged. The disproportion of these plans affected the situation up to the end of the 80s ... Or take, for example, the private farm of a collective farmer. In fact, it was destroyed. The peasants could not feed themselves ...

I did not have to observe that Brezhnev was deeply aware of the shortcomings and serious failures in the country's economy. ... He did not fully realize this. I took on faith the statements of employees who were directly responsible for a particular direction ... "

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in 1957-1985 A.A. Gromyko about L.I. Brezhnev